Central and Eastern European Labor Mobility to the EU15 Countries Before and After European Union Accession by Ortsey, Craig
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN LABOR MOBILITY TO THE EU15 
COUNTRIES BEFORE AND AFTER EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION 
 
 
Craig Ortsey 
 
 
Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of Political Science 
Indiana University 
May 2010 
 ii
Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Doctoral Committee 
 
       ______________________________ 
       Jacob Bielasiak, Ph.D., Chair 
 
 
 
       ______________________________ 
       Jeffrey Hart, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
       ______________________________ 
       Beate Sissenich, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
       ______________________________ 
       Patricia McManus, Ph.D., Sociology 
 
 
 
 
Date of Dissertation Defense: May 3, 2010
 iii 
Acknowledgements 
 
 Although there is only one person’s name on the front page of this dissertation, 
there would be no dissertation to attach that name to if many other people* had not 
provided professional, financial and personal support to that one person. First, I would 
like to extend my heartiest appreciation to my dissertation committee for their assistance, 
especially its chair, Jacob Bielasiak, who was present from the very beginning to the very 
end of the process. Jeffrey Hart, Patricia McManus, who graciously joined the committee 
at the last minute, and Beate Sissenich also supplied a great deal of guidance and helpful 
comments at various stages of the development of this project. Additionally, I would like 
to take this opportunity to thank the other IU-Bloomington faculty members who either 
served on my research committee in the past or otherwise strongly influenced this 
endeavor’s progress: George Alter, Kenneth Bickers, Norman Furniss, Clark Gibson, 
Owen Johnson, Burt Monroe, and the late John Williams. Finally, I would be remiss if I 
did not express my deep gratitude to the long-time graduate secretary of the Political 
Science department, Sharon Laroche, for her invaluable assistance in navigating the 
paperwork shoals of the Ph.D. program. 
 Many different individuals and institutions have been responsible for helping me 
finance my graduate education and dissertation. In Bloomington, the Department of 
Political Science afforded me with fee remissions and associate instructorships for part of 
my time there. The Russian and East European Institute’s summer language-acquisition 
program (SWSEEL) also granted me fee remissions and fellowships to study first-year 
Czech and Polish for one summer apiece. Additionally, the Student Academic Center and 
                                                 
*
 Please forgive me if I forget to mention anyone in these acknowledgements; any such omission is 
accidental and completely the fault of the author (as are any mistakes elsewhere in this document). 
 iv
its director Sharon Chertkoff funded a sizable portion of my time in graduate school. A 
Joyce Grant from the Lilly Foundation and a grant from the National Science Foundation 
were also instrumental in providing me with the necessary resources to complete my 
graduate training. In addition, the African-American Student Support Center’s tutoring 
program, along with various ones sponsored by the Student Academic Center, supplied 
me with financial assistance at important junctures during my graduate education. This 
same assertion could be made, with special thanks to their grader coordinator Paul 
Bickley, about the IUB Continuing Studies Program. I would also like to extend my 
appreciation to several Bloomington professors and graduates who hired me to work on 
their research projects at various times: Kenneth Bickers, Jeffrey Hart, Elinor Ostrom, 
Amanda Rose, and the late John Williams. The Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis made important computing and office resources available to me for several 
years of my graduate education as well. Finally, at the end of my time in Bloomington, 
the Preparing Future Faculty program granted me an academic year fellowship that 
initially allowed me to teach in the IPFW political science department. 
 I have also been fortunate to receive considerable financial support from 
numerous sources at IPFW as well. First, I would like to express my gratitude to its 
Department of Political Science, especially the department chair James Lutz, for 
employing me as a limited-term lecturer for several years. I would also like to give my 
deepest appreciation to Georgia Ulmschneider, whose recommendation permitted me to 
take a one-year visiting instructor position with the department during the 2008-2009 
academic year and granted me a large portion of the resources that I used to finish writing 
this dissertation. It is also with her dogged intervention that I have the opportunity to 
 v
occupy a continuing lecturer position with the department starting next academic year. 
The department-associated Mike Downs Center for Indiana Politics and its director 
Andrew Downs also generously afforded me a summer stipend after my PFF fellowship 
year. IPFW’s International Language and Cultural Studies Department and its chairs 
Laurie Corbin and Nancy Virtue have also supported my research on a few occasions, 
including endowing me with a grant that allowed me to purchase some supplies critical to 
this project’s completion. Lastly, I must gratefully recognize the assistance of a grant 
from IPFW’s Remnant Trust program for the same purpose.  
 On a much more personal note, I have received a vast amount of emotional 
support and friendship from a large group of people over the time that it has taken to 
complete my Ph.D. program. First of all, I want to recognize the encouragement of my 
fellow IUB political science graduate students, especially Brian Shoup and Derekh 
Cornwell. The former GPSO president, Rachel Anderson, also deserves my gratitude for 
providing me with a unique service opportunity during my time with that organization. 
My college friends, Adam, Id, Jason, Jean, Mike and Paul, have been with me every step 
of the way and greatly deserve the break that they will now get from hearing me discuss 
my dissertation. My colleagues in the IPFW political science department (Elliot Bartky, 
Andy Downs, Susan Hannah, Jim Lutz, Jamie Toole, Georgia Ulmschneider, and Mike 
Wolf) and the IPFW library have been very supportive; frankly, no one could ask for a 
better set of academic co-workers. This assertion is even truer for the secretary of the 
IPFW History and Political Science Departments, Barb Blauvelt. My other friends and 
colleagues in the IPFW and St. Francis communities whom I have come to know also 
deserve my warmest thanks for their encouragement: Troy Bassett, Esperanca Camara, 
 vi
Steve Carr, Chris Erickson, Glen Gendzel, Brad Gilbreath, Rachel Hile, Deb Huffman, 
Ann Livschiz, Lee Roberts, Suin Roberts, David Schuster, Jason Summers, Nancy 
Virtue, and Karla Zepeda. Finally, I must express my sincerest appreciation for the 
assistance of Mike Wolf and his wife Beth Kuebler-Wolf; without their constant support, 
this project would probably not have been completed. 
 Last, but most certainly not least, I want to acknowledge the encouragement and 
love that I have received from my family, to whom this dissertation is dedicated. 
 vii
Craig Ortsey 
 
Abstract: Central and Eastern European Labor Mobility to the EU15 Countries Before and After 
European Union Accession    
 
Despite the fact that European Union member-state politicians are committed by Treaty of Rome 
obligations to make intra-EU freedom of production factor movement a central goal of their 
economic development plans, many of those same politicians have reacted negatively in the past 
to the anticipated waves of poorer-country workers who they believe would shift residences once 
their economies have joined the EU. During the enlargement round of the 2000s, many EU15 
governments insisted upon and took advantage of derogations in the new member-states’ 
accession treaties that allowed the older members to delay the free movement of CEEC10 
workers for up to seven years. This action was taken despite several reputable studies sponsored 
by the European Commission and various think tanks that indicated that the size of CEEC10 
worker movement would be modest at most. The goal of this analysis is to test the plausibility of 
these forecasts and to determine whether the EU15 governments should have expended the 
political capital necessary to negotiate and implement this derogation. Using the generalized least 
squares statistical technique, this research establishes that while economic factors and certain 
policies do influence migration rates, network theory variables and the implementation of a free 
migration policy do not. This outcome implies that member states that wish to limit initial poor-
country worker migration to their economies would be better-served by channeling their efforts 
into EU cohesion policy and others that encourage intra-EU economic growth. It also suggests 
that the free worker migration derogation should be omitted from future accession treaties except 
perhaps as a psychological balm for receiver-country workers. Additionally, several migration 
projections using the GLS estimators (with no country-specific estimators) and an under-utilized 
technique called systems modeling are forecast here under a variety of policy conditions. The 
results of these projections indicate that the modest consensus forecasts conducted in the run-up 
to CEEC10 accession were reasonable and perhaps even a bit high. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Background--Worker mobility within the European Union (EU) has been a serious 
concern for EU policymakers and politicians from the earliest days of the organization. In 
fact, the group’s foundational document, the 1957 Treaty of Rome, asserted that a 
primary goal1 of the EU would be to guarantee the gradual, but eventual, unfettered 
movement of goods, services, capital and labor (the “four freedoms”) throughout Western 
Europe. Out of the four freedoms, the one that has encountered the most resistance in its 
implementation is that of labor. Generally, politicians know that they would experience 
many more political difficulties if they were to advocate an open market in labor2 in 
addition to that of goods and services. Their hope in pushing for the latter is that these 
politicians’ economies could enjoy the benefits of free trade without suffering the greater 
political costs of opening their labor markets to foreign workers (Schulze, 9-10, 211-214; 
Pritchett, 9, 12; Tsoukalis, 230-233). In the EU’s case, the political barriers to labor 
mobility were in fact among the last3 to be dismantled in the quest for a single market.  
 An enormous challenge to the concept of free worker mobility within the 
European Union was present during the preparations for the accession of eight CEE 
candidate countries in 2004 and two more4 in 2007. These potential member states were 
considerably poorer than even the poorest EU155 country; in fact, the economic gap 
between these countries and the rest of the EU was wider6 than had been the case in any 
earlier enlargement (Poole, 12-13; McCormick, 172-173). Many politicians and members 
of the public in the EU15 states were therefore quite concerned in the years immediately 
preceding these accessions that workers from the CEE states would try to access their 
labor markets as soon as they could take advantage of the EU’s policy of free mobility 
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(Kunz and Leinonen, 148; Maas, 40, 78-83). At first glance, this anxiety is not an 
unreasonable one, as neo-classical economic theories of migration posit that a primary 
determinant of this phenomenon is income differentials between the labor sender and 
receiver countries (Massey et. al. 1993, 434-435). In the end, this reservation led EU 
negotiators to include in every CEE accession treaty a derogation on the unfettered 
movement of workers from all of those countries. That clause allowed older member 
states to maintain limits on CEE workers for up to seven years after their homelands’ 
accession (van den Bogaert, 59-61). Although the governments of the CEE countries 
chafed at the perceived slight of being treated as second-class citizens within the EU, and 
because the derogations cost the EU15 delegations extensive political capital in their 
negotiation and implementation, negotiators for the CEE countries recognized that these 
limits7 were part of the price of admission and reluctantly consented to them (Dinan 
2005, 152, 574; Sedelmeier, 424; Rees, 220-222). The EU15 countries were not required 
to adopt the labor mobility derogation, but only three of them did not implement it for the 
2004 entrants (Gilpin et. al. 3; Lord Wright, 15) and only two did not8 for the 2007 new 
member states (BBC News 2007).  
 However, should the EU15 governments have concerned themselves with a flood 
of labor migrants from Central and Eastern Europe arriving on their doorsteps as soon as 
the ink was dry on the accession documents? Previous enlargements involving poorer 
European countries, most famously the southern enlargements of the 1980s, did not 
create such movements despite grave warnings to the contrary (Salt et. al., 43-48; van der 
Mei, 120-121; Tassinopoulos et. al., 23; Boeri and Brücker 2000, 119). In order to tamp 
down the expected large-scale worker movements from Southern Europe (Greece, Spain 
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and Portugal) to the rest of the EU, the organization spent a great deal of money on 
cohesion programs in these newly accessioned member states. The expenditure of these 
funds, which are designed to increase the level of prosperity in lagging areas to EU 
norms, is aligned with the arguments of neo-classical economic theories of migration that 
state that it may be prevented or limited by raising the average income of people in the 
donor areas (Massey et. al. 1993, 434-436). In addition, the same derogations for the free 
movement of labor that would be so disliked by the prospective CEE member-state 
governments were first applied to Greek, Spanish and Portuguese workers in the 1980s 
(Dinan 2005, 373-384; Poole, 25; R. King, 114; Bauer and Zimmermann, 44; Salt et. al., 
43). However, despite the continuing relative impoverishment9 of many places that 
receive cohesion money and the long-past expiration of these labor mobility derogations, 
worker movement from Southern Europe to the rest of the EU has been rather limited in 
scope (Dinan 2005, 382-383; Tassinopoulos et. al., 23).  
 Another piece of evidence that might have reduced the anxieties10 of these 
governments and their citizens on this score is the fact that most (although not all) of the 
academic and official EU predictions of CEE member-state labor mobility contend that 
the expected number of workers from these places should be relatively modest at worst, 
even in the long run (Salt et. al. 6-7; Boeri and Brücker 2005, 11). These studies are 
explored in considerable detail in the literature review, but it should be noted here that 
these reasonable estimates of worker movement failed to prevent many policymakers 
from speaking out against free CEE worker mobility. Finally, it is well-known in EU 
policymaking circles that less than two percent of European Union workers, including 
those from the poorer regions of the EU, work in member states other than where they are 
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citizens (Cremers and Donders, 11; Biffl, 159; Veil, 10; Lord Wright, 34; Krueger, 5-8). 
The European Commission is disappointed by this small figure11 because it indicates to 
them that there exist barriers to the free movement of workers12 that are not being 
adequately addressed (Schumacher; Tassinopoulos et. al., 21-25; Recchi, 71). The very 
existence of this small percentage13 despite the considerable policy pressures to produce a 
contrary result could have been an indication to EU15 politicians that the post-accession 
mass movement of CEE workers to their economies would be extremely unlikely.  
The Problem--In short, it seems that we have an interesting political-psychological 
question here: how can we explain the enormous concern that free CEE member-state 
labor mobility wrought in many EU15 countries when most of the reliable historical and 
predictive indicators are pointing in the opposite direction of these worries (Doyle et. al., 
8-9; Salt et. al., 46, 96)? However, there are two even more fascinating puzzles that are 
related to this one that must be tackled before it can be addressed. First, how many CEE 
workers could politicians in the EU15 governments have reasonably expected and can 
they expect to move in the future? This total includes not just the workers whose 
countries gained admittance to the EU in 2004, but also workers from the states that 
joined in 2007 and from countries that are likely to join in the decades to come. Second, 
what policies should EU politicians have adopted with reference to these workers in the 
past and what should they do for CEE countries that complete the accession process in 
the future? As has already been shown, the adoption of derogations on the question of 
free labor movement for CEE workers created considerable tension within the 
organization that may not have been worth their purported benefits. In short, it is these 
two basic questions that this research hopes to address in immense detail, and which 
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should permit it eventually to legitimately tackle the original question that begins this 
paragraph.  
 In order to evaluate the issue of what policies EU governments should adopt in 
relation to new member-state workers, this contribution must attempt to resolve some 
discrepancies in the literature concerning CEE worker mobility predictions and test a new 
combination of theories of migration that may lead to a more generalizable picture of this 
phenomenon. Many of the models of CEE labor migration forecast that between two and 
four percent of the total population of the ten prospective CEE countries would leave 
home and take up residence in the EU15 states in the long term (Krieger, 18; Boeri and 
Brücker 2005, 11). However, a considerable number of these projections state that a 
smaller (Dustmann et. al., 2003) or larger (Sinn et. al., 2001) number of CEE labor 
migrants should have been expected by the governments of the EU15 member states. 
Although one might expect there to be an array of values predicted for this movement 
given the nature of this exercise and the different methodologies in use here, a range 
whose scope stretches from under one to almost fifteen percent of the CEE states’ 
population requires some clarification. If this work can conclude using various data-
driven (not formal or hypothetical) models of this phenomenon that one particular set of 
projections is the most valid, it will have contributed something to the debate over CEE 
labor movement by demonstrating what the probability of mass migration of CEEC10 
workers was at the time of their accession and what the likelihood of future poorer-
country workers might be in the future.  
 The current research also aims to advance the broader literature on migration in 
addition to dealing with the specific question of CEE worker mobility. There are a 
 6
number of competing and complementary explanations for migration in the literature 
(Massey et. al. 1993; Massey et. al. 1998), but there is no single widely-accepted theory 
of why this important human behavior takes place. In constructing the present models of 
CEE labor migration, the complementarity and explanatory value of several migration 
theories are explored in some detail. A number of methodological tools are also utilized 
in this research, including statistical modeling, systems modeling and the case study 
method. This diversity of methodological tools should allow for stronger conclusions to 
be drawn about this study’s research questions and hopefully permit a more substantial 
addition to the literature to be made here. In all cases, these inferences are drawn from the 
outcomes of various data-driven, rather than formal, models of migration. 
Research Questions--Although parts of what this project wishes to explicate have been 
hinted at above, more formal statements of these research questions can be clustered into 
two groups here. 
Locus 1: How many workers, and what types of workers, could EU15 leaders have 
expected to take positions in their countries after the enlargements of the mid-2000s, 
given different conditions that could affect their mobility? How many labor migrants 
might the EU15 countries expect to receive from these new member states in the future? 
What are the dynamics of internal labor migration within the European Union? 
 
Locus 2: Given these figures and dynamics, what policies should EU member states 
develop individually and collectively to address the opportunities and difficulties 
presented by new streams of labor migration created by the accession of new member 
states? What policies are effective and ineffective at influencing how many workers 
change their country of residence?  
 
The first collection of research questions covers issues such as what political, economic 
and policy features of the CEEC10 drive workers from home to their new workplaces, 
where specifically from within that group of countries they would hail, and the barriers 
that might prevent these workers from moving. The relationships defined by this group of 
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questions are elucidated in explicit detail in a series of hypothesis statements in the 
statistical modeling sections of this research. In a later part of this contribution, these 
hypotheses also form the endoskeleton of the systems models’ structures. Many of these 
hypotheses are grounded in the neo-classical economic explanations for worker migration 
discussed in the literature review chapter of this research, although others are derived 
from historical-structural and network migration theories as well. The selection of 
economic theories of migration as a major source of testable hypotheses has been a 
common strategy in previous studies of these questions, but political and policy variables 
are added here to address Kupiszewski’s (2002, 637-638) criticism that non-economic 
determinants of migration have generally been ignored in the past. Additionally, the 
inclusion of political and policy variables helps to maintain this research’s focus on the 
political, rather than the strictly economic, features of labor migration. This approach 
follows from an assumption that EU member-state governments are able to create and 
implement policies that can encourage or discourage labor migrants from entering their 
economies. Politicians and their public policies must be able to limit or promote 
economic migration to their countries or else the second group of research questions 
would be moot. In short, exploring the kinds of policies and traits of governmental 
systems that accomplish these goals is a featured part of all facets of this modeling 
exercise. 
Chapter Overview--The background to the political and policy problems of CEE labor 
migration to the EU15 countries and thus the research questions that this dissertation 
explores has been fairly well explicated above. Therefore, the next step in this narrative is 
to elucidate the foundational assumptions upon which this contribution rests. In other 
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words, how does this study expect labor migrants, and the politicians and policymakers 
who must manage the consequences of their interstate movement, to react given the real-
world incentives and constraints that shape their perceptions of their economic, social and 
political environments? Hopefully, this section illuminates these matters in a satisfactory 
fashion as they guide much of the model construction and discussion that follows. 
Although a fuller examination of the methodological details of this study must wait until 
the appropriate empirical research chapters, the next portion of this chapter provides an 
outline of how it proceeds. A brief synopsis of the complete research endeavor and its 
broader implications to the discipline and the migration literature is then attempted. 
Finally, a preliminary taxonomy of modeling in political science is appended to this 
chapter as the setting for this study’s use of these powerful research tools. 
Operative Theoretical Expectations:  
Political and Behavioral Expectations--The above introductory comments and brief 
presentation of the research problem serve as the background which this study employs to 
approach its topic. In particular, this research takes as its initial standpoint that workers 
are not as mobile as many academics, politicians and members of the EU15 public seem 
to believe they are (Massey et. al. 1998, 8; Martin and Taylor, 97-98; Zolberg 1983, 239; 
but see Zelinsky, 223-225; Ghosh, 97). For example, the most basic version of the micro-
level neo-classical economic model of migration (Massey et. al. 1993, 434-436; Massey 
et. al. 1998, 18-21; Todaro, 141) asserts that an individual14 worker’s decision to change 
locations is directly related to his expected rate of return on this choice. This anticipated 
amount is a function of the average earnings differential between his home and 
destination countries, weighted by the migrant’s chances of finding employment in each 
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place and the likelihood of his deportation from the target country, and a constant term. 
This constant term denotes the total transaction costs of changing economies, including 
the non-economic and psychological barriers that disincentivize migration from one 
economy to another (Massey et. al. 1998, 20; Straubhaar 1993, 11-12).  
 A difficulty here, however, is that the final term in the migration decision 
equation is probably much larger than some politicians and researchers implicitly 
presume (Straubhaar 1986, 837-839). There appears to be a tendency among EU 
politicians and citizens to overestimate the pull factors15 that attract poorer member-state 
workers to their countries and make the same mistake with the push factors that impel 
them to leave home. Large-scale movements of workers do occur (Hatton and 
Williamson), and mobility is induced by items such as economic differences between 
countries, including in their unemployment and wage rates (Massey et. al. 1998, 123-
125), but massive shifts are created by much larger disparities than is commonly 
supposed. Language differences, skills incompatibilities, distance, and simple inertia 
(Lee, 51; Piore, 17; but see Brücker and Damelang, 9-11) are not insignificant barriers to 
movement, but they are systematically discounted in some politicians’ evaluations and 
policy analysts’ investigations of this phenomenon. Potential foreign labor migrants also 
have considerable psychological attachments to their home countries that must be 
overcome before they can be induced to move, a fact that is at times neglected by 
individuals who are concerned about the effects of worker migration. Additionally, there 
are institutional and bureaucratic barriers that make it costly to move from one location to 
another to take a job, even in an open labor market economy (Karras and Chiswick, 659; 
Wallace 2002, 614-617; Böhning, 36-37; Lucas, 87).  
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 A defense of the idea that workers are less itinerant than is sometimes presumed 
raises the related matter of why some members of the public and their politicians 
continue to operate as if poor-country workers are quite mobile. While some EU15 
politicians and their voters may sincerely believe that their economies are threatened by 
large-scale worker movement after the EU admits members from poorer parts of Europe, 
an argument could be made that these individuals might instead know that large-scale 
movements of poorer member-state workers are unlikely. However, the potential negative 
effects of mass migration are so great, especially for economically vulnerable host-
country workers, that even if the chances of these consequences happening are low, 
receiver-state citizens demand safeguards of their politicians anyway. In addition, the 
threat of intra-EU labor migration could be used by wealthy-country employers to extract 
wage concessions from their workers. If that menace were removed through the 
imposition of governmental limits on poor-country workers, EU15 employers would be 
unable to play that stratagem against their employees. Rational democratic politicians 
comprehend these pressures and, because they want to stay in office (Geddes, 7-8), would 
behave publicly as if they believed that foreign workers were easily mobile, even if they 
thought differently, and accede to their voters’ demands. Politicians who genuinely 
supported new member-state worker restrictions might also use an exaggerated domestic 
backlash threat as a bargaining tool in accession negotiations. In other words, EU 
politicians and their publics may be constrained by economic and political forces to act in 
ways that may be contrary to this situation’s reality, their beliefs, and perhaps the long-
term best interests of their countries (Zolberg 1983, 230-231, 244).  
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 Even taking these arguments into consideration, however, much of the political 
concern about CEE labor migration to the EU15 countries does not appear to be 
warranted since it seems to be based on the assumption that relatively small economic 
disparities between countries lead to massive interstate worker movements (Kupiszewski, 
642). The preliminary evidence cited in this chapter’s introductory comments seems to 
support the low worker mobility position, however. Multiple prior instances of the EU 
admitting poorer member states never created the level of worker migration16 that the 
relatively low consensus figure from prior studies (Boeri and Brücker 2005, 11) of this 
question of two to four percent of the CEE countries’ population would imply (Salt et. al., 
43-48). While it is true that the CEE states are poorer relative to the rest of the European 
Union than any previous enlargement countries were, the movement of four percent of 
one country’s population to another in peacetime (Kupiszewski, 630-633), even in the 
long run, would create considerable countervailing political pressures in the sender and 
receiver countries to limit that movement. It seems unlikely that EU15 member-state 
politicians would not react to this level of migration given the demands of their 
constituents in this area.  
 The question then becomes how this perspective affects the anticipated outcomes 
of this study and why that is important to the topic that is being explored here. The 
primary critical implication of the argument that individual workers are less mobile than 
sometimes believed is related to this issue’s importance to the policies of the European 
Union and its member states. Should this research’s contention that workers do not 
change locations easily be supported by the evidence, its conclusion will be that member-
state politicians should learn from past experience17 and not adopt restrictive policies 
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concerning future new member-state workers. That stated, the issue of CEE labor 
migration is likely to remain an important one for EU15 political figures for a long time 
to come because a considerable number of these politicians and members of their publics 
believe that a mass of CEE workers is currently swamping, or is likely in the near future 
to flood, their economies. It is therefore hoped that the results of the current research may 
shed some light18 on the actual state of affairs in EU labor mobility and influence how 
academics and others view intra-EU labor migration. In terms of EU politics and 
policymaking as a whole, the implications of this expectation, if it is indeed supported, 
are more mixed. On the one hand, the discovery of evidence that only a relatively small 
number of CEE workers are likely to leave for the rest of the EU would justify the EU’s 
overall position that worker mobility should be as free as it is for capital, goods and 
services. However, it would also mean that the EU’s efforts to spur member-state 
workers to sell their services in countries outside their own would need to be enhanced. 
Just having a large number of poorer-country employees join the common labor market, 
in other words, is not going to induce more EU citizens to labor in places outside their 
country of origin.  
Policymaking Expectations--Implicit in any discussion of EU labor migration 
policymaking are at least two important assumptions about how member-state 
policymakers behave concerning this issue and think about their ability to affect it on 
behalf of their constituents. The first conjecture is that EU member-state politicians adopt 
labor migration policies based in part on their anticipation of how many accession-
country workers will be attracted to their economies in the future. This reactive stance 
implies that EU member-state politicians utilize forecasts of labor migration, their 
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understanding of how their constituents would respond to these calculations, and other 
domestic and international political considerations to determine their positions on free 
labor mobility. In general, the more workers who are predicted to move, the greater the 
pressures that exist on current member-state politicians to shield their labor markets from 
new member-state workers. It can be argued that there is some behavioral and rhetorical 
evidence to justify this particular supposition. For instance, the fact that this issue and the 
same arguments and political pressures surrounding it arise every time the EU is 
negotiating with poorer potential member states but do not when wealthier states are 
negotiating for entry convinces numerous observers of European politics that this notion 
is reasonable. However, the matter then becomes how many workers should these 
politicians expect to move, a central question of interest to this research. 
 The second assumption that resides within the preceding narrative is that 
politicians can in fact create policies that impact the number of non-native workers who 
take jobs in their national economies. This proactive stand on the effectiveness of labor-
market policymaking is a natural one for politicians to take; after all, there would be little 
practical point in creating government policies that are unable to even affect the level of 
some social problem that the policies are meant to address. However, this notion is 
challenged by some studies (Doyle et. al., 11-12; Drew and Sriskandarajah; European 
Commission 2006, 14; Pritchett, 13-14) that assert, among other notions, that the 
underlying economic demand for labor in a market actually drives migration19 and that 
politicians are hamstrung in their efforts to limit it. Initially, this line of reasoning might 
seem quite economically persuasive because it leaves the determinants of migration up to 
impersonal supply and demand forces. From a politically pro-migration point of view, 
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this argument is credible since it would encourage governments to adopt an unfettered 
labor market as official policy. However, it is apparent that this idea is not totally correct 
due to the labor migrant “deflection effect” described in some detail20 in the literature 
review. On another but no less-important level, EU member-state politicians behave as if 
their policymaking influences the extent of labor migration to their countries. Even if the 
scholars who maintain that restrictive policymaking in this area is futile were completely 
correct, for domestic political reasons EU member-state politicians must continue to be 
seen as acting to limit the size and effects of labor migration on native workers. The 
operative question then becomes which policies are the most effective at achieving those 
goals, a matter on which this research comments at its overall conclusion. 
Plan of Action: 
A variety of investigative tools is utilized by the current study to explore the research 
questions posed in the introductory section. The purpose of this portion of this chapter is 
to give an initial indication of how these tools are utilized in this analysis; please see the 
appendix to this chapter for a background discussion of these methods. Statistical 
modeling, the case study method, and systems modeling are all utilized by this project to 
grant different perspectives on the questions surrounding the politics and policymaking of 
CEE labor mobility. 
Statistical Modeling--The first of these instruments is statistical modeling (in particular, 
time-series modeling of pooled cross-sectional data), which is employed here to create 
forecast estimators for projecting future CEE labor migration. This strategy, which has 
been employed by many previous studies of this question (e.g., Zaiceva; Boeri and 
Brücker 2000; Fertig), consists of three distinct steps. In the first phase of this process, a 
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statistical examination of the proposed determinants of labor migration is completed to 
both confirm which variables have statistically significant relationships with the 
dependent variable (change in migration rate) and to create estimators that are then used 
to calculate future worker flows in a later stage. Although much more is explicated about 
these matters in the statistical modeling chapter of this work, it is vital to assert that 
several models are created here using net migration rate as the dependent variable and a 
number of economic (e.g., differences in unemployment and GDP rates), political and 
policy (e.g., regime type, political instability, the adoption of free labor mobility between 
countries) concepts21 are utilized as independent variables. Two separate models, one 
using migration flow data from Southern Europe to Germany and another using the same 
type of data from a wider variety of countries to Germany over the same time period (the 
1960s to just before CEEC8 accession in the mid-2000s), are formed to calculate the 
estimators that are necessary for the next phase of the process. This approach is 
somewhat different from how earlier scholars have addressed this question in terms of 
country and time period selection; in fact, this methodology represents a combination of 
tactics that have been exercised by the authors cited earlier in this paragraph and Bauer 
and Zimmermann (1999). Using a larger number of countries in the data set can avoid 
sample bias issues, but drawing exclusively on the history of Southern European 
emigration to forecast CEE emigration could lead to more accurate estimates of the latter 
phenomenon. Both strategies are pursued here in an attempt to obtain a variety of results 
and to allow for a direct comparison between the outcomes of both estimation strategies.  
 The second segment of the statistical forecasting procedure utilizes the estimators 
calculated in step one, along with assumptions about state policy choices and economic 
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convergence between Germany and the new CEE member states, to compute projected 
net migration rates from the latter to the former. Although much more information about 
this part of the process is presented in the statistical modeling chapter, it is critical to 
emphasize a few points about this stage here. First, every scholar working on the question 
of the magnitude and politics of future CEE labor migration is aware of the fact that their 
estimates of this behavior are problematic because of the double out-of-sample problem 
described more fully in the literature review discussion of previous studies of this 
phenomenon. Not only are these projections extrapolations of past observations into the 
future, they are based on data from countries outside of Central and Eastern Europe due 
to the short history of regularized movement between these places and EU member states. 
There are also considerable data problems (e.g., short time series, poor record-keeping) 
that plague these studies more generally. However, having some well-considered, 
reasonable estimates of labor migration is more useful than having none at all, even if 
they must be utilized with some caution. Secondly, the calculations in this step require 
the selection of estimators that permit high-quality projections of labor migration to be 
computed. As noted in the literature review, the proper choice of such estimators has 
been a matter of some controversy22 in these investigations (Brücker and Siliverstovs; 
Alvarez-Plata et. al., 35-38), so a few different kinds of estimators could be employed to 
investigate the effects that selection might have on this study’s results. One such 
estimator that is considered here is the country-specific fixed-effects estimator that Boeri 
and Brücker (2000, 120-121) adopt. This type of estimator is used to take into account 
factors that either remain constant or change very slowly over the course of the study 
(e.g., the relative level of development, historical ties, and distance between countries), 
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and can outperform many conventional estimators (Brücker and Siliverstovs, 735). 
Finally, the forecast models developed in the statistical modeling chapter allow this 
investigation to explore the possible effects of diverse future economic and political 
assumptions using policy choices and economic data related to the new CEE member 
states either collectively or individually. For instance, one can project CEE migration 
rates under several kinds of economic convergence conditions (high degree of GDP 
convergence versus low) or policy decisions (immediate versus delayed implementation 
of free labor mobility). A few different such scenarios are forecast for CEE migration to 
Germany in that chapter, a step which could both help set reasonable bounds for that 
migration and determine whether certain policy choices might be expected to work 
effectively or not.  
 The third and final part of this study’s statistical modeling involves taking the 
estimated net migration rate information calculated for each year of the forecasts and 
multiplying it by the population of the relevant CEE country. The collective results of 
these calculations represent the number of CEE workers and their dependents who move 
away from home for each year of the forecasts, which can then be aggregated to produce 
five, ten, twenty, or more-year projections of CEE migration. However, these figures 
only correspond to movement to Germany, the dominant migrant-receiving country in the 
EU15 prior to CEEC8 accession. In order to forecast migration levels for the entire 
EU15, one must know what percentage of CEE labor migrants who worked in the EU15 
member states as of a time close to CEEC8 accession chose Germany as their destination 
country. Fortunately, that information is available (Boeri and Brücker 2000, 126-128) and 
is used here to complete these projections. Of course, this strategy assumes that the 
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pattern of migration that existed before and after enlargement remains stable, a 
supposition that seems reasonable in light of the findings of network23 migration theory.  
Case Study Method--The second research tool employed to investigate CEE labor 
migration to the EU15 countries here is the case study method. Case studies can 
complement and supplement statistical and computational research methods by using 
natural language approaches to investigating the questions under study. These procedures 
can permit researchers the ability to examine events, concepts and policies that are 
difficult to quantify, exist in small amounts, or require thick description for the topic to 
be explored adequately (George and Bennett). These advantages of the case study method 
are exploited here through a brief examination of the UK as a migrant-receiver country in 
the EU15 member states and Poland as a CEEC10 migrant-sender country. In particular, 
this analysis searches for initial evidence of welfare or unemployment benefit 
exploitation among the workers of two countries that have constructed an important 
migration relationship over the past several years. The operative notion behind this 
examination is that if “social tourism” (van der Mei) does not seem to be taking place 
between these two countries that have such a deep-seated migration flow connection, 
then it is probably not taking place on a large scale elsewhere in the EU either, despite 
desperate warnings to the contrary prior to CEEC10 accession. Note that the case study 
method is perfect for addressing this matter given the small number of countries and short 
time period involved in this research. Obviously, one must be extremely cautious in 
generalizing the results of a single case study to a broader set of interstate relationships, 
but data availability and time series issues necessitate this small-scale approach. 
Additionally, conceptualizing social tourism into a variable that can be simply fit into a 
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statistical equation is an astoundingly difficult proposition; using natural language 
models, along with some numerical data, is almost certainly the best tactic for 
investigating this question. 
Systems Modeling--The final research instrument that is utilized in this study is a type of 
algorithmic modeling called systems modeling (Richmond; Sterman). Much more 
information about the theory and operation of systems analysis and systems modeling is 
provided in the systems modeling chapter, but it is worth noting at this time that the stock 
and flow architecture of systems modeling seems to dovetail well with the commonly 
used stock and flow language seen in migration studies (e.g., Salt et. al., 18-33, 45; 
Papademetriou, xvii-xx). Perhaps the best way to describe how the creation of systems 
models proceeds is to divide the process into three stages as is also done in the statistical 
modeling portion of this discussion. In the first stage, after the underlying framework of 
the systems model has been constructed using known relationships from prior studies of 
labor migration, the model is programmed employing past CEEC10-related data. The 
basic purpose of this step is to replicate previous CEEC10 migration to Germany, so the 
choice of estimators is less vital than being able to recreate earlier system behavior (as 
long as the estimator, data and relationship choices are defensible, of course). Essentially, 
researchers can be somewhat more confident in their models’ predictions for the future if 
they can reproduce the past behavior of their systems. 
 Just like with this study’s statistical modeling, a goal of the second step of its 
systems modeling is to forecast how many CEEC10 workers could be expected to take 
jobs in the German economy over their first few post-accession decades. Many of the 
variables and estimators that are utilized in this step, and in the first one as well, are 
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featured in and derived from the statistical models24 constructed in the relevant chapter. 
However, relationships and variables that are excluded from the statistical models for 
various reasons are parameterized in this stage of the process as well. Details concerning 
these factors, as well as the data and estimators utilized in the systems models, can be 
located in the appropriate chapter, but it can be safely argued here that these models 
should be able to create interesting conclusions about various features of CEEC10 labor 
migration. Clearly, the primary purpose of the second phase of the systems model 
construction and usage process is to estimate the future movement of CEEC10 workers to 
Germany over the first few decades after CEEC10 accession. However, since the basic 
systems model tracks the movement of people from one place to another directly and 
does not use net migration rate as a proxy, it is a relatively easy matter here to combine 
the statistical model development’s third step with its second one and convert the figures 
for migrants to Germany to migrants to the EU15 countries overall. 
 Finally, in the third stage of the systems model development process, some 
speculative experimentation involving the economic and policy parameters of this model 
can take place. Some parts of this process are similar to what is done with the statistical 
model (e.g., altering the economic convergence factor level, choosing different 
population change factors), but others are only possible due to the nature of systems 
modeling. For instance, this step must also feature some sensitivity analyses and stress 
tests to insure that the projections derived from these models are not dominated by one or 
a few particular variables. These tests should inspire confidence in the systems models’ 
forecasts and make it more valid to compare their results with those drawn from the 
purely statistical models. 
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 The only subject remaining in this section of the discussion is to determine the 
value that is added to this research by its inclusion of systems modeling. Although the 
systems modeling chapter explores this matter in more detail, a few points directly tied to 
the immediately preceding deliberations should be outlined here. First, systems modeling 
can be more intuitive than statistical modeling in that the former follows objects flowing 
between two areas of interest (CEEC10 workers from home to Germany and back, in this 
case). The latter, however, utilizes net migration rate25 as its dependent variable; that 
figure must then be converted to numbers of workers using the relevant population 
figures. In studying labor migration, this process is a bit longer and less instinctive than 
monitoring the movement of people directly. Another way in which systems modeling 
can supplement statistical modeling is that the systems models created by this research 
can explicitly add consideration of demographic variables to the procedure (i.e., age 
structure and population information can be included here). This inclusion, and the 
feedback mechanisms that may accompany it, should prevent the sorts of problems that 
Kupiszewski (2002, 631-633) criticizes in previous CEE migration models. Finally, in 
addition to the relevant demographic characteristics, the systems model developed in this 
research allows one to consider the economic, educational and other attributes of the 
migrants under study. In the statistical models, the workers who move are 
undifferentiated from one another in the net migration rate figure. However, it could be 
interesting from a theoretical and policy point of view to consider what sorts of actions a 
government could take to encourage the “right” kinds of migrants to come to their 
economies. Those sorts of matters could not be addressed easily using only statistical 
 22
models; in short, systems modeling and statistical modeling can be quite complementary 
to one another if both are performed correctly. 
Outline of Subsequent Chapters--The second chapter of this dissertation starts with a 
comprehensive overview of the literature relevant to the topic of labor migration, 
including the broader theories of why people move, how other scholars have 
conceptualized this notion, and how this piece conceptualizes it. This material affords a 
good general setting for a concise but inclusive history of European labor migration over 
the past few centuries and description of EU labor migration policymaking over the last 
fifty years. Most importantly, this literature review contextualizes the different methods 
of forecasting labor migration and many specific past instances of when the CEE-EU15 
migration system has been the subject of academic study. 
 Chapters Three and Four comprise the original research portion of this 
dissertation, beginning with the statistical modeling section. After some introductory 
comments, the relationships that underlie, and the hypotheses that are tested by, the 
statistical models are explicated and defended using brief references to the relevant 
literature. The data and methods section follows this description, along with details about 
and justifications for the statistical models’ construction. The results of the statistical 
models employed to calculate the forecast estimators of net migration rate are then 
presented and discussed, after which the relevant projections of that rate to Germany and 
the EU15 countries are imparted and elucidated. Should the operative theoretical 
expectations of this research be correct, one would anticipate the discovery that relatively 
few CEEC10 workers would be expected to arrive in the post-accession EU15 
economies. At the end of this section, a brief case study about the potential for benefit 
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tourism in the Poland-UK free labor migration relationship is included to illuminate some 
of the features of the statistical models’ results. This case study places the migration rates 
projected by the statistical models into a context that should increase understanding of the 
dynamics of this process and permit investigation of questions that are less well-suited 
for statistical methods.  
 The fourth chapter of this research effort focuses on the construction, explication 
and results of various systems models of CEEC10-EU15 labor migration. These models 
are based on policy variable and assumption adjustments of one principal systems model 
that is described and defended thoroughly in this chapter. This section of the discussion 
opens with an exposition of the theory and utility of systems modeling as an analytical 
technique. Then, the relationships that comprise this systems model are described in 
detail; since large portions of the theory behind that model are the same as the statistical 
model defended in the preceding chapter, more attention is given here to the 
relationships, operationalizations and data that are unique to the systems model. The 
underlying causal loop diagram26 that elucidates important behaviors of the EU labor 
migration system is included and described in some detail in this section. Once the basic 
systems model has been constructed and supported, that model is used to reproduce the 
CEEC10-German labor migration systems behavior for as much of the period between 
the end of the Cold War and CEEC8 accession as possible. This step is necessary to 
ensure that this systems model is at least a reasonable facsimile of how this system 
behaved during the relevant period. The creation of several CEEC10 labor migration 
projections, including forecasts affected by policy and demographic shifts that are of 
interest to this research, follows this step. Sensitivity and surprise behavior tests are 
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utilized here as well, simply to ensure that the model holds up under a number of 
potentially adverse conditions and that no one variable has too much influence over the 
model’s results. The outcomes derived from these models are also discussed here; once 
again, these systems models should supplement the insights gained from the statistical 
models described in the prior chapter. Hopefully, these results are in accord with the 
expectation that a relatively small number of CEEC10 workers would be expected to shift 
economies after their countries’ EU accession. 
 The final chapter of this dissertation thoroughly explores the theoretical, political 
and policy implications of the previous chapters’ work. First, a brief appraisal is 
conducted of whether the hypotheses that guided the construction of the original models 
are supported, and it is ascertained whether this study can contribute to the current 
general migration literature debate on the overall determinants of migration. These results 
are also utilized to illuminate the narrower literature dispute about expectations of EU 
worker movement from the CEEC10 to the EU15 member states. That explication should 
permit this section to include comments on whether a motivational belief of this research, 
that EU politicians have been too concerned in the past with mass worker migration from 
poorer to richer EU regions, can be sustained. The results of this research are also used 
here to discuss the migration policy implications related to these findings. In other words, 
the effectiveness of what politicians attempt in order to influence the number and types of 
workers who come to their economies to find employment is reviewed. More specifically, 
this portion of the last chapter analyzes whether delaying free mobility for new member-
state workers or enacting some other policy choice might be a more effective way of 
protecting vulnerable EU15 workers from post-accession dislocation. Finally, a few 
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remarks concerning how labor migration and mobility fit into the discipline of political 
science and the future of this research agenda are made to conclude this chapter. 
Broader Implications of this Research and Chapter Conclusion: 
There are several theoretical and practical reasons why the consequences of this research 
could enhance the discipline of political science and its collective understanding of 
politics and public policy more generally. First, the outcomes of this study could provide 
evidence in favor of one or more theoretical perspectives on why workers leave their 
home countries for foreign economies to find employment there. Although constructing a 
unified theory of migration is beyond the remit of this project, any information that 
supports or discounts any of the various competing migration theories pushes the 
discipline forward in this area. This statement holds equally true for the differing 
forecasts of CEEC10 labor mobility that are described in the literature review. If this 
research can improve on these predictive models and clarify some of the disputes 
between them, then something important has been made available for further studies of 
CEE labor migration and other analyses related to this issue. 
 The matter of learning by public policy practitioners and academics is another 
place where this study might make some useful contributions to a greater understanding 
of the issues involved with this subject. Even though all of the CEEC10 economies are 
finally part of the EU, the question of how many and what kinds of future workers the 
EU15 member states could expect from these countries is not a settled one. Partially, this 
statement is true because labor mobility restrictions on these workers are still in force in 
many EU15 countries. The question of whether EU15 politicians should have enacted 
and continue to enforce these derogations given the state of knowledge about CEEC10 
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worker mobility at the relevant times is still an interesting one to consider. It is also 
necessary to investigate how other kinds of public policies (cohesion, social welfare, 
employment) may influence workers’ interstate migration decisions as well. The short 
case study that is part of this research should, at least to a limited extent, allow tentative 
conclusions to be reached on parts of this question. However, the primary reason why the 
issue of labor migration expectations from new member states is still a vital one is that 
the EU continues to plan further expansion into Eastern and Southern Europe (including 
perhaps Turkey someday). A common argument that one would expect to hear in 
opposition to future EU expansion is the idea that admitting ever-poorer states into the 
EU will encourage a horde of their workers to invade the labor markets of the wealthier 
EU countries. This action would be done at a time, so this claim would continue, when 
the EU is still processing the implications of the CEEC10 accessions. Any evidence 
concerning the likelihood of mass labor movement might be treated seriously by all sides 
of this controversy. In any event, interstate worker migration is likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future to be an important political issue in the EU and the developed world 
more generally. 
 Furthermore, incorporating systems modeling more firmly into the 
methodological practices of political science would represent an increase in the variety of 
tools utilized in the discipline for investigating important research questions. The 
introduction to the systems modeling chapter states extensively that political science has 
not exploited the features of this technique very much in recent years. Although this tool 
is not appropriate for every research question, there are some, like migration, for which 
systems modeling can be quite valuable if used in tandem with other techniques. 
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However, the methodological opportunity created by the present contribution is not 
simply a matter of emphasizing a neglected instrument in the political science toolbox. 
Using systems modeling and systems thinking in an attempt to better understand the 
dynamics of EU worker migration can engender a deeper appreciation of how these 
systems work in reality and could lead to more sophisticated quantitative and qualitative 
models and forecasts of this phenomenon. Systems modeling is also quite appropriate for 
studying labor migration given its structural compatibility with how workers move 
between countries. Finally, this investigation’s systems models should allow it to make a 
few interesting statements about the characteristics of CEEC10 labor migrants beyond 
their mere numbers, unlike what is generally possible with statistical models. 
 In addition to the other enhancements to the literature that this research wishes to 
create, there is one more task that it wants to accomplish through its successful 
conclusion. This goal is to bring the issues of labor mobility and migration closer to the 
center of political science research because of their noteworthy political and policy 
implications. As the background information provided by the first few paragraphs of this 
chapter indicates, the EU has struggled with the question of worker mobility since its 
inception. However, for the most part, the academic literature on labor mobility resides in 
the fields of economics, population science and history (Messina and Lahav). This state 
of affairs is unfortunate, because the mass movement of workers across state borders (or 
at least the perception of their large-scale movement) can have acute and pressing 
impacts27 on the receiving and sending countries’ political systems (Zimmermann 2005, 
6-12). Political scientists should pay much more attention to these issues than they do 
because of how labor mobility issues can impact the politics of the systems they study, 
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and any research that indicates how this phenomenon can be guided by public policy is 
useful in accomplishing that goal. Hopefully, this research can help to establish migration 
and labor mobility issues as more mainstream topics within the discipline. 
 It is worthwhile in concluding this discussion to spend a few moments assessing 
what has been accomplished here before transitioning into the literature review portion of 
this project. Some basic facts about the purposes of the European Union and how those 
principles affected the accession processes of ten Central and Eastern European countries 
in the 2000s begins this chapter. Included in this material is how CEE labor migration 
might have been expected to compare with what was observed after a similar EU 
enlargement in the 1980s and how previous studies of potential CEE migration had 
estimated the magnitude of this phenomenon. This background information creates the 
setting in which the research questions for this contribution are briefly explicated. Issues 
concerning the expectations of EU15 politicians, policymakers and publics about 
substantial CEEC10 labor movement after those countries’ EU accession are then 
described. An outline of the methods utilized by this study, which is supplemented by the 
appendix that immediately follows this paragraph, is offered as a preview for the 
information provided in the empirical research sections. The wider repercussions of this 
contribution and a summary of how this dissertation proceeds ends the body of this 
chapter. In conclusion, the literature review that comprises the next section advances this 
investigation by providing the theoretical and historical settings for the propositions that 
are closely examined in the empirical research chapters.  
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Appendix--Modeling in Political Science:  
Although different kinds of modeling (Lave and March) have been major research tools 
of social scientists for many decades, especially in political science since its post-World 
War II turn to behavioralism, there exists in the literature considerable terminology 
profusion and confusion28 concerning this topic. Therefore, an important task is to follow 
in the footsteps of Alker (1975, 144-145), who attempted a similar project for statistical 
modeling, and endeavor to formulate a general picture of how the different kinds of 
social science modeling are related to one another. This portrait is necessarily cursory, 
but hopefully complete, and emulates earlier efforts by Taber and Timpone (1996) and 
Saunders-Newton (2006). In order29 of increasing abstraction from and decreasing 
verisimilitude to the real world, the three broad modeling categories utilized here are 
naturalistic or natural language, computational or algorithmic, and analytical or 
mathematical modeling (Saunders-Newton, 175; Taber and Timpone, 43).  
Naturalistic Modeling--These representations of reality are those that are expressed in 
ordinary or academic language using the prose format. An evident advantage of this tool 
is that it is available to any literate person; as long as one can read at the appropriate 
level, the conclusions of these models are theoretically accessible to anyone. Very little 
specialized training is necessary to understand the format in which these models are 
expressed. However, as Fiorina (1975, 136-139) indicates, natural language models have 
considerable difficulties, including conceptual imprecision, ambiguities in the meanings 
of important terms, and the problem of camouflaging model assumptions. On the other 
hand, the in-depth, thick-description case studies that may be extremely useful in 
illustrating a particular theory’s implications are unavailable without using natural 
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language tools (Bates et. al. 2000, 696). These models include verbal theories, thought 
experiments, ethnographic studies, hermeneutics, analytic narratives and counterfactual 
experiments (Taber and Timpone, 43; Saunders-Newton, 175). Analytic narratives (Bates 
et. al. 2000, 696) are an attempt to improve and utilize theory in case studies, the in-depth 
exploration of a particular political, social, historical or economic event. Case studies 
(George and Bennett) are notorious for being atheoretical or impossible to generalize 
beyond the bounds of that particular instance, but analytic narratives30 are an effort to 
address these criticisms while still reaping the benefits of examining some case in 
considerable detail. Counterfactual experiments (Fearon; Taber and Timpone, 44) are 
designed to explore the proverbial “dog that didn’t bark”. In other words, they allow 
researchers to opine about what would have happened if some chain of events that did 
take place had not or what would have occurred if something that did not take place 
actually had. There are obviously major problems with “playing the what-if game” in the 
social sciences, just as there are with extrapolating past trends into the unknowable 
future, since there are few ways that one could confirm one’s assertions here. However, 
counterfactuals can be quite useful in clarifying a researcher’s thought processes and the 
implications of the hypotheses that she is considering.  
Analytical Modeling--At the other end of the verisimilitude-abstraction scale from natural 
language models are analytical or mathematical models. Many of the most respected, 
popular and versatile techniques in the social scientist’s methodological toolbox fall into 
this category, including statistical and time-series models, dynamic31 modeling, decision 
and game theory, and logic (Taber and Timpone, 43; Saunders-Newton, 175). Two of the 
more common types of dynamic modeling are difference (Huckfeldt et. al.) and 
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differential32 equation modeling. Although difference and differential equation modeling 
are not statistical, they are complementary to statistical modeling and can be used in 
tandem with statistical modeling to understand the dynamics of synchronic change 
(Huckfeldt et. al., 9-10). That strategy of utilizing both dynamic and statistical modeling 
has been implemented sometimes in the international relations literature, in fact (e.g., 
Gillespie and Zinnes). Since it would be impossible here to do justice to the wide variety 
of statistical and time series models that have been utilized in political science over the 
decades, it must be sufficient to the purposes being served in this discussion to note that 
these techniques have been employed in some pieces on migration (e.g., Hatton; Karras 
and Chiswick). Decision and game theory (Axelrod 1984) have also been used to study a 
wide variety of topics in political science and international relations.  
 Analytical models have several distinct advantages to recommend them, including 
clearly stated assumptions, improved conceptual precision, and an increased ability to 
communicate results between social scientists who use the same techniques but not 
necessarily the same natural languages (Taber and Timpone, 43). These benefits should 
allow researchers to build upon one another’s work and create the cumulative knowledge 
that it so important to the social sciences. However, there are substantial disadvantages to 
them that imply that they may not be appropriate for all research questions or for all 
investigators. One of the most important such problems is that analytical modeling 
requires a considerable up-front investment in learning how to understand, manipulate 
and apply these techniques. Statistics, game theory, formal modeling and dynamic 
modeling all involve studying specific techniques for considerable amounts of time in 
order to master them, and to the uninitiated these tools are impenetrable enigmas. The 
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greater criticism, however, originates from those academics who argue that these 
techniques abstract so far from the real world that their results are meaningless or are of 
miniscule importance (Elster; Green and Shapiro). In the end, what these methodological 
disputes seem to suggest is that the best research makes use of a combination of 
techniques that compensates for each tool’s weaknesses (George and Bennett, 37-57), a 
strategy that the current research pursues. 
Computational Modeling--Of great interest here is the category of models that occupies 
the middle ground between high verisimilitude and high abstraction, computational or 
algorithmic models. Although the deployment of this kind of modeling in the discipline 
dates back to at least the 1950s, and while it is true that it can be a very flexible and 
useful tool for investigating many political questions, computational modeling has not 
attracted as much research attention as its promoters feel that it should (Taber and 
Timpone, 41-42). This class of models includes neural and social network modeling, 
computer simulation, dynamic modeling (including systems modeling), and agent-based 
modeling (Taber and Timpone, 43, 46; Saunders-Newton, 175). Dynamic modeling has 
afforded scholars a productive vein of results and insights into political behavior, 
especially for certain international relations subjects. For instance, arms races have been 
examined extensively by numerous researchers over the past several decades (Brito and 
Intriligator; Gillespie et. al.; Taber and Timpone; Sanjian), particularly through the use of 
the Richardson (1960) arms race model33 that depicts weapons spending by two rivals 
using fairly simple differential equations (Taber and Timpone, 42). The wider peace and 
conflict studies literature has been enriched through applications of dynamic modeling 
(Mesjasz; Maxwell and Reuveny) as well, most notably in the fields of ethnic conflict 
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and genocide (Lustick et. al.; Bhavnani and Backer; Harff and Gurr; Schrodt and Gerner). 
Dynamic models have also been utilized to investigate and forecast (Choucri and 
Robinson; Harvey) global population, trade, environment and economic trends (Clark and 
Cole; Meadows et. al. 1972; World Bank 2006; Forrester 1973; Onishi; Widmaier; 
Pollins). International relations is not the only political science subfield that has exploited 
dynamic modeling techniques profitably, however. American politics scholars, especially 
those who study psephology (elections and voter behavior), have been able to gain 
considerable purchase on this subject through dynamic modeling (Gurian; Brunk; Carsey 
and Layman; Knoke and Macke; C. Brown; Mondak). Fields of study outside of political 
science, such as demography (Lee and Tuljapurkar; Rosero-Bixby and Casterline), have 
been able to take advantage of dynamic modeling as a research tool as well. Additionally, 
this specific algorithmic model has not been the only one that has been employed by 
political science researchers; for instance, Axelrod (1976) and Taber (1992) have 
illustrated the utility of cognitive mapping and expert system models in the discipline, 
respectively, and Stokman and Berveling (1998) have demonstrated that network 
modeling can be helpful in understanding policymaking processes. Finally, agent-based 
modeling, which is attempting to study how individuals act within a particular setting 
using computerized algorithms of people and their preferences (Bhavnani, 126-127; 
Bruun), has found some limited use in the social sciences (Axelrod 2006, 140). 
 The benefits of computational over natural language models are much the same as 
those of using analytical over natural language models (e.g., assumption clarity, 
conceptual and communication precision), but one might also contend that there are 
considerable advantages to using computational over analytical models as well (Taber 
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and Timpone, 43-46). First, computational (including systems) models can permit 
theoretical uncertainty to deliberately enter their construction where necessary. Since 
researchers rarely have perfect theoretical knowledge of the relationships between, and 
the values of, the variables under investigation, it can be valid for them to explicitly build 
that uncertainty into their models. Mathematical models have less flexibility to permit 
that strategy and generally must be radically simplified in their structure in order to be 
tractable, while computational models are less likely to suffer from those issues. In 
addition, computational models can be considered more versatile than analytical ones 
because some concepts that might be very difficult to express mathematically (such as an 
agent’s decision-making process or an arms race) may be written relatively simply as 
algorithms. Computational modeling also allows disparate theories and empirical results 
to be integrated into a single model relatively straightforwardly, which could be very 
helpful for the creation of a new theory or the testing of older, established ones. That 
testing could even include the creation of counterfactual cases to gain a deeper 
understanding of the phenomenon in question. Finally, and most importantly, this set of 
techniques permits researchers to investigate the complex political and behavioral 
processes behind what they observe. Since it is designed to allow this kind of inquiry, 
tracing the multifarious progressions by which political, economic and social events 
occur is easier with a tool like computational modeling than analytical modeling, which is 
less adept at this task.  
 However, computational modeling is not the perfect tool for all research questions 
and it has its own issues with which to contend (Taber and Timpone, 45-46). As is also 
true for analytical models, learning how to comprehend and generate results from 
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computational models requires considerable specialized training that may not be 
generally available to all researchers. It is clearly not impossible to become skilled at 
these techniques, but mastery of them does require a non-trivial outlay of time and effort. 
The quality of the results of computational models is also highly dependent on the 
assumptions that the researcher makes at the initiation of the process. If those 
assumptions are flawed or theoretically questionable, the outcomes of that work are also 
damaged or at least open to genuine question. However, perhaps the most serious 
problem that computational (including systems) models has is that their users have a 
difficult time testing the validity of their models and results. As the systems modeling 
background section discusses in some detail, there are few broadly accepted tests for 
verifying computational models. This lack of the equivalent of F-tests, t-tests and similar 
tools that statistical models possess opens up computational models to charges that they 
are little more than individual researchers’ flights of fancy. In the end, perhaps the only 
way to address these criticisms adequately is to use a combination of methodologies that 
compensates for the weaknesses of some techniques with strengths from others.  
Criticisms of All Modeling Techniques--Although this discussion has been reporting 
critiques of each of the three types of modeling techniques as it has progressed, it is also 
worthwhile to describe some broader criticisms of the modeling enterprise in political 
science more generally. For instance, Rodgers and his co-authors (1976, 395) remind 
social scientists that “a model is only a shadow of reality,” and that the real test of its 
utility resides in whether it helps scholars understand the real world better. Their 
conclusion is that many of the models (especially the global computational ones) that 
were in use at that time had serious structural or data problems, were deterministic or 
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untested, or gave spurious or marginal results, implying that model-builders should tone 
down their claims for what their models could demonstrate. Doran (1999) asserts that all 
models of future behavior (forecasts) are bound to fail because they almost always utilize 
linear assumptions for forthcoming events and lack a technique for predicting when the 
trend patterns under study will shift to a non-linear structure. Discontinuities in 
international relations (e.g., wars, financial crises) are inherently unpredictable, and there 
is no way that the inflection point between business as usual and the spiral to disaster can 
be foreseen. That basic fact does not imply that social scientists and policymakers should 
not try to understand the dynamics of normal and extraordinary times, make reasonable 
predictions about and plans for the future, or learn from past mistakes. However, it does 
mean that all such forecasts should be treated with extreme caution and that policymakers 
should always be ready for these predictions to be proven wrong by real-world events 
(Doran, 32-33, 36-37). Finally, Granato and Scioli (2004, 313-314) begin their piece by 
describing some frequent criticisms of three of the most common methodological tools 
from two of the three categories described above: formal models (they often dismiss or 
ignore important information about the topic under study); statistical models (they can 
lack solid theoretical foundation); and case studies (they tend to be overly focused on 
idiosyncratic details). What these authors then assert is that only by combining formal 
models with empirical tests, either statistical or case-study, can the accumulation of 
knowledge in the social sciences be achieved. In other words, only a careful combination 
of the advantages of different methodological techniques advances the discipline, a point 
with which this research concurs. 
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1
 It was much easier, however, for the Treaty of Rome signatories to establish this objective than it was for 
them to accomplish it; a full generation passed before virtually all of the final barriers on the movement of 
these factors of production were abolished with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on 
European Union) in 1993 (Dinan 2003, 26; Wood and Yeşilada, 57-60, 72-73). As it currently stands, 
Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome guarantees the free movement of workers, while Articles 52 through 58 
safeguard the right of establishment of self-employed workers (i.e., self-employed individuals can start 
businesses and otherwise work without handicap in all member states) and Article 59 secures the free 
movement of services (Salt et. al., 2-3).  
 
2
 Academic arguments in favor of free mobility of workers can be divided into two basic categories, 
philosophical (Carens; Ugur, 66-76; Lane, 134-141) and economic (Pritchett; Kapur and McHale; Hamilton 
and Whalley; Ugur, 76-83). For instance, restrictions on migration are illegitimate from a utilitarian 
perspective because although some workers may profit by having their jobs protected from an influx of 
outside competitors, the increased utility of the potential migrants and of the receiving-country social actors 
who benefit from migration generally outweigh those benefits to the protected workers (Carens, 263-264; 
Ugur, 66-67). From a Rawlsian (1971) point of view, limitations on migration are equally suspect because 
no one behind the veil of ignorance would choose to put themselves in a position where they would be 
unable to take advantage of the potential benefits of moving to another country for work (Carens, 255-262). 
Finally, libertarians’ invocation of private property rights to exclude migrants from enjoying the public 
goods benefits of living in wealthier countries fails because of the inherent tensions and conflicts that exist 
between the notions of private individual property rights and the ownership of public goods (Ugur, 68-69; 
Carens, 252-254). The economic argument in favor of free migration is fundamentally one of improving 
global economic efficiency and individual welfare (Hamilton and Whalley, 61-67; Ugur, 76-77). 
Essentially, labor flows from parts of the world that have too much of it to other parts that need it, reducing 
the costs of labor and thus increasing efficiency. At the same time, the workers themselves improve their 
lot by moving from places where they can gain relatively little from their labor investments to places where 
they can gain much more (thereby also improving overall efficiency). In fact, removing the impediments to 
the free mobility of workers would allegedly increase global efficiency by many times more than 
dismantling all of the remaining analogous barriers to trade (Hamilton and Whalley, 70-73; Pritchett, 33-
34). Although there are inherent problems with the comparison between barriers to trade and those to 
worker mobility (Pritchett, 33-34), just suggesting this contrast demonstrates how rarely these issues are 
explicitly linked in policy debates over these issues. 
 
3
 The incorporation of the Schengen Agreement (Uçarer 2007, 306-307; Rifkin, 198-199; Reid, 207-208) 
into EU law via the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam was designed to remove the last major hindrance to free 
worker mobility, the presence of constant customs and passport checks at intra-EU frontiers. However, 
Schengen’s implementation has been incomplete and slow, most notably in the opt-out countries (UK and 
Ireland) and the new Central and Eastern European (CEE) member states. For instance, only five of the 
original six European Economic Community (EEC) countries signed onto Schengen when it was first 
drafted outside of the European Community’s (EC) auspices in 1985 (Italy did not participate until 1990), 
and it took several years for most of the 2004 CEE entrants to put its provisions into effect (Staples, 111, 
114, 156, 165-174; McCormick, 160; Lungescu 2007). 
 
4
 Eight Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC8) joined the EU in May of 2004: Poland, Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Dinan 2005, 143-152). Two more 
states, Bulgaria and Romania, completed the enlargement process in January 2007 (Drew and 
Sriskandarajah). The CEEC10 member states are therefore the eight that joined the EU in 2004 plus 
Romania and Bulgaria; however, the AC10, another common abbreviation, refer to the ten EU member 
states (the CEEC8 plus Cyprus and Malta) that finished the accession process in 2004 (Dustmann et. al., 4). 
Several candidate countries (like Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia, and the western Balkans) are in various 
stages of this process but have not yet been given firm EU membership dates (Barnes and Barnes, 433-
436). This research focuses on labor mobility from the CEEC10 member states, although it may someday 
address it from these candidate countries also. 
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5
 A common shorthand for discussing matters related to the EU member states, especially statistical 
averages, is to use the number of countries in the organization at that time preceded by the appropriate 
acronym. Therefore, EU25 refers to the 2004 to 2006 array of member states, and EC9 describes the 
countries that were in the European Community between 1973 and 1981. In order of accession, the EU15 
members from 1995 to 2004 were as follows: Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Ireland, UK, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden (Wood and Yeşilada, 4). In 
January 2007, it became appropriate to use the acronym EU27 to describe the EU’s entire membership. 
Additionally, name changes for what is now known as the European Union have been relatively common in 
its short history. It is generally accepted that the EU had its start as the European Economic Community in 
1958, became the European Community in 1965, and only became the European Union in 1993 with 
Germany’s ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Dinan 2005, 7, Table 2.1, 40, Table 4.1, 99). This work is 
careful to employ the historically appropriate name at all times, but most commonly utilizes the terms 
European Union or EU when discussing the organization. A more loosely bound economic organization, 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) currently consists of only four members: Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. The first three of those countries have adopted many of the EU’s 
rules through their membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), an organization that promotes 
closer economic and political cooperation between its members that falls short of full EU membership 
(Dinan 2005, 137-141).  
 
6
 Furthermore, the economic and political situation facing the wealthy EU countries in 2004 was much 
more dire than that of the mid-1980s. First, Germany had not fully dealt with the economic ramifications of 
reunification; it was still heavily subsidizing its eastern Länder and had only limited funds to spare for 
other formerly Communist areas. France and Germany, the countries that had been the engines and 
underwriters of EU policy previously, were underperforming economically. Finally, Great Britain had 
decided to remain aloof from the most important EU projects of the preceding decades, especially monetary 
union (Poole, 33-36; Dinan 2005, 143-152). 
 
7
 In retaliation for so many EU15 countries taking advantage of the free movement derogation, and in 
compensation for the disruption that creating the new Schengen external frontier caused, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia adopted reciprocal restrictions on the labor migration ability of EU15 citizens whose 
governments had invoked the derogation (Maas, 81; Bijak et. al., 130). Additionally, because its labor 
market is so tiny, Malta was induced to take partial advantage of its transitional arrangements safeguard 
clause that limited the number of other EU workers who could be legally employed in that country 
(European Commission 2006, 4; van den Bogaert, 61). It should also be noted that all ten 2004 accession 
countries fully opened their labor markets to each other upon their accession and that Maltese and Cypriot 
workers are not subject to the EU15 countries’ worker mobility derogation (European Commission 2006, 4; 
Kunz and Leinonen, 148). 
 
8
 The United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden declined to adopt this derogation for the 2004 CEE new 
member states, while only Sweden and Finland refused to implement it for Bulgaria and Romania (Drew 
and Sriskandarajah).  
 
9
 These economically struggling areas include southern Italy, an area that has been part of the EU since its 
inception, and many of the industrial areas of the UK, a relatively wealthy country that has been an EU 
member since 1973. The program also has a reputation for squandering funds on projects of dubious value, 
even according to a World Bank report on this matter (Dinan 2005, 382-384). 
 
10
 Zolberg (1983, 239), for example, maintains that migration is an “exceptional phenomenon” given the 
many cultural, economic and policy barriers that exist against it. Fassmann and Hintermann (1998, 60) go 
so far as to call the fears of mass CEE labor movement to the EU15 countries “irrational and superficial.” 
 
11
 In fact, regional migration apparently decreased during the early part of the 1990s (a time when many EU 
leaders hoped that worker movement would greatly increase due to their implementation of the Single 
European Act and the  Maastricht Treaty) due to various economic problems (Lindley, 212).  
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12
 In response, the EU has created a number of schemes (such as LINGUA and EURES) that encourage EU 
workers to take jobs in fellow member-state countries. Programs to persuade EU students to study in other 
countries have proven to be somewhat more successful than those to promote worker mobility; for instance, 
the Erasmus/Socrates program has enabled more than a million European students to study outside their 
home countries (Maas, 112; Recchi, 71; Schumacher, 16-18).  
 
13
 As an aside, it seems ironic that so many EU15 member states have expended so much effort to cut off an 
expected deluge of CEE workers at the same time that the European Commission is desperately trying to 
encourage this behavior throughout the entire organization (European Union, 2006). 
 
14
 Although the models developed by this research are, like most of the others in the migration literature, 
inspired by micro-level neo-classical economic explanations of why individuals move from one place to 
another to seek work, they are not individual-level models of why that happens. That sort of data would be 
almost impossible to collect in large amounts, so this study must depend on aggregate-level GDP and per-
capita income differentials between sender and receiver countries to act as proxies for the individual-level 
income differences utilized by this theory. That practice is normal in the literature (e.g., Boeri and Brücker 
2000, 153; Fertig, 712; Zaiceva, 13) and should cause no problems here.  
 
15
 An important concept that appears throughout the labor migration literature is that of push and pull 
factors (Deutsche Bank Research, 16-17; Hailbronner, 16-17; Martin and Taylor, 98-102; Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 19-21; İberg, 23-25). Push factors are those that affect the supply of labor; in other words, 
conditions that induce migrants to pursue work outside their home countries. These items include high 
unemployment, low domestic wages, serious poverty, and intrastate conflict. Pull factors are the ones that 
attract migrants to specific host countries, including: high wages or a sufficiently large wage differential 
between the sender and receiver economies; a booming economy and the plentiful job opportunities that 
come with it; easily available housing; and a strong demand for labor due to a declining birth rate, 
economic reconstruction or a shift in how certain jobs are perceived by local workers. Although Zulauf 
(2001, 21) implies that push-pull factors are limited to behavioral approaches to migration when she 
describes push-pull models in sociological studies of migration, they appear in historical-structural models 
as well (Piore, 133-140). This point is revisited briefly in a later explication on the wider literature 
concerning why people engage in labor migration. 
 
16
 Indeed, it seems although the identity of the sources of these labor migrants changes over time (southern 
Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, the Central European countries), the overstated public worries about 
them has  invariably been the same (Massey et. al. 1998, 125; Tassinopoulos, et. al., 23). Apparently, there 
does not seem to be much learning taking place on the part of member-state politicians about what they and 
the citizens who they represent can realistically anticipate when new countries join the organization despite 
the long history of EU labor migration policy. 
 
17
 As a matter of fact, some early evidence on the size and effects of CEEC8 labor migration (Boeri and 
Brücker 2005, 14-16; BBC News 2006; Portes and French, 33; Gilpin et. al., 49) appears to bear out this 
assertion since there has been only a modest though measurable movement of these workers to the EU15 
countries that did not take advantage of the free mobility derogation. Additionally, the member states that 
foreswore this exemption were more economically successful in the first years after CEEC8 accession than 
those that adopted it (Economist 2006). 
 
18
 Another implication of this perspective is that it suggests that the initial values of some of the variables in 
the systems models that are designed to reproduce historical trends in migration are lower than might 
otherwise be assumed. (These historical patterns must be reproduced when projections are made to ensure 
that the model is plausible.) Note that there is an inherent check on the accuracy of this argument here in 
that if the past patterns of migration between the CEE and EU15 countries cannot be repeated and these 
values are the source of the discrepancy, they must be changed before the forecasting models are accepted. 
Second, and more importantly from a theoretical point of view, the feedback effects caused by migration 
can be explicitly taken into account by the systems models. In fact, feedback is a central tenet of systems 
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thinking, the theoretical basis of systems modeling, because it permits emergent properties to appear and 
counterintuitive conclusions to be found within a system. Additionally, systems modeling allows 
researchers to investigate both net and gross migration patterns if desired. These ideas are explicated in 
considerable detail later, but for now it is sufficient to state that factors that have been ignored in past 
studies of CEE labor migration are accounted for openly in the current study. 
 
19
 It should be noted that the European Commission report (2006, 14) is particularly explicit on this matter, 
stating that supply and demand factors for labor ultimately determine the number of people who move from 
member state to member state looking for work. In fact, it asserts that anti-free migration policies do not 
accomplish much other than delaying the onset of movement or distorting the natural migration patterns 
that would have been observed without the presence of these policies. 
 
20
 After CEEC8 accession in 2004, the varying EU15 member-state policy responses to this event created 
quite different migration patterns from what was expected ahead of time. There was a large-scale shift in 
where the new member-state workers sought employment from Germany and Austria to the UK and Ireland 
in the immediate aftermath of this enlargement (Boeri and Brücker 2005, 14-16). One could explain that 
partly through the variations in economic conditions between these countries, but a large portion of the 
responsibility for this phenomenon might safely be laid upon the fact that Germany and Austria 
implemented the free labor migration derogation and the UK and Ireland did not. 
 
21
 Details concerning the data sources for all of the independent variables, both economic and migration-
related, can be located in the appropriate sections of Chapters 3 and 4. It should also be kept in mind that 
modeling is an iterative process (Sterman, 87-89), so ideas for variables and models have arisen as this 
research has progressed.  
 
22
 For instance, Alvarez-Plata and her co-authors (2003, 39-40) assert in their contribution that generalized 
methods of moments (GMM) estimators are more robust than other estimators. Boeri and Brücker (2005, 
49-50), however, argue that GLS estimators are more efficient and superior to GMM estimators given the 
fairly small group dimension of their panel. Other authors (Boeri and Brücker 2000, 116) assert that fixed-
effects estimators are best for pooled cross-sectional data sets such as the ones compiled for contemporary 
labor migration studies. This issue is revisited in more detail elsewhere in this project. 
 
23
 As is discussed in the literature review and briefly in another endnote, these patterns did not remain static 
in the immediate aftermath of CEEC8 accession. However, if a driving feature of this research is 
investigating how many workers EU15 politicians could have reasonably assumed were coming in 2004 
and afterwards, this assumption still makes sense in light of network theory. Alternative figures for this 
transformation could be utilized in the statistical modeling chapter and justified in light of what was known 
during the years prior to CEEC8 accession in the interests of academic exploration, however.  
 
24
 Theoretically, at least some of the estimators that are employed in these steps could be derived from 
statistical models that utilize CEEC10 labor migration data from the last several years leading up to 
CEEC10 accession. While this strategy avoids the out-of-sample problems that afflict other forecasts of 
CEEC10 labor movement, it squarely runs into the small data set and short time series problems that the 
statistical modeling procedure described above avoids. Systems modeling is somewhat more flexible 
concerning issues such as this one because an enervating purpose of this technique is to allow for greater 
speculation concerning model parameterization. On the other hand, these hypothetical CEEC10-derived 
estimators would likely be too unstable or otherwise unsuitable for this study since accurate data on CEE 
migration and economic indicators are only available for a few years prior to 2004. For instance, 
comparable unemployment data are obtainable for the CEEC10 only in 1996. Therefore, this study’s 
systems models shall exclusively employ the estimators derived from the statistical model described earlier. 
That act reintroduces the out-of-sample forecasting problems detailed in the literature review chapter, but 
they may be unavoidable if anything is to be affirmed about this study’s research questions using systems 
modeling. 
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25
 Although Malmberg (2006, 36) cautions that: “There is no such thing as a net migrant,” it is generally 
easier and more convenient to track migration differentials rather than each directional flow separately.  
 
26
 Causal loop diagrams are charts that illustrate, using only variable names and labeled arrows, causal links 
between the primary variables in the model. They are effective at demonstrating the most important 
connections in the system of interest in as simplified of a form as possible (Sterman 2000, 137-157). 
 
27
 The defeat of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty at the hands of French voters in a May 2005 referendum has 
in fact been laid at the feet of the legendary “Polish Plumbers” who allegedly threaten to take away the jobs 
of French workers (Sciolino; BBC News 2008). 
 
28
 Some of the more memorable names that form portions of the research for this assessment of modeling 
are dynamic soft systems analysis (Onishi), dynamic simulation, computational modeling, and systems 
dynamics. Even the two works that form much of the basis for this review (Taber and Timpone; Saunders-
Newton) cannot quite agree in some instances about how to classify and name certain techniques.  
 
29
 Please note that for expositional purposes the order in which these modeling tools or languages is 
discussed is different from what is initially presented here.  
 
30
 For a critique of Bates et. al.’s original work (1998) in this area and the idea of rational choice analytic 
narratives more generally, please consult Elster (2000).  
 
31
 In surveying the modeling literature, one point of great confusion and disagreement concerns the exact 
position of dynamic modeling in a classification scheme such as the one suggested here. Unfortunately, 
“dynamic modeling” is a term that is used loosely and without much attention paid to how it has been 
employed elsewhere. After much consideration and reflection, it has been determined that dynamic 
modeling straddles the line between computational and analytical models. However, for the purposes of the 
present elucidation and with one exception, this review shall treat dynamic modeling as if it belongs solely 
in the computational category. Please be aware that Taber and Timpone (1996, 43) utilize the term “formal 
modeling” to cover both mathematical and computational modeling techniques rather than just game theory 
and related tools. 
 
32
 The distinction between difference and differential equation models arises in how they treat time. In the 
former, time is divided into equal, discrete units, while in the latter, time is continuous (Huckfeldt et. al., 5).  
 
33
 Please note that the presence of the discussion of the Richardson arms race dynamic model here 
illustrates the overlap that exists between the notions of computational and mathematical models (see 
earlier endnote). 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 Any social, political or economic phenomenon that involves about three percent 
of the world’s total population (World Bank 2006, 26-27) is bound to attract substantial 
interest from politicians, policy analysts and academics. That statement is most definitely 
true about global labor migration and the movement of people across international 
borders in general. However, as shall be seen momentarily, not all investigators of labor 
migration examine this issue using the same theoretical perspective. In fact, there are 
several rival theories of why labor migration occurs and continues, each of which may 
explain part of the puzzle that is cross-border worker movement. These theories all have 
somewhat different explanations for the magnitudes and patterns of European labor 
migration that have been observed over the past few centuries and for the EU’s 
policymaking responses to these phenomena. Traces of these theories can also be located 
in the previous forecasts of CEE labor mobility to Western Europe that round out this 
literature review chapter. In fact, the labor migration theories, history and models 
elucidated here comprise the unequivocal basis for the models that are constructed in the 
later chapters of this work and guide this overall research project more generally.  
General Labor Migration Literature:  
Although the discussion in Chapter 1 generally presumes that Central and Eastern 
European workers are induced to move from their home countries to the wealthier parts 
of the EU, little has been explicitly stated thus far on why that might be true. For that 
perspective, one must turn to the wider literature on the motivations and incentives for 
labor mobility. Although there does not appear to be one unified, comprehensive and 
coherent theory of international labor migration1 (Massey et. al. 1998, 17, 281; 
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Tassinopoulos et. al., 12; Hatton and Williamson, 12-13; Bauer and Zimmermann, 13-21; 
Pryor, 110), one can divide the various approaches on why interstate labor migration 
occurs into a number of partially competing and overlapping schools of thought. Some of 
these different theoretical perspectives2 include micro and macro neo-classical economic 
theories of migration, the new economics of migration, dual labor market theory, network 
theory and cumulative causation theory.  
Labor Migration as a Concept--However, before delving into a discussion of the 
theoretical explanations of migration, it would be wise to state explicitly what that term 
means exactly as the literature on labor migration often presumes an implied meaning of 
this most important concept (Salt 2001, 3-4; Kupiszewski, 629-630; Tassinopoulos et. al., 
6-7). Basically, labor migration occurs when workers leave their home country to take a 
job in a foreign economy. However, what this study is really concerned with is the annual 
net labor migration from the CEE accession countries to the EU15 rather than the sheer 
volume of workers who leave the former for the latter in some year. CEE workers may 
take temporary (less than one-year) positions that might not be included in this total, and 
“permanent” CEE workers who decide to migrate back to their home countries count 
against it3 (Kupiszewski, 630). There are at least two important reasons for this concern 
with net rather than gross4 CEE labor migration, the first of which is that the systematic 
projections examined later in this chapter all use some form of it as their dependent 
variable (e.g., Fertig, 712; Boeri and Brücker 2000, 114-116; Dustmann et. al., 47). The 
choice to follow in these studies’ footsteps makes the results of this research more easily 
comparable, without any adjustments to these figures, to what the earlier studies find. 
Second, permanent net labor migration seems to excite considerably more political 
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agitation against it than does the temporary5 kind. This situation likely exists because of 
the cultural aspects of permanent migration that go along with this phenomenon 
(Penninx, 32-36, 44-48; Spencer, 3-9; Carrera, 115-123). Although large-scale short-term 
worker movement could foment negative political responses against these workers, for 
the most part they are tolerated as long as the receiver-country citizens anticipate that 
their stay in the host economy will be brief. For example, the large numbers of West 
German Gastarbeiters who were recruited in the 1950s and 1960s were not a 
controversial addition to that economy at first because it was widely assumed that their 
presence would be temporary. However, political backlash began to build against them 
when it became more obvious that their stay in West Germany was going to be longer 
than initially anticipated (Meyers, 128-133). In short, this study is concerned with longer-
term worker migration due to the greater potential impacts that it has on receiving and 
sender-country politics. 
Macro and Micro-Level Neo-classical Economic Theories--The most well-known of the 
various approaches to migration incentives, and thus the first of them to be discussed, are 
the theories that use economic concepts as their basis. Macro-level neo-classical 
economic theories posit that interstate labor mobility is a function of the factor 
endowments of different countries. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) 6 model of 
international trade argues that countries exchange goods, capital and other factors of 
production because they have a comparative advantage in producing these items. Both 
countries benefit from trade because they can swap production factors that they have in 
abundance or can generate cheaply for those that they can fabricate only expensively or 
not at all. As applied to interstate labor migration, what the HOS model predicts is that 
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labor flows from countries that have a surfeit of it compared to capital to states that have 
a smaller ratio7 of labor to capital (İberg, 23-24). The national economies of both 
countries should improve in comparison to the no-trade scenario because the one with the 
labor shortage now has sufficient workers to maximize its production of goods and 
services and the one with the labor excess has relieved the pressure on its labor markets 
caused by having too many workers. In addition, the wage rates of the labor-exporting 
country should rise because employees are now a more expensive commodity, thus 
benefiting the people who remain behind. Finally, the migrants themselves should profit 
because they have left a country that has low wage rates for one where they are 
considerably higher (Massey et. al. 1993, 433; Tassinopoulos et. al., 13-16). Note that 
this approach truly does focus on the highest level of abstraction; the two countries 
involved in this trade benefit on the whole, even though some individuals in that 
economy might not profit from this exchange. That fact implies that each country’s 
politicians may come under pressure from those who do not benefit from this exchange to 
protect them from economic harm. In other words, even though both countries’ 
economies would benefit from this swap, these domestic political pressures8 would 
prevent it from being realized.  
 For researchers who contend that individual-level reasons9 for why workers leave 
their home country for another labor market are more important than interstate 
comparative advantage is, this high level of abstraction is not very satisfying. Micro-level 
neo-classical economic models (Wilson and Jaynes; Nahuis and Parikh; Giannetti; Profit; 
Dustmann et. al.; Boeri and Brücker 2000) focus intently on the determinants of, and 
barriers to, individuals moving from one place to another to find work. The basic 
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assumption of this approach, including the human capital model popularized by Sjaastad 
(1962), is that rational actors calculate the costs and benefits of changing labor markets 
and only move if the latter are greater than the former. Economic actors understand the 
quality of the investments they have made (or need to make) in themselves as potential 
workers, and migrate to the location where they can realize the greatest rate of return on 
those investments (Harris and Todaro, 126-127). They are also fully aware of the kinds of 
impediments (Todaro, 139-140; Kitching, 173-174) that stand in their way of moving, 
such as the search costs of a new job, language differences, and relocation expenses. 
Many micro-level studies have utilized wage differentials as a primary explanatory 
variable because the use of these data easily fits into the economic maximization 
assumption of rational actor models. In addition, these researchers sometimes segment 
migratory flow by age, gender, ethnicity, education, skill level, or some other variable in 
which they are interested. However, it is important to reiterate that these authors are 
concerned with individual-level wage differences rather than the macro-level economic 
disparities described previously (Massey et. al. 1993, 434-435; Massey et. al. 1998, 18-
21; İberg, 24-25). 
 The ostensible near-ubiquity of micro-level neo-classical migration theory 
explanations should not disguise the large amount of criticism of these models that has 
appeared in the literature, however (Ghosh, 99-101; Massey et. al. 1998, 8-11; Pryor, 
117-120; Lucas, 85; Piore, 4-5; Favell et. al., 16-19; Dietz and Kaczmarczyk, 41-42; 
Fassmann, 178-179). The bulk of these criticisms can be distilled into three points, the 
first of which is the notion that wage differentials by themselves do not promote as much 
interstate labor migration as the theory might suggest. Given the huge gap that exists 
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between developed and underdeveloped economies, workers should be observed moving 
on a vast scale from one state or region to another as a regularized part of economic 
survival. However, as has been noted elsewhere in this work, labor-force participants are 
generally reluctant10 to move even in the face of considerable wage differentials between 
regions or countries. Additionally, neo-classical economics models pay too much 
attention to the economic motives for why workers leave home for new jobs, according to 
critics. People leave their national labor markets for many reasons other than wage 
maximization, including family reunification, phase of life issues (e.g., college education, 
military service, marriage and divorce, retirement) and adventure (T. Brown, 5; Lee, 50-
52).  Reducing the act of migration to a simple economic calculus of costs and benefits 
omits or downplays these other rationales to the detriment of creating a complete picture 
of why workers leave their home markets. Finally, neo-classical economic theories of 
migration cannot explain well why migration continues once it has started. The notional 
expectation here is that migration levels decline as the wage differentials between two 
labor markets decrease and that worker movement does not cease entirely until that gap 
has been obliterated. However, empirical work in this area (Massey et. al. 1998, 9-10; 
Massey et. al. 1994, 701-711) indicates that migration does not end until living conditions 
in the labor supply country have improved to some minimal level of comfort. Other 
theories of migration also maintain that worker movement sometimes continues well after 
the economic reasons for its initiation have faded into memory due to the persistent 
consequences of family reunification policies and network effects. In sum, neo-classical 
economic theories of migration are a good starting point for discussing the motivations 
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for labor mobility, but they are not as complete of a picture of this phenomenon as their 
backers might believe they have constructed.  
New Economics of Migration--An approach that has been developed recently in response 
to the alleged flaws of these micro-level neo-classical models is one that has been labeled 
the “new economics of migration” (Massey, et. al. 1993, 436; Massey, et. al. 1998, 21-
34). This school accepts that economic actors can improve their situation by rationally 
estimating cost-benefit analyses on whether migration is a good strategy for 
accomplishing this goal. However, these researchers disagree with the neo-classical 
assumption that the relevant economic actor here is the individual worker. Their 
argument is that the household is a better unit of analysis for these studies because 
families generally attempt to maximize their collective income when debating whether 
someone migrates rather than just the individual who is deciding whether to leave. This 
seemingly minor assumption change permits new economics scholars to study a wider 
variety of strategies that households, especially those in the developing world, utilize to 
raise their relative economic status in their communities and minimize (or at least spread 
out) the risks that come along with migration. It also allows them to compare how 
developing and developed-world families cope with economic pressures and discuss what 
mix of strategies might be best for different kinds of households (Salt et. al., 75, 77; 
Massey et. al. 1993, 436-439). 
Historical-Structural Theories--One similarity between all of these various economics-
based theories, however, is that they all rest on behaviorist assumptions. In other words, 
institutional, social and historical constraints play very little role in determining whether 
and why labor shifts from one place to another, and a micro-level unit of analysis is 
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usually the focus of the work at hand. A rather separate set of approaches to studying 
migration is what Zulauf (2001, 21-22) terms the historical-structural school. These 
theories concentrate their attention on institutional, historical and structural explanations 
for why migration takes place and posit that the observed pattern of migration between 
states is the result of interactions between these macro-level incentives and constraints. 
For many of these researchers, migration occurs as a method of relieving the tensions 
caused by the interactions between these influences.  
 The first approach that falls under the historical-structural umbrella is dual labor 
market theory, which contends that labor demand from wealthier and more industrialized 
countries or regions drives the engine of migration. For a variety of reasons inherent to 
the structure of the labor markets of these developed economies, including the social 
status and pay of the available positions there, migrants generally take the lower-end 
jobs11 in those countries. This observation implies that there is a two-tiered (dual) labor 
market in industrialized countries and that structural factors make employers dependent 
on migrants to fill positions in the lower half of the market. Since native workers are no 
longer willing to take these jobs at an economical wage but the positions need to be 
filled, employers must turn to migrant workers12 as a last resort. This observation implies 
that in general native and migrant workers are rarely in competition for the same jobs 
despite fears to the contrary (Massey et. al. 1993, 440-444; Massey et. al. 1998, 28-32; 
Dietz and Kaczmarczyk, 38-48; Piore, 17, 27-49, 86-87). Another important set of 
historical-structural models of migration are the ones based on Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
(1974) world systems theory. These studies employ as their theoretical foundation the 
concept that the most fundamental reason for interstate labor migration is the imposition 
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of capitalist economic relations on traditional, non-capitalist systems (Massey et. al. 
1993, 444-447; Massey et. al. 1998, 35-37; Portes, 76-81; Zolberg 1981, 8-12; Meyers, 
179-181). Again, the most important determinants of interstate labor migration are not 
those found at the individual level; rather, they are at the systemic level and are strongly 
shaped by historical factors that the economic approaches generally ignore. 
Important Implications of the Migration Initiation Theories--What is really important 
about this abbreviated review of labor migration initiation theories, however, are the 
implications they hold for why workers do (and do not) move to a new market, the 
identity of those migrants, and what sorts of policies countries might implement to 
control labor migration into their economies. Both macro and micro-level neo-classical 
economic models agree that the primary reason workers decide to migrate is the rational 
calculation that they can successfully exploit the wage differential between their home 
labor market and the one to which they are traveling. In other words, only the conditions 
in the relevant national labor markets matter to a worker’s migration decision, and 
migration does not cease until that wage differential is negated. Both types of neo-
classical economic models also imply that skilled rather than unskilled employees are 
more likely to move from one labor market to another due to the former’s greater human 
capital and ability to respond to the signals that interstate wage differences give them. 
Finally, these two theories imply that governments that want to control the influx of 
foreign workers into their systems can do so by altering the economic conditions in either 
country’s labor market. Wealthy states can discourage migration by promoting 
development13 in the poorer country, thus reducing the wage differential between the two 
markets, or by increasing the costs of migration through greater restrictions on foreign 
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workers and more rigorous enforcement actions against undocumented employees and 
the host-country companies that hire them. Countries that are facing a labor shortage in a 
booming region may also encourage migration by actively recruiting workers or by 
building infrastructure and making other investments that attract businesses and the 
concomitant need for labor migrants (İberg, 23-27; Massey et. al. 1993, 434-436; 
Massey et. al. 1998, 19-21).  
 In spite of the considerable similarities between the inferences that can be drawn 
from the two neo-classical approaches, there are also non-trivial differences between 
them as well. First, micro-level models are more prone to take the likelihood that 
migrants find work in their new labor markets into account than macro-level models are 
since the latter often assume full employment in both economies. In addition to 
unemployment being more important to micro-level theories of migration, psychological 
constraints against and incentives for migration can be more easily addressed in these 
models because they are more concerned with why individuals leave for another market 
than macro-level models are. Finally, micro-level economic models can more easily 
utilize a number of reasons why individuals might shift labor markets beyond wage and 
skill differentials. Aside from the psychological inducements and barriers mentioned 
previously, changing social conditions, technologies, and state policies in the receiver or 
sender countries might make it easier or more difficult for workers to alter residences 
(Massey et. al. 1993, 434-436; Zelinsky, 223-226). 
 Despite the use of “economics” in its title, the conclusions of the new economics 
of migration school on the above points are quite a bit different from the ones of the neo-
classical theories. First, as a result of new economics theorists’ change of the unit of 
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analysis from the individual to the household or family, these writers can now examine a 
wider range of strategies for dealing with economic disadvantage. In the neo-classical 
economics-based approaches, the rational response on the part of the workers in a poorer 
region to a wage differential between two places is migration (mediated by distance, the 
chances of host-country employment, and other costs of shifting locales). Wage 
differentials still matter in new economics models, but the rational reaction to them may 
be to send only some members of the family to the wealthier area while leaving others at 
home to work and depend on remittances from the distant household members. 
Complicating the strategies for how individuals react to migration incentives thus implies 
that wage differentials are not the sole determinant of labor migration. Workers may 
continue to shift locations even when the wage differential between two places disappears 
or may demur from moving even though the existence of a substantial wage differential 
would compel neo-classical models to predict that they would leave (Massey 1993 et. al., 
438-440; Massey 1998 et. al., 21-27).  
 This observation has considerable bearing on both sender and receiver-country 
government policies towards limiting economic migration. Since a worker’s migration 
decision is a function of household rather than solely individual incentives, government 
policies must be subtle in their approach to reducing motivations to move. An income 
increase that might dissuade one person in a household with a certain skill set from 
leaving might actually encourage another worker in the same family with different skills 
to leave. Another reason that all governments need to carefully tailor their programs to 
local conditions, according to new economics theorists, is their assumption that a 
household’s objective of increasing its income is not just an absolute goal but a relative 
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one14 as well. A receiver government’s plan to augment income in an underdeveloped 
part of a sender country may have the perverse effect of increasing outmigration under 
certain circumstances. The idea that households monitor the incomes of other families in 
their community, and base their decisions on how to improve their situation relative to 
their neighbors on what they perceive, indicates that simplistic income-enhancement 
programs must be evaluated closely before they are implemented15 (Massey 1993 et. al., 
438-440; Massey 1998 et. al., 27-28).  
Labor Migration Perpetuation--One similarity that all of the above models have, despite 
the many differences among their assumptions and implications, is that they generally try 
to explicate how labor migration begins. That observation may seem rather 
unremarkable, except that the reasons for why interstate labor movement begins may be 
rather different from why it continues. A separate set of theories and studies have 
therefore been produced to explain the perpetuation of labor migration. Their frameworks 
can be placed within the historical-structural school of thought because they all rely on 
the routinization of certain behavior patterns in the international migration system and the 
sender and receiver countries. The primary explanation for how interstate migration 
becomes perpetuated is network theory16 (Wallace 1998, 29; Bauer and Zimmermann, 
19; Recchi, 68; Hailbronner, 8; Kapur and McHale, 125-128; Portes, 73-74), which 
asserts that migration is easier for later workers from a certain region who leave for the 
same receiver area. Earlier laborers pay much higher costs and take much greater risks in 
leaving home for a new market because they are forced to locate housing and jobs in 
areas unfamiliar to them in the absence of the assistance of others who were once in their 
predicament. However, later migrants can readily plug into the networks established by 
 54
their predecessors to locate these resources, a distinct advantage especially when there 
are linguistic and cultural barriers between the new labor market and home. Even same-
country migrants who do not originate in the region where the initial migrants are from 
can utilize this network to overcome these linguistic and cultural hurdles. Essentially, the 
“social capital” (Putnam 2000, 19-24) banked by earlier compatriots becomes a resource 
for later migrants, considerably reducing the risks and increasing the benefits involved in 
interstate labor movement. These later migrants are then expected to become part of that 
network and assist workers still at home to come to the receiver country and find jobs 
themselves, which helps to propagate this pattern still further (Massey et. al. 1993, 448-
449; Massey et. al. 1998, 42-45; Salt et. al. 21-22).  
 A related perspective to network theory called institutional theory concentrates its 
explanatory attention not on the self-generated networks created by migrants, but on the 
secondary organizations that grow up around labor migration. Interstate worker 
movement generates a large and vigorous demand for a variety of legal and illegal 
services, opportunities that various entrepreneurs stand ready to exploit. These 
opportunities are especially plentiful in wealthy countries that issue far fewer worker 
visas than there are migrants willing to apply for them (Massey et. al. 1993, 450-451). 
Migrant networks and the institutions that develop around them are not the only ways that 
international labor movement becomes a self-perpetuating process. Cumulative causation 
theory declares that migration decisions modify the economic and social context in which 
later migration choices are made in ways that make worker movement more likely to 
occur. Many of these alterations, such as shifts in income, agricultural practices, the 
distribution of farmland, and the “culture of migration”17 transpire in the migrant-sender 
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communities. In addition, the movement of the most skilled workers in a sender region to 
areas where they can reap the most reward from their human capital makes it more likely 
that future skilled workers will follow them because new industries that require such 
laborers will locate in the places where skilled employees already work. This process is 
part of a cycle that further impoverishes sender areas and reinforces the incentives for 
their workers to migrate (Massey et. al. 1993, 451-453; Massey et. al. 1998, 45-50). 
Important Implications of the Migration Perpetuation Theories--Just like the historical-
structural and economic theories of why migration starts, what is truly important about 
the competing descriptions of how migration continuation occurs18 are the policy 
implications that can be derived from them, along with what they suggest about the 
incentives and disincentives that exist for workers to move to a new economy to take 
positions there. Network, institutional and cumulative causation theory all affirm that (in 
contrast to the economic, but like the historical-structural, theories of migration initiation) 
governments are seriously handicapped in their attempts to control labor movement. The 
perpetuators of worker migration lie largely outside the control of the state, especially the 
underground migrant networks created by laborers who enter the receiver country and the 
institutions that develop around them. In fact, government attempts to regulate labor 
migration often create perverse incentives and outcomes that nullify the effects of the 
original policies or make the problems the state wants to solve considerably more acute. 
For instance, cracking down on immigrant smugglers may lead to an even more 
expensive and clandestine system of migration that is further outside the view and control 
of the government. Family reunification policies designed to assist legal migrants in 
sponsoring close relatives for residency and encourage the proper method of migration 
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may inadvertently bolster networks designed to shelter illegal foreign workers. Basically, 
these theories contend that the underlying patterns that reinforce and propagate labor 
migration are strongly resistant to government intervention and only break down once the 
fundamental social, cultural and economic reasons for that movement disappear (Massey 
et. al. 1993, 449-451, 453-454; Massey et. al. 1998, 45, 49-50; European Commission 
2006, 14).  
 To differing extents, all three continuation theories also argue that the feedback 
mechanisms that maintain migration relationships between countries become independent 
of the motives for their initiation, regardless of what those reasons were at the beginning 
of the process. Network theory in particular recognizes that while wage differentials 
might help jump-start labor movement between sender and receiver countries, those 
income differences soon become weakly correlated with migration flows because 
network effects quickly swamp out those of the wage differentials. Again, the migration 
patterns between countries become self-sustaining over time as they become more 
institutionalized and established. Finally, network and cumulative causation theory 
declare that although high-skill workers are generally the first ones to migrate, eventually 
the labor flow becomes more representative19 of the sender community as a whole. This 
shift occurs because although workers with higher skills are attracted to the receiver 
countries first, the network created by those laborers reduces the costs and risks for 
lower-skill workers to arrive later (Massey et. al. 1993, 449-451, 453-454; Massey et. al. 
1998, 45, 49-50).  
Migration Theory Literature Review Conclusion--A brief reminder of where the present 
study fits within the literature20 on CEE worker movement and the basic theories of 
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migration is appropriate after this lengthy theoretical discussion. In addition to following 
the precedents set by previous investigations specifically devoted to intra-EU migration, 
the present study should also find a reasonable place within the wider migration literature 
as well. In particular, the construction of the statistical and systems models and their 
component variables is based on a number of general migration theories. The factors and 
relationships of importance suggested by the various economics-based theories, 
especially the micro-level ones (e.g., unemployment and wage differences), are relied 
upon quite heavily. One of the advantages of modeling21 is that relationships from a 
number of theoretical perspectives can be explicitly incorporated into the model 
successfully, which implies that insights from some of the historical-structural theories 
can be profitably utilized by this study as well. Much more is discussed about these 
points in the appropriate sections, but for now it is important to keep in mind that the 
current research is both firmly based in the mobility literature and exploratory in its 
approach to an important question inspired by the theories expressed in it. Finally, the 
kinds of economic, social and institutional policies that governments can use to retard or 
accelerate the amount of worker migration into their economies is discussed extensively 
here. The observable effects of some of these policies are examined explicitly using many 
different research tools, and are elucidated in great detail in the concluding chapter of this 
study.  
History of European Labor Migration: 
Labor migration within Europe is not a new phenomenon, although its magnitude has 
grown and its speed has accelerated considerably in the past century. Agricultural 
societies, like much of Europe until the Nineteenth Century, featured rather 
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circumscribed mobility due to laws preventing it and the absence of information and 
resources that average people needed to decide whether and where to move for work. 
Barring a major natural disaster, political upheaval, or war, most workers did not leave 
the places of their birth for any reason, let alone a new job (Zolberg 1983, 232-234; 
Zelinsky, 224-226). Better transportation and media technologies, economic 
improvements fostered by the Industrial Revolution, the repeal of laws preventing worker 
mobility, and increasing population pressures created the first era of international labor 
movement during the Nineteenth Century. Much of the scholarly attention dedicated to 
this period has been expended on the large-scale shifts of workers from Europe to the 
Americas, Oceania and South Africa, but there was considerable intra-European worker 
movement22 also. For instance, the 1880s witnessed large numbers of Belgians and 
Italians working in France and many Poles doing the same in Germany (Hatton and 
Williamson, 7-23; Meyers, 63-64; Zolberg 1983, 234-239; Bonifazi, 109). Late 
Nineteenth Century economies also experienced the first major wave of east-west 
migration as well; industrialized areas of France and Germany became important 
destinations for many CEE labor migrants23 during this time (Fassmann and Hintermann 
1998, 59; Wallace and Stola, 13). On the other hand, the first half of the Twentieth 
Century, for the most part, saw more restrictive legal regimes being placed on migrants to 
Western European countries. Although France maintained relatively open borders due to 
their labor shortages arising from the effects of World War I, other European countries 
(and the United States) raised the hurdles that immigrants had to surmount in order to 
access those labor markets. It should be kept in mind that these restrictions were not just 
on labor migrants; asylum-seekers and refugees also had more difficulty claiming 
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sanctuary during this economically depressed era (Zolberg 1983, 239-243; Meyers, 64-
66, 86-88, 121-125). Europeans then lived through considerable population movement 
during and shortly after World War II, but not primarily for economic reasons. Tens of 
millions of people were displaced by the war’s destruction or forcibly repatriated from 
one part of the continent to another; much of this shift took place from Eastern to 
Western Europe, but not exclusively (Bonifazi, 112-113; Wallace and Stola, 13-14; 
Fassmann and Hintermann 1998, 59-60; Zolberg 1983, 243). 
Post-World War II European Migration--The situation that thus faced Western European 
policymakers and politicians in the late 1940s and 1950s, the time that the ECSC and 
EEC24 were created, was that there had recently been large-scale, non-economically 
incentivized movement of people across the continent. At the same time, the devastation 
wrought by the recent conflict created considerable labor demand in order to rebuild both 
civilian and industrial infrastructure. These displaced persons did not necessarily possess 
the required skills to engage in that reconstruction process, so Western European 
politicians began to look to labor recruitment and free worker mobility schemes (see next 
section on EU labor policymaking) to fulfill their economies’ needs. Many of these plans 
were strongly influenced by ethnic ties and imperial history; for instance, the UK 
sustained a liberal migration policy for its colonials, and the West German government 
strongly encouraged as many ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) to emigrate from behind the 
Iron Curtain as possible, during this time (Meyers, 67-68, 125-126). However, the 
German need for laborers was not fully satisfied by this policy, and so the first agreement 
for Gastarbeiters (guest workers) was struck with Italy in 1955. This labor recruitment 
accord would be the first of many with numerous Southern European and North African 
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countries that would result in the movement of millions of guest workers to West 
Germany between 1955 and 1973 (Meyers, 126-130; Salt 1981, 138-139; Schneider, 14; 
Bauer et. al., 206-211). France was also continuing to actively recruit labor from 
Southern Europe, especially Spain and Portugal, in the 1950s and 1960s. These efforts 
were taking place even as more than a million French citizens returned from Algeria and 
other former French colonies during these decades (Constant, 273; Bonifazi, 115; Recchi, 
54-55). Decolonialization and the return of home country citizens to the metropole was a 
common occurrence between the 1940s and 1970s, as many millions of French, British, 
Dutch, and Portuguese citizens left their colonial abodes to take up residence in Europe. 
These imperial links also became the basis for natives of those former colonies’ claims on 
moving to their former mother countries. In fact, the UK was forced to place limits on the 
ability of Commonwealth citizens to move to the UK in the 1960s in response to the 
demand for that privilege (Meyers, 69-70, 88-89; Bonifazi, 115; Salt 2001, 1).  
 However, many of the labor recruitment schemes and liberal immigration policies 
of the first few post-war decades were severely curtailed or even canceled in the face of 
the oil crisis-related recessions of the 1970s. Most famously, the West German 
government halted all labor recruitment efforts in November 1973 in response to these 
altered economic conditions (Bauer et. al., 273; Zolberg 1983, 243; Schneider, 14; 
Tapinos, 53-54). The next fifteen years or so featured half-hearted host-government 
attempts to encourage established guest workers to return to their home countries and a 
general increase in restrictions on migration of all types. Even family reunification 
policies became controversial, and considerably less liberal, during this period due to the 
chain migration that these procedures created. Additionally, the last of the 
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decolonialization-motivated returns from Africa and Asia took place, further depressing 
the perceived need for West European immigration (Schneider, 14-15; Bonifazi, 116; 
Meyers, 70-73, 90-94, 130-133; Bauer et. al. 213-215; Constant, 274). The accession of 
Greece, Spain and Portugal to the EC also took place during this time period; not 
surprisingly, this situation generated increased public concerns25 about mass labor 
migration within the previous member states. The policy response to this development 
was to impose long transition periods on the free movement of the new member-state 
workers. As it happens, there is little evidence that these derogations were necessary, as 
there were no great inducements for these workers to move either before or after the 
expiration of the transitional periods (Boeri and Brücker 2000, n; Salt et. al., 43-48).  
Post-Cold War European Migration--The collapse of the Soviet Union’s control over 
Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the instability caused by Yugoslavia’s and the 
USSR’s demise in the early 1990s ushered in a new era of migration in Europe, and not 
just of workers. For instance, this period witnessed an enormous spike in the number of 
asylum-seekers to Western Europe; more than three million applications for asylum were 
received in those countries during the first part of the 1990s (Messina and Thouez, 109). 
The main political consequence of this flood of asylum requests was for the Western 
European countries to greatly tighten their standards for granting safe haven. 
Additionally, even though only a small proportion of these requests were ever granted, 
these sudden, unexpected and mammoth inflows of migrants created considerable 
consternation among Western European publics (Meyers, 74-75, 96-101, 133-135, 166-
168; Bauer et. al., 215-218; Bonifazi, 119; Schmeidl, 72-73; Schneider, 15; Uçarer 2002, 
15, 18-22). Although the power to review requests for and grant asylum rests in the hands 
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of the EU member states, the organization as a whole tried to help them coordinate their 
responses to this huge influx of asylum-seekers. The primary EU-level policy response 
on this matter during this period was the Dublin Convention of 1990. This accord, which 
like the Schengen Agreement was technically created outside of official EU institutions 
but was later integrated into EU law, set the standards by which the country making this 
decision would process the claim. Essentially, the Dublin Convention is designed to stop 
asylum-seekers from “shopping around” for the easiest country in which to gain protected 
status by forcing them to apply for it in the first safe country in which they arrive 
(Hailbronner, 51-52, 382-386; Gondek, 197-208; Messina and Thouez, 100; Loescher, 
37-39; Kunz and Leinonen, 140-142; Uçarer 2002, 25-26). Simultaneous with the large-
scale arrival of these asylum-seekers in Germany was a huge influx of Aussiedler from 
Central and Eastern Europe and the massive “internal” post-reunification shifts of 
citizens of the former East Germany to the western part of the country (Őbersiedler). The 
German government reacted to this situation by tightening not just the rules for granting 
asylum but also their regulations governing the ability of ethnic Germans from outside of 
the country to settle there (Bauer et. al., 223-225; Meyers, 133-137, 141-143; Stola 1999, 
141; Morokvasic, 3). What does not appear to have happened, however, is an 
uncontrollable flood of CEE labor migrants to the markets of the EU15 countries. While 
there was an increase of CEE workers in these economies during the 1990s, it was at 
nowhere near the scale that was commonly predicted. Although it is possible that this 
observation is partly due to a data figment since the short-term movement of workers is 
often not caught by the data sources on migrant labor and this type of movement was 
starting to displace long-term shifts during this time, it still intimates that workers are 
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more likely to stay in their home countries than many pundits and scholars would assume 
(Salt et. al., 17-27; Bonifazi, 120; Stola 1999, 142-144).  
 The overall European migration pattern26 and pressures that faced the EU as it 
prepared to welcome the CEEC8 into its membership in 2004 were therefore fairly 
complex. Although historically (Hatton and Williamson) most European countries have 
been countries of emigration, the economic reality at the turn of the century was that they 
were immigrant attractors and probably would be for some time to come (Salt et. al., 17, 
22-26; Messina and Thouez, 106-107). For instance, Germany, whose government 
insisted for decades that it was not a country of immigration while at the same time 
recruiting millions of guest workers, recognized that it was one when it eased its 
naturalization requirements in 2002 (Schneider, 12-13; Bauer et. al., 197; Meyers, 133, 
156-158). West European countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece that had 
been net exporters of labor to wealthier states for decades have begun to attract many 
economic migrants from Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa (Bonifazi, 119-
120; Schneider, 15; Cangiano and Strozza, 164-171). Even the CEEC8 economies that 
the EU15 governments were so concerned about being sources of migration are finding 
that they are becoming, or soon will be, immigrant attractors as well (Bijak et. al. 148; 
Wallace 2002, 606-613; Salt 2001, 10-11; Lavenex and Uçarer, 8). In fact, during the 
1990s and early 2000s, the CEE countries became the locus of a complicated set of 
migration patterns of their own, featuring transit migrants, short-term migrants27 and 
cross-border commuters, small-scale traders, asylum-seekers and some permanent 
migrants (Wallace and Stola, 23-37; Bonifazi, 122; Salt et. al., 23-24; Ruspini, 183-186; 
Recchi, 69-70; Okólski and Kozlowski, 16-22, 24-25; Maresová and Grumlik, 36-37; 
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Juhász and Toth, 41-46). This change in perspective is difficult to accept for the voters of 
many EU15 and CEE countries, and as implied earlier there has been considerable 
political backlash to this notion (Schneider, 9-11; Wallace 2002, 618-621; Meyers, 108-
109, 158-160; Constant, 275; Maas, 96-100; van Amersfoort, 80-82). 
Some Preliminary Notes on Early Post-Accession CEE Labor Migration--Once CEEC8 
accession became a reality in 2004, both the newer and older member states braced for 
the labor migration consequences of that event. As it turned out, some surprises were in 
store for both the academics who study this behavior28 and the politicians who must deal 
with its consequences. As mentioned previously, the UK, Ireland and Sweden declined to 
implement the optional derogation on the free movement of workers from the 2004 CEE 
accession countries. The release of an EU-sponsored study (European Commission 2006) 
that showed that these three countries performed better economically than the rest of the 
EU15 states that kept worker movement limits in place in the mid-2000s and the 
perceived lack of an initial burst of labor migrants even in the UK (Portes and French, 4) 
persuaded four more EU15 states29 to scrap their restrictions in May 2006 (Economist 
2006; Partos; Kunz and Leinonen, 148). In particular, the Commission study reports that 
CEEC8 labor migration flows had positive effects on public finances, economic growth 
and employment rates in the EU15 countries; in addition, CEE workers are apparently 
complements to EU15 workers, not substitutes (European Commission 2006, 14). It is 
fascinating that these conclusions hold even for the UK, which took the brunt of CEEC8 
labor migration; if there had been any sizeable negative effects on the labor markets of a 
receiver country, they should have appeared here, but they did not. This situation became 
so positive that by May 2009, every EU15 member state except Germany and Austria had 
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allowed their derogations on CEEC8 labor movement to lapse (Economist 2009b). 
However, the subsequent political responses to Bulgarian and Romanian accession on the 
question of free worker mobility to the older EU countries varied in reaction to member-
states’ post-2004 experiences; while the UK, Ireland and most of the EU15 countries 
adopted curbs on this right, Sweden, Finland and eight newer member states30 extended 
free labor mobility to the newest members right after their accession (BBC News 2008; 
Drew and Sriskandarajah). 
 Interestingly, this situation where some countries kept their restrictions in place 
and others did not created a natural experiment: would their continued existence in most 
of the EU15 countries and their lifting in three others deflect CEEC8 migrants to the 
latter member states? The answer to this question seems to be a qualified yes; while the 
UK31 has received far more CEE migrants than they expected based on a Home Office 
study (Dustmann et. al., 2003), the evidence from Ireland and Sweden is more mixed 
(Zaiceva, 17-21; Boeri and Brücker 2005, 14-16; Doyle et. al., 10-14; Ruhs, 10-12; BBC 
News 2006). However, the large number of “new” migrants reported by the UK might be 
misleading, as it is widely suspected that many CEEC8 workers who had been laboring in 
the UK illegally or in the gray market simply registered their presence once they could do 
so without penalty (Ruhs, 8; Portes and French, 14-15; Gilpin et. al., 13-14; Bijak et. al., 
135; European Commission 2006, 11). In addition, the Worker Registration Scheme 
under which CEE labor migrants are counted by the UK government only measures gross 
inflows of these workers; in other words, there is no requirement for CEE workers to 
deregister when they leave the UK (Portes and French, 16). There is also some evidence 
of a diversion effect in that the UK presently attracts the majority of CEE labor migrants 
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and the portion going to Germany and Austria has decreased considerably (Brücker and 
Damelang, 14-16). However, any evaluation of this observation needs to be tempered by 
an awareness of the data problems discussed in this paragraph and elsewhere in this 
dissertation.  
 This set of events has two critical implications for previous models of labor 
migration and the ones constructed by this research. First, politics and institutions matter; 
the CEEC8 migrants reacted to different member-state rules about labor movement in a 
rational fashion, and politicians have some indication that they can affect how many 
people come to their country to work. These politicians are not able to stop labor 
migration entirely, but they know that they can create policies that change the calculus of 
foreign workers who are deciding whether to move to another economy. Second, the 
distribution of where migrants settle may not be the same in the future as it was in the 
past if the rules affecting those choices change. Boeri and Brücker’s (2000, 126) 
assumption that this distribution would remain constant could be problematic, so future 
migration models should be designed to take the possibility of these shifts into account. 
Illegal Immigration to the EU--As implied by the earlier discussion of CEE workers in 
the UK, not all labor migrants enter the EU15 economies legally. Although irregular 
labor migrants are not a new problem in Europe and it is almost by definition difficult to 
acquire reliable data on illegal immigration, it is fairly clear that the scope and magnitude 
of this problem has increased considerably over the last few decades (Salt 2001, 22-28; 
Salt et. al., 17; Messina and Thouez, 109-110). Bolstered by the European public’s 
aversion to illegal immigrants, the policy response to this social problem at the member-
state level mostly has been to crack down on them and make it more difficult for illegal 
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immigrants to assimilate into their host societies (Schneider, 10-11). Even though asylum 
and immigration policy were transferred from the third to the first pillar by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has been limited by sovereignty issues, political concerns, and 
national opt-outs from engaging in too much centralized policymaking in this area. The 
EU has managed to help limit illegal immigration by strengthening the external Schengen 
border by funding and assisting member states with land and sea border patrols through 
the FRONTEX program, however (Schneider, 23-24, 29; Messina and Thouez, 112; 
Maas, 87; Miller; BBC News 2009b). These policies, along with the EU’s work in the 
asylum policy area, has led to some criticism that the organization is trying to create a 
“Fortress Europe” against outside invasion (Meyers, 220; Zimmerman 1995, 45). The 
idea here is that while the free movement of EU workers is actively encouraged inside the 
fortress, the organization does its best to prevent any worker who is not already a citizen 
of one of the member states from enjoying that freedom (Lavenex and Uçarer, 5). 
According to these critics, this pattern of behavior is inconsistent and possibly unfair at 
some level (Loescher, 37-38; Kunz and Leinonen, 153-154). On the other hand, skeptics 
of the EU more generally would assert that the organization is not doing enough to 
protect its member states from illegal immigration and that the free movement of workers 
is a bad idea altogether (Lungescu 2007; Kunz and Leinonen, 146-147). All of these 
arguments are framed against a backdrop where many demographers contend that Europe 
as a whole needs to encourage more immigration from outside the continent in order to 
maintain its countries’ generous welfare states. To these scholars, because of longer life-
spans and reduced fertility, in a few decades there simply will not be enough active 
workers to fund the retirement programs that European workers currently expect in their 
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old age. Although this solution to this problem is not perfect, not the only one available, 
and politically difficult to implement, increased immigration might be a vital component 
of saving these programs (Coleman 2002, 49-59, 64-73; Münz and Straubhaar, 122-123, 
144-150; Holzmann and Münz, 233-241; Schneider, 18-22; Hailbronner, 19-20; Bijak et. 
al., 149). In short, EU member-state politicians face some knotty short and long-term 
trade-offs when it comes to dealing with current and future European migration patterns. 
EU Labor Migration Policymaking:  
The question then becomes one of what kind of assistance they can expect from their EU-
level partners in handling these issues. Labor migration has been a feature of European 
Union policymaking and treaty-writing from the genesis of the organization (Haus, 287-
289). In fact, the notion of free worker mobility influenced the negotiations over the 
creation of both the ECSC and EEC. Under the Treaty of Paris that fashioned the ECSC, 
coal and steel workers from all six member states were afforded the right to take jobs in 
any member state. However, true free mobility of these workers took several more years 
of negotiations and considerable political expenditure on the part of the Italian 
government to accomplish (Maas 12-17). Although these consultations had been lengthy 
and controversial, a precedent had been set, so when negotiators of the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome that founded the EEC wanted to include provisions for the free movement of all 
non-public sector workers, they were seen as an extension of a principle that was already 
in place on a small scale rather than a radical new idea. It took another decade of 
transitional periods, Commission pronouncements and negotiations, but in 1968 private-
sector EEC workers gained in principle the right to move to any member-state economy 
to ply their trade (Recchi, 57-58; Maas, 17-22). However, there remained considerable 
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technical barriers to free movement, including national rules about certificate and 
diploma recognition, that prevented many skilled personnel from working outside their 
home countries (Schneider and Claessens, 136-159). These obstacles were not completely 
dismantled until the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty in the 1990s. Additionally, 
as mentioned elsewhere, the 1997 incorporation of the Schengen Agreement into EU law 
at Amsterdam represented the final step in removing obstructions to EU-wide worker 
mobility. Schengen essentially erased the EU’s internal borders, allowing workers to 
travel from one member state to another for employment as easily as journeying from one 
part of their own country to another for that purpose (Recchi, 58-62; Dinan 2003, 29; 
Dinan 2005, 103-112, 118-123, 391-412; Uçarer 2007, 306-307; Kunz and Leinonen, 
138-140, 142-143; McCormick, 150-151). These major milestones in EU labor migration 
policymaking32 were supplemented by various pronouncements of European Council 
meetings on legal and illegal migration throughout the 1990s and 2000s, including the 
Tampere, Seville and The Hague gatherings (Meyers, 218-219; Schneider, 22-31).  
 However, the recent EU labor migration policy that has attracted the most 
attention (and one that greatly concerns the present research) is the derogation on the 
ability of CEEC10 workers to travel to EU15 countries to take up employment. This 
provision was included in the accession treaties of the 2004 and 2007 new CEE member 
states at the insistence of EU15 negotiators who were concerned about the possibility of 
large-scale worker movement from these entrant countries. The structure of this 
derogation is a bit more complicated than the normal description of this stipulation, 
which is to affirm that current member states can block the free mobility of CEE workers 
for up to seven years after their countries’ accession, so a more detailed examination of 
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this proviso is in order. For the first two years of this period, the current member-state 
governments can keep whatever policies they had in place at the time of the signing of 
the accession agreements without any interference from the Commission. At the end of 
this time, however, the member-state governments are required to inform the 
Commission about what policies they plan to maintain for the next three years. After a 
total of five years, the only legitimate way that a member state may preserve the labor 
mobility derogation for another two years would be if it were faced with either the threat 
or reality of a significant labor market disruption. However, the application of this 
derogation is voluntary; a member state may drop it33 at any time of their choice. At the 
conclusion of this seven-year time frame, new member-state workers must be treated just 
like those from the older member states (van den Bogaert, 60-61; European Commission 
2006, 3-5; Drew and Sriskandarajah; BBC News 2008; Bijak et. al., 130-131; Kunz and 
Leinonen, 148). As can be observed, what this policy has meant for CEEC10 workers is 
that they have faced a patchwork of rules that has shaped their migration decision-
making. For the EU15 member-state governments, this derogation has given them an 
opportunity to protect their constituents from competition, ignore it to make a statement 
about the value of EU expansion, or even forego it at a politically opportune time.  
EU Migration Policymaking Goals--At the concluding stages of this discussion of 
European labor migration and EU labor migration policymaking, it is worthwhile to 
summarize what the primary policy goals of the organization are in this area. Although 
these principles (Staples, 118; Wood and Yeşilada, 231-232) have not been explicitly 
asserted thus far, they have remained not too far in the background. In short, EU policy in 
this field should: 
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 1) encourage greater European economic growth, stability and integration through 
the free movement of EU labor (human capital) as an important factor of production; 
 2) promote improved understanding34 between EU citizens and a pan-European 
identity through enhanced and increased contact between citizens of the various member 
states; 
 3) prevent political instability caused by large-scale population movements from 
rural to urban areas or from poorer to wealthier parts of the EU. This instability could be 
caused by the “hollowing out” of these poorer or isolated regions, the overdevelopment 
of urban centers, or the fears of current job holders that economic migrants are going to 
take their positions; 
 4) reduce illegal economic migration from outside the EU, while still maintaining 
a humanitarian policy that permits legitimate political refugees and persecuted 
individuals to claim asylum in EU member states; 
 5) interdict the importation of illegal drugs, stolen goods and other prohibited 
items and halt human trafficking for the purposes of black-market employment, including 
prostitution;  
 6) coordinate member-state cooperation on all facets of intra-EU and external 
migration policy, including areas where the members still have exclusive competence. 
 
What is immediately evident about the items on this list is that several of these goals 
conflict with one another or contradict legitimate EU goals in other policy areas. For 
instance, preventing economic and political instability by protecting certain job holders 
from competition by labor migrants diverges from the larger goal of encouraging greater 
overall economic growth and efficiency in the organization. Restricting the movement of 
workers, even temporarily, also makes it more difficult for European citizens to meet 
with and improve their understanding of one another. Obliterating customs and passport 
checks between EU member states, as happened after the implementation of the 
Schengen Agreement, also complicates EU and member-state efforts to apprehend illegal 
immigrants once they have crossed the EU’s external borders. Finally, securing the 
Schengen external borders against illegal migration and other illicit activities complicated 
and disrupted the new CEE member-states’ relationships with their eastern and southern 
neighbors that were not joining the European Union in the near future (Jileva, 79-80; 
Grabbe 2002, 92-93, 98-101; Bort, 4-16). This policy shift made it more challenging35 for 
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the CEE candidate countries to have generally positive interactions with their bordering 
states, an important part of the Copenhagen membership criteria. Ultimately, EU 
politicians have had considerable difficulties balancing the demands of these policy 
goals, and that has shown in at least some of their decisions in this policy realm. 
EU Member-State Migration Policymaking Goals--Another important matter concerning 
the above list is that at least some of the EU’s goals as listed there complement and 
conflict with the objectives of EU member-states’ migration policies. Again, although a 
reasonable list of member-state migration policy ends has not yet been produced 
explicitly (Kapur and McHale, 7-9, 37-39), these goals have been implicit in the past 
discussion. In terms of these guiding principles, member-state migration policy should: 
 1) encourage both short and long-term economic growth and stability by filling 
skill gaps in the domestic labor supply, persuading the “best and brightest” workers from 
other countries to move there, and ensuring that there are enough current workers to 
support social welfare programs for past workers; 
 2) integrate new workers into their societies, should they be permanent migrants, 
or at least not alienate temporary workers from their host-country’s political system; 
 3) be sensitive to the political and economic demands of the host-country’s 
workers in terms of labor competition and peace; 
 4) limit illegal economic migration from outside the country while still 
maintaining a humanitarian regime for legitimate asylum-seekers and refugees; 
 5) impede the importation of illegal goods and human trafficking; 
 6) help to maintain (or at least not worsen) the political relationships between the 
member state and its neighbors. 
 
While points one and four through six should look familiar as one peruses the earlier roll 
of EU labor migration policy goals, the second and third purposes on each list are quite 
different. In relation to point two, despite the creation of certain limited citizenship rights 
for EU member-state citizens, power over traditional citizenship policy36 lies in the hands 
of the EU member-state governments. The EU may be trying to create a form of pan-
European citizenship, but it is up to the member states to decide who has access to that 
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citizenship through their own naturalization and integration policies. Different EU 
member states have pursued quite different policies in this area over the last several 
decades, and some have even changed tack during that time (Meyers, 156-158), but in all 
cases the EU has had practically no influence over the sort of citizenship policies that 
their member states have adopted and implemented. Again, while the EU might be trying 
to create a supranational European identity and citizenship without respect to nationality, 
its member states determine whether and how migrants join their own national polity and 
thus potentially the emerging European one. Superficially, both third points address 
building and maintaining political stability, but they do so at different levels. The EU is 
concerned about this matter on a Europe-wide level, and because of that fact it is unclear 
who the intended audience (e.g., member-state governments, Eurocrats, European-level 
politicians) is for these policies, although it is unlikely37 to be the member-states’ voters. 
The member-state governments and their politicians need to deal with these matters at the 
national level, and they know exactly who their audience is: their constituents, who could 
oust them from office at the next election should they create a policy that their voters do 
not like. In conclusion, these conflicts between the EU’s migration policy objectives and 
its member-states’ migration policy goals animate many of the controversies and 
difficulties that have haunted this policy area over the past several decades and are likely 
to be matters that affect both groups’ collective future. 
Methods of Forecasting Migration:  
Before this study38 can describe specific previous forecasts of probable post-accession 
CEE labor migration to the EU15 countries, it is vital to explore more generally how 
previous researchers have made conclusions about the size and composition of this 
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phenomenon. Given the amount of political excitement that the prospect of CEE 
accession created in popular discussions39 of its repercussions for worker movement, 
Veil’s (1998, 85-86) observation that the free movement of persons had not been the 
focus of much systematic research up to that point might seem surprising. However, 
several important forecasts40 of how many CEE workers the EU15 countries might 
reasonably expect were concluded within just a few years of Veil’s remark (Dustmann et. 
al., 30-33). Three basic approaches41 to projecting CEE labor mobility potential can be 
identified in that literature (Boeri and Brücker 2005, 12-13; Bauer and Zimmermann, 31-
37, 44-47; Salt et. al., 84): estimates based on survey data in the sender countries; 
projections derived from similar experiences in different parts of the world, including the 
European Union; and extrapolations that result from econometric models.  
Survey Estimates--The easiest path to determining how many people from the CEE 
accession countries plan to move to the EU15 countries to seek work would seem to be to 
ask them about that question directly. The responses to those inquiries would then assist 
host governments in planning for labor migration to their countries. This approach was 
attempted in a comprehensive way for the CEE accession countries, as well as a few 
others, most notably by Fassmann and Hintermann (1998), Wallace (1998) and Krieger 
(2004). However, trying to extrapolate actual worker mobility from survey data is 
notoriously difficult due to a number of factors. First, the gap between what survey 
subjects state they plan to do on this score and what they actually do is considerable 
(Wallace 1998, 30-31; Fassmann and Hintermann 1998, 61; Bauer and Zimmermann, 35-
36). It is easy to say to a pollster, even in a face-to-face interview, that one plans on 
leaving home for a job in another country, but it is something else entirely to actually 
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depart. Partially, this fact is due to another difficulty with using survey data to predict 
worker mobility, which is that they only give the researcher information on the push 
factors that impel people to migrate and little data on the pull factors that attract them to 
certain countries. In other words, survey data grant researchers some idea of what 
conditions are like in the home country of the respondents, but relatively little 
information on the social, political and economic circumstances of the receiver countries 
where those workers might relocate. Finally, many survey questions may not capture the 
temporary nature of much economic migration (Dustmann et. al., 29-30; Lord Wright, 22; 
Salt et. al., 84) in that simply asking workers “Are you interested in taking a job in 
another country?” does not indicate how long they plan on remaining abroad. Wallace 
(1998, 80-81) tries to escape this constraint by explicitly building a time element into her 
survey questions, but Krieger (2004, 10) is unable to follow suit. In summary, results 
based on survey data may permit interesting insights into patterns of migration intention, 
but their results must be taken with a large modicum of caution given the problems that 
exist with this method (Boeri and Brücker 2005, 12). 
Extrapolations from Earlier Migrations--The second common method of predicting CEE 
population flows into the EU15 countries, extrapolation from previous experiences with 
worker migration, is in some ways an extension of existing comparative research on past 
migration patterns (e.g., Muus and van Dam). Basically, the results of prior occasions 
where the EU experienced the threat of massive labor migration are used as the basis for 
projections for what might happen in the new case. In the instance of Layard et. al. (1992, 
6, 24), the EU’s experiences with southern to northern European migration between the 
1950s and 1970s are utilized as the foundation for an educated guess that at least three 
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percent of CEE workers would move west if given the opportunity. Salt and his co-
authors (1999, 89-90) employ the emigration rates of the then-current EU15 member 
states to construct something they call a “Western Normality Index” and apply those 
emigration rates to several of the 2004 accession countries. These authors determine that 
about three percent of the CHEPS (Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, Slovenia) 
countries’ populations would move west over the first fifteen years after accession, a 
figure that is roughly in line with Layard et. al.’s results. Salt and his co-authors then 
conclude that although their methodology might have problems, their results are probably 
more realistic than the terrifying numbers that were being derived primarily from survey 
data at that time. 
 A more formalized use of a previous instance of worker migration in the EU to 
forecast the CEE case is found in Bauer and Zimmermann (1999, 44-46). In this piece, 
the authors use EU labor migration figures from Greece, Spain and Portugal before and 
after their free movement restrictions were lifted to calculate estimated coefficients of 
how various economic factors (unemployment and GDP differences) might affect CEE 
labor migration. These coefficients are then utilized to create estimations of potential 
labor emigration rates to the EU from a number of CEE accession states. A general 
difficulty with this approach, however, is that one could argue (Boeri and Brücker 2001, 
1, 3-5) that the baseline cases employed by these studies are so different from what they 
are being used to explain that the projections are inaccurate. In particular, one could 
contend that the EU labor market was in equilibrium with relation to workers from the 
southern expansion states at the time the restrictions on their mobility were dropped, 
implying that their abolition should not have caused a sudden increase in their presence in 
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those markets. Since that condition was very unlikely to be true at the time of the CEE 
member states’ accession, Bauer and Zimmermann’s approach is questionable (Boeri and 
Brücker 2000, 119-120; Boeri and Brücker 2001, 12-13).  
Econometric Models--Finally, a frequently used method of predicting the magnitude of 
CEE worker migration has been to estimate this figure using econometric and statistical 
models (Bijak et. al., 2008). These studies employ a number of different estimation 
procedures, including pooled OLS and GLS with both fixed-effects and heterogeneous 
estimators. Many of the analyses described below are econometric models, and they are 
explored in considerable detail momentarily. However, one problem that they all share is 
that their estimators are borrowed from other contexts because regularized CEE 
migration42 is such a relatively new phenomenon. The implication of this procedure is 
that these researchers are forced to assume that these coefficients are appropriate and 
invariant across both time and space. As has already been asserted, that assumption may 
not be correct and implies that one must approach the results of these studies with some 
caution (Boeri and Brücker 2005, 12-13; Brücker and Siliverstovs, 737). 
Previous Estimates of CEE Labor Mobility:  
Perhaps surprisingly given how controversial this topic has been, many of the models of 
CEE worker migration (regardless of the estimation method) generally conclude that the 
EU15 countries could have expected a long-term (ten to thirty-year) total population flow 
equal to two to four percent of the sender-countries’ populations43 into their labor 
markets. Not every estimation agrees with this consensus, which is a vital reason for the 
existence of the present study, but many of them do (Alvarez-Plata et. al., 8; Boeri and 
Brücker 2005, 11). The earliest of these investigations, and one that apparently laid the 
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intellectual groundwork for many of those to follow, is the Layard et. al. (1992) piece that 
estimates that around three percent of the CEE’s population would move to Western 
Europe within the next fifteen years. This assessment is an extrapolation from Western 
Europe’s experiences with population movement from Southern Europe during the early 
years of the EEC/EC and the amount of migration from Mexico the US has encountered. 
Since east-west movement was such a rarity during the Cold War, Layard cannot use past 
occurrences of this particular phenomenon to project a figure. Still, Layard and his co-
authors feel confident in making this prediction because it is based on the economic and 
political conditions that motivated the two long-term instances of population movement 
cited earlier. The problem with this estimate, however, is that it seems to be little more 
than an educated guess because there is no formal statistical model or other rigorous 
technique behind it. Despite this fact, this forecast has been an influential one for later 
studies that project CEE worker mobility into Western Europe. 
European Commission Models--For understandable reasons, policymakers at the 
European Commission and in the governments of the EU15 countries were intensely 
concerned about what sorts of worker and generalized population movements they could 
have expected from the CEE accession countries once they were inside the organization. 
This problem was felt especially acutely given the relative dearth of official, systematic 
quantitative or qualitative research done into European Union population movements 
described in the conclusion to Veil’s report (1998, 85-86) on this matter. To address this 
question, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Employment and Social 
Affairs authorized a group of academics led by Boeri and Brücker (2000) to study how 
eastern enlargement might impact the labor markets of the EU15 member states. In their 
 79
final report and in two follow-up papers released in 2001 and 2005, these authors contend 
that, under reasonable assumptions about economic convergence between the EU15 and 
CEEC10 member states and the magnitude of other relevant economic variables (e.g., 
GDP growth, unemployment), a maximum of four percent of the total population of the 
new member states would move west within the first thirty years after the restrictions on 
labor mobility are dropped (Boeri and Brücker 2000, 126-131; Boeri and Brücker 2001, 
10-13). This figure seems to be quite large, although in reality it only represents around 
one percent of the total population44 of the EU15 countries in 2000. While these authors 
do not wish to imply that the effects of this migration would be negligible, especially 
since some countries (like the CEE “border states” of Austria and Germany) and labor 
markets (especially those for low-wage, low-skill employment) would be more greatly 
impacted than others, the fears of an EU swamped by Central and Eastern European 
workers are probably unfounded (Boeri and Brücker 2001, 12-14).  
 Boeri and Brücker’s basic econometric model in these analyses is a time-series 
model founded on Hatton’s (1995) examination of emigration from the United Kingdom 
in the four decades prior to World War I. Since Germany was the country of destination45 
for about two-thirds of CEE migrants in the most recent year (1998) the authors have 
relevant data, Boeri and Brücker first estimate the number of migrants who would arrive 
in Germany for the first thirty years after the free labor mobility policy is implemented. 
Then, based on the percentages of CEE nationals in the other EU15 countries in 1998, the 
authors predict the number of such migrants who would move to each of these member 
states over the same time period. The authors feel confident in taking this step because 
national patterns of migration are generally stable over time due to networking effects 
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(Boeri and Brücker 2000, 113-116; Massey et. al. 1993, 448-449). In short, Boeri and 
Brücker assert that the total consequences of eastern expansion on EU15 labor markets 
would not be insignificant, but they would be manageable without adopting radically 
obstructionist policies, even in the case of CEE worker mobility (Boeri and Brücker 
2000, h-n).  
 Since CEEC8 enlargement was postponed until 2004, however, the Commission 
wanted to ensure that not enough had changed in the circumstances surrounding the 
EU15 labor markets and their relationships with CEE workers that the original report’s 
results had been invalidated. Therefore, the Employment and Social Affairs directorate-
general commissioned a follow-up report a few years later to examine this question. 
Alvarez-Plata and her co-authors (2003) discover that relatively little had shifted in terms 
of the migration conditions between the EU15 and CEE countries in the few years since 
the Boeri and Brücker piece had been written. While the German economy (and that of 
the EU in general) had not performed as well as the original model predicted, and 
increased economic growth in the CEEC10 had decreased the GDP gap by more than the 
original authors believed would happen, these differences are not large enough to change 
the overall extrapolation that declares that less than four percent of the CEEC10’s 
population would move to the EU15 countries in the long run. In fact, the new report 
asserts that this number should be slightly less by a fraction of a percent (Alvarez-Plata 
et. al., 7, 9, 50-51). The one outcome of this new analysis that might be contradictory to 
the previous results is the evidence that is derived from at least one of these authors’ 
models about the future distribution of CEE labor migrants in the EU15 economies. In 
one of their models, Alvarez-Plata and her co-authors find that the German share of the 
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CEEC10 workers would be less than half of the sixty percent46 predicted by Boeri and 
Brücker’s work. However, the new report’s authors believe that this result is nonsensical 
and do not use it to project labor migration potentials for the entire EU15 region 
(Alvarez-Plata et. al., 56). In general, however, this follow-up report confirms the results 
of the earlier European Commission study of the question of CEE population migration 
potential (Alvarez-Plata et. al., 55-56). 
Other Consensus Pieces--Three other pieces that use different methodologies from the 
European Commission’s reports but agree with their two to four percent long-term donor-
country migration conclusion are Bauer and Zimmermann (1999), Brücker (2001), and 
Krieger (2004). The first pair of authors employ a similar accession experience to the 
CEE situation, the period in the 1980s when the EU admitted three southern European 
countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) into the organization, to estimate migration 
determinant coefficients. These figures are calculated for the periods before and after 
labor mobility restrictions were in place for these three countries and then applied to a 
number of CEE countries’ populations. Despite some reservations on their part due to the 
even worse economic situation the prospective CEE member states were in compared to 
the southern European ones, Bauer and Zimmermann conclude that a reasonable 
expectation for CEE migration is that two to three percent of their populations47 will 
leave for Western Europe in the long run (Bauer and Zimmermann, 44-47). Brücker 
(2001, 32, 52), however, pursues a somewhat different tack to arrive at a similar 
conclusion. He takes emigration data to Germany from eighteen different countries and 
estimates coefficients that he uses to project thirty-year CEE migration potential to 
Germany. Since at that time Germany was by far the most popular destination country for 
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CEE labor migrants (Boeri and Brücker 2000, 113), the author can then make broader 
statements about East to West European labor migration using these figures. In fact, he 
determines (Brücker, 48) that Germany should expect between two and three percent of 
the CEEC10’s population to migrate during the period in question, thus hinting that fears 
of mass labor migration from Eastern to Western Europe are unfounded. 
 A survey-based forecast48 of CEEC10 migration can be found in Krieger (2004), 
who argues that despite the huge methodological differences that exist between a survey-
based and econometric study of this question, his results are in line with those of the 
Boeri and Brücker (2000) contribution. First, Krieger’s measure of short-term (five-year) 
migration potential predicts that just over one percent of the CEEC10’s population could 
move within that time frame, which corresponds with what Boeri and Brücker (2000, 
127) maintain. Additionally, Krieger’s gauge of long-term migration potential (which he 
labels “general inclination” and “basic intention” to move) furnishes him with a band 
between 1.8 and 3.7 percent of the target population that may leave home49 in the distant 
future. This prediction is also in accord with what the official European Commission 
reports conclude, again despite the serious divergence in approaches here. Krieger 
acknowledges that there are noteworthy limitations on his methods, some of which are 
inherent in using surveys and some50 that are unique to his work. However, the author is 
certain that his results can be usefully compared to those of the commonly-cited 
econometric models (Krieger, 16-18).  
Low Previous Estimates--It is vital to keep in mind that not every forecast of CEE labor 
movement concurs with the two to four percent boundaries discussed above. In fact, a 
few systematic studies predict that a smaller percentage of population movement would 
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occur, perhaps a surprising admission given the amount of political concern expended on 
this topic in the years immediately preceding CEEC10 accession. For instance, after 
briefly mentioning that despite these public worries about CEE workers there is very little 
in the social scientific literature that tries to make a reasonable estimate of their migration 
potential, Fertig (2001, 707-708) sets about trying to correct that oversight. He creates a 
time series model, also based on Hatton (1995), that tests the predictors of long-run 
migration into Germany and then utilizes them to estimate future migration patterns into 
that country from the CEEC10 accession states. The author51 discovers that just over one 
percent of the population of these countries would move to Germany during the first 
twenty years after their accession (Fertig, 717-719). Since in the 1990s Germany was the 
most popular target country for CEE migration by far (Boeri and Brücker 2000, 126), one 
could extrapolate from Fertig’s results to conclude that overall EU15 migration from 
these states still lies below the lower-bound consensus figure (Boeri and Brücker 2005, 
11; Alvarez-Plata et. al., 26). In short, Fertig contends that EU15 politicians and publics 
should expect a mild influx of workers on the order of their experiences with the southern 
enlargement of the 1980s (Fertig, 719). A survey-based investigation into the question of 
CEE labor migration potential that posits a smaller figure than the consensus one is 
Fassmann and Hintermann (1998), which is essentially a summary of a much larger piece 
written on the same subject (Fassmann and Hintermann 1997). These authors argue that 
the realistic migration potential52 of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Hungarians lies 
approximately between one and two percent of each country’s working-age population 
and at 1.43 percent of their overall population (Fassmann and Hintermann 1998, 62). 
Although larger projections of movement are possible from their data, these authors 
 84
conclude that their lowest figure is the most likely because these respondents have taken 
concrete steps towards realizing their goal of leaving their home country to work in 
another place; i.e., they have applied for a work or residence permit in their destination 
country (Fassmann and Hintermann 1998, 61-62). 
 Another research effort that forecasts a smaller-scale CEE population migration 
than that of the consensus figures is a report commissioned by the UK Home Office that 
appeared just before CEEC8 accession (Dustmann et. al.). These authors create an 
econometric model to establish the determinants of population inflow for Germany and 
the United Kingdom based on historical immigration patterns from other parts of the 
world. The determinant coefficients that result from this procedure are then used to 
forecast CEE migration for the first ten years after CEE accession in a pattern similar to 
Fertig (2001) and Bauer and Zimmermann (1999). What Dustmann and his co-authors 
predict is that relatively few CEE citizens are likely to move to either Germany or the UK 
after their countries become EU member states. In fact, the authors explicitly state 
(Dustmann et. al., 57) that their predictions for Germany are at the low end of what 
previous studies have found and that the numbers for the UK are even smaller than that. 
Despite the problems inherent in this study, the authors are certain that CEE migration is 
unlikely to be excessively large (Dustmann et. al., 8, 52-59). Although these results 
concern only two EU15 countries, Germany and the UK, one could extrapolate these 
results for the rest of them and calculate a CEE migration potential figure below the band 
settled on by the greater part of the relevant literature (Boeri and Brücker 2005, 11).  
High Previous Estimates--Just as there are forecasts that predict that a smaller percentage 
of the CEEC10 workforce would shift west once eastern accession occurred than the 
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scholarly consensus contends is reasonable, there are also some that forecast that a much 
larger percentage would move. In the years before CEEC8 accession, the popular press 
and many politicians speculated that twenty, forty or even fifty million53 Central and 
Eastern Europeans would flood the EU15 countries, causing havoc in the host countries’ 
labor markets and welfare systems (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1; Krieger, 3; Alecke et. al., 
64). To put that in perspective, the consensus projection percentages forecast a shift of 
around 2.0 to 4.5 million CEE labor migrants in the long term (Boeri and Brücker 2001, 
12; Boeri and Brücker 2005, 13-14). More reasonable systematic high-end estimations54 
can be found in the literature, however; perhaps the best example of this type of result is 
Sinn et. al. (2001). This piece builds an econometric model of CEE migration to 
Germany using that country’s experience with population movement from Turkey and 
the EU southern enlargement countries. The authors then predict that over the first fifteen 
years after CEEC10 accession55 that four to five million people from those countries 
should arrive in Germany. Based on this estimation, the authors conclude that the 
German government should adopt policies that would delay CEE workers’ ability to 
freely access the German labor market (Sinn et. al., xvi-xviii; xxiii-xxiv). When 
extrapolated to all of the EU15 countries, however, this estimate would forecast a 
CEEC10 migration potential equal to twelve to fifteen percent of their population. 
Alvarez-Plata and her co-authors (2003, 8, 26) contend that this vast figure is exceedingly 
unrealistic. These authors fault the Sinn group’s use of a common constant term in their 
forecasts, a problem which Alvarez-Plata and her co-authors believe led to Sinn et. al.’s 
upwardly biased estimates.  
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 A similar problem haunts Flaig’s (2001) work on this topic; he starts from a 
similar place as Sinn et. al., utilizing the migration history of five Mediterranean 
countries to create his migration determinant estimators. Flaig then employs these 
parameters to forecast the long-term level of migration from several CEE countries to 
Germany. These results parallel56 what Sinn and his co-authors (2001) discover, but the 
lack of country-specific constants in his forecast equations makes Flaig’s estimators 
suspiciously high also (Alvarez-Plata et. al., 26). Finally, an interesting short-term 
projection of CEE population migration potential can be found in Hille and Straubhaar 
(2001), who determine that this annual figure could reasonably lie between 0.2 and 0.4 
percent of these countries’ population. This figure might seem extremely high, especially 
given that Boeri and Brücker’s (2000, 112) highest projected figure is four percent total 
over thirty years. However, as Hille and Straubhaar are completely willing to admit, this 
short-term percentage may go down after a few years as migrants become adjusted to 
their new situations and economic convergence makes moving to the EU15 countries a 
less compelling option (Hille and Straubhaar, 84-85, 95). 
Critiques of CEE Migration Projections--As might be imagined given the difficulties 
inherent in forecasting any event, the many estimates of labor migration from some or all 
of the CEEC10 economies to the EU15 member states have attracted a considerable 
amount of criticism (Kupiszewski). Some of these negative assessments appear above, 
but others remain to be discussed in this section. For instance, one of the most powerful 
critiques of these extrapolation studies is that they are based on double out-of-sample 
estimates (Zaiceva, 11; Alecke et. al., 70). In other words, since the CEE countries were 
walled off from normal migration patterns during the Cold War (Stola 1999, 140-144; 
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Fassmann and Hintermann 1998, 59-60), there is little past history to guide the creation 
of estimators for future movement. An approximation of what those numbers might have 
been if history had been different must first be calculated (often by analogy to similar 
historical events) and then those estimators are utilized to project future mobility, thus 
creating double out-of-sample estimates. Another methodological criticism of much of 
this literature revolves around the notion that the use of improper estimation techniques 
may lead to faulty labor migration forecasts (Alvarez-Plata et. al., 26). In particular, 
Brücker and Siliverstovs (2006, 749) argue that fixed-effects and Bayesian estimators 
outperform procedures like pooled-OLS or instrumental variable estimators. Even the 
definition of “migration potential”, especially as the term is used in survey estimates, is 
strongly brought into question by some authors (Kupiszewski, 634-636). This term is a 
new one in the study of demographics and worker movement, and as such does not have 
a commonly accepted definition. That fact implies that scholars define this phrase in their 
own ways, creating some potentially serious problems when comparing research results 
from various efforts.  
 Practical problems with projecting labor movement are another focus of various 
researchers’ criticisms of past studies in this area. Quality data availability problems (Salt 
et. al., 86-87; Brücker and Siliverstovs, 737) are a serious challenge to labor migration 
studies, although the situation today is somewhat better than it once was. An issue 
specific to examinations of labor migration to Germany, and projections to the rest of the 
EU15 countries based on these figures, is the fact that the magnitude of these flows might 
be distorted by the return of ethnic German Aussiedler from Eastern Europe in the early 
1990s. For all realistic purposes, however, that migration source is now exhausted, so 
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German policymakers should not expect to see movements at those levels in the future 
(Kupiszewski, 632-633; Meyers, 141-143). Even when suitable data are available, some 
trenchant criticisms exist concerning how those data are employed. For instance, several 
authors (Kupiszewski, 637-638; Bijak et. al., 132-133; Salt et. al., 87) contend that most 
econometric forecasting models do not grant sufficient explanatory attention to non-
economic variables, especially demographic ones. The difficulty with this practice is that 
it might lead to overestimates of labor migration, including predicting sizeable mobility 
from areas whose demographic profiles (Coleman 1993, 526-545) would not support 
such a proposition (e.g., predicting that many people would move from an area with 
mostly elderly residents or with a small overall population remaining after many years of 
migration). Another complexity arises in deciding what kind of migration should be 
under investigation by the research in question. In general, studies of worker movement 
examine permanent labor migration; additionally, some studies only consider gross 
(unidirectional) flows rather than net. These choices could lead to overestimates of labor 
migration and ignore the intricacies of temporary migration, including cross-border 
commuting57 and seasonal work (Hárs et. al. 2004, 262; Kupiszewski, 628, 638). In short, 
the combination of questionable assumptions, ad-hoc specifications and definitions, and 
untenable methodologies allegedly creates a literature littered with improbable results 
(Kupiszewski, 627-630, 642). This study is cognizant of this critical literature and 
attempts to address at least some of its concerns in constructing the models presented in 
the new research chapters, but it is confident that it can add something positive to the 
study of labor migration within the European Union. 
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Conclusion:  
One of the appeals of a large-scale research project like the present one is that it can 
pause to thoroughly appreciate the complexity and breadth of the literature into which it 
is trying to fit. This review has attempted to accomplish that feat in three distinct ways. 
First, several important theories of labor migration (neo-classical economics, new 
economics of migration, dual labor market theory, network theory, cumulative causation) 
and their observable implications have been described in great detail. As stated earlier, 
these theories both compete with and complement each other, and the inferences that one 
can derive from several of these theories is used to justify the models constructed and 
tested in subsequent chapters of this work. Second, the history of European labor 
migration and goals of EU migration policymaking have been briefly but thoroughly 
reviewed. As demonstrated in that discussion, the history and patterns of these peacetime 
movements should have allayed any serious fears about the magnitude of labor migration 
that would follow CEEC10 accession to the EU. Finally, the results of the specific 
forecasts of CEE labor migration to the EU have been explicated in sufficient detail to 
demonstrate that there were a wide variety of these predictions in the literature. The 
divergence of these results illustrates the need for a more thorough and partially 
reconceptualized projection of CEE worker movement to the wealthier EU member 
states. Fortunately, now it is time to end this break in the proceedings, however, and 
move on to the new empirical research chapters on the migration of CEE workers into the 
EU15 countries. 
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Table 2.1 Summary Information Concerning Previous Forecasts of CEEC10 Migration 
 
Author(s)/ 
Year 
Estimation 
Method 
CEE58 Sender  
(Donor) Countries 
Target 
Area 
Estimated 
Migration Flow 
Alvarez-Plata et. al.  
(2003) 
Econometric CEEC10 EU15 3.6 percent in 
2004-2030 
Bauer and  
Zimmermann (1999) 
Extrapolation BU, CZ, HU, PO, 
RO, SK, SV 
EU15 2-3 percent in 
long run 
Boeri and  
Brücker (2000) 
Econometric CEEC10 EU15 4 percent in 
2002-2030 
Brücker (2001) Econometric CEEC10 Germany 2-3 percent in 
2002-2030 
Dustmann et. al.  
(2003) 
Econometric AC10 UK, 
Germany 
5,000 to 13,000 
to UK, 20,000 
to 73,000 to  
Germany, over 
10 years 
Fassmann and 
Hintermann (1998) 
Survey CZ, HU, PO, SK any 
country 
≈700,000 over  
unknown time 
Fertig (2001) Econometric CEEC10 Germany ≈1 percent over 
20 years 
Fertig and  
Schmidt (2000) 
Econometric CZ, ES, HU, PO Germany 300 to 400  
thousand over 
20 years 
Flaig (2001) Extrapolation/ 
Econometric 
CZ, HU, PO, RO, 
SK 
Germany >3 million over 
15 years 
Franzmeyer and 
Brücker (1997) 
Extrapolation CZ, HU, PO, RO, 
SK 
Germany 680,000 per 
year to 2030 
Hille and  
Straubhaar (2001) 
Econometric CEEC10 EU15 0.2-0.4 percent 
per year 
Krieger (2004) Survey CEEC10 EU15 990 thousand 
over 5 years 
Layard et. al. (1992) Extrapolation non-Soviet Eastern 
Europe 
EU15, 
EFTA 
3 percent over  
15 years 
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Table 2.1 (continued):  
 
Author(s)/ 
Year 
Estimation 
Method 
CEE Sender  
(Donor) Countries 
Target 
Area 
Estimated 
Migration Flow 
Orłowski et. al.  
(2001) 
Econometric CEEC10 Austria 187 to 302 
thousand over  
10-12 years 
Salt et. al. (1999) Extrapolation CZ, ES, HU, PO,  
SV 
EU15 3 percent over 
15 years 
Sinn et. al. (2001) Econometric CZ, HU, PO, RO, 
SK 
Germany 4 to 5 million 
over 15 years 
Straubhaar (2001) Extrapolation CEEC8 EU15 1.5-2.0 percent 
over 15 years 
Wallace (1998) Survey BU, CZ, HU, PO, 
SK, SV (and others) 
any 
country 
no data 
Zaiceva (2006) Extrapolation/ 
Econometric 
CEEC10 EU15 3-5 percent 
over 10 years 
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1
 To illustrate the complementary nature of the various theories of migration in the literature on this subject 
and the confused nature of its state of play, Massey and his co-authors (1998) closely examine almost every 
theoretically-informed study of migration that they could locate. What they discover is that there is 
evidence from nearly every region of the world supporting virtually every theory of migration in existence 
(Massey et. al. 1998, 106-107, 132-133, 158-159, 193-195, 219-221). The results of studies from some 
regions tend to support some theories over others, but there is no way for these authors to distinguish which 
one of these theories would be best more generally based on the studies and data that were in the literature 
at the time of their assessment.  
 
2
 Two older theories of migration that are not given much attention by this literature review are 
demographic transition theory (Zelinsky) and gravitational (distance) models (İberg, 38-39). Demographic 
transition theory argues that modernizing societies endure population growth bubbles that come about when 
mortality decreases due to health-care and other technological improvements but fertility does not decline 
in the face of this new reality. The large number of workers who are caught in that bubble cannot find jobs 
when they enter the workforce and are thus induced to migrate elsewhere to survive. Gravitational models 
(Ravenstein 1885, 1889, cited in Lee, 47) state that, analogously to any two objects in Newton’s theory of 
gravity, the attractiveness of a particular destination to migrants is inversely proportional to the distance 
between the migrant’s home and destination regions. As a result, the observed volume of migration from 
one place to another decreases with distance. Although this insight is often used as a control variable in 
studies of migration (e.g., Borjas), it is of a descriptive rather than explanatory nature and thus probably 
does not belong in a discussion of the theoretical explanations of migration (İberg, 39; Straubhaar 1986, 
837; Pryor, 117; Böhning, 35-36; Hárs et. al. 2004, 262). 
 
3
 A bit of an elision or quietly stated assumption in the literature should be observed here, which is the fact 
that net migration is sometimes utilized as a proxy for permanent worker movement and gross migration is 
utilized as a shorthand for temporary worker movement. In neither case is that always true; temporarily 
contracted workers may happen to be present in an economy when the relevant data are collected and thus 
add to the net migration total, whereas some more permanent “gray-market” workers may be missed by 
those figures entirely (Kupiszewski, 628-630, 637-642). However, because permanent migration increases 
the stock of foreign workers in an economy and thus the net migration rate, this equivalency is not 
completely unreasonable. Although cross-border commuting and short-term migration are increasing in 
importance in Europe (Salt et. al., 86; Okólski, 105-106; Wallace 2002, 611-613), permanent or long-term 
labor migration remains the greater concern of politicians and publics due to what that activity implies for 
the receiver and sender-countries’ politics and cultures. 
 
4
 Please note that systems modeling does permit one to track both gross and net migration simultaneously; 
this information can then be used to explore the effects of both types of migration volume on the policies of 
the countries under study and how those figures are in turn affected by those policies. This point is returned 
to in some detail at the end of the systems modeling background section in Chapter 4.  
 
5
 A similar statement could be made about the phenomenon of cross-border commuting, an extremely 
short-run form of labor migration if one looks at it that way (approximately eight hours per workday). This 
practice is becoming more common in Europe (Salt et. al., 86), but it is unlikely to cause much controversy 
and it is not new or unique to Europe. Suburban commuters to urban centers are an everyday sight in the 
developed world, and although there may be some resentment between urban and suburban dwellers 
associated with questions of tax burdens and service use, that sentiment is unlikely to turn into the 
equivalent of the sort of nationalist backlash that permanent migration can create. In a borderless, post-
Schengen European Union, crossing national borders is somewhat similar in effect to crossing state borders 
in the US, and cross-state commuters are quite common there. Again, although there may be some discord 
between the commuters and natives of these states, it is doubtful that this friction would create the 
equivalent of a nationalist backlash. Finally, the author recalls taking the equivalent of a commuter train 
between France and Germany near Strasbourg in the early 1990s while he was traveling during foreign 
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study. The phenomenon of cross-border commuting is not a new one if the French and German 
transportation authorities had set up a commuter line between them that many years ago. 
 
6
 For a detailed application of the HOS econometric model to international labor migration, including 
within the EU15 context, see Basu (2004); a briefer application of the Heckscher-Ohlin model to this topic 
on a global scale can be located in Kapur and McHale (2005, 70-71). 
 
7
 One might also expect that capital would shift from countries that have a lot of it compared to labor to 
those in the converse economic position. Foreign investment by developed-world companies into the 
developing world, although a controversial change associated with globalization, should therefore not be a 
surprising event. Capital, in the form of technology upgrades, can also substitute for labor, implying that 
reducing the supply of labor through immigration limits may cause employers to invest in laborsaving 
devices that actually reduce the number of jobs available to local employees. That result represents the 
opposite of what is logically intended by reducing external competition for jobs through more stringent 
economic immigration rules, and indicates that perverse outcomes may occur in this area if policymakers 
do not carefully consider the consequences of their actions (Tassinopoulos et. al., 15-16). 
 
8
 A topic of considerable contention in studies of the type attempted by this analysis is the notion of the 
substitutability of trade for labor migration. A basic tenet of the HOS model described in this section is that 
they are substitutes for each other in the same way that capital and labor mobility are interchangeable 
(Razin and Sadka, 14-26; Holzmann and Münz, 254-255). The underlying idea here is that increased trade 
between a wealthier and a poorer country will improve economic conditions in the latter, thus providing 
jobs for workers who would otherwise be induced to move to the former to find employment (Bissell and 
Natsios, 310-312). In European Union development assistance policymaking, this idea is often found in 
conjunction with policies that encourage foreign direct investment in, and traditional development aid to, 
poorer states (Muus and van Dam, 36-37; Lavenex 2002, 168; European Commission 2002, 21-23). As is 
discussed elsewhere, concerns about large-scale labor migration from post-Cold War CEE to the European 
Union existed almost from the first day after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, but so has the suggestion that 
increased EU-CEE trade and CEE economic prosperity might reduce the need for it (Layard et. al., 51-61; 
Razin and Sadka, 25). The goals of discouraging pre-accession CEE labor movement both directly through 
continuing EU member-state limitations on it and indirectly through greater unrestricted EU trade with that 
region were advanced by the “Europe Agreements” that were negotiated between the potential CEE 
member states and the EU in the 1990s. These documents promised far more EU direct development aid to 
the CEEC10 and open trade in goods between the CEEC10 and EU than they did free worker migration 
between them (Dinan 2005, 146-147; Friis, 187; Peterson and Smith, 202-203; Barros, 120-122). Although 
it has been asserted that a basic function of all free trade organizations, including the EU and North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), is to reduce migration potential through the economic 
development of their poorer members (Massey et. al. 1998, 283-284) and the EU has used cohesion policy 
for this reason for decades, the EU’s leadership apparently could not state that position officially during the 
CEEC10’s accession preparations. One could speculate that reticence existed because the EU’s leaders 
understood that the citizens of the successful applicant countries would someday have the right to move to 
any EU economy to take work, a right that the Commission is supposed to encourage EU workers to 
exploit. This seeming reluctance to make explicit what is deducible from their actions can be readily 
contrasted with the very public proclamation by NAFTA’s negotiators that it was designed to improve 
economic conditions in Mexico to the point that its citizens would be less likely to migrate to the United 
States or Canada (Muus and van Dam, 68-70; Smith, 136-138). In fact, the Mexican president who 
negotiated NAFTA, Carlos Salinas, was quoted publicly as stating that he hoped that Mexico would now be 
exporting “goods and not people” through the anticipated expansion of the maquiladora complexes on the 
US-Mexico border (Massey et. al. 1998, 284). However, the question still remains whether labor migration 
and trade are substitutes for, or complements of, one another. Even though the HOS model strongly argues 
in favor of the former position and Holzmann and Münz (2006, 254) contend that they were substitutes in 
the case of the CEEC8 at the time of their accession, at least a few scholars would promote the latter stance, 
especially for low-skill employment (Holzmann and Münz, 254-255). In fact, Landesmann (2001, 106-108) 
claims that the literature’s lack of exploration of this controversy for the CEE economies in the years before 
their EU accession has created one of the great unresolved questions related to this event. 
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9
 There are many individual-level reasons for people to migrate (e.g., maximization of economic gains, 
marriage and family reunification, the furtherance of one’s education), not all of them rational (Lee, 50-57; 
T. Brown, 5). However, one motive that hardly ever appears in this discussion is politics (T. Brown, 29). 
Aside from expellees or refugees (Lee, 56; Schmeidl), people rarely move for strictly political reasons. In 
other words, Democrats seldom move from one part of the United States to another just to live near other 
Democrats, for example. The partisan nature of the place where one chooses to live may play a role in the 
final living arrangements selection (i.e., one may choose to settle in a Republican rather than a Democratic 
neighborhood in the same city), but it is very unlikely that the move itself is initially motivated simply by 
politics.  
 
10
 In fact, Massey and his co-authors (1998, 10) suggest that the “propensity to move,” which is a standard 
idea that labor migration researchers are trying to examine, should be replaced with the propensity to stay 
put, as that is the more common response to wage differentials between labor markets. 
 
11
 Of course, migrant workers must earn more in their new labor markets in order for them to overcome 
important obstacles to leaving their old ones (T. Brown, 5). Although dual labor market theory concentrates 
its theoretical attention on the more structural reasons for migration, it does not deny that individual 
workers can rationally calculate whether moving is in their best interests (Massey et. al. 1993, 443-444). 
 
12
 It is easy to aver that alterations in the structures of modernized economies have made three previous 
sources of what Piore (1979, 86-93) refers to as marginalized workers--peasants, housewives and students--
less available or attractive to companies as temporary hires than in previous decades. Modernization of 
farming technology has meant that rural laborers have entered the regularized workforce en masse and have 
permanently moved to urban areas (in other words, there is less underemployment in rural regions than 
there once was). Stay-at-home parents are much less common than they once were, with most working-age 
families in the US having (or at least trying to have) dual full-time incomes. Additionally, fewer young 
people are working their way through school as parents support them more generously so they can 
concentrate on their studies more fully. While it is true that many subsistence farmers, students and stay-at-
home parents still define themselves by what they do outside of the workplace and some of them do 
supplement their incomes with irregular or part-time work, this pool of competition to migrants for lower-
end jobs is not as deep as it once was (Massey et. al. 1998, 32-33) .  
 
13
 As stated previously, the primary purpose of the EU’s cohesion funds (Wood and Yeşilada, 173-184; 
Dinan 2005, 373-384) is to create exactly that sort of migrant-discouraging economic development in the 
depressed parts of the EU. However, the program has long been troubled by charges of political favoritism 
in the determination what projects the EU supports and is thus not viewed favorably by many citizens of 
the EU who provide tax money for these efforts.  
 
14
 This concept is derived from relative deprivation (RD) theory in the social movements and political 
violence literature (Gurr, Davies, Canache). Basically, RD theorists contend that absolute poverty and 
deprivation do not cause conflict; rather, it is only when people perceive a relative difference between their 
status and that of another group that social movements and political violence occur. According to new 
economics theorists, relative income deprivation shapes the income acquisition strategies (including 
migration) of households in many countries. 
 
15
 As one might imagine, the conclusions and implications of the historical-structural theories are at 
considerable variance from those of the economics models. The dual labor market and world systems 
approaches both contend that demand-side determinants of labor migration are the dominant explanations 
for why workers move from one country to another. Supply-side reasons (like political instability in sender 
states) might play some role here, but the developed economies’ need for low-wage migrant labor is built 
into the international system. That fact implies that the wage differentials between wealthier and poorer 
regions that played such a huge role in determining migration decisions in the economics models have little 
explanatory power in the historical-structural theories. Those differences may grow, shrink or remain static, 
but as long as rich capitalist economies need immigrant workers, they will be recruited from outside those 
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wealthy states. The engrained nature of the requirement for inexpensive-labor migration also suggests that 
governments, especially those of receiver states, have scant incentives to stanch the tide of low-wage 
workers in the international system. Since these governments owe their survival to continued domestic 
economic growth, and the corporations that guarantee this growth require migrant labor to prosper, receiver 
states (and the sender-country governments that depend on them) would be shooting themselves in the foot 
to take any serious steps to halt mass interstate labor migration. (A world systems or dual labor market 
theorist would likely argue that this observation helps to explain why American immigration policy 
remains relatively open even under considerable domestic political pressure and rhetoric to seriously 
restrict it.) For these theorists, industrialized- country political institutions can at best shape the origins of 
that migration and direct it to certain parts of their territory. In short, it is not as if developed country 
governments could not do more to cut down on the number of workers who come into their labor markets; 
it is that they are unwilling for important economic and structural reasons to do so (Massey et. al. 1993, 
444, 447-448; Massey et. al. 1998, 33-34). 
 
16
 The concepts encompassed by network theory appear under multiple names in the labor migration 
literature. They could also be referred to as the family and friends effect, friends and relatives effect, chain 
migration, or path dependency (Massey et. al. 1994, 729; Hatton and Williamson, 14, 17; Boeri and 
Brücker 2000, 128).  
 
17
 This term refers to expectations in sender regions about the likelihood of workers moving elsewhere to 
find jobs. The first few migrants must overcome considerable resistance to the idea of going abroad to 
work, but as they prosper and return far wealthier than before or send remittances back home, others will 
try to emulate that success and depart as well. Eventually, it may even become the norm that most laborers, 
especially young ones, relocate to a receiver country at least temporarily to work (Massey et. al. 1993, 452-
453). The gradual creation of this pro-migration culture is an important part of cumulative causation theory. 
Of course, economic setbacks for these workers in their host countries, such as those that occurred during 
the European recession of the late 2000s, may slow or even reverse the flow of workers to, and remittances 
from, these targeted economies (Broomby; Donadio and Schwartz).  
 
18
 Massey and his co-authors (1993, 454) describe a fourth perspective which they call “migration systems 
theory,” which seems to be a generalization of the conclusions of network, institutional, cumulative 
causation, and world systems theories. The most important idea that can be sifted from this approach is that 
sender and receiver countries establish stable and intense systems of migration and exchange over time. 
These systems can be multipolar as well as bilateral, and can change as the economic, social and political 
conditions that spawn them evolve. 
 
19
 Note that this idea does not necessarily contradict the comment in the description of cumulative causation 
theory that higher-skill workers are disproportionately attracted to migration centers (Massey et. al. 1993, 
453). Migrant networks that reduce the costs of moving for lower-skill workers do the same for more 
skilled workers; just stating that the labor flow becomes “more representative” of the community does not 
imply that it ever becomes perfectly characteristic of its skill distribution. 
 
20
 One matter of interest here is to note that a major purpose of Massey et. al. (1998) is to review the state 
of play in the migration literature at the time of its writing using the various theoretical perspectives that 
they describe as an organizational strategy. The various studies that they examine are also broken down 
geographically by region (Europe, the Gulf states, Asia, North and South America). From the authors’ point 
of view, there are relatively few theoretically-grounded studies in the empirical migration literature that 
they scrutinize (Massey et. al. 1998, 293). 
 
21
 Of course, concepts from multiple theories can be incorporated into both statistical and systems models, 
but the structure of systems modeling allows that to happen more openly. In fact, that openness is true of all 
computational models more generally (Taber and Timpone, 43-44). 
 
22
 Massive intrastate European labor movement, often from rural to urban areas, was also occurring during 
this time; for example, by the mid-Nineteenth Century almost one-quarter of the industrial workers in 
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Scotland and England were from rural southern Ireland, which at the time was still part of the UK (Zolberg 
1983, 237).   
 
23
 Substantial intrastate east-west worker movement was also taking place during this period, too. As the 
capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Vienna attracted laborers from poorer parts of the empire like 
Moravia, Galicia and Bukovina (Fassmann and Hintermann 1998, 59).  
 
24
 The purpose of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was to create a common market in 
these two materials that are so important to a country’s warmaking abilities and to rationalize these 
industries. Its founders hoped that multistate control over these industries would make fighting future 
European conflicts more difficult. The European Economic Community was designed to encourage 
interstate trade, and thus peaceful relations, between its participants by reducing tariff barriers between the 
member countries. The EEC and Euratom, a group that encourages pan-European cooperation in the 
nuclear energy industry, were created by two separate Treaties of Rome in 1957 (McCormick, 65-69; 
Wood and Yeşilada, 15). The six countries that constituted the EEC, Euratom and the ECSC were West 
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg (Rifkin, 201-202). 
 
25
 By contrast, neither the 1973 accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark to the EC nor the 1995 
accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland to the EU impelled the organization to impose labor movement 
restrictions on its newest member states’ citizens. These limitations were generally considered to be 
unnecessary because of the relative economic parity of the countries involved and because workers in the 
1995 enlargement-round countries had already enjoyed free mobility through their countries’ membership 
in the EEA. For similar reasons, Iceland’s potential EU membership is also unlikely to produce demands 
for a labor migration derogation on that country’s workers (Hailbronner, 30-32, 221; Salt et. al., 43; BBC 
News 2010). 
 
26
 One might be tempted to argue here that EU countries are finding themselves in a similar situation as 
American cities are (Peterson, 25-27) in that they have lost control over who can move there for work. 
However, as shall be seen shortly, EU member-states are still able to regulate the migration of people from 
non-EU countries; in EU parlance, these individuals are referred to as third-country nationals or TCNs 
(Staples, 3-5, 10-12; Lavenex and Uçarer, 6). Like their American city-level counterparts (Peterson, 27-29), 
they can also implement policies that attract and repel different kinds of companies (and thus EU workers) 
from moving to their cities and regions. 
 
27
 Okólski (2001, 106-107) summarizes this short-term movement, including peddling and small-scale 
trading, under the term “incomplete migration” and claims that this phenomenon is new to the study of 
labor mobility. Basically, this migration is unfinished because permanent settlement in the receiver country 
is not a goal of the workers or their families; in fact, the length of their stays is often on the order of days 
and weeks, not years. However, this foreign employment is a major factor in their households’ incomes and 
the cumulative effect of many of these short stays is that they are abroad for considerable stretches of time.  
 
28
 Obviously, one cannot at this point weigh whether the consensus figures of population migration were 
correct because insufficient time has passed (and that would obviate an enervating purpose of the current 
research). However, some interesting observations can be made about the size of the early CEEC8 labor 
migrant population and its distribution in the EU15 countries. It might also be tempting to conclude at this 
point that the restrictive policies worked and thus were necessary, but there are few reasonable ways to 
prove this counterfactual. 
 
29
 Portugal, Spain, Finland, and Greece abandoned the CEEC8 worker mobility derogation in May 2006 
(Economist 2006; Partos; Kunz and Leinonen, 148). 
 
30
 The ten member states that permitted the free movement of Bulgarian and Romanian workers upon those 
two countries’ EU accession were Finland, Sweden, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (BBC News 2007). As of April 2009, at least four more EU member states 
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had allowed these workers to freely take jobs in their economies: Greece, Hungary, Portugal and Spain 
(BBC News 2009c).  
 
31
 There is now at least some evidence to suggest that the influx of CEE workers to the UK seen just after 
the 2004 accessions is ending due to appreciating CEE currencies and an economic slow-down in the UK. 
This state of affairs is a decidedly mixed blessing for British workers and employers as the 2012 London 
Olympics rapidly approach (Broomby; Cox; Chappell et. al., 18-27, 41-42; BBC News 2009a).  
 
32
 An excellent summary of the state of the current EU migration area and the unanswered questions that 
still exist related to it can be found in Ruspini (2008). At least some of the effects of European Court of 
Justice case law on the development of EU policies concerning the free mobility of EU workers, other EU 
citizens, and third-country nationals can be located in Schneider and Claessens (2005), van den Bogaert 
(2005), van der Mei (2005), Staples (1999), and Hailbronner (2000). 
 
33
 EU countries that suddenly found themselves facing serious labor market disruptions after voluntarily 
forsaking this derogation are permitted to reimpose it during the seven-year transition period by invoking a 
safeguard clause. However, older member states are under an obligation to not make the rules facing a new 
member-state’s workers any more difficult than they were at the time of the signing of that country’s 
accession treaty (van den Bogaert, 61; European Commission 2006, 4).  
 
34
 The earliest proponents of European integration subscribed to liberal international relations theory in that 
they argued that military conflict would be less likely among countries that traded more, and populaces that 
met one another more often, than those that did not. In this sense, it could be stated that the free mobility of 
labor is part of the EU’s plan to ensure that war does not again sweep across Europe (Dinan 2005, 13-14; 
Doyle, 1153, 1161-1162). 
 
35
 In fact, the toughening of the applicant countries’ external visa regimes was one of the most controversial 
parts of the CEEC10 accession process as it proved costly for these potential member states in terms of 
their relations with their non-candidate neighbors. The 1990s saw strong economic ties develop between 
several of the accession countries and their eastern and southern neighbors; these connections were 
disrupted by the process of securing the new external frontier of the European Union. Accession also 
threatened to disturb rejuvenated ethnic ties between nations that had been divided by state borders (e.g., 
between Poland and Ukraine or Romania and Moldova) over the course of the Twentieth Century 
(Andreas, 103-104; Lavenex 1999, 154-158; Bort, 5-8; Bobinski, 238; Grabbe 2002, 99-100; Grabbe 2003, 
84-87; Kiss, 85-87; C. King, 260-264; Lieven, 304-305; Jileva, 79-80; Melis, 194-195; Salt et. al., 73; 
Wallace 2002, 606, 615). 
 
36
 Traditional citizenship (i.e., access to full voting rights, member-state government employment and 
passports, and non-employment related social welfare benefits) policy and the determination of who 
qualifies for access to these citizenship benefits remains under the sole and exclusive control of the member 
states (Maas, 93). Although EU politicians and bureaucrats commonly speak of European citizens and 
citizenship, there are no such creatures in the typical sense of that term. The EU is not a state, and the 
people who live in the EU’s member states are citizens of those countries. EU member-state citizens may 
(in certain situations) access the consular services of other member states, may vote and stand in European 
elections regardless of whether they live in their home country, and carry a similar burgundy-colored 
passport. However, these features do not make them “citizens” of the EU in the usual sense (McCormick, 
149, 154; Maas, 50-52). In short, the granting of member-state citizenship, and thus access to EU 
“citizenship” benefits, is a task left wholly to the governments of the EU’s members. 
 
37
 This assertion relates back to the “democratic deficit” thesis, the argument that because many EU 
decisions are made behind closed doors by unelected bureaucrats or indirectly by heads of government, 
ordinary Europeans are alienated from the process (McCormick, 141-149). Despite the best efforts of the 
EU to address this problem, many observers, especially Eurosceptics, aver that this deficit seems fated to 
increase (Dinan 2005, 5-6; 286-287; Fröhlich, 28-29). 
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38
 A seemingly minor, but possibly noteworthy, shift in nomenclature takes place in this section. Most (if 
not all) of the authors who estimate migration potential for CEE nationals describe them as “population 
migration potential” models rather than worker or labor migration potential models. The unstated inherent 
assumption here is that CEE country citizens are not going to leave for the EU15 member states unless they 
are departing to take a job. After all, what motivates these researchers (as well as the current research) is 
the need to estimate how CEE accession might affect the labor markets and politics of the EU15 countries. 
Based on the EU’s experience with the effects of southern expansion and the EU’s strong bias towards 
viewing its citizens solely as workers, making the mental note that “population” really stands for “labor” 
seems like a reasonable strategic assumption to make. 
 
39
 For an influential summary of how economists attempt to model labor migration, please consult Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 285-308). A brief discussion of the empirical literature on migration more broadly 
can be located in Bauer and Zimmermann (1999, 22-30).  
 
40
 Several excellent reviews, listings and summaries of these estimates now exist (Zaiceva, 6-11; Salt et. al., 
83-93; Bijak et. al., 132; Hárs et. al. 2004, 276-278), some of which cover the non-English language 
literature thoroughly as well. Table 2.1, found at the end of this chapter, contains a summary of relevant 
information concerning many of the studies cited in this literature review.  
 
41
 Bauer and Zimmermann (1999, 37, 41-43) also describe labor mobility projections based on 
demographic and economic trends (see Zimmermann [1995] and Coleman [1993]), especially the age 
cohort and skill differences present between Western and Central or Eastern European economies. 
However, it seems as though this set of projections could be subsumed under the extrapolation models idea 
without abusing the latter. It should be noted that Coleman (1993, 538-539) envisages only limited 
opportunities for mass labor migration from CEE to Western Europe based on the age and skill differences 
between them. 
 
42
 Although Cold War politics and the construction of the Iron Curtain prevented regularized east-west 
migration (especially labor migration) between 1948 and 1989, these obstacles did not prevent all 
migration. Political upheaval in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia at different times during this era sent 
millions of CEE migrants streaming westward, for instance. Yugoslavia, which was not quite behind the 
Iron Curtain, also sent many workers to Western European countries like Germany and Switzerland 
(Wallace and Stola, 14; Fassmann and Hintermann 1998, 60).  
 
43
 According to Eurostat, the approximate total population of the CEEC10 accession states on January 1, 
2001, roughly the midpoint of when these studies were conducted, was 102 million people (Krieger, 18). 
 
44
 In addition, if one presumes, like Boeri and Brücker (2000, a) do in their report, that only 35 percent of 
the people who comprise this migrant total are present employees, the effect on the EU15 labor markets 
does not appear to be nearly as substantial as many people might believe. However, a much higher 
percentage of the immediate post-accession migration flow were employed workers, especially in the UK 
(Pollard et. al., 27; Brücker and Damelang, 34-37). This fact, along with the EU’s historic focus on 
securing the free movement of labor, helps to explain why the present analysis rhetorically equates 
CEEC10 migrants with workers. 
 
45
 In 1998, the next most popular destination (Austria) attracted about twelve percent of the total CEE 
migrants to come to the EU15 countries (Boeri and Brücker 2000, 126). In fact, Orłowski et. al. (2000) 
project that CEEC10 worker migration into Austria in the first decade after accession would add up to 
about two to four percent of Austria’s total population, a considerable figure for that country in that time 
span (Zaiceva, 8).  
 
46
 In one scenario, the German migrant share is as low as twelve percent (Alvarez-Plata et. al., 56). 
 
47
 Another estimate of CEE migration potential based on the EU’s experiences with expansion in the 1980s 
concludes that while three to four percent of the CEEC8 region’s gross population will shift locations west 
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in the first fifteen years after their accession, only about 1.5 to 2 percent of their net population will do so 
(Straubhaar 2001, 7). A further forecast of CEE migration based on the free mobility of Greek, Spanish and 
Portuguese workers in the EU determined that between three and five percent of the CEE’s population 
could be expected to move to the EU15 labor markets (Zaiceva, 13-16). Although that figure might seem a 
bit high to be included in the consensus model section, the author demonstrates visually (Zaiceva, 31) that 
her estimates are indeed in accordance with the consensus figures. 
 
48
 Bauer and Zimmermann (1999, 36-37, 97-100) also conduct a survey of migration policy experts in the 
CEEC10 and determine that their average expectation of population movement falls within the two to four 
percent range of consensus migration rate (2.65 percent). However, this survey has a very low response rate 
(20 of 446 experts replied, for a response rate of 4.48 percent), so its results should be utilized with caution. 
 
49
 Krieger (2004, 17-18) also predicts that about a million (0.99 to 1.1 million) CEEC residents should 
migrate within the first five years of accession (his “firm intention” group). Although this division of 
migrants into general inclination, basic intention and firm intention bands recalls Fassmann and 
Hintermann’s (1998, 62) separation of their respondents into general, probable and real migration potential 
groupings, the purposes to which these figures are being put is somewhat different.  
 
50
 One of these unique limitations is that Krieger’s (2004, 18) survey does not allow him to predict the 
destination countries where these migrants would go to find work. 
 
51
 Fertig and a co-author approach the question of Central and Eastern European migration potential 
somewhat differently in a contemporaneous paper (Fertig and Schmidt). In this work, the authors use 
historical immigration data from seventeen European and North American countries over nearly forty years 
to estimate determinant coefficients of migration. These coefficients are then utilized to project migration 
potentials from four CEE countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia) to Germany over twenty 
years. Not surprisingly given Fertig’s other findings, these results demonstrate that the public disquiet over 
CEE population mobility is probably excessive (Fertig and Schmidt, 20-25). However, as Alvarez-Plata 
and her co-authors (2003, 27) discuss, if one extrapolates the highest estimate from these results for the 
entire CEEC10 over a comparable time period, one would discover that Fertig and Schmidt’s projections 
would equal roughly two-thirds of what Boeri and Brücker (2000) predict. That figure would put Fertig and 
Schmidt’s conclusions somewhere at the low end of the two to four percent consensus discussed earlier. 
 
52
 Please note that this potential is not just to the EU15 member states but to anywhere outside of the 
respondents’ home countries. However, since only about six percent of respondents (and no one from the 
Czech Republic or Slovakia) volunteered a destination country outside of Western Europe, one could argue 
that these authors’ results can be properly compared to those of the other studies in this literature review 
(Fassmann and Hintermann 1998, 67). In fact, these findings may even make the authors’ contention of a 
small EU15 migration potential even stronger because of the possibility of migrants leaving for places other 
than the EU. 
 
53
 One piece even suggested that, including Russia, around one hundred million people from this part of the 
world would emigrate to Western Europe (Coleman 1993, 524). 
 
54
 Alecke et. al. (2001, 64) briefly discuss a number of these higher-end estimates, including the notion that 
fifty million CEE migrants might soon be moving to Western Europe. Most notably, they describe an early 
estimate by Franzmeyer and Brücker (1997, 89, ft. 2) that states that up to 680,000 people, or about 0.5 to 
1.0 percent of each sender countries’ population (Zaiceva, 7-8), could emigrate from the Central European 
Free Trade Area (CEFTA) countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia) annually until 
2030. That would translate to nearly 1.2 million people per year from the entire CEEC10 for the next 
several decades. 
 
55
 It should be noted that Sinn and his co-authors (2001, xvi-xvii) only run projections for the five of the 
CEEC10 economies that had the largest populations (Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic and 
Slovakia) and then extrapolate to acquire the CEEC10 figure. 
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56
 In particular, Flaig (2001, 74, 76) determines that more than three million people from five CEE 
countries (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia) would arrive in Germany within fifteen 
years after EU accession. If one were to extrapolate these numbers for the rest of the CEEC10 as Sinn et. al. 
(2001) does, then one would arrive at figures that are close to those of Sinn et. al.’s article. 
 
57
 In discussing cross-border commuting, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, one should probably 
take care to make a distinction between the “false tourists” who embark on many short-term trips from their 
homes every year to purchase goods that can then be sold at a profit in their home economies and people 
who live in one country but work in another and cross the border on a daily basis to travel to and from their 
workplaces (Stola 2001, 94-102; Hárs et. al. 2001, 256-257, ft. 5; Okólski, 110-124). The former can locate 
their origins in the Cold War-era Polish “suitcase traders” who would take advantage of the price 
differences in the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) economies and their own 
country’s relatively lax visa policies for visiting fellow Eastern-bloc countries to earn a little extra money 
during the lean years of Communist rule. Once the CEE countries relaxed their mobility restrictions after 
the Cold War ended, small-scale traders from all of these states became a common sight at the region’s 
border crossings, train stations, and peddler’s markets. In fact, these open-air markets became known as 
“comecon markets” in a nod to their origins (Czakó and Sik, 715-716; Sik and Wallace, 697-698, 706; 
Stola 2001, 94-98; Wallace 2002, 613). Although these small-scale traders are an important part of the 
CEE’s incomplete circular migration pattern (Okólski, 106-107) discussed elsewhere in this literature 
review, the more traditional cross-border commuters who shuttle to and from home and work in different 
countries are the focus of this discussion. Cross-border commuting has a long history in the EU; for 
instance, a 1964 Council directive on the free mobility of workers specifically exempted cross-border 
commuters (or “frontier workers” in EU parlance) from a rule that allowed member states to suspend that 
right in cases of domestic labor-market instabilities (Maas, 20, 66). This activity has been especially 
popular in certain areas of the EU, such as in the Benelux countries and along the border between France 
and Germany (Huber and Nowotny, 34-39; Recchi, 69-70). However, although there are many case studies 
(Greve and Rydbjerg; Gottholmseder and Theurl) of cross-border commuting in particular European 
regions such as the Cross-Border Commuting in the EU: Obstacles and Barriers (CROBOCOB) project 
(Clasen, cited in Recchi, 70; Ruppenthal et. al.) that examines six different such areas, Huber and Nowotny 
(2009, 31) claim that no study has thus far attempted to investigate this phenomenon on a Europe-wide 
level. Their effort in this direction employs EU Labor Force Survey data and determines that cross-border 
commuting is a relatively rare activity for EU workers, as only 0.6 percent of them report engaging in it 
between 2005 and 2006 (Huber and Nowotny, 34). Even this low figure might be somewhat misleading, 
however, as the majority of border regions report that less than 0.5 percent of their workers engage in 
cross-border commuting (Huber and Nowotny, 35-36). The overall average could be inflated because there 
are several “hot spot” regions that possess conditions that make it considerably easier for workers to 
commute across their borders, such as a shared language or long history of such travel. These areas include 
the Czech Republic-Slovakia border, the Alsace-Lorraine region of France, the Vorarlberg Land in Austria, 
and the entire country of Luxembourg (Huber and Nowotny, 34-41; Gottholmseder and Theurl, 97-101). 
Huber and Nowotny also perform a regression analysis to discover the determinants of commuting in which 
they find that shorter distances, language similarities, and greater economic differences are consistent, 
positive predictors of this behavior. Additionally, these authors contend that the results of their model bring 
into question the idea that the end of the labor migration derogation for the CEEC10 workers would 
unleash a deluge of such commuters to the EU despite forecasts to the contrary (Huber and Nowotny, 44-
48; Maas, 81). In other words, these results agree with the predictions of more “permanent” CEEC10 net 
worker migration that argue that only a modest increase in their numbers should have been expected by the 
post-accession EU15 governments.  
 
58
 Please note that the following abbreviations are used in this column for the sake of saving space: BU--
Bulgaria; CZ--Czech Republic; ES--Estonia; HU--Hungary; PO--Poland; RO--Romania; SK--Slovakia; 
SV--Slovenia. Additionally, “percent” in the Estimated Migration Flow column always refers to the 
percentage of the sender-countries’ total population, not the target region’s; in pieces where several 
forecasts are reported, the medium or baseline projection data are recorded in that column as well. 
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Chapter 3: Statistical Models 
 For the millions of EU workers who labor in member states other than the ones in 
which they were born and hold citizenship, the fact and effects of their presence in these 
“foreign” economies are well-established in the popular and academic1 literature. These 
workers provide necessary skills for, and occupy positions that are difficult to fill within, 
the host country and the companies that hire them. Most of these workers go about their 
duties quietly and cause very few problems for their host countries’ political systems. 
However, as has already been noted, the presence (or even the threat of the presence) of 
Central and Eastern European new member-state workers created considerable 
consternation among many EU politicians and their publics. For these individuals and 
political communities, the operative questions then become the incentives for these new 
member-state workers to pick up stakes and move to the older members’ economies and, 
based on the magnitudes of those motivations, how many CEEC10 workers will take that 
step in the long-term future. It is these matters that the following empirical research 
endeavors to address, starting with an explicit description of the research hypotheses and 
expected relationships that lie behind the statistical model that is constructed, modified 
and employed here. This model is also operationalized in the first part of this chapter, 
including a depiction of the data sources that provide the raw materials for this study. The 
results of the various specifications of the main model are then presented and analyzed to 
determine whether the initial expectations of the research hypotheses are satisfied. This 
step includes an investigation of the projections of CEEC10 labor migration to the EU15 
countries on the broader question of whether older member-states’ worries about this 
phenomenon are justified and reasonable. Finally, the concluding paragraphs of this 
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chapter appraise the augmented state of the literature’s collective knowledge of intra-EU 
labor migration, especially that between poorer and wealthier member states. This section 
includes a concise case study of concerns about “welfare shopping” in the EU, especially 
as it deals with the migration relationship between Poland and the United Kingdom, in an 
attempt to provide some detailed context for the migration numbers forecast by the main 
model. 
Hypotheses and Operationalizations: 
It is still a relatively rare occurrence for social scientists to explicate their relationships of 
interest in explicit hypothesis statements. More often, these expectations are camouflaged 
by the descriptions of their models or are assumed without much detailed exposition of 
their origins; a good example of this practice is how Fertig (2001, 709-711) develops his 
model that is the inspiration for many of the ideas and methods utilized by the present 
study. Although they might seem a bit cumbersome, this analysis has decided to adopt the 
stance that overt hypothesis statements are a useful tool for the reader to comprehend 
exactly what is under discussion and for the author to be as transparent as possible about 
the assumptions present in this investigation.  
Dependent Variable--However, before introducing the first such hypothesis statement, it 
is necessary to describe the operationalization of the dependent variable for the statistical 
models, change in net migration rate (∆mrt). The net migration rate is calculated by 
taking the difference between the population inflows from and outflows to each migrant-
donor country2 and Germany during the year in question (1960 to 2003) and then 
dividing that figure by the population of the sender country (Hatton, 411). Although it has 
been stated previously, it bears repeating that net rather than gross (Zaiceva, 13) 
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migration is utilized here because the former concept represents the more politically 
salient permanent migration, is cited more commonly in the literature, and is less likely to 
overstate the magnitude of the effects of labor migration on the receiver country. 
Additionally, any forecast of medium to long-term labor migration, the subject of this 
research, should concern itself with net rather than gross migration because the size of the 
flow of the net migration stream could strongly impact the likelihood and magnitude of 
permanent migration from one place to another (Fertig, 712). The change in net migration 
rate rather than the net migration rate itself is utilized as the dependent variable since that 
step follows the example of some important parts of this literature (Fertig; Boeri and 
Brücker 2000), permits this model to examine (with the addition of level and change in 
level independent variables) both the short and long-run determinants of labor migration, 
and allows for acceptable forecasts of future intra-EU labor migration (Boeri and Brücker 
2000, 116). The migration rate rather than per capita migrant stock is employed as part of 
the dependent variable because although both the speed with which migrants are entering 
a receiver country’s labor market and their total numbers there matter politically, a high 
arrival rate seems to engender a greater political response than a large, but static, migrant 
population. In addition, most of the relevant studies3 in this field (e.g., Hatton; Zaiceva; 
Fertig; Fertig and Schmidt; Alvarez-Plata et. al.) use migration rate rather than migrant 
stock as their dependent variable and migration rate more directly captures the dynamic 
nature of the phenomenon under study here. Finally, due to the significant autocorrelation 
(AR(1) process) that is present in data from previous studies employing different forms 
of the dependent variable (Hatton, 412; Boeri and Brücker 2000, 116; Fertig, 713), a one-
year lag of the net migration rate is included in the models under investigation.  
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Hypotheses--Since the economic determinants of migration play such a critical role in 
previous studies of this activity, it is appropriate that the hypotheses related to these 
factors are examined first by this discussion. 
Hypothesis 1--Differences in economic conditions between migrant recipient and sender 
countries impel poorer-state workers to leave home and take jobs in more prosperous 
states. 
 Hypothesis 1a--The greater the discrepancy is in average wage rates between two 
countries, the more workers will migrate from the low wage region to the high wage one.  
 Hypothesis 1b--The larger the unemployment rate is in a potential migrant-donor 
country, the more workers will leave the area of high unemployment; the larger the 
unemployment rate is in a potential receiver country, the fewer worker migrants will be 
attracted to that economy.  
 
This collection of hypotheses and variables is derived directly from micro-level neo-
classical economic theories of migration and follows in the tradition of Hatton’s (1995), 
Sjaastad’s (1962), and Harris and Todaro’s (1970) work. The general notion here is to 
capture the wage gains achieved by workers who shift economies, adjusted by their 
chances of finding a job in the recipient country. Those wage rate gains are 
operationalized as the change in the ratio of the receiver-country’s average wage to that 
of the sender country in each year of the study. Changes in the level of this independent 
variable are again employed here rather than the levels themselves so this model can 
examine both short and long-run determinants of the migration rate. Additionally, a one-
year lag of the wage ratio variable is included in these models to examine whether this 
regressor persistently impacts changes in the migration rate. One should anticipate a 
positive relationship between changes in the wage rate ratio (and the lagged wage rate 
ratio) and changes in migration rates because rational workers are expected to maximize 
their earnings whenever possible, subject to the costs of moving and other economic, 
political and social barriers4 that make it difficult to fully engage in that wage 
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maximization process. Unfortunately, comprehensive and comparable wage rate data 
across many countries are not available for any substantial length of time, so this research 
follows the example set by several other works in this field and utilizes the natural log5 of 
Maddison’s (2003) purchasing power parity per-capita GDP data (1990 international 
Geary-Khamis dollars) as a proxy for income instead. By no means is this substitution a 
perfect one because employment rate and population issues are folded into this “income” 
information, but these data are the best-available approximation of wage figures in the 
literature (Fertig, 712; Boeri and Brücker 2000, 114, 153-154). In addition, the 
underlying purpose of including this independent variable in the analysis is to estimate 
what sorts of economic gains induce workers to move from one country to another. 
Although per-capita GDP is not a flawless substitute for wages, especially since many 
migrants earn less than the average wage in the host economy, it can stand in for wages if 
one is interested in the changes of economic rewards that migrants could expect by 
altering their places of employment.  
 Just as with utilizing per-capita GDP data for wages above, a minor substitution 
for the unemployment statistics is also performed here in that employment figures 
(defined as one hundred minus each country’s unemployment percentage) are used 
instead of the raw unemployment data. There are both pragmatic and stylistic reasons for 
this decision; from the former viewpoint, using employment rather than unemployment 
figures avoids the problem of taking the natural log (ln) of the null unemployment rates 
reported by a few countries at certain points in the relevant time series. In the case of the 
latter perspective, making use of employment rather than unemployment figures 
transforms the expected relationships into a more intuitive structure. Specifically, an 
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increase in the employment rate of the host country should make it more attractive to 
labor migrants, which should increase the rate at which they flow to that recipient state. 
Conversely, an increase in the employment rate of the donor economy should reduce the 
flow of workers out of that economy and make it more attractive to returning migrant 
workers, thus reducing the overall outmigration rate. As with the GDP ratio data 
described above and for identical reasons, both the change in the sender and receiver-
country’s employment rates and a lag of each rate are included in these models. There 
seem to be some differences in the literature6 over whether including both sender and 
receiver-country employment as separate variables or putting them in their models as a 
ratio of receiver to sender-country unemployment is more appropriate. From an ease of 
calculation perspective, especially for the projections, it might be advisable to insert both 
employment variables separately. However, for the sake of consistency with the GDP 
ratio’s operationalization and for expository reasons (a ratio better expresses the notion 
that sender-country workers improve their chances of finding jobs by moving to the 
receiver economies), this option might be the better alternative. Since the consensus on 
this point in the literature appears to be unstable, models with both the two employment 
variables treated separately and a ratio are created here to determine if there is much 
difference between their results and utility. As the logic of the GDP ratio variable’s 
relationship to the dependent variable would dictate, one would expect that the receiver to 
sender-country employment ratio should also have a positive relationship with migration 
rate since the improved odds of finding a job in the host economy over the sender one 
should attract rational migrant workers to the receiver country.  
Hypothesis 2--The presence of a history of migration from one country to another makes 
it more likely that current worker migrants will continue that pattern.  
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 This conjecture is a direct outgrowth of the historical-structural idea called 
network theory, which asserts that economic migrants create webs of interpersonal 
relationships that make it easier and less expensive for later migrants from the same 
places to take similar journeys. The social capital that is invested in these relationships 
reduces the risks and costs for later migrants in terms of finding a job, housing, and social 
services. In fact, once a critical mass of migrants is reached, inertia takes over and this 
pattern of worker movement becomes self-perpetuating (Massey et. al. 1993, 448-450; 
Massey et. al. 1998, 42-45). This idea is operationalized here as the stock of sender-
country migrants living in Germany during the year in question divided by that donor-
country’s population. These stock data are divided by the population figures7 of the 
appropriate countries because if network theory is accurate, the greater the concentration 
of a sender-country’s population in one place, the more interconnected should be the 
webs of “friends and family” present in that country and the more that they should 
influence the decisions of other labor migrants to move there. Overall, one should expect 
based on network theory that the greater the concentration of a sender-country’s migrants 
in a receiver country, the higher the migration rate from that donor country to the host 
should also be. In contrast to how the economic variables are operationalized, the first-
order lag of migration stock8 is not used here; rather, the level variable is employed 
instead. This step is taken because the current level of migration stock should influence 
migrants’ decisions about moving to a new economy, not last year’s stock amount. This 
migration stock represents the result of many years’ worth of migration, and it is that 
accumulation of people over the decades that influences later workers to shift to the new 
economy. It should be noted that at least two past analyses in this literature come to quite 
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different conclusions about the effect that a country’s migrant stock has on the migration 
rate from that place. Fertig (2001, 15) determines that this stock has a negative effect on 
labor mobility from the country of interest, a result that he attributes to a crowding-out 
effect (earlier migrants take job opportunities away from potential later ones and thus 
discourage them from leaving home). Zaiceva (2006, 14), however, discovers a positive 
relationship between the extent of migrant networks and migration flows from the sender 
to the receiver country. In short, the difference between what this analysis predicts and 
what at least some authors find acts as an extra motivation for the current work.  
Hypothesis 3--Countries that have a greater ability to absorb foreign workers into their 
economies are more likely to attract those workers than countries that cannot do so. 
 
 The genesis of this hypothesis lies in both neo-classical economic and dual labor 
market (another of the historical-structural perspectives described in the literature review) 
theories. An economy with a large number of unfilled jobs, the way in which this variable 
is operationalized here (the number of host-country vacant positions in each year divided 
by that country’s civilian labor force), is naturally attractive to a migrating labor force as 
it is an indication that a need for foreign labor exists in that potential host economy. 
However, the presence of these job openings is not only a suggestion to prospective 
migrants that work is available in the receiver economy, it could also be a signal that this 
economy is not producing the “right” kinds of workers to staff all of its needed positions. 
As dual labor market theory asserts, when an economy reaches a higher level of 
development, certain jobs become unsuitable for even the most desperate host-country 
workers to take. Nonetheless, these jobs must be performed no matter how distasteful9 
they are to the receiver-country workers, so the companies involved in providing these 
services must turn to foreign labor to execute these tasks. In short, the inclusion of both 
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employment rates and what this research calls absorption capacity10 is describing related 
but not identical push-pull determinants of labor migration. Generally, one would expect 
that an increase in this absorption capacity leads to a corresponding increase in the net 
rate at which migrants arrive in that host11 economy. Just as with the other economic 
variables described in the discussion of Hypothesis 1 and for the same reasons, both the 
change in absorption capacity from year to year and a one-year lag of the level of that 
capacity are utilized in the statistical models. This decision also provides a degree of 
continuity of treatment for all of the economic independent variables in this analysis.  
Hypothesis 4-- Political conditions in, and policy choices made by political actors in, 
sender and receiver countries affect the rate at which migrants enter the receiver-country 
economy.  
 Hypothesis 4a--The presence of a policy of free worker mobility between two 
countries makes it more likely that workers will move from the state with the weaker 
economy to the state with the more prosperous one. 
 Hypothesis 4b--The adoption of a government-sponsored guest worker program 
between two countries accelerates the net migration rate between them from the host-
country’s perspective. 
 Hypothesis 4c--Host-country governments that subsidize foreign worker 
repatriation programs will experience decreases in their net migration rates. 
 Hypothesis 4d--The existence of political turmoil in migrant-donor countries, 
including wars and coups, promotes higher net migration rates to host-country 
economies. 
 Hypothesis 4e--Regime differences, particularly those between authoritarian 
sender countries and democratic receiver states, encourage greater rates of net labor 
migration from the host country’s point of view. 
 
 Although this fourth main hypothesis does not seem like it should be very 
controversial, as has already been demonstrated several theories and observers of 
migration have brought into question the utility of political attempts to control labor 
migration. For instance, Boeri and Brücker (2000, 119) find that the expiration of the free 
movement derogation for the Southern European EU member states had little effect on 
the flow of Spanish, Portuguese and Greek workers to the wealthier EU countries, and the 
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European Commission (2006, 14) argues that the transitional arrangements for the 
CEEC8 member states only delay labor market adjustments between EU countries. 
Additionally, economic theories of migration contend that this phenomenon does not stop 
until the underlying (economic) causes of migration behavior have been addressed. 
Network and cumulative causation theories also maintain that once migration patterns are 
established, it is extremely difficult for governments to alter them.  
 Each of these five political and policy-related hypotheses are operationalized 
through the use of dummy variables, just as studies of migration have done previously 
(e.g., Boeri and Brücker 2000; Fertig; Zaiceva). The first dichotomous independent 
variable, the one for free mobility of workers, is defined as a one if free movement 
existed between Germany and that donor country for the year in question and a zero 
otherwise. That definition implies that this variable is a one for the following countries 
from the relevant years to the present day: the remaining EEC6 countries, 1968; the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark, 1973; Greece, 1989; Spain and Portugal, 1992; Austria, Finland 
and Sweden, 1994 (Biffl, 156; McCormick, 140, 158; Hailbronner, 30-32). The guest 
worker program dummy is operationalized similarly to the one for free mobility; it is 
coded as a one if a recruitment treaty was in force between Germany and the country in 
question during that year and as a zero in all other cases. Based on the information 
provided by Bauer et. al. (2005, 206) and Meyers (2004, 127), this variable is a one for 
only the following states and years: Greece, 1960-1973; Italy, 1960-1973; Portugal, 
1964-1973; Spain, 1960-1973; Turkey, 1961-1973; Yugoslavia, 1968-1973. A converse 
policy to worker recruitment, one of actively repatriating foreign workers and their 
families to their countries of origin, was pursued by the German government three times 
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during the time period of interest: for a total of eight months in 1983 and 1984 for all 
former beneficiaries of the Gastarbeiter programs; in 1996 and 1997 for refugees from 
the Yugoslav civil wars; and in 1999 and 2000 for refugees from the Kosovo conflict 
(Bauer et. al., 214-215; Meyers, 132-133, 136-137). That fact implies that this dummy 
variable is coded as a one only in 1983 and 1984 for the six countries that once had 
worker recruitment treaties with Germany, and in 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000 for 
Yugoslavia (which by this point consisted of only Serbia and Montenegro).  
 The fourth dichotomous variable utilized in this study is the one for sender-
country political instability, which is included in this analysis upon the assumption that 
wars, coups and other national political problems produce migrant flows to safer 
countries. Boeri and Brücker (2000, 120, 154) report that the inclusion in their models of 
Yugoslav data from the 1990s has some effect on their coefficients but an overall 
negligible impact on their projections. However, this research broadens Boeri and 
Brücker’s notion of political instability to include coups and other incidents of sudden 
regime transition in the country in question and has determined that it is worthwhile to 
include this more extensive operationalization in its analysis out of an abundance of 
caution about the results. That fact implies that this variable is coded as a one not just for 
Yugoslavia during the war years (1991-1995, 1999) but also for Greece (1967, 1974), 
Portugal (1974), and Turkey (1960, 1971, 1980) as well. The final political dummy 
variable concerns how regime differences affect migration flows, and presumes that 
workers are often pushed out of authoritarian regimes to democratic ones for economic 
and political reasons. Since the receiver country (Germany) was a democracy during the 
entire time under examination here, the question then becomes how to operationalize 
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what an authoritarian regime is for this study. For the purposes of this research, an 
authoritarian regime is one that can be labeled as “partly free” or “not free” as defined by 
the combined score of the civil liberties and political rights scales presented in Freedom 
House’s12 well-respected annual publication Freedom in the World. This definition 
means that this variable is scored as a one for each of the following countries and sets of 
years: Greece (1967-1973); Portugal (1960-1975); Spain (1960-1976); Turkey (1960-
1961, 1971-1973, 1980-2003); and Yugoslavia (1960-2001). 
 The only remaining independent variable operationalizations are the ones for the 
fixed- effects variables employed by this study. Fixed-effects variables are utilized for 
values that either do not change or shift very slowly over the course of the time period of 
interest (Zaiceva, 14). These relationships pose special challenges for a time-series 
analysis such as this one because independent variables must vary in order to avoid 
serious statistical complications (and if this concept is to be at all meaningful). However, 
since these variables do have different values across the countries in the panel (i.e., they 
vary cross-sectionally if not chronologically), they can be included in a limited way in 
this analysis without creating grave statistical difficulties.  
Hypothesis 5--Time-invariant, or limited time-variant, factors can play important roles in 
determining the net migration rates between countries. 
 Hypothesis 5a--As the quality of life (level of development) improves in migrant-
sender countries, the less likely it is that workers will move from a donor to a receiver 
economy.  
 Hypothesis 5b--Language similarities between migrant host and donor countries 
increase the likelihood that sender-country workers will take jobs in the host country. 
 Hypothesis 5c--The further that workers must travel to take jobs in other 
countries, the less likely it is that they will undertake that journey. 
 Hypothesis 5d--Migrant-sender and receiver countries that share a border with one 
another are more likely to have high net migration rates between them than similar pairs 
of countries that do not share a border. 
 Hypothesis 5e--The presence of a global city in a migrant-sender country reduces 
the likelihood that workers will cross a state border to start work in another country. 
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 The initial country-specific time-invariant independent variable of interest here is 
the one dealing with the level of development13 of the migrant-sender countries. This 
variable is operationalized as the 2003 value for the Human Development Index (HDI) 
score14 of each country (United Nations 2008, 25-26). The higher the level of this index, 
the better the quality of life is in that country (and thus the lower the chances are that 
workers from that country will be induced to take jobs in other states). The HDI is a 
measure of well-being of most UN members’ citizens that takes into account not just 
standard of living (as the economic variables described above do) but literacy, education 
and health matters as well (United Nations 2008, 355-356). The variety of information 
sources and the multiple measures of quality of life that the HDI employs implies that it 
can be included in this analysis without generating serious multicollinearity problems. As 
Boeri and Brücker (2000, 154) assert, the relative HDI ranking15 of the countries in their 
analysis is fairly steady over the time period of concern. Therefore, even though states’ 
relative HDI positions may change somewhat over time, they do not do so enough to 
prevent their use as part of the fixed-effects estimators. The adoption of this presumption 
is reasonable given its use in this way not only in Boeri and Brücker’s (2000) analysis but 
also in Fertig’s (2001) and Zaiceva’s (2006) as well. The effort that migrants must 
expend to overcome language differences between their country and that of their host 
economy is one part of the obstacles to worker mobility that Sjaastad (1962, 84-85) refers 
to as the “non-money” mental costs of migration. It thus stands to reason that language 
similarities between countries should make it easier for sender-country workers to take 
jobs in a host economy and thereby increase the net migration rate between them, which 
is exactly what Boeri and Brücker (2000, 120-121) determine in their analysis. Three 
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countries in the current sample (Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland) use German as 
their sole official language or as one of their official languages and are thus coded as a 
one for this variable.  
 The next two country-specific variables are closely related to each other but, as 
shall be seen momentarily, are not identical in their theoretical implications. Gravity 
models of migration (Ravenstein, 1885, 1889) posit that a person’s propensity to migrate 
decreases with increasing distance between their home and destination. This explanation 
is not a behavioral one and has thus been downgraded in importance in recent migration 
models, but it can still be included in a larger model such as the present one as a 
descriptive variable. Zaiceva (2006, 14, 28) and Boeri and Brücker (2000, 120) come to 
different conclusions about the utility of this variable, so it is even more important to 
include it here in order to determine which author is more likely to be correct about their 
inferences on this point. This variable is operationalized as the air distance in kilometers 
between the capital city of the donor country and Frankfurt am Main, a major German 
economic hub16. Even though the hypothesis that avers that neighboring states should 
have a greater migration rate between them than those that do not share a border might 
seem like a variant of the gravitational model described above (with a distance of near 
zero for migrants who live and work right along the border), matters are somewhat more 
complex than that. Border areas often share historical, linguistic and cultural similarities 
that make migration within them seem easier17 than even moving one hundred kilometers 
within one’s own country to a place that does not have these connections. Therefore, both 
the distance between capitals variable formulated above and a dummy variable for having 
a border with Germany are included in this analysis. Due to the very real possibility of 
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multicollinearity here, however, regressions with and without either and both of these 
variables are performed and checks are made for the presence of this issue. The final 
time-invariant independent variable of interest here involves the presence of a “global 
city” in the country of migration origin. The global city concept comes from the 
historical-structural school of thought known as world systems theory (Massey et. al. 
1998, 40-41). This theory suggests that much of the globe’s economic activity has 
become concentrated in only a few cities that attract large quantities of skilled and 
unskilled labor. The presence of one of these metropolises in a migrant-sender country 
reduces the migration rate to other economies because the global city serves as a magnet 
to migrant workers of all stripes and thus limits the need for cross-border migration. 
Since global cities do not develop rapidly and there is considerable inertia in their status 
once they are established, this variable can be considered as time-invariant even though 
they may change somewhat over the years. The operationalization of this variable is 
provided by Friedmann (1986, 72), who has a list of primary18 core-country global cities 
that serves as this research’s list of such world centers of commerce and industry. The 
inclusion of this variable appears to be unique to this research, and should therefore be a 
valuable addition to the literature on the question of migration determinants.  
Data, Methods and Procedures, and Model Construction:  
Although the political and fixed-effects variables are operationalized and their data 
sources are provided above, the origins of the other variables’ data are not described there 
because they are somewhat more involved than the ones that have already been 
discussed. The net migration data for the dependent variable in this analysis, the annual 
change in net migration rate for each of the twenty-two donor countries to Germany, are 
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obtainable from the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) for all of 
the years19 of interest. It should be noted (Fertig, 712) that the Statistical Office excludes 
returning ethnic-German migrants (Aussiedler) from these counts. The population data20 
that are necessary for the denominator of the dependent variable’s operationalization are 
found in multiple issues of the United Nations’ annual Demographic Yearbook, as is a 
fairly common practice in these studies (e.g., Fertig and Schmidt, 20). The bulk of the 
migrant stock data21 (1967 to 2003) is also available from the German Federal Statistical 
Office, but not all22 of those figures can be found there. These data must be supplemented 
by migrant stock data located in the 1961 German national census and then interpolated 
to provide figures for the years 1962 to 1966. Interpolation is not always the most 
accurate strategy to employ in these cases, but the steady increases in migrant stock noted 
for most of the sender countries for a few years after 1967 give comfort that it should not 
adversely affect this study’s results.  
 The economic data that form the basis of a large portion of this analysis are 
available from a variety of sources. As indicated earlier, the per capita GDP (wage level 
proxy) figures are derived predominantly23 from Maddison (2003), just as in many other 
previous studies of this question. Finding consistent unemployment data for all of the 
countries in this study is somewhat more difficult due to the different standards that 
national statistical agencies utilize for this figure. However, OECD (2008) has a data set 
that covers virtually all twenty-two countries and that conforms to International Labor 
Organization (ILO) standards for this figure. Just as Boeri and Brücker (2000, 154) and 
Fertig (2001, 712) must, however, these unemployment figures are supplemented by 
national statistical office figures and other sources24 where necessary. The OECD (2008) 
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labor force statistics database referred to earlier also grants the civilian labor force figures 
required to calculate the absorption capacity variable. The German unfilled job vacancies 
information needed to complete that variable is also provided by an OECD database, but 
these data are from their Main Economic Indicators25 source instead. Table 3.1 provides 
some summary descriptive statistics for the dependent variable and the most important 
independent variables in this analysis. 
Methods--The procedures by which the forecasts of CEEC10 labor migration are 
calculated here are somewhat complex, but this section attempts to explicate these steps 
as clearly as possible. First, the overall model, including all of the variables described 
above and using the data from 1960 to 2003, is analyzed with twenty-two dummy 
variables26 (one for each country-specific fixed effect) added to it (Allison, 9, 21-23). 
This regression employs the FGLS technique because of the groupwise heteroscedasticity 
that is present27 in these panel data (Baltagi 2008, 87-91; Baltagi 2009, 99, 133; White); 
the data’s autocorrelation is accounted for by the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable. The coefficients for these dichotomous variables become the data for the 
dependent variable in a separate OLS regression28 with the fixed-effects independent 
variables listed in the discussion of Hypothesis 5. The fixed-effects variables that are 
significant predictors of the countries’ dummy coefficient values then replace the 
country-specific fixed- effects coefficients in the migration projection models. These 
forecast models employ the long-term (steady-state) coefficients of the independent 
variables of interest, which are calculated by dividing the non-change in level coefficients 
by the one for lagged migration rate (see below for the equation that demonstrates this 
process). This step is appropriate since this analysis is interested in utilizing the steady- 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables in All-Country GLS Regressions 
 
Variable Name Mean Standard Deviation 
Net Migration Rate 0.00019 0.00107 
Ln (GDP Ratio) 0.12774 0.44919 
Ln (German Employment) 4.55655 0.03320 
Ln (Donor-Country Employment) 4.54348 0.04841 
Per Capita Migrant Stock 0.00719 0.00990 
Absorption Capacity 0.01273 0.00705 
Free Movement Dummy 0.36 0.481 
HDI 0.93098 0.04630 
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state determinants of migration and this action eliminates short-term migration 
determinants from the projection equation. The projected rates of migration to Germany 
from the CEEC10 member states can then be calculated for each of these new EU 
member states using the relevant data points for 2003 and particular assumptions about 
economic convergence, employment and other economic and political factors. The 
standard figures for these forecasts have been assumptions of a two-percent rate of 
economic convergence and no change in the employment difference, but as shall be seen 
below many different scenarios can be validly explored here. At this stage of the process, 
the migrant population numbers for each country can be computed given each year’s rate 
and that country’s 2003 population29 figure. Once this task is complete, a migration 
extrapolation to the entire EU15 can be made given these migration projections to 
Germany and further assumptions30 about the distribution of CEE migrants in the EU15 
member states (Boeri and Brücker 2000, 116-128; Fertig, 712-718; Zaiceva, 12-15, 32-
33).  
Model--The overall statistical model that is employed in this analysis can be written in 
extensive form as: 
∆mrdt  =  β1∆ln(wr/wd) t  +  β2∆ln(er)t  +  β3∆ln(ed)t  +  β4(msd)t  +  β5∆(acr)t  +  
β6ln(wr/wd)t-1  +  β7ln(er)t-1  +  β8ln(ed)t-1  +  β9(acr)t-1 + β10mrdt-1  +  β11FMt  +  β12GWt  +  
β13WRt  +  β14PTt  +  β15RDt  +  β16COUNTRY 
 
where mrd is the migration rate of donor-country residents to the receiver country in year 
t; wr and wd are the wage (GDP) rates and er and ed are the employment rates of the 
receiver and donor country, respectively; msd represents the migrant stock of the donor 
country in the receiver country; acr stands for the absorption capacity of the receiver 
country; FM refers to whether the host and sender countries had a free movement of 
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workers deal between them; GW represents whether the two countries in question had a 
formal guest worker arrangement; WR denotes whether the receiver country had an 
active worker repatriation program; PT corresponds to whether the donor country was 
experiencing political troubles (a war or coup, for example); RD signifies whether there 
was a regime difference between the receiver and donor country during the year in 
question; and COUNTRY stands for the five country-specific fixed-effects dummy 
variables described previously. In those models where the ratio of the employment rates 
are used, the appropriate variables are replaced by ∆ln(er/ed)t and ln(er/ed)t-1. Following 
Boeri and Brücker (2000, 116) and Fertig (2001, 716-717), the projection models utilize 
the long-term coefficients of the independent variables of interest, which can be 
calculated according to the following equation: 
mrd
*
  =  (β4/-β10)msd  +  (β6/-β10)ln(wr/wd)  +  (β7/-β10)ln(er)  +  (β8/-β10)ln(ed)  +   
(β9/-β10)acr  +  (β11/-β10)FM  +  (β12/-β10)GW  +  (β13/-β10)WR  +  (β14/-β10)PT  +   
(β15/- β10)RD  +  (β16/-β10)COUNTRY 
 
where mrd* is the steady-state (long-term) migration rate from the donor country to the 
receiver country. Due to the expected negative sign of the lagged migration rate variable, 
this coefficient must be multiplied by a negative one to avoid altering the equilibrium 
relationships between the other independent variables and the migration rate.  
Regression Results: 
In general, the outcomes of the full model that utilizes all twenty-two countries’ data are 
in line with what is expected in the hypothesis generation section of this chapter. 
However, there are a few serious, and several minor, exceptions to that statement that are 
explored at length in this section. Table 3.2 contains the outcomes of the complete basic 
model’s analysis and, although most of the relationships appear as predicted, at least two  
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Table 3.2: Estimation Results for Complete Basic Model 
 
Variable Name Coefficient t-value sig 
Change Ln (GDP Ratio) 0.0025690 8.36 0.000 
Change Ln (German Employment) -0.0008386 -0.32 0.750 
Change Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0018582 -3.17 0.002 
Per Capita Migrant Stock -0.0087352 -1.32 0.186 
Change Absorption Capacity 0.0585510 9.14 0.000 
Lag Ln (GDP Ratio) -0.0001201 -2.03 0.042 
Lag Ln (German Employment) 0.0002347 0.30 0.767 
Lag Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0013142 -4.83 0.000 
Lag Absorption Capacity 0.0094848 2.36 0.018 
Lag Net Migration Rate -0.3923536 -14.42 0.000 
Free Movement -0.0000103 -0.62 0.538 
Guest Worker 0.0003943 4.02 0.000 
Worker Repatriation -0.0006100 -3.71 0.000 
Political Troubles -0.0002115 -0.91 0.363 
Regime Difference 0.0000525 0.72 0.474 
Australia 0.0047853 1.28 0.201 
Austria 0.0052320 1.38 0.166 
Belgium 0.0048161 1.29 0.199 
Canada 0.0047379 1.27 0.206 
Denmark 0.0048334 1.29 0.197 
Finland 0.0048638 1.30 0.194 
France 0.0048238 1.29 0.198 
Greece 0.0051730 1.36 0.173 
Ireland 0.0048945 1.31 0.191 
Italy 0.0048080 1.28 0.200 
Japan 0.0048958 1.31 0.192 
Luxembourg 0.0050642 1.34 0.179 
Netherlands 0.0049155 1.31 0.191 
Norway 0.0048643 1.30 0.195 
Portugal 0.0050033 1.33 0.183 
Spain 0.0047412 1.27 0.205 
Sweden 0.0048363 1.29 0.197 
Switzerland 0.0047991 1.28 0.201 
Turkey 0.0052760 1.40 0.162 
United Kingdom 0.0048245 1.29 0.198 
United States 0.0047522 1.27 0.205 
Yugoslavia 0.0054575  1.44 0.149 
 
Dependent variable: change in net migration rate (∆mrdt) 
Number of observations: N = 946 
Wald χ2 (37) = 521.52  (0.0000)
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anomalous results are apparent to the reader even during a cursory examination of this 
information. The first is the null result (in the theoretically unexpected direction) between 
change in German employment31 and the dependent variable while absorption capacity 
has a strongly positive relationship with change in net migration rate. While one would 
anticipate that a positive relationship would exist between absorption capacity and the 
dependent variable, it seems strange that this association would be stronger than any 
other in the model. Unfortunately, the operationalizations of absorption capacity and 
German employment are essentially measuring the same aspect of the German economy, 
so these two independent variables are highly correlated (Pearson’s r = .608) with one 
another. Since nearly all past statistical investigations of the determinants of migration 
flows use receiver-country employment as a factor and multicollinearity has a significant 
presence here, the absorption capacity variable32 is dropped from this analysis. This 
action permits the theoretically expected strong positive relationship between changes in 
German employment and net migration to manifest itself (results not shown). However, 
there remains the issue of the Political Troubles independent variable’s unanticipated and 
weak association with the dependent variable. A thorough investigation of this outcome 
discovers that this observation is the result of a coding abnormality in Political Troubles. 
In other words, the years in which coups occurred in Greece, Portugal and Turkey just 
happened to be years of considerable economic distress in Germany and thus times when 
substantial return migration to these sender countries took place (for instance, see Rose, 
134-135). If one limits the definition of this political instability variable to periods of 
open military conflict as Boeri and Brücker (2000, 154) do, which in this case would 
mean coding this new “War Only” variable as a one for Yugoslavia between 1991 and 
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1995 (and also in 1999), the theoretically expected strong positive relationship between 
war and migration appears.  
 Table 3.3 displays the results of the analysis of this new “modified basic model” 
and sets the stage for the next part of the present discussion. In the same fashion as 
before, most of the anticipated relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables are observed, although there are some exceptions that must be commented upon 
here. First, the free movement of workers dummy does not have a significant positive 
relationship with changes in net migration rate. This null positive result is fairly 
consistent across different versions of this model and would normally lead one to omit it 
from further experiments. However, there are good theoretical and practical reasons to 
keep it, such as the fact that other authors (e.g., Fertig 2001; Boeri and Brücker 2000) 
discover significant positive relationships between the EU’s free worker mobility policy 
and migration levels. Its presence is also necessary in the projection step to see whether 
this policy has any important effects on CEEC10 migration levels. Therefore, the free 
worker movement dichotomous variable remains in this analysis despite this 
disappointing and unexpected outcome. The Regime Difference independent variable, the 
one that measures freedom in the migrant-sender country, also has no significant positive 
relationship with changes in net migration rate. A thorough investigation into this 
unanticipated result determines that many of the years where several of the donor 
countries had dictatorial governments were also years of generalized European economic 
difficulties. These problems would encourage return migration and thus disguise the 
expected significantly positive relationship with the dependent variable. Although the 
results of this data examination33 are not as clear-cut as they are in the case of Political  
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Table 3.3: Estimation Results for Modified Basic Model 
 
Variable Name Coefficient t-value sig 
Change Ln (GDP Ratio) 0.0020185 7.38 0.000 
Change Ln (German Employment) 0.0102745 6.09 0.000 
Change Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0024205 -4.44 0.000 
Per Capita Migrant Stock -0.0197455 -2.67 0.008 
Lag Ln (GDP Ratio) -0.0003221 -4.71 0.000 
Lag Ln (German Employment) 0.0008298 1.78 0.075 
Lag Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0010300 -4.42 0.000 
Lag Net Migration Rate -0.4319264 -16.16 0.000 
Free Movement 0.0000142 0.94 0.346 
Guest Worker 0.0004520 4.61 0.000 
Worker Repatriation -0.0006605 -3.85 0.000 
War Only 0.0032484 4.46 0.000 
Regime Difference 0.0000769 1.09 0.277 
Australia 0.0008971 0.44 0.662 
Austria 0.0015995 0.76 0.447 
Belgium 0.0009428 0.46 0.646 
Canada 0.0008429 0.41 0.681 
Denmark 0.0009402 0.46 0.648 
Finland 0.0010222 0.50 0.619 
France 0.0009306 0.45 0.651 
Greece 0.0017218 0.80 0.421 
Ireland 0.0011094 0.54 0.589 
Italy 0.0010311 0.50 0.618 
Japan 0.0010183 0.50 0.620 
Luxembourg 0.0012206 0.59 0.557 
Netherlands 0.0010912 0.53 0.598 
Norway 0.0009700 0.47 0.637 
Portugal 0.0013097 0.63 0.527 
Spain 0.0009819 0.48 0.633 
Sweden 0.0009477 0.46 0.645 
Switzerland 0.0009009 0.44 0.662 
Turkey 0.0018882 0.90 0.370 
United Kingdom 0.0009481 0.46 0.644 
United States 0.0008128 0.40 0.692 
Yugoslavia 0.0016625 0.78 0.434 
 
Dependent variable: change in net migration rate (∆mrdt) 
Number of observations: N = 946 
Wald χ2 (35) = 411.85  (0.0000) 
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Troubles, they are convincing enough to explain what happened with this variable. The 
third unexpected result that is notable here is the negative and significant one between the 
dependent variable and per capita migrant stock. Although this association is in accord 
with what Fertig (2001, 714) finds, it contradicts network theory’s assertion that a larger 
stock of a sender-country’s migrants in a receiver country should persuade more fellow 
potential migrants to move. This result is fairly, but not perfectly, consistent34 across 
different variations of the modified basic model, which might initially lead one to argue 
that Fertig’s observation may be correct in this instance. 
 A far more important irregular result from this investigation can be detected in the 
relationships between the GDP ratio variables and change in net migration rate. As 
expected, the GDP ratio change variable35 has a very strong and consistently positive 
association with the dependent variable; however, the lagged ratio variable has a 
significantly negative relationship with change in net migration rate. No other pair of 
change and lag variables evinces this pattern of switching signs36 between them, and it is 
unclear from a theoretical perspective why such a variation would occur or what it means 
in terms of the data. This relationship anomaly has tremendous implications for the 
projections in this analysis because it suggests that as the GDP ratio between two 
countries shrinks, more people are induced to move from the sender countries to the 
receivers. Although this conclusion might make some degree of sense in terms of 
regional integration37 theory, shrinking economic differences between Germany and its 
sender countries should not create larger motivations for workers to move38 from the 
latter to the former.  
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 Whenever an unexpected result such as this one materializes in an investigation, 
several potential reasons for it could be present. One possibility is that the statistical 
technique used to analyze the data is misapplied, faulty or inappropriate for the problem 
at hand. After careful consideration, however, this option is rejected because a very 
similar technique has been successfully employed for this problem in the past (Fertig) 
and all relevant considerations to choice of methodologies (e.g., panel data, 
autocorrelation39, heteroscedasticity) seem to be addressed here. However, the country-
specific variables that Fertig utilizes are not strictly necessary for the projections 
(Brücker and Siliverstovs), although it would be preferable if they were included.  
 Secondly, there could be problems with the data set itself. That concern is 
especially relevant given the apprehensions that previous authors40 (Boeri and Brücker 
2000; Fertig) have about migration data from Yugoslavia, particularly during the war 
years of the early to mid-1990s. These points are tested by removing the Yugoslav data 
from the modified basic model and by doing the same to all donor-countries’ data from 
1991 to 1995. In neither case are there any appreciable changes in the sign or significance 
of the lagged GDP ratio variable, although omitting the Yugoslav data does make the free 
movement of workers dummy significant (figures available upon request). Another 
potential data set problem is that the political and economic changes engendered by the 
end of the Cold War in Europe altered migration patterns to the point that results that 
would have seemed unbelievable prior to 1991 may now be correct. This option is 
examined by placing a dummy variable called Post90 in the modified basic model to test 
whether there is any significant difference between the relevant time periods in terms of 
the independent variables’ relationships with change in net migration rate, and by running 
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the analysis again using only data from before41 1991. Even though the post-1990 dummy 
does not demonstrate any significant differences between the time periods, the 
experiment that only utilizes the pre-1991 data does (Table 3.4). Of particular 
importance42 for the purposes of this discussion is the fact that both the change and 
lagged GDP ratio variables are now significant positive predictors of the dependent 
variable. It remains unclear what specific alterations in the data would have led to this 
result, but there is at least some evidence here that the end of the Cold War modified 
some important features of the migration variable relationships. 
 Yet another possible cause of the unusual result for the lagged GDP ratio variable 
is that it is interacting with other independent variables in the model (just like absorption 
capacity and German employment do earlier). Of particular concern here are the 
insignificant substantive dummy variables for free worker movement and regime 
difference along with the country-specific dichotomous variables at the end of the model. 
Eliminating the insignificant dummies has no effect on any other independent variables in 
the model, but some interesting results come about when one removes the country-
specific variables43 from the equation (Table 3.5). For example, the sign and magnitude 
of the migration stock variable switches from significantly negative to insignificantly 
positive. However, of far more interest to this analysis is the fact that the lagged GDP 
ratio variable is now an insignificantly positive predictor of change in net migration rate. 
This observation indicates that it is possible that the country-specific variables are 
masking the true and predicted positive relationship between these two variables. If that 
is the case, it might be acceptable to use these coefficients to forecast net CEEC10 
worker migration. What this decision implies is that these projections would treat all  
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results for Modified Basic Model (1960-1990 Data Only) 
 
Variable Name Coefficient t-value sig 
Change Ln (GDP Ratio) 0.0028027 15.09 0.000 
Change Ln (German Employment) 0.0174243 11.54 0.000 
Change Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0028387 -6.69 0.000 
Per Capita Migrant Stock -0.0315602 -4.00 0.000 
Lag Ln (GDP Ratio) 0.0000791 1.80 0.072 
Lag Ln (German Employment) 0.0009011 1.38 0.167 
Lag Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0017432 -6.63 0.000 
Lag Net Migration Rate -0.4086896 -17.37 0.000 
Free Movement 0.0000252 1.54 0.123 
Guest Worker 0.0005740 6.47 0.000 
Worker Repatriation -0.0002496 -1.40 0.161 
Regime Difference 0.0000433 0.71 0.480 
Australia 0.0038526 1.63 0.104 
Austria 0.0048343 2.02 0.043 
Belgium 0.0038795 1.64 0.102 
Canada 0.0038013 1.60 0.109 
Denmark 0.0039316 1.66 0.097 
Finland 0.0039714 1.68 0.094 
France 0.0039028 1.65 0.100 
Greece 0.0047191 1.94 0.053 
Ireland 0.0038201 1.61 0.107 
Italy 0.0038954 1.64 0.102 
Japan 0.0039675 1.68 0.094 
Luxembourg 0.0044184 1.86 0.063 
Netherlands 0.0041074 1.73 0.084 
Norway 0.0039649 1.67 0.094 
Portugal 0.0039744 1.67 0.095 
Spain 0.0036962 1.55 0.120 
Sweden 0.0039474 1.67 0.096 
Switzerland 0.0040858 1.72 0.085 
Turkey 0.0044387 1.85 0.064 
United Kingdom 0.0038678 1.63 0.103 
United States 0.0038552 1.62 0.104 
Yugoslavia 0.0045538 1.89 0.059 
 
Dependent variable: change in net migration rate (∆mrdt) 
Number of observations: N = 660 
Wald χ2 (34) = 843.00  (0.0000) 
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results for Modified Basic Model without Country-Specific and 
Several Dummy Variables 
 
Variable Name Coefficient t-value sig 
Change Ln (GDP Ratio) 0.0024570 9.75 0.000 
Change Ln (German Employment) 0.0121306 6.25 0.000 
Change Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0013465 -2.84 0.005 
Per Capita Migrant Stock 0.0020583 0.96 0.336 
Lag Ln (GDP Ratio) 0.0000347 1.30 0.195 
Lag Ln (German Employment) 0.0003458 2.22 0.027 
Lag Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0003338 -2.13 0.033 
Lag Net Migration Rate -0.3456958 -13.96 0.000 
Free Movement 0.0000046 0.52 0.603 
 
Dependent variable: change in net migration rate (∆mrdt) 
Number of observations: N = 946 
Wald χ2 (9) = 352.22  (0.0000)
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countries as if their citizens have the exact same incentives to migrate and these forecasts 
would forego the use of the time-invariant variables listed in Hypothesis 5. While this 
outcome is not what this study intended from the beginning and it represents a sacrifice 
of part of the model’s explanatory value, the results of Brücker and Siliverstovs’ (2006) 
tests of the forecasting power of various estimators should eliminate any doubt about the 
propriety of this step. What these authors discover is that, although other estimators 
outperform GLS estimators more generally, there is very little difference44 between the 
forecasting performance of GLS estimators that utilize time-invariant variables and those 
that do not. In other words, estimating the model without the country-specific effects and 
then conducting a projection using those estimators is legitimate. 
 A final potential reason for these unusual results is that this analysis discovers 
something new about the European migration system; in other words, there is nothing 
wrong with the modified basic model as it originally stands. Even though these findings 
run counter to the established literature on this subject, one must be open to the 
possibility that new results correctly contradict previous studies. It also implies that the 
information from Table 3.3 should be utilized in a projection to determine whether these 
results could be valid. What this explication implies for this research overall is that three 
basic projection models (one using the information from Table 3.3, one utilizing the 
coefficients from Table 3.4, and a third taken from the data in Table 3.5) are calculated 
and compared to discuss the plausibility of their results and the consequences of 
accepting each of these forecasts as accurate. 
Southern European Data Models--One of the items that some previous explication of this 
analysis promises is that it would include models that employ data from “Southern 
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European”45 countries that have historically been relatively economically disadvantaged 
in comparison to others in the full data set. That pledge exists because it might be 
asserted that models that use these data would grant more accurate predictions of CEE 
migrant flows due to their similarly economically deprived status in comparison with 
most of Western Europe. In order to maintain methodological consistency, the same 
initial basic model is estimated for the Southern European data as for the complete data 
set. Perhaps not surprisingly, the same problems with the absorption capacity and 
Political Troubles independent variables are discovered here, and so the same steps are 
taken as above to deal with these issues. Those actions create a modified basic model 
using the Southern European data that produces results (Table 3.6) that are quite similar 
to those of the complete-data model. For instance, all of the change in level variables are 
statistically significant in their anticipated directions, and the theoretically unexpected 
(but identical to the full-data) result of a negative relationship between migrant stock and 
the dependent variable is found here. Additionally, the unusual outcome of a positive 
change in GDP ratio relationship with change in net migration rate but a negative lagged 
GDP ratio correlation with that same dependent variable is in evidence. Investigations 
into the origins of these findings like those outlined previously turn up very similar 
results to what is found in the complete-data model (e.g.: no effect of the addition of a 
post-1990 dummy; the lagged GDP ratio variable’s sign changes when using only pre-
1990 data points) with one critical exception. The removal of the Yugoslav or the post-
1990 data, even just the figures from 1991 through 1995, have an appreciably deleterious 
effect on the significance of the change in GDP ratio independent variable’s relationship 
with change in net migration rate. In other words, important portions of the Southern  
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Table 3.6: Estimation Results for Modified Basic Model Using Southern European Data 
 
Variable Name Coefficient t-value sig 
Change Ln (GDP Ratio) 0.0021721 1.90 0.057 
Change Ln (German Employment) 0.0199230 3.47 0.001 
Change Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0052095 -2.06 0.039 
Per Capita Migrant Stock -0.0157209 -1.23 0.217 
Lag Ln (GDP Ratio) -0.0003099 -1.07 0.286 
Lag Ln (German Employment) 0.0008882 0.37 0.709 
Lag Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0010275 -1.16 0.244 
Lag Net Migration Rate -0.5197133 -9.63 0.000 
Free Movement 0.0000618 0.69 0.490 
Guest Worker 0.0004718 2.90 0.004 
Worker Repatriation -0.0005817 -2.15 0.032 
War Only 0.0030822 3.44 0.001 
Regime Difference 0.0000822 0.61 0.541 
Greece 0.0013489 0.14 0.892 
Ireland 0.0008162 0.08 0.935 
Italy 0.0007000 0.07 0.944 
Portugal 0.0010072 0.10 0.919 
Spain 0.0006777 0.07 0.946 
Turkey 0.0015717 0.16 0.873 
Yugoslavia 0.0013999 0.14 0.887 
 
Dependent variable: change in net migration rate (∆mrdt) 
Number of observations: N = 301 
Wald χ2 (20) = 129.01  (0.0000) 
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European modified basic model’s results are rather dependent on these particular data 
points. That conclusion implies that the coefficients derived from models using just the 
Southern European data are likely to be unstable and thus unsuitable for projection 
models. In short, forecasts of CEE migration to the EU15 countries are not made using 
only the Southern European data in this analysis due to this outcome. 
Time-Invariant Variables Calculations--Although several different sets of full-data 
projections are pursued in this analysis, only one fixed-effect regression is described in 
detail presently because the process and results are virtually identical for each of the 
procedures. As described earlier, this stage of the analysis consists of conducting an OLS 
regression with the twenty-two country-specific coefficients comprising the dependent 
variable’s data and the five fixed-effects variables discussed in Hypothesis 5 as the 
independent variables. Table 3.7a displays the pertinent results46 of the complete OLS 
regression for the modified basic model’s GLS regression (Table 3.3). As can clearly be 
seen in this table, the initial results of the full model do not resemble what was initially 
predicted; for example, only one independent variable (HDI) is a significant predictor of 
the dependent variable in the expected direction. However, since the border dummy has 
some degree of collinearity with the language one (Pearson’s r = .582) and one could 
argue that it is measuring much the same concept as the distance variable is, the border 
dichotomous variable is omitted from further regressions. That act immediately permits 
the language variable’s significant positive relationship with the dependent variable to be 
observed, even though the rest of the independent variables (aside from HDI) remain 
insignificant. The next inconsequential variable to be removed from the analysis is 
distance, especially since neither Boeri and Brücker (2000, 120) nor Fertig (2001, 716)  
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Table 3.7a: Estimation Results for Modified Basic Model’s Time-Invariant Variables (All 
Hypothesis 5 Variables) 
 
Variable Name Coefficient t-value sig 
HDI -0.0049840 -5.07 0.000 
Language 0.0002401 1.61 0.126 
Distance -5.75e-09 -.047 0.647 
Border -0.0000269 -.022 0.831 
Global City -0.0001341 -1.36 0.192 
constant 0.0057939 6.46 0.000 
 
Dependent variable: country-specific fixed effects 
Number of observations: N = 22 
F-test (5, 16) = 7.57  (0.0008) 
Adjusted R2 = 0.6101  
 
 
Table 3.7b: Estimation Results for Modified Basic Model’s Time-Invariant Variables 
(Significant Hypothesis 5 Variables Only) 
 
Variable Name Coefficient t-value sig 
HDI -0.0053931 -5.94 0.000 
Language 0.0002315 1.93 0.068 
constant 0.0061161 7.24 0.000 
 
Dependent variable: country-specific fixed effects 
Number of observations: N = 22 
F-test (2, 19) = 18.25 (0.0000) 
Adjusted R2 = 0.6217
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find that distance has a significant impact on the dependent variable. This step has no 
effect on the ability of the sender-country global city presence dummy to be a significant 
predictor47 of the dependent variable, although in a few cases it is close to passing the 0.1 
significance cutoff point in the expected direction. Removing the global city presence 
dichotomous variable from the analysis leaves only the human development index and 
language measures (Table 3.7b) as variables that could be carried over into the projection 
phase of this analysis. 
Steady-State Estimators Calculations--Since the process of computing the long-term 
estimators is the same for all three model variants, only one instance of this work is fully 
described here in order to conserve time and space. Table 3.8 presents the steady-state 
coefficients for the modified basic model’s analysis. These figures are calculated by 
dividing each of the relevant coefficients by the one for the lag of the dependent variable 
(multiplied by negative one for the reason outlined above). These coefficients are the 
ones that are employed for the projections because they should omit any short-term 
effects on the migration patterns under study (Fertig, 717). It should be noted here that 
only certain independent variables are brought forward into the forecasting section of this 
project. For instance, none of the five dichotomous variables described in Hypothesis 4 
are utilized in the forecasts, except for free movement, because it is exceedingly unlikely 
that the CEE countries that are the focus of these projections will have a regime 
difference, guest worker scheme, or migrant return program48 with Germany (or 
experience a civil war) in any reasonable future. The free movement variable is used in 
these projections, even though it is not generally49 a significant predictor of the dependent 
variable, because it is a policy feature of great interest to this project. Additionally, other  
 136
Table 3.8: Modified Basic Model’s Steady-State (Long-Run) Coefficients 
 
Variable Name Coefficient Long-Run Coefficient 
Per Capita Migrant Stock -0.0197455 -0.0457150 
Lag Ln (GDP Ratio) -0.0003221 -0.0007457 
Lag Ln (German Employment) 0.0008298 0.0019212 
Lag Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0010300 -0.0023847 
Free Movement 0.0000142 0.0000329 
HDI -0.0053931 -0.0124862 
 
Lag Net Migration Rate (β10) = -0.4319264 
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authors (e.g., Boeri and Brücker 2000) determine that it can have a positive effect on 
worker migration. Furthermore, the significant language variable from the Hypothesis 5 
OLS regressions is omitted from the forecasts because none of the ten CEE countries of 
interest here have a language similarity with Germany. Finally, the migrant stock variable 
is included in the projections despite lingering questions about the direction of its impact 
on migration since there is considerable reason (from network theory and even its 
detractors) to believe that it has some influence on this phenomenon. In short, the choice 
of projection variables is driven by statistical significance, theoretical importance, and 
practical decision-making. 
Projections: 
Prior to describing the results of the various forecasts that are performed in this analysis, 
it is critical to explicate the conditions that are assumed to hold true in their “future”. 
First, in order to simplify comparisons between these results and those of the literature 
projections, it is supposed here that all ten CEE new member states join the EU in 2004. 
Additionally, the baseline economic conditions that are presumed to exist for all three of 
the projection models include an annual two-percent GDP convergence between 
Germany and each CEE member state and a static employment50 situation. The 
employment figures that are utilized in these forecasts are the averages of each country’s 
employment between 1996 (the first year ILO unemployment data are available for all 
ten CEECs) and 2003. Given the seven-year derogation on free worker mobility included 
in each CEE state’s accession treaty and the political pressures facing EU15 politicians in 
2003, these forecasts also initially assume that all of the EU15 countries fully exercise 
this provision (i.e., completely free intra-EU migration does not occur until 2011). Since 
 138
the Human Development Index scores do not change much over short periods of time, it 
is presumed that these figures remain the same over the entire projection period (roughly 
25 years, from 2004 to 2030). Following Fertig (2001, 718), all of these forecasts also 
allow the migration stocks to collect year by year and then cumulatively impact the next 
year’s figures; in addition, it is also assumed here that births into and deaths out of these 
stocks are equal. Finally, the baseline projection presumes that the CEE countries’ 
populations remain static throughout the forecasting period. Given the demographics of 
this part of Europe over the past twenty years, taking a steady-state initial approach might 
be appropriate. Even if there are objections to some of these assumptions, however, many 
of them are adjusted in the alternative projections that follow or could be changed in the 
future if necessary. 
 Given the problematic results of the country-specific effects regressions, perhaps 
it is not surprising that the projections that employ the coefficients derived from these 
regressions are troubling as well. In both51 the full-data modified basic model and the one 
that utilizes only information from 1960 to 1990, the projected migrant outflow in the 
first year of the forecast exhausts the total migrant stock in Germany for each sender 
country. In other words, these forecasts would predict that more Bulgarians than lived in 
Germany in 2004 would return home from the receiver country in that year, for instance. 
While a negative net migrant flow from the host country is not a sign52 of a faulty model, 
predicting that in one year every Central and Eastern European worker leaves Germany 
for home (and then some) is clearly ridiculous. The primary culprit for this result is the 
relatively large negative value for the HDI coefficient; to a lesser extent, the negative 
wage ratio value53 in the full-data modified basic model contributes to that forecast’s 
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problems. Again, given the interaction issues that plague the country-specific variables 
that spawned the HDI coefficient, this discovery should not be particularly startling. 
While it could have been asserted from the start of this process that the pre-1991 data 
projection would be invalid due to truncated data issues, the results of the forecast using 
the complete data set and country-specific variables are rather disappointing. 
 Far more encouraging are the results from the projection that omits the country-
specific variables54 entirely; Table 3.9 contains the long-term coefficients for this model. 
This forecast (Table 3.10) claims that only a small percentage (1.39%) of the CEEC10 
member states’ populations will migrate to the EU15 countries over the first quarter-
century of their countries’ EU membership. This figure falls below that of the consensus 
band discussed in the literature review, but it is not an unreasonable estimate given the 
theoretical expectations of this analysis. The projected migration flow figures also 
perform reasonably well dynamically, with only small increases or decreases in the rate 
of these changes until a near-plateau in that growth is reached in many cases (Table 
3.11). This pattern is somewhat similar to how Boeri and Brücker’s (2000) and Fertig’s 
(2001) forecasts behave. The lone exception to the plateau observation occurs when fully 
free mobility of workers is introduced in 2011. There is a one-year spike in migrants for 
all ten donor countries then, but the pattern of slow growth or shrinkage in migration 
rates quickly resumes. To test the accuracy of this forecast model, the relevant 2003 
economic and political conditions are also programmed into it and the result of these 
calculations can be compared with the actual CEEC10 net migration totals that are 
observed for that year. While the model would forecast that 33,522 net CEE migrants 
would have moved to Germany in 2003, the actual total net migration from these  
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Table 3.9: No Country-Specific and Omitted Dummy Variables Steady-State Coefficients 
 
Variable Name Coefficient Long-Run Coefficient 
Per Capita Migrant Stock 0.0020583 0.0059541 
Lag Ln (GDP Ratio) 0.0000347 0.0001004 
Lag Ln (German Employment) 0.0003458 0.0010003 
Lag Ln (Donor-Country Employment) -0.0003338 -0.0009656 
Free Movement 0.0000046 0.0000132 
 
Lag Net Migration Rate (β10) = -0.3456958 
 
Table 3.10: Baseline Projection of Migration to Germany by CEEC10 Member State 
 
Country 2004-2030 Migrants 
Bulgaria 80,755 
Czech Republic 60,770 
Estonia 8,317 
Hungary 71,598 
Latvia 19,826 
Lithuania 31,933 
Poland 392,887 
Romania 199,000 
Slovakia 48,399 
Slovenia 12,573 
Total 926,059 
 
Total CEEC10 Migrants to All EU15 Member States: 1,423,831 
Total 2003 CEEC10 Population: 102,594,000 
Percentage of CEEC10 Population Migration to EU15 Countries: 1.388% 
 
 
Table 3.11: Baseline Projection of Migration to Germany by CEEC10 Member State and 
for Selected Years 
 
Country 2004 2010 2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 Total 
Bulgaria 2888 2898 3003 3012 3024 3036 3049 80,755 
Czech Republic 2240 2198 2326 2299 2266 2232 2196 60,770 
Estonia 306 301 318 314 310 306 302 8,317 
Hungary 2610 2582 2711 2694 2674 2652 2631 71,598 
Latvia 715 713 743 742 741 740 739 19,826 
Lithuania 1148 1147 1193 1194 1195 1196 1197 31,933 
Poland 14053 14100 14612 14654 14710 14769 14830 392,887 
Romania 7155 7151 7437 7440 7446 7451 7457 199,000 
Slovakia 1742 1740 1810 1810 1811 1811 1812 48,399 
Slovenia 462 454 479 475 469 463 457 12,573 
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countries was 33,085 individuals in that year, a difference of roughly 1.30 percent. 
Despite the uncertainties involved in any projection model, this outcome certainly 
bolsters one’s confidence in its potential accuracy. 
 In order to test whether the baseline projection is overly dependent on any 
particular coefficient and to explore the effect of an important worker migration policy on 
these results, a number of alternative projections using different starting assumptions are 
performed here (Table 3.12). The “low-incentive” projection presumes that economic 
convergence between the CEEC10 and Germany would be three percent per forecast 
year, unemployment in Germany would remain at a constant ten percent during this 
period, and CEEC10 unemployment would be seven percent55 during this time. Although 
the three percent convergence figure is utilized by Boeri and Brücker (2000, 124) in their 
low-incentive projection as well, the above unemployment figures are included because 
they represent approximately the highest German and lowest CEE country unemployment 
during the eight years prior to 2004. The “high-incentive” forecast adopts nearly mirror-
image figures for economic convergence (one percent) and unemployment (seven percent 
German and fifteen percent CEEC10) during the projection period for similar reasons. As 
might be anticipated from the titles of the remaining alternatives, the “free movement 
2004” projection supposes that there are no barriers to CEE worker movement from the 
first moment of Eastern enlargement and the “no free movement” forecast postulates that 
this policy is never implemented by the EU15 governments. As can be seen in the 
relevant table, in none of these cases56 do these alterations create considerable changes in 
the total migration flows. For instance, the policy choices of starting free worker 
movement in 2004 (1.40%) or never putting this policy into effect (1.35%) barely budge  
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Table 3.12: Alternative Projections of 2004-2030 CEEC10 Migration 
 
Country Low-Incentive High-Incentive Free 
Movement 2004 
No Free 
Movement 
Bulgaria 54,670 88,090 81,595 78,583 
Czech Republic 52,867 96,443 61,865 57,937 
Estonia 5,586 11,369 8,463 7,941 
Hungary 63,329 106,598 72,685 68,786 
Latvia 12,603 22,534 20,076 19,181 
Lithuania 20,732 35,485 32,303 30,974 
Poland 263,645 426,790 396,987 382,283 
Romania 182,986 275,821 201,333 192,966 
Slovakia 29,346 52,322 48,977 46,906 
Slovenia 11,087 19,617 12,788 12,019 
Total (Germany) 696,851 1,135,068 937,071 897,576 
Total (EU15) 1,071,419 1,745,185 1,440,762 1,380,037 
%CEEC10 Migration 1.044 1.701 1.404 1.345 
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the migration percentage from what is derived from the baseline case. While the overall 
numbers do not vary a great deal, there are some interesting observations to be made here 
concerning how individual countries’ predicted migration rates shift due to these 
assumption modifications. An example of that statement can be detected in comparing 
how Bulgaria’s and Czech Republic’s numbers change in the low and high-incentive 
projections. Since the Czech Republic’s unemployment rate is at the low end of the range 
of CEEC10 values between 1996 and 2003, its net migration rate is not much different in 
the low-incentive alternative than the baseline case. A similar assertion can be made 
regarding Bulgaria’s net migration numbers in the high-incentive alternative due to its 
relatively elevated unemployment during this period. 
Discussion and Conclusion:  
Although some methodological changes have been required in the execution of this 
analysis compared to what was originally intended, one can come to some conclusions 
about the initial hypotheses proposed in this chapter. First, it has been mostly confirmed 
that the economic variables listed in Hypothesis 1 have statistically significant 
relationships in the theoretically expected directions with the change in sender-country 
net migration rate. In fact, the economic change in level variables have strongly 
significant relationships with the dependent variable (t-values below 0.01) in almost all 
model permutations. This finding is unsurprising, as it follows very closely what earlier 
economists, political scientists, and other migration experts discover in their research. 
Additionally, the lagged versions of these variables follow the same pattern57 for the most 
part, except for the lagged wage ratio variable. Its apparent interactions with the country-
specific variables and some of the dummies conceals the expected positive relationship 
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between it and change in net migration rate, which is a major reason why the 
methodological alterations alluded to earlier are made.  
 Definitive conclusions about the importance of the migrant stock variable are not 
as easy to state, however. In most versions of the basic and modified basic model, 
migrant stock is a significantly negative predictor of change in the net migration rate; in 
other words, the larger the number of donor-country migrants who live in the receiver 
country, the fewer such workers are induced to move in that year. This finding 
contradicts what would be predicted by network theory and at least some statistical 
investigations of the effect of migrant stocks on the willingness of sender-country 
workers to leave home. On the other hand, this result may be a statistical figment based 
on the migrant stock variable’s interactions with the country-specific variables. 
Removing only these dummies from the model uncovers a significantly positive 
relationship between migrant stock and change in net migration rate (t-value = 2.00; 
results not shown); even when several substantive dummies are removed from this 
version of the model, migrant stock remains a positive but insignificant predictor of the 
dependent variable (Table 3.5). It is unclear why migrant stock would interact with the 
country-specific dichotomous variables, so in the end one should probably just aver that 
no firm inferences can be made in this analysis about the relationship between these two 
variables. A similar statement could be made about the absorption capacity measure due 
to its high correlation with the German employment variable. In the basic model, it 
certainly seems to have a considerably significant relationship with net migration rate 
change in the expected direction, but one cannot be sure why that is the case due to 
collinearity issues.  
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 However, no such reticence is necessary when discussing the dichotomous 
variables in the GLS regressions because almost all of them have clearly definable 
relationships with the dependent variable. Wars (although not political instability more 
generally), guest worker policies, and migrant return programs all have significant effects 
on the dependent variable in their expected directions. On the other hand, in most 
versions of these models free worker migration policies and political system differences 
have insignificantly positive impacts on changes in net migration rates. As detailed 
earlier, the free migration variable is brought forward into the projection stage despite its 
insignificance58 because one of the driving forces behind this research is to explore how 
potential EU and member-state policy choices may affect worker migration. Although 
these variables are underutilized in the forecasting phase of this research, conclusions 
about the ones from Hypothesis 5 can also be drawn based on the fixed-effects OLS 
regressions. For example, language similarities between countries have a significantly 
positive effect on worker migration, while similar levels of social development between 
states tends to significantly discourage it. However, increasing distance between major 
state population centers, sharing a border, and the presence of a global city in the sender 
country does not appear to have a significant impact on net migration rate changes (even 
though global city presence is fairly close to the cutoff score in many instances). In short, 
this analysis confirms Boeri and Brücker’s (2000, 121) findings about many of these 
time-invariant variables.  
 The projection results obtained from the non-fixed effects GLS regression 
coefficients do not quite conform to the consensus forecast that asserts that two to four 
percent of the Central and Eastern European member-states’ population would move to 
 146
the EU15 countries in the long-term aftermath of CEEC10 accession. In fact, the current 
analysis’ projection implies that fewer people than the consensus models predict will 
move in the first twenty-five years or so of the CEEC10’s EU membership. That 
observation is found even under a number of different forecast conditions, including one 
designed to maximize the economic incentives for CEEC10 workers to move. The 
question then becomes how EU15 politicians should have reacted to a prediction such as 
this one, especially in light of earlier assertions that forecasts of two to four-percent 
worker movement over a long-term time horizon should not have excited great political 
tumult against the new member-state workers. Although much more is stated on this 
point in the concluding chapter of this dissertation, perhaps an indication of what these 
conclusions would be can be gathered by briefly contextualizing these results in the 
truncated post-enlargement history of CEE welfare tourism in the EU15 countries. 
Case Study--“Welfare tourism”, otherwise known as “benefit tourism” or “welfare 
shopping” among other names, is the notion that poor-country workers regularly change 
locations to wealthier states in order to take advantage of the more generous social 
welfare benefits available in the latter countries (Doyle et. al., 8; Ruhs, 22; Pollard et. al., 
31). Although the EU has tried, especially through European Court of Justice case law, to 
encourage its member-states to treat all EU citizens equally when it comes to social 
welfare benefit acquisition, EU countries may still discriminate between its own citizens 
and other member-state citizens when certain such benefits are at question. For instance, 
EU countries must treat all EU citizens equally when it comes to work-related social 
benefits (unemployment, particular tax credits), but the UK has been able to limit the 
ability of post-accession CEEC8 citizens to acquire non-work related welfare benefits 
 147
during their first year of registered work in that country (Maas, 64-66; van der Mei, 107-
117; Ruhs, 22). This situation contrasts with that of the United States, where every state 
must treat all legal residents identically when determining social welfare benefit 
eligibility, regardless of how long the applicants have lived in the state that is paying out 
the subsidy. Despite the fact that EU case law has moved a long way toward the 
American model in this area, it is unlikely that EU citizens will have full access to all 
member-states’ welfare systems on the same basis in the foreseeable future given the 
political sensitivities surrounding this issue (van der Mei, 117-122).  
 One of the most commonly-repeated arguments against CEE accession prior to its 
commencement was that welfare tourists from those countries would inundate the EU15 
economies, straining these systems to their breaking point (Doyle et. al., 8-9; Pollard et. 
al., 31; Brochmann and Dölvik, 157-158, 170). This contention continued to be made 
during this period in spite of the presence of policies designed to prevent benefit tourism 
and a host of research (Lord Wright, 11-12; Bengtsson et. al., 49-51; Bauer et. al, 238-
242; Chiswick and Sullivan, 559-560; Pritchett, 96-98; Kunz and Leinonen, 152-153) that 
demonstrates that migrants are either a net contributor to national welfare systems or at 
worst have an unclear overall effect on these programs. Concerns about welfare tourism 
are not totally inappropriate, of course, as a particularly generous welfare state could 
theoretically attract substantial numbers of low-skill migrants. These individuals would 
not only be potentially greater users of wealthy-country welfare systems but also 
represent increased competition for low-skill native workers who constitute the most 
economically vulnerable segment of the host-country population (and thus often heavy 
users of their countries’ social welfare programs). These native workers, who represent 
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many votes at election time, would be expected to protest increased migration and threats 
of welfare shopping due to the migrants’ potential for increased competition for jobs and 
social welfare resources. Politicians must listen to these voters if they want to stay in 
office in spite of what the evidence may state, but the question then turns into whether 
fears of welfare tourism were any better-grounded during the 2000s in the EU15 
countries than at any other time or place (Razin and Sadka, 49-80; Piore, 168-170; 
Pritchett, 98; Brochmann and Dölvik, 172). 
 A good test of this proposition would be to examine the situation in the UK, 
especially as it relates to Polish migrant workers in that country. If there were any EU15 
member state where welfare tourism might have taken place in the first few years after 
CEEC8 accession, it would be the UK given their immediate implementation of the free 
worker migration policy and the large numbers of CEE workers that attracted to the UK’s 
economy. Polish workers are by far the most numerous such workers who have been 
drawn to the UK economy; more specifically, about two-thirds of all approved UK 
Worker Registration Scheme applications in the first thirty months after CEEC8 
accession were filed by Polish citizens. In fact, Polish nationals now represent the largest 
ethnic minority in the UK even though they only ranked in thirteenth place on that score 
in 2004. This hefty influx has had numerous consequences for the British economy, 
ranging from the noteworthy observation that the flight destination patterns of the UK’s 
airports have been altered to the trivial reflection that Polish beer is now far more 
available in the UK than it once was (Herm, 10; Pollard et. al., 5-6, 24; Vasileva, 5). 
However, there is virtually no evidence of welfare shopping in the UK59 by these Polish 
migrants or by any of the other ones from the CEEC8. In the first year or so after CEEC8 
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accession, less than two percent of the National Insurance Numbers (NiNos) allocated to 
CEEC8 workers in the UK had been utilized to access social welfare benefits; the rest 
were used for employment purposes only (Ruhs, 22-23). Not much changed in the next 
few years after accession either, as by December 2007 only 2.4 percent of the NiNos 
given to CEEC8 workers had been used to access benefits. Out of that percentage, only 
about one-third had been utilized for the purpose of taking advantage of non-tax credit 
based welfare programs (Pollard et. al., 31-32). This trend has continued, as fewer than 
three percent of 2007-2008 NiNo registrants from all twelve 2004 and 2007 accession 
countries were collecting any kind of welfare benefits six months after their registration 
in the program (Salt 2009, 59). 
 Another assessment of the welfare tourism hypothesis might include an 
examination of the response of CEEC10 migrant workers to the economic downturn that 
began in 2008. Although the evidence for scrutinizing this phenomenon is unavoidably 
anecdotal, it seems as though many such workers are leaving for home rather than staying 
in their destination country to receive welfare benefits or are just not coming to the EU15 
economies60 at all (Economist 2008; Economist 2009a; BBC News 2009a; Donadio and 
Schwartz; Lungescu 2009). As Wallace (2002, 616) notes, European social welfare 
benefits are not transportable, so many CEE migrants would be incentivized to depart 
Western Europe when a recession hits to take advantage of the sender-country benefits 
that they are clearly entitled to exploit. In fact, Wallace further argues that European 
social welfare systems should act as a deterrent to initial migration61 rather than as an 
incentive to do so, and that there should be “circular migration” patterns observed 
between the CEE and EU15 countries. This phenomenon appears to have been what was 
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already happening in the UK prior to the late-2000s recession, and one could speculate 
that these economic problems have merely accelerated this process. For instance, Pollard 
and her co-authors (2008, 5) report that approximately half of the CEEC8 workers who 
took up positions in the UK between 2004 and 2007 have already left for home. The 
observed rapid outflow of CEEC8 workers (Economist 2008; BBC News 2009a) from the 
UK in the last few years may simply represent a reverse wave in an already-existing 
circular migration pattern. In the final analysis, however, there is very little evidence to 
support the notion that CEE welfare tourism is occurring on any significant level. 
Conclusion--In ending this empirical findings chapter, it might be worthwhile to briefly 
recap what it has determined about worker migration in general and such movement 
between the CEE countries and the EU15 member states more specifically. First, it 
appears that the predictions of neo-classical economic theories of worker migration are 
supported to a satisfactory degree, although the same cannot be stated for the network or 
world systems theory points of view. While various political and public policy 
explanations of migration prove to be important determinants of this event, one of the 
most critical EU policies that is designed to encourage movement (free worker migration) 
is not sustained as a significant determinant of that behavior. Even though a slightly 
different methodological technique is required to generate it than was originally 
envisioned, the baseline migration projection using all of the information that would have 
been available to EU15 decision-makers in 2004 demonstrates that even fewer CEE 
workers are likely to arrive in their economies than the previous consensus figures would 
have indicated. Altering various parts of that forecast to make it more or less likely for 
these workers to shift places of employment does not change the general picture of 
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limited CEE worker migration very much. Finally, this portrait of constrained migration 
level predictions is fleshed out by a succinct discussion of the possibility of welfare 
tourism within the ranks of the CEE workers who arrived in the EU15 member states in 
or soon after 2004. In short, it appears that the vast majority of these workers who shifted 
locales did so to genuinely work and not to take advantage of the EU15’s generous 
national welfare systems. As this analysis shifts into its next phase, it will be interesting 
to note what insights a different methodological technique, systems modeling, can bring 
to bear on the question of post-EU accession CEE worker migration.  
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1
 A large portion of this chapter (and some parts of the rest of this dissertation) was presented as a paper 
entitled “A New Long-Term Forecast of Post-Accession CEEC10 Mobility to the EU15 Member States” at 
the 2010 Midwest Political Science Association Meeting on April 24, 2010. 
 
2
 The twenty-two migrant sender countries for which data were collected from 1960 to 2003, the year 
before the CEEC8 joined the EU, are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia. These states are included not 
just for reasons of data availability but also because they represent a satisfactorily broad cross-section of 
migration data for Germany. In fact, for many of the years in the sample, these countries comprise the great 
majority of the migrants to that country. Additionally, several of these states were in similar economic 
situations at the time that these migration data were gathered as the CEEC10 were in 2004. It should also 
be noted here that this total number of migrant donors represents an increase in the quantity of countries 
over that which has been used in past studies of CEE-EU labor migration. For example, Boeri and Brücker 
(2000) employ data from eighteen sender countries, while Dustmann et. al. (2003), Fertig (2001), and 
Fertig and Schmidt (2000) only utilize seventeen. Due to the use of differenced variables and one-year lags 
in these models, their maximum N is 946. All data concerning Germany refer to West German figures until 
1990 and the reunified Germany for 1991 and beyond.  
 
3
 Boeri and Brücker (2000, 2001, 2005) make the opposite decision on this controversy because they 
determine that migrant stock, not migration rate, is cointegrated with the economic explanatory variables 
used in most studies of this type. That fact implies that there is a long-term equilibrium relationship 
between their dependent and independent variables that they cannot demonstrate between migration rate 
and the relevant explanatory variables (Boeri and Brücker 2000, 114). 
 
4
 Kupiszewski (2002, 637-640) complains at length about how previous migration studies place too much 
emphasis on the economic determinants of this phenomenon to the exclusion of all others. This study takes 
that criticism seriously, and includes a number of these concepts in its policy and fixed-effects variables 
elucidated below.  
 
5
 It should be noted that transforming data by using the natural log of those values is a common technique 
in statistical work to reduce potential heteroscedasticity problems. 
 
6
  Please see Hatton (1995) versus Zaiceva (2004), who also utilizes unemployment rather than 
employment figures, for these approaches to this issue. 
 
7
 It is interesting that at least two authors of past studies in this area, Fertig (2001) and Zaiceva (2006), do 
not take this step, although Fertig does divide his stock figures by 100,000 for some unexplored reason. 
Note that these data cannot be transformed here by taking the natural log of these values because that action 
would result in negative values in the projection step of this project, thus altering the sign of the resulting 
calculation with the variable’s coefficient.  
 
8
 Given the identity of the dependent variable, the change in migrant stock regressor is also not utilized here 
for obvious reasons. 
 
9
 A large number of vacant jobs may also indicate a shortage of certain skilled workers that the economy 
can only satisfy by hiring foreign labor, a fact that would change the identity of the workers being drawn to 
that economy but not the overall rate at which these workers arrive. It should also be noted that not all 
workers who are attracted to the host economy will have the “right” skills for the jobs that they take there; 
in fact, some of them may work at jobs that are below what their education and training would qualify them 
for at home in terms of status or be paid less than their counterparts in the same jobs (Batalova and Lowell, 
97-101).  
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10
 As far as can be determined from the literature in this area, this operationalization of absorption capacity 
is unique. Zaiceva (2006, 14) does utilize the term “absorptive capacity” when describing features of the 
host labor market, but her operationalization (host-country population) is quite different from the one 
utilized here and she only employs this variable in her fixed-effects estimators equations. Boeri and 
Brücker (2001, 11) discuss this term momentarily, but then do not operationalize it in their models.  
 
11
 Leaving the issue of skills mismatches aside, one could also speculate that large numbers of vacant jobs 
in sender countries should dissuade their workers from going abroad to find employment and thus reduce 
the net migration rate. However, this variable is not included in this analysis due to serious data set 
limitations; for instance, only twelve of the twenty-two countries provide a complete run of the relevant 
data to the OECD (1993) for one of their historical statistics collections. 
 
12
 As of September 1, 2009, the complete series of these scores for all 192 countries from 1972 to the 
present is also available as an Excel file from Freedom House’s web site: 
www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439. The author projects these scores backwards in time to 
1960 using the trends present in the Freedom House data, the seven-point scales and topics utilized by this 
organization, and information about the political situations in each of the 22 countries in this study. Only a 
few of these decisions (e.g., Turkey after the 1960 coup) could be considered controversial. In general, a 
country that possesses a score of: two through five on the combined political rights and civil liberties scales 
is “free”; six through ten (or eleven, depending on the year) is “partly free”; and anything above that is “not 
free”. In contrast to many of the other data sets concerning Yugoslavia, Freedom House adopts that name 
for this country for the entire period of this analysis.  
 
13
 Boeri and Brücker (2000, 154) and Zaiceva (2006, 14) both employ the exact same data source for this 
notion, but the former authors refer to it as “quality of life” while the latter scholar uses the phrase “level of 
development” instead. That fact explains why this discussion uses both terms interchangeably.  
 
14
 For unknown reasons, the 2003 HDI level for Luxembourg is omitted from the 2007-2008 version of the 
report, so it is obtained from the 2005 edition of that volume instead. Additionally, the 2003 HDI value for 
Yugoslavia is calculated by taking the average of the (nearly identical) HDI values for Serbia and 
Montenegro.  
 
15
 The Human Development Index, which has a maximum value of one and a minimum value of zero, is 
really the unweighted average of three separate index scores (GDP, life expectancy, and education) that are 
scaled from zero to one. Each of these component parts is determined by setting a top and bottom 
“goalpost” for each of the three indexes and then calculating how close each country is to that goalpost. For 
instance, the minimum and maximum goalposts for life expectancy are twenty-five and eighty-five years, 
respectively. Turkey, which in 2005 boasted a life expectancy of 71.4 years, therefore has a life expectancy 
index score of 0.773 ([71.4-25]/[85-25] = 0.773). The education and GDP index scores are established 
similarly, except that the former is actually the weighted average of each country’s adult literacy rate and 
gross school enrollment (primary, secondary and tertiary) ratio and the latter uses logged GDP values rather 
than the raw figures (United Nations 2008, 356). As one can discern, each state’s absolute value on the 
Human Development Index has little inherent meaning. However, its HDI value relative to other countries’ 
HDI values (and to the zero to one limits on this score) does signify its comparative level of development. 
This observation supports the notion that one can employ HDI as an independent variable in a fixed-effects 
regression because the states’ relative rankings on it do not change frequently over the years of interest 
(Boeri and Brücker 2000, 154). 
 
16
 Migrant travel distances are derived from a commonly used air mileage calculator (the one on 
infoplease.com; this site remains functional as of September 1, 2009); please see this site for details as to 
how this tool calculates these mileages. It should be noted that Frankfurt am Main is employed as the 
German destination city for reasons other than that it is the primary financial center of this study’s migrant 
destination country. This choice avoids the issue of whether to use Bonn or Berlin, the two political capitals 
of Germany during the time period of interest, and places the destination somewhat nearer to the center of 
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the country. Additionally, it is the only German city on Friedmann’s (1986, 72) list of primary or secondary 
“world cities” (see the discussion of Hypothesis 5e for details). 
 
17
 One could also contend that the presence of borders between relatively wealthy and underprivileged 
countries could discourage migration as cross-border commuters could choose to live on the poorer side of 
the border but earn wages in the nearby wealthy economy. This concern is an obvious one when the point 
of the current research is to project the permanent movement of CEE workers to Germany. Unfortunately, 
this analysis is not really constructed to deal with this problem even though it may attenuate the 
relationship predicted in the relevant hypothesis.  
 
18
 The list of these primary global cities is comprised of London, Paris, Rotterdam, Frankfurt, Zurich, 
Tokyo, New York, Chicago and Los Angeles. Friedmann (1986, 72) also has a catalog of secondary global 
cities in his piece, including Brussels, Milan, Vienna, Madrid, Toronto, Sydney and Houston. The primary 
rather than the primary and secondary roll of cities is utilized in this research because there is little doubt 
that all of the primary conurbations are global centers of capitalism and this statement could certainly be 
made about these global cities throughout the time period of interest.  
 
19
 The net migration figures for some, but not all, of the countries in this data set are even available back to 
1952. Separate inflow and outflow data by migration country of origin are also available from the same 
source. In fact, one donor-country’s annual entry (net migration data from Sweden in 1996) is omitted from 
the official file and is calculated from these data separately.  
 
20
 Following the example of the German Federal Statistical Office in this matter, “Yugoslavia’s” population 
excludes Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 onward and Macedonia’s population from 
1993 forward. In other words, Yugoslavia is treated as Serbia and Montenegro from 1993 to 2003.  
 
21
 Yugoslav migrant stock data covers the entire country up to 1991, but after 1992 it no longer includes 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and after 1993 it does not include Macedonia either. These 
figures do include “stateless Yugoslavs,” however.  
 
22
 Fertig (2001, 712) claims that migrant stock in Germany data are discoverable back to 1960, but 
extensive electronic communications between this author and the German Federal Statistical Office failed 
to produce information prior to 1967. Many thanks are due here to Christina Leib-Manz and Daniela Glock, 
two employees of the Statistisches Bundesamt, whose tireless efforts to find and convey this information 
are deeply appreciated. 
 
23
 Per-capita GDP data are available in Maddison (2003) for all countries except Yugoslavia and 
Luxembourg from 1960 to 2001; updates for 2002 and 2003 can (as of September 1, 2009) be located on 
Maddison’s web site: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontal-file_03-2007.xls. 
Yugoslav data can be obtained from these sources until 1991; after that year, the figures for the successor 
state of Serbia and Montenegro are used instead. Luxembourg’s 1960 to 2001 per-capita GDP data are 
interpolated from five data points provided by Maddison (2001, 2003) and then extrapolated based on GDP 
change for 2002 and 2003. This extrapolation is exactly the transformation that Boeri and Brücker (2000, 
153) perform for all of their 1995 to 1998 per capita GDP data. Please see Maddison (1995, 2001) for data 
source information and details about how these data are transformed into comparable per-capita GDP 
values; this dissertation notes with sadness Professor Maddison’s recent passing (Economist 2010).  
 
24
 As of September 1, 2009, the data set associated with OECD (2008) can be located at the following web 
site: www.sourceoecd.org/database/unemployment. Unfortunately, unemployment data for Luxembourg 
only go back to 1974 in this set, so data for the years 1960 through 1973 must be obtained from Info Statec, 
Luxembourg’s national statistical agency. Yugoslavia’s figures are also omitted from this data collection, 
so a number of other sources are necessary to gather this information. Woodward (1995, 383-384) 
publishes this information for most of this time period (1960 to 1990), but official figures from the 1995 
edition of the Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia (1991-1994) and the ILO’s labor statistics database 
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LABORSTA (1995 to 2003) supply unemployment figures for the rest of the relevant years. This final data 
source is available (as of September 1, 2009) at laborsta.ilo.org.  
 
25
 The OECD’s Main Economic Indicators (MEI) database can be found on-line at oberon.sourceoecd.org 
(again, as of September 1, 2009). 
 
26
 All of these estimation models suppress the constant term in order to avoid the problem of perfect 
multicollinearity between the constant term and the country-specific dichotomous variables that would 
otherwise result (Gujarati, 504, 526-527). In some of the later models that remove the country-specific 
variables, the constant remains absent in order to preserve comparability across the different kinds of 
models. Out of an abundance of caution, some of these model variants are run with a constant to see if its 
suppression makes any difference to the outcomes of the model; in fact, it does not (figures omitted). 
 
27
 Please see Fertig (2001, 713-714) for a more detailed defense of the statistical methodological choices 
made by this contribution. This analysis did attempt to use the maximum likelihood by GLS estimation 
technique (Oberhofer and Kmenta; Eliason; G. King) as Fertig does, but this approach was abandoned 
when the model took too many iterations to converge and created some very strange results (e.g., it posited 
a statistically significant negative relationship between change in net migration rate and the change in GDP 
ratio variable). The results of these model runs are available for inspection upon request. It should also be 
noted that as part of their contribution Boeri and Brücker (2000, 117, ft. 80) utilize seemingly unrelated 
regression (Zellner) in a peculiar fashion. In particular, they enforce restrictions that make all countries’ 
estimated coefficients the same except for the intercepts.  
 
28
 An early usage of this technique can be found in Dickens and Katz (1987, 69).  
 
29
 Settling on a reasonable population projection for this part of the analysis is difficult in light of the 
different strategies that are attempted by previous authors. For example, Boeri and Brücker (2000, 122) and 
Fertig (2001, 717) utilize World Bank estimates of Central and Eastern European population change, while 
Zaiceva (2006, 33) presumes no population change for her forecasts. Given the uncertainty that surrounds 
these figures and the developing trends in CEE demography, perhaps assuming a steady-state population 
for this part of the world is not an unreasonable step to take as a starting point here. 
 
30
 According to Boeri and Brücker (2000, 126), 65.04 percent of the CEEC10 labor migrants who came to 
the EU15 countries in 1998 shifted economies to Germany. This figure is adopted here because it is the 
most readily available and consistent such quantity closest to the 2004 CEEC8 accession date in the 
literature; additionally, there is only limited evidence that this percentage changed very much in the years 
leading up to CEEC8 accession (Alvarez-Plata et. al., 50-51, 71; Boeri and Brücker 2001, 13; Boeri and 
Brücker 2005, 11). In order to determine the projected worker migration total to the EU15 countries 
between 2004 and 2030, therefore, the total number of workers who are forecast to move to Germany 
during that time in each model is divided by 0.6504. Boeri and Brücker (2000, 126) also provide migrant 
percentage breakdowns for each of the EU15 member states besides Germany, so it would be theoretically 
possible to calculate the projected number of migrants for all of these economies. However, this action is 
not taken in this investigation because it is only interested in treating the EU15 economies as a migration 
target area as a whole; perhaps a future version of this analysis will take this step. 
 
31
 Over the course of this investigation, it became apparent that using separate employment variables rather 
than their ratios is more interesting theoretically and allows one to examine a slightly broader array of 
migration determinants. Therefore, these separate variables are utilized throughout this analysis, even 
though initial tests of the ratio variable’s interactions with the dependent variable demonstrate that it has a 
significant positive relationship with change in net migration rate. Please keep in mind that employment 
percentage rather than rate data are used here to avoid altering the sign of these relationships during the 
migration forecasting process. 
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32
 Although one might be persuaded to contend here that absorption capacity really does have a positive 
relationship with the dependent variable, it is difficult to support that conclusion fully given the correlation 
of this variable with the German unemployment measure.  
 
33
 In fact, this investigation makes one wonder what role these economic troubles played in the transition to 
democracy on the part of at least some of the formerly authoritarian Southern European migrant-donor 
countries. It should also be noted that dropping the regime difference dichotomous variable has no effect on 
the modified basic model’s results (results not shown, but available if necessary).  
 
34
 As shall be seen momentarily, a positive but insignificant relationship is observed between these two 
ideas if the country-specific variables are removed from the model. It is unclear why taking out these 
dummies should have this effect on the migrant stock measure’s relationship with the dependent variable, 
but this result strongly tempers one’s conclusions about the significance of the relationship between these 
variables of interest.  
 
35
 Much like Fertig (2001, 715) does in his work, the modified basic model is also run without the GDP 
ratio variables to determine what effect they have on the overall stability of this model. The outcomes of 
these calculations demonstrate only minimal changes to the model; in particular, the employment variables 
become much stronger predictors of changes in net migration but the migrant stock variable loses its 
significant negative relationship with the dependent variable (results not shown).  
 
36
 Although in various versions of the main model the lagged variables in these pairs are sometimes 
significant and other times not, there is no other case where the signs become reversed. 
 
37
 Greater regional integration, especially in organizations like the EU that work assiduously to reduce 
economic disparities between regions, should lead to rising living standards in poorer areas even relative to 
wealthier locales in the same organization. That increase in wealth, along with increases in employment 
opportunities and information about them in other countries, could give poorer-region workers greater 
resources to exploit those opportunities and thus a greater ability to move. 
 
38
 While it is true that there are certain circumstances under which decreasing economic differences among 
sender and receiver countries caused by economic growth in the former could create increases in migration 
between them, none of the German-sender countries instances (including the German-CEEC10 case for the 
projections) should be examples of such a situation. The “migration hump” hypothesis (Martin and Taylor, 
105-107; Massey et. al. 1998, 49; Oucho, 226-227) asserts that a plot of sender-country migration flow 
over time (assuming constantly increasing economic growth) assumes an inverted-U shape that looks like a 
camel’s hump. At very low levels of economic development, potential migrants do not have sufficient 
resources to invest in migrating abroad for work. As those incomes grow as a result of development, 
eventually an increasing number of workers acquire those resources (money, information, language skills, 
personal connections) and will take advantage of them by migrating out of their home country to find 
employment. As the economic situation of the sender country improves relative to the receiver economy, 
however, there are fewer tangible benefits to migrating, so that flow decelerates and may even begin to 
reverse itself. None of Germany’s donor countries in the statistical model, and none of the CEEC10 
economies for the projections, are or will be poor enough during the time frames of interest that they should 
be impacted by this phenomenon. (It should be noted that a similar argument could be made for when a 
previously closed economy opens to free trade. The idea here is that the economic dislocations caused by 
the removal of these trade barriers create conditions ripe for increased migration, at least at first. However, 
as the sender-country economy is strengthened by free trade, that growth eventually reduces the incentives 
to move below the level present at the time that the trade restrictions were removed [Martin and Taylor, 
104-107]. One might be tempted to maintain that the CEEC10 economies would have been in such a 
situation at the start of their EU accession; however, Martin and Taylor’s contention seems to be more 
applicable to very tightly closed or impoverished Third World economies. The ten CEE accession states 
had already been exposed to freer, if not completely free, trade with the EU15 member states through their 
Europe Agreements by 2004 and 2007, and none of them could have been classified as “Third World” 
countries in those years.) 
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39
 A great deal of inertia is present in the net migration flows observed here, a conclusion that can be 
bolstered by replacing the regular modified basic model dependent variable with net migration rate levels. 
The massively significant positive relationship between the lagged net migration rate and this new 
dependent variable discovered in this run illustrates this point quite well (Fertig, 715). 
 
40
 In an attempt to gain a handle on exactly why the unexpected results concerning the GDP ratio variables 
is taking place here, “replications” of both Fertig’s (2001) and Boeri and Brücker’s (2000) work are 
attempted. These replications are not identical to what these authors do because the methods utilized in 
each study are somewhat different from what is attempted here, but the same data, years and variables as 
these authors employ are included. In both cases, the unusual result of a positive relationship for the change 
in GDP ratio, but a negative relationship for the lagged GDP ratio, with the dependent variable is observed 
(results available if desired). Please note that one cannot just remove the 1991 to 1995 Yugoslav data from 
this model because that action would create an unbalanced panel. 
 
41
 An attempt to recreate this analysis with just post-1990 data fails due to small-N and country-specific 
dummy variable multicollinearity problems. The guest-worker dichotomous variable is not included in this 
evaluation since it does not vary in this data set (i.e., no guest-worker programs have been implemented in 
Germany after 1990).  
 
42
 In particular, the worker repatriation dummy variable is no longer a significant negative predictor of the 
change in the net migration rate. It should also be noted that the military conflict dummy variable (War 
Only) does not vary prior to 1991, so it must be omitted from this experiment.  
 
43
 The primary reason why the substantive dummies aside from free movement are not part of this model is 
that they are not carried over into the projection step of this research (please see the steady-state coefficient 
calculation portion of this chapter for why that is true). Additionally, some of these dummies, especially the 
military conflict variable, interact badly with the lagged GDP ratio variable (results available upon request).  
 
44
 Additionally, Alvarez-Plata and her co-authors (2003, 37) determine that various forms of GLS 
estimators grant about the same predictions of long-run migration stocks in studies much like the one 
conducted here. 
 
45
 Seven countries’ data from 1960 to 2003 are utilized in these regressions: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Ireland is included here even though it is not technically a “Southern 
European” country because its economic circumstances have been similar to those of the other states in this 
data set. Due to these regressions’ inclusion of lagged and differenced variables, the maximum N for these 
models is 301.  
 
46
 It should be kept in mind that Human Development Index data for 1990 rather than 2003 are used in the 
relevant OLS regression in order to keep the operationalization style of this variable consistent (i.e., the 
HDI values for the last year of the data’s time span are utilized in this fixed-effects regression). 
Additionally, no HDI coefficients can be employed in any forecasts derived from the regression with no 
country-specific variables, for obvious reasons. 
 
47
 Although they are not done here, performing similar regressions for the Southern European data would 
require a few alterations to the independent variable selection and composition. First, the language and 
border variables would be omitted from them because none of the Southern European states share either of 
these characteristics with the receiver country. Since no Southern European country has a primary world 
city in it, the list of relevant secondary (i.e., Milan and Madrid) world cities from Friedmann (1986, 72) 
would be utilized instead. It should be noted that using the list of primary and secondary world cities for the 
full-data fixed-effect regressions’ global city dummy does not alter the conclusions drawn by this analysis 
as to this concept’s utility.  
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48
 Even Spain, a country that tried to encourage the repatriation of foreign workers to their original 
countries during the great recession of the late 2000s, avoided offering such incentives to EU citizens 
(Donadio and Schwartz). 
 
49
 For instance, the free movement variable becomes a significantly positive predictor of migration rate 
change when the Yugoslav data are removed from the modified basic model (figures excluded, but 
available if necessary).  
 
50
 Boeri and Brücker (2000, 124) and Fertig (2001, 718) employ these assumptions for their baseline 
(medium convergence) scenarios as well. 
 
51
 Please note that no projection utilizing only the Southern European data is performed here for the reasons 
outlined elsewhere in this discussion.  
 
52
 In fact, in Boeri and Brücker’s (2000, 124) low migration incentive forecast, there is a decrease in the 
overall number of CEEC10 migrants in Germany by 2025. 
 
53
 By contrast, the theoretically unexpected negative coefficient for migrant stock plays very little role in 
both of these projections’ issues. It should be kept in mind that although all of these figures are omitted 
here, they are available for inspection if necessary. 
 
54
 The model described in Table 3.5 can be estimated with the country-specific variables as well, of course, 
but if one does so the projection derived from this model’s coefficients suffers the same problems as the 
others that try to introduce time-invariant elements to their forecasts (figures omitted, but available).  
 
55
 In other words, the German employment rate would be ninety percent and the CEEC10 employment rate 
would be ninety-three percent during the forecast period. 
 
56
 Two projections that are excluded from Table 3.12 vary the population figures to determine the effect 
that this alteration might have on the projection results. The first utilizes the average value of the 1996-
2003 United Nations Developmental Yearbook population changes in each CEE country to forecast their 
population to 2030. The second one predicts the same values using World Bank (2009) projection data 
(also available as of December 1, 2009 at go.worldbank.org/KZHE1CQFA0). In neither case do these 
population projection changes have a marked effect on the overall forecasts of CEEC10 migration (1.34 
percent total in the first case, 1.33 percent in the second). 
 
57
 Table 3.3 shows that the lagged German employment variable in the modified basic model is only 
significant at the 0.10 level in the expected direction. 
 
58
 Additionally, two of the pieces that most influence this work (Boeri and Brücker 2000, 118; Fertig, 714) 
determine that free worker mobility does positively stimulate worker migration in a significant fashion. 
 
59
 Early evidence concerning this question from the other EU15 member states that permitted CEEC8 
workers to freely enter their economies right after their countries’ accession also contradicts the welfare 
tourism hypothesis. The Swedish government reported in 2005 that just one percent of total welfare 
spending went to nationals of one of the ten 2004 accession countries that year. Additionally, the Irish 
government stated that fewer than one thousand 2004 accession-state citizens were on their unemployment 
rolls in March 2006 (Doyle et. al., 12-13). Finally, on the second anniversary of CEEC8 accession, the 
European Commission (2006, 5) conveyed the argument that there was no great increase in welfare 
spending by the EU15 governments in the immediate aftermath of that event.  
 
60
 Please note that this latter outcome would be exactly what this analysis’ regression model would predict. 
 
61
 It should be kept in mind in this discussion that ironing out social security eligibility and taxation 
questions is a problem for commuters in the EU as well (Maas, 103-104; Greve and Rydbjerg, 16-22).  
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Chapter 4: Systems Models  
 
 As discovered in reviewing the literature on CEE worker migration and through 
hard experience in the last chapter, one’s choices of research tools and methodology at 
the start of an analysis in this area can lead to quite different expectations of post-
accession worker movement. It may therefore be advisable to utilize multiple analytical 
methods to arrive at any final conclusions about the magnitude and consequence of this 
phenomenon. That goal, which can be accomplished here by employing an underutilized 
technique called systems modeling, is the paramount objective of this chapter. Before 
attempting to fulfill that ambition, however, the provision of some background 
information about systems modeling is necessary since it is not a familiar technique for 
most political scientists. Once that detailed material is presented, the specifications for 
the baseline systems model are explicated, including any new relationships or data 
sources that are necessary to construct this model. The outcomes of the baseline model 
and the alternative versions of that model follow this step, along with careful testing to 
ensure that its results are plausible, not overly dependent on any particular assumption or 
variable within it, and able to withstand difficult conditions. Finally, a brief discussion of 
the importance of these results in light of the product of the statistical models described 
in the previous chapter is imparted. These techniques should prove to be complimentary 
to one another and permit a deeper understanding of the dynamics and consequences of 
CEE worker migration.  
Systems Thinking and Systems Modeling:  
Succinctly put, systems modeling1 is a computational methodological tool that can be 
used to investigate the dynamics of complex systems and that features an 
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interdisciplinary approach to problems grounded in a complicated reality (Klir; Laszlo; 
Mesarović; Skyttner; Weinberg). Systems modeling borrows from a number of academic 
traditions, including mathematics and engineering (for their theories of non-linear 
dynamics and feedback control, respectively) as well as the social and behavioral 
sciences. Systems modeling is also designed to illustrate the utility of systems thinking, 
the philosophy that the real world must be understood holistically rather than in a 
piecemeal fashion (Sterman 2000, 4-5). Thus, for many systems modelers (Clark and 
Cole, 41-43; Sterman 2007, 90), systems thinking is a paradigm (Kuhn) that influences, 
in the most fundamental possible ways, how they perceive the social, economic or natural 
worlds that they are trying to understand.  
History and Uses of Systems Modeling--The development of systems theory, the formal 
or mathematical expression of systems thinking principles, started just before World War 
II (Klir, 97-98). However, the appearance of biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s article 
(1950) on closed and open systems is generally considered to be the origin point2 of the 
attempt to form a general systems theory3 across the various scientific disciplines. 
Systems engineering and operations research, the study of design principles and problems 
respectively, soon developed4 out of this desire for a general systems theory (Klir, 101-
102). These disciplines eventually attracted the attention of the American federal 
government, which began funding large-scale model-building projects for their military 
and space programs, among others (Clark and Cole, 4-5). Between the 1950s and 1970s, 
there was considerable intellectual excitement surrounding the idea of creating a general 
systems theory; many academics were attracted to this subject by the promises of the 
fruits of multidisciplinary work and by the idea of unifying the many fields of the natural 
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and social sciences5 (Ackoff, 52-53, 56-59). However, the researcher who probably did 
the most to popularize the study of system dynamics in the management and social 
sciences is Jay Forrester (1975). His application of these principles to the business world 
(Forrester 1958) and the study of how cities grow, thrive and decay (Forrester 1969) are 
milestones in the development of system dynamics. The work that gained him and system 
dynamics the most public notoriety, however, is the Club of Rome project (Forrester 
1973; Meadows et. al. 1972) that predicts widespread natural resource shortages and 
overpopulation problems in the world’s medium to long-term future. The resulting 
political and cultural firestorms related to these publications (Forrester 1973, vii-viii) and 
their attendant criticisms (Hoos, 236-237), along with the failure of many of the 
predictions of Meadows et. al.’s (1972) volume6 to come true, removed some of the 
sheen from system dynamics. However, as Sterman (2007, 90) argues, system dynamics 
remains a vibrant field of study today, with its ideas penetrating even elementary school 
pedagogy and the realm of video games.  
 Although it is interesting to consider that the utility of system dynamics goes 
beyond the walls of academia, what is more important at present is to remark upon how 
systems modeling and system dynamics are employed in research areas that are of 
interest to this study. International relations scholars (Choucri; Skyttner, 100-104), 
especially peace and conflict studies researchers (Boulding 1978; Mesjasz; Kamiya and 
Wils; Hoover and Kowalewski), find that system dynamics and the systems modeling 
approach are helpful in addressing a number of different questions about the political 
world. Additionally, a few demographers (Bongaarts and O’Neill; van de Walle and 
Knodel; de Cooman et. al.; Rosero-Bixby and Casterline) and public policy analysts 
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(Cavana and Clifford) are able to employ system dynamics to gain greater insights into 
their research interests. However, relatively few past scholars apply these ideas to 
migration7 or immigration matters (İberg, 39-40). For instance, Mabogunje (1972) 
utilizes system dynamics principles in examining West African migration patterns to 
create something that might be called the “migration system” concept (Mabogunje 1970, 
3-4; Bonifazi, 123). Feedback effects, self-regulation, and the circularity of migration are 
all inherently captured in Mabogunje’s portrait of this issue in this part of the globe 
(İberg, 39). Pryor (1981, 122-123) describes a few attempts from the 1970s at employing 
system dynamics to examine labor migration from the former Yugoslavia to Western 
Europe. Finally, Richmond and Verma (1978) devise a prolegomenon for a global 
systems model that accounts for both international and domestic migration. Designing 
such a model compels them to compare neo-classical economic or sociological theories 
of migration with Marxist views on migration, and they find that none of them grant 
scholars a complete picture of this concept. However, Pryor (1981, 123) declares that 
Richmond and his co-author are too ambitious in their piece and encourages them to 
ground their work in a smaller, real-word migration system.  
Critiques of Systems Modeling--This mild criticism of the Richmond and Verma article 
pales in comparison to some of the opprobrium that has been heaped upon system 
dynamics from some quarters over the years, however. This turn of events is partly due to 
some of the near-fantastical claims that are made about this idea by some early 
researchers into general systems theory. Even some of the founders of the field (Boulding 
1964, 29-34; Rapoport) explicitly caution system dynamics scholars against becoming 
carried away with promises about what systems modeling could accomplish. Another 
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reason why some scholars are disenchanted with systems modeling is that it has 
developed a reputation among some critics for being too “touchy-feely” 8 to be a serious 
method. Especially given the difficulties discussed below that systems modelers have 
with confirming their results, any indication that a tool is not as exacting as it should be 
would count as a strike against it in many practitioners’ minds. That contention is 
particularly true in a discipline like political science that has tried for a long time to 
become more methodologically rigorous. Finally, systems modeling gained much public 
attention when it was utilized during the Club of Rome project9 in the early 1970s. The 
infamous difficulties and political uproar associated with the results of that endeavor 
turned many politicians, policy analysts, government officials and academics away from 
this technique.  
 However, the scholar who makes the most sustained and thorough critique of 
systems analysis10 is Hoos (1983). She censures both the theories behind systems analysis 
and the results of projects that use it, going on to assert that its methods are too 
politicized and thus avoid unfavorable scrutiny (Hoos, 15-27, 67-85). The author 
continues her condemnation by declaring that systems analysis often employs techniques 
out of their appropriate contexts, a phenomenon she refers to a “cargo cult” mentality 
(Hoos, 81). She directly confronts what she calls the “Panglossian” aura (Hoos, 25) that 
surrounds systems engineering, maintaining that this method cannot claim unqualified 
successes even when it is applied properly in its correct sphere. In short, Hoos’ book is a 
devastating indictment of systems analysis and all of its derivative methods and fields of 
study. However, this analysis still maintains that systems modeling can be used prudently 
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in this research to create a better understanding of the politics of labor migration within 
the European Union. 
Systems Thinking Principles--Now that an examination of the history of systems 
modeling is complete, one can turn full attention to the five fundamental principles11 of 
systems thinking: openness, purposefulness, multidimensionality, emergent properties, 
and counterintuitiveness (Gharajedaghi, 29-55). The notion of openness is that the world 
is composed of permeable sets of relationships that can only be truly understood in their 
wider, holistic context rather than in isolation from one another. In other words, systems 
thinking encourages people to intently examine the widest possible picture of the 
phenomena that they are interested in studying (Richmond, 113; Gharajedaghi, 30-32; 
Sterman 2000, 861-862). Purposefulness implies that there are reasons why systems (and 
the individuals within systems) behave as they do. It is up to the investigator to learn 
what motivates people in different settings and then incorporate those motives into the 
design of their models. Although rational (self-interested) choice is a significant part of 
purposefulness, systems thinking also recognizes that other kinds of choices and 
constraints matter as well (Gharajedaghi, 33-36). One of the most powerful principles 
behind systems thinking is multidimensionality, which is the ability to detect 
complementary relationships in apparently divergent tendencies and construct workable 
systemic explanations from seemingly incompatible parts of competing theories 
(Gharajedaghi, 38-44). Taking this principle into account also allows individuals to 
appreciate a plurality of functions, structures and processes that may surround and 
permeate their ideas much more easily than a dichotomous perspective would tolerate. A 
multidimensional perspective also permits systems modelers to see beyond the 
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constraints that dichotomous relationships and zero-sum games may place on many 
analysts’ conceptions of social problems and their solutions.  
 Another important foundational concept of systems modeling is that of emergent 
properties, which are characteristics of a system that organically arise from it but do not 
exist in any one particular part of it. They are present because of the interactions of 
multiple individuals or sub-systems but cannot be located using a reductionist point of 
view (Gharajedaghi, 45-47). For example, human life itself (or perhaps consciousness of 
human life) is an emergent property; in order for it to exist, all of the critical systems in a 
human body must be functioning properly and working together to maintain it. However, 
life does not exist in any one part of the body since if one removed a vital organ12 from a 
person, her life would disappear. An appreciation for emergent properties in systems 
thinking can allow those who practice it an enhanced ability to model how large systems 
actually behave in the real world. That perspective may also open up their studies to more 
holistic and interesting questions than are available to those who do not fully embrace 
these principles. 
 Finally, systems thinking emphasizes counterintuitiveness, or the realization that 
systems and individuals often do not react to incentives and stimuli in the way that one 
might expect at the outset. This behavior may sometimes create unintended 
consequences, or at least results that are quite surprising to an outside observer or an 
initiator within the system. This property of systems thinking is strongly related to 
emergent properties; since it is generally difficult to observe or measure the latter in 
isolation, it is quite easy to mistakenly believe that some particular action should have a 
desired effect when in fact an emergent property of the system can frustrate that aim. In 
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any event, the idea of counterintuitiveness covers a number of observations about cause 
and effect in real-world systems that are important to any study of human societies or 
behavior (Gharajedaghi, 48-50; Richmond, 22-28). Cause and effect may be separated by 
time and space, one cause may have many effects, and inertia may play a determinative 
role in how a system behaves. Systems thinking’s explicit recognition of these features of 
reality can allow it to systematically include counterintuitive results in its models and 
illuminate a broader understanding of the behavior under examination.  
Basics of Systems Modeling--In order to put these principles of systems thinking into 
action and enhance their ability to study a host of interesting biological, physical, social, 
managerial and economic phenomena, systems modelers have created a set of 
mathematical tools based on non-linear dynamics. These techniques require systems 
modelers to categorize the items they want to examine into three groups: stocks, flows 
and converters (Gharajedaghi, 59-64; Sterman 2000, 191-210; Richmond, 35-41, 56-59). 
Stocks13 are accumulations of money, people, objects or other characteristics that a 
researcher is interested in examining; if one could speak of a “grammar” of systems 
modeling, stocks are the “nouns” of that analogy. Because they are collections of the 
items of interest, stocks describe the condition of a system at any specific moment, 
provide systems with memory and inertia, and are the sources of delays in those systems. 
They are normally represented in stock and flow diagrams as rectangles labeled with the 
name of the stock in question and, ideally, the units in which the stock is measured.  
 Flows measure the movement of physical and incorporeal objects into and out of 
stocks at any particular point in time; they are the “verbs” of systems modeling because 
they describe activities or items in motion. They are generally signified in stock and flow 
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diagrams as thick arrows or pipes with valve-shaped symbols representing how those 
inflows and outflows are regulated going into and out of stocks. More generally, the rate 
of change of a stock is the net flow into or out of it; these changes occur in an 
infinitesimal amount of time so that they may be mathematically integrated over time into 
the values of a stock. Converters14 help to determine flow rates as exogenous constants or 
endogenous variables that influence the speed with which objects enter or leave stocks. In 
terms of the grammar analogy used earlier, converters are “adverbs”15 because they 
influence how quickly or slowly money, people, skills or other objects move into or out 
of stocks. Converters are generally represented in systems modeling diagrams as circles 
with thin arrows directed at the flow valves that they are influencing.  
 Population growth and movement can be conveniently conceptualized and 
represented in these systems modeling terms. Every country has a number of people who 
live within its borders and who are migrants in it (stocks), but those figures are not 
constant over time. The net changes in state population or migrant stocks (flows) are 
impacted by the health and wealth of these populations, whether a war or virulent disease 
is present in that country, and by a host of other external and internal conditions 
(converters). Although sometimes policymakers are interested in the value of these 
population stocks at any one time so they can provide various services to them, generally 
they want to know the rate at which they are changing and what those stocks’ figures may 
be in the future. Again, systems modeling grants policymakers the ability to comprehend 
the dynamics of their country’s demographics that led to the present situation, estimate 
future values of population-related data, and design effective responses to problems that 
may arise from domestic and cross-border population shifts.  
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Systems Modeling Procedures--Systems modeling research proceeds much like any other 
such endeavor in the social sciences, and its process16 can be broken down into five 
distinct phases (Sterman 2000, 85-104). The first issue that must be handled is problem 
articulation, or setting the external boundaries of the study. Although systems thinking 
encourages examining social and economic problems from a holistic perspective, limits 
must be placed on the incipient model in order to prevent unworkable, unwieldy and 
confusing products from being created. This step includes determining the problem one 
wants to explore, establishing the key variables that might be useful in addressing that 
problem, and selecting the time horizon for the investigation. The second matter that 
must be attended to is formulating the dynamic hypotheses that guide the study. These 
hypotheses are based on competing and complementary explanatory theories of the 
problem, but with a special focus on potential endogenous feedback structures that may 
affect the subject of the research. An important part of this stage is mapping the causal 
structures that underlie the initial hypotheses using a number of diagrams, including 
causal loop diagrams and stock and flow maps.  
 Third, the systems modeling process insists that a researcher formulate her model 
by carefully specifying its structure, estimating its parameters and initial conditions, and 
testing it to see if it addresses the puzzle it is designed to examine. For some researchers, 
this step may mean tediously writing out the equations that comprise the model with all 
of the attendant mistakes that act might create. However, with modern systems modeling 
software17 like STELLA, the relationships can be specified using stock and flow 
diagrams instead. The program then automatically converts those diagrams into the 
equations they represent and checks to ensure that many basic mistakes (such as creating 
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circular relationships) are not committed. In the fourth step, valid data are entered into the 
model, results are estimated, and the model is tested in a number of ways to ensure its 
reliability. These tests often include reproducing historical trends using known data 
patterns and verifying that the model is robust even when subjected to extreme data 
conditions. The basic purpose of these tests is to be certain that there are no serious flaws 
in the model that would compromise the results that are derived from it. Finally, these 
results are translated into policy design and evaluation in the fifth and final stage of the 
systems modeling procedure. This step includes determining strategies and rules that 
might be applied in the real world and examining whether some of these strategies might 
interact well with one another to create synergistic results. In conclusion, this process is 
implicitly followed in this chapter to investigate interesting policy questions surrounding 
EU internal labor migration.  
Advantages of Systems Modeling--Although the mechanics and theory behind systems 
modeling are interesting topics, a more pressing question to discuss here is what this 
procedure can and cannot do in social science research. One important benefit of systems 
modeling is that it effortlessly incorporates feedback relationships between variables, a 
fundamental principle of systems thinking, into its modeling process (Richmond, 17-21, 
61-72; Sterman 2000, 12-14). Many of the most interesting real-world relationships and 
phenomena are not linear and unidirectional, and systems thinking recognizes that in its 
modeling by overtly encouraging researchers to take those features into account. In fact, 
many system dynamics are created by the presence and interaction of self-reinforcing 
(positive) or self-balancing (negative) loops. Self-reinforcing loops create the familiar 
exponential growth that anyone who has studied arms races or bacterial growth in a food-
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rich environment understands implicitly. However, no quantity can grow exponentially 
forever; resources are finite, and so expansion is naturally limited by balancing loop 
processes. In terms of labor migration, the arrival of foreign workers into a new, 
wealthier economy creates the potential for both self-reinforcing and balancing loops to 
develop. Migration between these two countries might be bolstered by the networking 
effects that make it easier for compatriot workers to leave home for the new economy. 
However, the growth of their presence may reduce the number of available jobs for later 
migrants and can engender a negative political and social backlash among native workers 
that would make the receiver economy less inviting for newer arrivals. In other words, 
scholars’ appreciation of labor migration is truncated without the idea of feedback 
somewhere in their mental models of it.  
 Another benefit of systems modeling is that it can encourage the discovery of 
unexpected relationships in the systems under study, and thus the creation of new 
hypotheses involving the variables in question. It may even suggest new combinations 
and interactions of variables that would be worthy of further examination. These features 
of systems modeling arise directly from the systems thinking principles of emergent 
properties and counterintuitiveness (Sterman 2000, 5-10, 37-38; Gharajedaghi, 45-51). 
The former idea implies that some relationships and variables cannot be perceived as 
being in existence or important18 until a more holistic view of the system under 
investigation is taken. These emergent properties are often what make certain behaviors 
counterintuitive and initial predictions wildly inaccurate, a difficulty that this study is 
aware of in its explorations of the dynamics of intra-EU labor mobility. 
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 A final positive point to be made about systems modeling, at least as it is done 
using a program like STELLA, is that its visual nature makes it easier for non-technical 
users of these models to understand what their logic is (Sterman 2000, 193-195; 
Richmond, 116-120; Grafton and Permaloff 1995, 503-504; Grafton and Permaloff 1989, 
254-255). Mathematical equations can be imposing and confusing to the uninitiated, and 
even for experts they can be less than intuitive. Stock and flow diagrams remove this 
barrier from consideration, even though beneath those depictions lie some complicated 
mathematical relationships that the computer can more easily handle than any human 
could. In order for systems thinking to gain the widest possible audience, it should be 
user-friendly and approachable. Visual representations in systems modeling like stock 
and flow diagrams, causal loop diagrams, and user-monitored “dashboards” (gauges, 
charts and graphs that show how variables are behaving and have behaved within a model 
run) may allow that goal to be achieved remarkably well.  
Constraints of Systems Modeling--Even though there are many advantages of systems 
modeling that might make it useful to various social scientific analyses, there are also 
some limitations on what it can do that are important to appreciate from the outset. The 
first of these constraints is related to the more general problem of prediction and 
extrapolation from present data trends. When a systems model is utilized to forecast the 
future behavior of a system under different sets of conditions as is attempted in this study, 
one can never be certain19 that the results of the work are correct. All one can do is 
examine how the system behaves in the past and try to replicate that performance using 
historical data and the model in question (Sterman 2000, 874-880; Clark and Cole, 65-
68). This strategy at least allows one to make a defensible case that the future behavior of 
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the system will unfold as the model predicts. The validity of this argument is sensitive to 
the model’s assumptions, naturally, but one can test the robustness of the model’s results 
using a number of extreme case and sensitivity analyses (Ford and Flynn, 276-278; 
Sterman 2000, 869-871, 882-887; Richmond, 149-151). These steps can help deflect 
some, although not all (Hoos, 224, 237-238), criticism that a model’s results originate 
solely from the initial assumptions of, and data used in, that model.  
 A second limitation of systems modeling is derived from its inherently non-linear, 
non-positivist nature. As Sterman (2000, 846-850) states, models can never be verified or 
validated because, as simplified visions of reality, they are all “wrong” 20 at some level. 
However, even beyond that observation, systems models face an extra barrier to 
acceptance because they can rarely be supported by commonly accepted statistical21 tests. 
Although there have been some encouraging developments concerning this issue in 
recent years (Dogan), it is still difficult to perform hypothesis testing and calculate 
confidence intervals for systems models’ parameters. This feature is perhaps what most 
distinguishes systems models from econometric or statistical models of the same 
phenomena and is one reason why the former are oftentimes used in conjunction with the 
latter in the same study. The complementarity of these techniques (Gurian, 118-119) 
implies that the results of systems models can be used to further develop statistical 
models, and the results of statistical research can inform the construction of systems 
models. In fact, information from past statistical models is utilized in this study to build 
its systems models.  
Systems Modeling’s Suitability for this Study--Worker migration within the EU, the 
incentives that create it, and the barriers that prevent it comprise a complex system of 
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feedback loops and stocks and flows of people, and would thus seem to be a natural 
subject for systems modeling to address. This observation is especially resonant when 
one knows that the current work is inspired by a systems model that was constructed by 
the author and other co-workers (Bickers) to explore workforce movement and 
development in the state of Indiana. Although systems modeling is employed frequently 
in business22 and management research, the natural sciences, and environmental science 
(Forrester 1975; Sterman 2000, 42-55, 66-79; Gharajedaghi, 190-264), it is not applied in 
political science23 or public policy studies very often presently (Cavana and Clifford). 
One aim of this study is thus to add to these sparse contemporary applications using a 
topic that appears to be tailor-made for the strengths of this technique.  
 Additionally, systems modeling is especially appropriate for an analysis of labor 
migration because the stock and flow models can implicitly assume net worker flow. As a 
reminder, the unit of flow measurement adopted by the statistical models is population-
adjusted net annual labor migration rather than gross worker movement. An implication 
of this decision is that workers who leave short-term or seasonal jobs abroad and return 
home simply shift back into their home population stock and thus do not count in that 
year’s donor-country outflow. Generally, publics and politicians care more about workers 
who move permanently into their countries than temporary employees because the former 
are perceived to create lasting changes in a society’s demographics and labor market. The 
same statement could be made about cross-border commuters, small-scale traders 
(Okólski, 117-118) and other workers who have no intention of settling down in the 
country where they are temporarily engaged. This expectation is not unreasonable, of 
course, as questions of identity rarely revolve around temporary “visitors” to a country or 
 174
region. Earlier studies (e.g., Fertig, 712) make much of their focus on “permanent” 
migration, but using net flows is also an outgrowth of the available data and the logic of 
systems modeling.  
 However, systems modeling also allows researchers to examine the effects of 
gross migration flows24 on a society and its policies for dealing with both types of 
migration. Once again, the impacts of net and gross migration on the politics of both 
sender and receiver countries can be quite disparate from one another. One can easily 
imagine a scenario in which large-scale gross immigration and emigration are taking 
place between two countries, leaving only a small residual net migration in their wake. 
Although one would predict based on that inconsequential net migration that neither 
country’s economy or politics are being strongly influenced by the labor migration 
between them, the sheer quantity of two-way worker movement may create enormous 
political pressures in both states25 to decelerate that flow. In other words, the sheer 
volume of migration a country experiences may matter as much as the net outcome of 
that process due to the disconcerting cultural and political effects of large-scale 
permanent, or temporary, labor migration. Even if one could confidently predict that the 
long-term permanent volume of migration to a country would be low, a sudden influx of 
foreign workers arriving in an economy right after the introduction of a new labor 
mobility policy could create serious disequilibria in the politics and economy26 of both 
the sender and receiver country. Although the structural design of the systems modeling 
software does permit one to trace both gross and net migration at the same time, for 
technical and theoretical reasons27 this study limits itself to examining the determinants 
and consequences of CEEC10 net migration exclusively.  
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Model Building: 
An early phase in the systems model construction process (Richmond, 17-22, 141-153) 
involves setting the boundaries of the problem under study and determining the relevant 
variables in that system. An interesting way of visualizing that process is to construct a 
causal loop diagram containing the system’s variables of interest; the one that represents 
the current systems model can be located in Figure 4.1. Many of the interactions between 
these variables, including their directions and polarities, should be familiar given the 
results of the statistical model in the previous chapter. For instance, an increase in the 
GDP ratio difference between the migrant receiver and sender countries should lead to an 
increase in the migration rate and thus the number of net worker migrants shifting 
locations, while an increase in donor-country employment should generate a decrease28 in 
the number of net CEEC10 migrants. However, the causal loop diagram includes many 
relationships that are not present in the statistical model and illustrates loop structures29 
and feedback that statistical modeling does not permit. It is the goal of the next section of 
this discussion to elucidate, defend and operationalize these new relationships. It should 
be noted that the causal loop diagram outlines a rather simplified model of the migration 
system that exists between the CEEC10 and EU15 member states. In fact, a subsequent 
portion of this section explicates potential relationships between these variables that are 
not included here for various reasons. Hopefully, even this relatively uncomplicated 
model of the CEEC10-EU15 migration system should generate helpful insights as to how 
it behaves, however. Finally, this model-building explication concludes with a brief test 
of the model’s predictive ability utilizing CEEC10 data from the late 1990s and early 
2000s.  
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New Relationships--Perhaps the easiest of the new interactions30 to explain and support in 
this section are the ones between both host and donor country GDP and employment. 
Standard economic theory would contend that increasing per capita GDP would also 
augment employment because an expanding economy allows more workers to be hired 
and requires them to be in jobs in order to produce the goods and services that further 
enhance per capita gross domestic product. However, teasing out the exact value of the 
statistical relationship between increases of GDP and employment in isolation from all of 
the other factors that influence these entities is extremely difficult. The customary 
reaction to this situation would be to exclude this connection from a model because there 
can be little statistical confidence in the number that is utilized to quantify this 
relationship. However, according to Forrester (1961, 57; cited in Sterman 2000, 854), this 
action is tantamount to claiming that there is no relationship at all between two such 
variables, a claim that is almost certainly false. Therefore, an alternative appropriate 
action might be to estimate such parameters as carefully as possible and rigorously test 
the validity of these estimations through the use of sensitivity analyses and data 
replication using historical information. Although this choice may be contentious, it is the 
one made by this study in order to gain an enhanced perspective on the CEEC10-EU15 
migration system and illustrate the potential value of systems modeling more generally31. 
With these caveats firmly in mind, this study estimates that a one-percent increase in 
(sender or recipient-country) GDP creates, all else equal, a 0.01 percent increase32 in 
(donor or host-country) employment. This estimate33 is based on the author’s 
understanding of how these two factors interact with one another and the limitations34 of 
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this systems model; it is also quite conservative and could be easily changed in the future 
if it turns out to be faulty in any way.  
 Another set of relationships that must be discussed here involves the ones 
concerning migrant stock, including the observation that these new interactions create a 
reinforcing and a balancing loop in the model. The first new connection, the one between 
net CEEC worker migrants and per capita migrant stock, is simply an open recognition of 
something that is unstated in the statistical model. In particular, an increase in the number 
of CEEC migrants also increases the per capita stock35 of those workers in the receiver 
country. That observation is not particularly noteworthy, but at least one of its 
implications might be; if network theory is correct, and there is only limited evidence in 
its favor from the statistical model, that growth in per capita migrant stock should then 
generate an increase in the number of future migrants who arrive in the receiver country. 
The explicit recognition of the relationship between these variables indicates that a 
reinforcing loop structure exists between these two variables in the model. This loop is 
implied in the theoretical structure of the statistical model, but the systems model’s 
construction allows it to be recognized overtly. The next relationship involving per capita 
migrant stock is not as obvious as the previous one and therefore requires a bit more 
explication and defense. Logic and classical economic theory would contend that, leaving 
out other influences on this relationship, the per capita migrant stock variable should have 
a positive association with sender-country employment. That statement can be made 
because an increase in a country’s workers moving abroad to take jobs should reduce 
donor-country unemployment (increase employment) since there are now fewer 
competitors for positions in the sender country. Even if employed workers were to leave 
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the sender for the receiver country, those migrants must now be replaced, most likely by 
donor-country unemployed workers. The causal loop diagram indicates that the addition 
of this relationship creates a balancing loop in the model: an increase in the number of 
worker migrants augments the per capita migrant stock, which then increases host-
country employment and decreases the number of workers who migrate. In fact, the 
recognition of this balancing loop may indicate one reason why fewer workers often 
migrate than one might initially suppose (i.e., there is a integrated regulator in the system 
that retards the migration process). Using all of the operationalization qualifications 
described previously, this research estimates that, all else kept constant, a 0.01 (one-
percent) increase in per capita donor-country migrant stock creates a 0.01 percent 
increase36 in donor-country employment. Once again, this estimation is a fairly 
conservative one and can be altered if future investigation demonstrates that this figure is 
too high or too low.  
 The three new relationships involving education level, itself a new variable in this 
analysis, remain to be explicated and justified. The average number of years of education 
variable is calculated for the ten CEE countries’ workers37 from United Nations-collected 
data on the highest educational attainment by adults over the age of twenty-five 
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 172-173). The first relationship that utilizes this 
variable is the one that directly links education level and migration rate. The guiding 
presumption of this association is that CEE workers with greater accumulations of skills 
and education are more likely to move to the EU15 economies because they can generally 
realize greater gains from those skills in a wealthier economy (Harris and Todaro). 
Additionally, CEE workers with more education are more likely to have knowledge of 
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languages, job markets and contacts in their receiver country than those with less 
education. This deduction is also inspired by the “brain drain” hypothesis (Straubhaar and 
Wolburg, 1-2; Favell et. al., 11-12) that has so concerned policymakers in Central Europe 
and elsewhere across the globe38 over the past few decades. Operationalizing this 
relationship is somewhat complex, however, because one does not want to imply that all 
educational gains are equal. For instance, a group of workers with only a primary 
education may be more likely to move if they complete another year of education on 
average, but they are still unlikely to move overall because they have a relatively low 
amount of skills. A similar statement could be made about a group of potential migrants 
who have already completed a tertiary education, but they are more likely to migrate 
anyway because they have a large bank of skills at hand. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
operationalize the relationships that employ education as their base with an inflection or 
break point at which the effect of the education variable transitions from being a negative 
influence on the migration rate to having a positive influence on that rate. This analysis 
estimates that this null effect point is at twelve years39 of average education, which is 
equal to completing an upper secondary-level course of study. The particular 
operationalization that is utilized for this relationship is that, ceteris paribus, for every 
year of average education that a CEE country’s workforce possesses, the members of that 
workforce are more likely to migrate by a factor of 1x10-6. Although that figure40 may 
seem unusually tiny, it is important to keep in mind that the average migration rate 
calculated during the statistical modeling-based forecasts is roughly 3x10-4. While the 
initial estimation of this effect is fairly cautious, one can see that it could have a 
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considerable positive impact on a highly-educated society’s migration rate over the 
course of many years. 
 The remaining two interactions involving the average education level variable are 
also the ones that comprise the second reinforcing loop in the systems model. Increases in 
education level should independently augment sender-country GDP because workers 
with more skills are assumed to be more productive than low-skill workers. However, the 
separate effect of education on GDP is likely to be quite small here due to the 
considerable delays and decays that exist in transforming recently-acquired education 
into practical workplace skills. In other words, educational improvements do not 
automatically translate into workforce improvements; skills must be practiced in reality 
before they can become effective, and some expertise acquired in an academic setting 
may not be appropriate for certain working environments. Therefore, this analysis 
estimates that enhancements to a donor-country’s average education level have a very 
small, 0.1 percent (0.001) per year of improvement, effect on donor-country GDP. Please 
note that this variable is operationalized as the average education level-migration rate one 
is in that countries with an average education level above twelve years experience a 
positive effect41 of this function on their GDP while those with an education level below 
twelve years encounter a negative consequence for their GDP. Enhancements to per 
capita GDP are also expected to have a positive impact on education levels, which is the 
source of the second reinforcing loop illustrated in the causal loop diagram. The 
operational notion here is that as per capita GDP increases, there are more resources for 
the government and private individuals to spend on education and a reduced likelihood 
that students would need to leave school early for reasons of financial hardship. Once 
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again, however, the discrete effect of GDP on education level is likely to be slight 
because increases in per capita GDP would give governments and individuals the ability 
to expend resources on policy goods aside from education as well, and there are almost 
certainly going to be delays and “leaks” in the pipeline connecting GDP and education 
level growth. In other words, each year these resource enhancements can assist only a 
small fraction of a country’s students to finish a program of study or extra year of 
education who otherwise would not complete that training. Therefore, this analysis 
estimates that every one percent increase in donor-country per capita GDP creates an 
improvement in the donor-country education level by 0.001 average years of education. 
As has been stated for the previous new relationships, the values associated with these 
two associations are fairly conservative and are open to change as later circumstances 
warrant. 
 Another new variable of interest is related to a demographic factor that can 
certainly be contended to have an impact on the migration relationship between sender 
and host countries. Cumulative causation migration theory (Massey et. al., 47-49) 
contends that younger people are much more likely to move to find work than older 
potential employees are. Countries with a greater proportion of their population in the age 
bracket that is most likely to move would therefore be presumed to have higher migration 
rates42 than those with smaller proportions of their populations in the relevant age range. 
However, just like with the education variable, not all changes in the proportion of 
workers in the relevant age range are equivalent. For instance, a country with a very low 
share of its population in the twenty to thirty-four age bracket43 that expands that figure 
would have a higher migration rate, but the total effect of this low fraction of young 
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workers in the population on the migration rate would likely be negative. A similar 
statement could be made for a society that had a fairly large percentage of workers in the 
relevant age range; a decrease in that proportion would reduce the overall migration rate, 
but the complete impact of this high fraction of such workers on the migration rate would 
probably remain positive. Therefore, the operationalization of this association proceeds in 
a fashion similar to that of the education relationships. The break point between an 
overall positive and negative effect of the age range variable on migration rate is 
estimated to be twenty percent, and for every one percent (0.01) increase in the 
proportion of the donor-country’s twenty to thirty-four year old population, the migration 
rate increases independently by a factor of 1x10-6. Once again, this alteration44 is a 
relatively small one because other factors impact this relationship, but it can be adjusted 
as more information is gathered about this phenomenon. Additionally, one can perceive 
how this factor might have a considerable cumulative impact on the migration rate over 
many years. The initial values of the percentages of the CEEC10 populations in the 
appropriate age range are calculated from the 2005 figures45 located in World Bank 
(2009).  
 Each CEE country’s young worker proportion stock is not the only variable that 
must be operationalized in this discussion, however. For instance, because this analysis 
takes population changes into account as part of its baseline model, it is sensible to 
incorporate such alterations involving young worker proportion into it as well. The 
average rate of change46 in the young worker population proportion for each of the ten 
countries under study in this analysis is calculated from the figures available in World 
Bank (2009). The presence of these population proportions in the systems model may 
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also allow this study to make forecasts about the composition of the CEEC10-EU15 
migration flow as well as its overall magnitude. That assertion might be true because 
recent examinations of post-accession CEEC10 worker flows (Brücker and Damelang, 
31-32; Pollard et. al., 25) indicate that large portions of those workers47 are in the twenty 
to thirty-four age category. One could use the information provided by these studies to 
create a dimensionless multiplier called “age disproportionate factor” to estimate the 
portion and magnitude of future worker flows48 from each CEEC10 economy that fall 
into the relevant age bracket. Based on the studies cited earlier in this paragraph, the 
value of this factor is initially approximated to be three. This converter can then be 
multiplied by the annual age bracket percentage value to estimate the proportion of yearly 
worker migrants that lies in this category; the magnitude of the annual young worker flow 
can then be determined by multiplying this resultant by the yearly net donor-country 
migrants figure. The starting value of the age disproportionate factor is only a first 
estimate and is certainly open to change if later data acquisition suggests that another 
value would be better. 
 Another descriptive feature of the CEEC10 worker migrant flow that might be 
interesting to forecast, and the one that contains the final two new relationships that must 
be explicated in this section, is the proportion of those sender-country workers who 
possess a college degree. This concept does not appear in the causal loop diagram 
because its value is excluded from the calculation of each country’s annual net migration 
rate. However, it may still be worthwhile to try to understand what this figure could be 
like in the future so EU15 governments might know what to possibly expect on this 
score. The initial stock data49 for this measure are taken from Brücker and Damelang 
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(2009, 42), but they are problematic50 because these figures are for the percentage of the 
CEEC10 working-age migrant population rather than that entire population. That fact 
implies that one cannot calculate the number of college-educated migrants in an 
analogous way51 to how one is able to project the number of young worker migrants 
described earlier. In other words, the results section of this analysis can only report the 
final percentage values that these country-specific variables take. This analysis presumes 
that changes in sender and host-country GDP affect the proportion of the (working-age) 
migrants who have college educations in a mirror-image fashion. Since a growing 
receiver economy would be likely to disproportionately attract college-educated migrants 
from the sender countries because they would have a greater pool of skills to draw upon 
to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the expanding economy, this analysis 
posits a positive relationship between receiver-country GDP growth and the percentage 
of college-educated migrants who come to that host country. In particular, every one-
percent (0.01) increase in German per capita GDP is estimated to independently create a 
0.05 percent (0.0005) boost in the proportion of donor-country migrants52 with a college 
education. The relationship between sender-country GDP and the percentage of its 
migrants with college educations is similar in form except that a negative relationship is 
anticipated here because a growing sender-country economy should persuade potential 
college-educated migrants to become employed in their home economies. Specifically, 
every one-percent expansion in donor-country GDP is expected to create a 0.05 percent 
decrease in the percentage of college-educated migrants who leave for the receiver 
country. Both of these relationships are rather modest in their expectations of effects on 
the proportion of college-educated migrants in the relevant flows but, like the previous 
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new relationships, they are open to alteration if necessary and could have considerable 
effects on the value of this stock in the long run. 
Omitted Relationships--Although the above new relationships may seem to exhaust the 
possibilities presented by the causal loop diagram, they do not come close to their end. 
Quite a few other relationships might be hypothesized based on that drawing, the first set 
of which contains the connections that could be depicted from sender and host-country 
employment change to sender and host-country per capita GDP change, respectively. A 
reasonable classical economics argument could be made that an increase in employment 
might augment per capita GDP in much the same way that a rise in the latter stimulates 
an increase in the former. However, since both of these notions describe changes in these 
variables, attempting to include both sets of directional relationships in this model would 
create simultaneity issues (circular relationships) that the modeling software refuses53 to 
permit. Since per capita GDP increases would seem to have a greater impact on changes 
in employment rather than the other way around and because employment increases often 
lag GDP increases, only the former relationship is included in this systems model. 
Another variable that could affect both receiver and sender-country GDP levels is the 
number of net worker migrants who leave the CEE economies for the EU15 countries. 
One could certainly assert that an enhancement in net migration would increase the per 
capita host-country GDP and decrease the receiver-country’s per capita GDP because 
productive workers are being transferred from one economy to another in this 
relationship. However, the total consequences of this migration may depend quite heavily 
on the types of jobs that these migrants take in their host-country economies, especially 
since the variable in question here is per capita GDP change. For instance, if the brain 
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drain effect pulls CEEC10 workers away from high-skill jobs in their home economies 
and places them in low-skill jobs in the receiver economies (the so-called “brain waste” 
effect; Brücker and Damelang, 29, 30-31), the per capita GDP of both countries may be 
negatively impacted because the migrants’ skills are being squandered. They are, in fact, 
taking jobs that may not improve the per capita GDP of their hosts and their abilities are 
now absent from their home economies. Language barriers and skills incompatibilities 
may also make worker migrants less productive than native employees, which would not 
improve receiver-country per capita GDP. In contrast, one could contend that pulling 
unemployed or underemployed workers out of sender countries might actually improve 
those economies’ per capita GDP calculations because those workers may no longer be 
part of the denominators of those equations. A further alternative argument based on 
classical economic theory would state that the per capita GDP totals of both countries 
should be improved by migration because the workers’ skills are better distributed across 
both economies after migration is complete, leading to an overall improvement in each 
state’s productivity. In short, these migration-GDP relationships are omitted from this 
analysis because the directions of their effects are theoretically unclear. 
 Two potential relationships that include employment as the affected variable 
could also be derived from the causal loop diagram. The first of these associations 
involves the number of net worker migrants54 and host-country employment in that one 
could speculate that there should be a negative relationship between these two variables 
as migrants compete with native workers for jobs. Host-country employment would 
therefore decrease as more workers enter an employment market with only a limited 
number of jobs. However, as dual labor market theory asserts (Piore, 35-43; Massey et. 
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al., 28-34), many times migrants fill positions that are open because no receiver-country 
workers want to take them. This theory would therefore imply that migration has a 
limited or null impact on overall receiver-country employment because receiver and 
sender-country workers are compliments to one another rather than competitors with each 
other. Once again, this relationship is excluded from this systems model because its 
theoretical direction is not well-enough established in the literature. The other variable 
that could impact employment is education level; the idea in this relationship is that 
increased levels of education grant workers more skills and thus make them more 
employable. While it is certainly true that raising the level of education in a country 
increases per capita GDP because enhanced education makes workers more productive, it 
is unclear that augmenting the level of education in a country should have a similar effect 
on unemployment. Other factors may intervene here; more specifically, if there are no 
jobs for educated workers once they leave school or if their academic training is not what 
employers require, it may be that the country simply has more highly educated 
unemployed individuals. In short, the education-employment relationship is left out of 
this study because it is uncertain that the former really influences the latter in a 
theoretically predictable fashion. 
Baseline Model Operationalization--Most of the data sources, operationalizations and 
assumptions (e.g., all CEEC10 member states enter the EU in 2004, the approximately 
two-percent economic convergence rate) for the baseline systems model are the same as 
for the statistical model in the previous chapter; any questions or concerns related to these 
issues should refer back to that material. However, this section highlights where these 
matters differ between the two types of models, starting with the topic of population 
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change. The baseline experiment for the statistical model does not include any population 
changes, whereas the baseline systems model does since systems modeling makes 
incorporating projected population changes a relatively simple matter. For the sake of 
consistency, the statistical model results for the variant that employs World Bank (2009) 
population projection data55 is adopted for baseline systems model comparison purposes. 
Another particular difference between the two models involves each model’s treatment of 
sender and receiver-country employment. Both baseline runs utilize the average 
employment rate between 1996 and 2003 as the initial values for sender and host-country 
employment. While those totals are held constant throughout all of the statistical model 
variants, even the ones that use high and low economic incentives, those amounts shift in 
the systems models due to the impact of GDP (and, in the case of sender-country 
employment, per capita migrant stock as well) changes on them. As one might suspect, 
these alterations have interesting effects on the calculations of the migration rates56 and 
projected numbers of migrants moving from the ten CEE countries to the EU15 member 
states. A final distinctive feature of the systems models that makes them somewhat 
different from the statistical models arises in how the free migration policy variable is 
treated. In the statistical model-based projections, its coefficient can simply be added to 
the migration rate equation in the appropriate year. However, this relationship must be 
operationalized in the systems models using Boolean algebra so that free migration policy 
presence impacts the migration rate starting at the correct time (2011 in the baseline 
model).  
 To summarize the model construction process, Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
fundamental building-block stock and flow unit57 of the systems model. This same  
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architecture exists for all ten donor countries, and it should be noted that the 
accumulation stocks (e.g., the ones for total sender-country net migrants) and converters 
(e.g., “CEEC10 total net migrants to Germany”) are excluded58 from this picture. A very 
different representation of the same information can be located in this chapter’s appendix, 
which contains the equations59 that define the baseline systems model. Although the 
stock and flow diagrams and equation systems in this appendix appear quite dissimilar on 
the surface, it can be safely asserted that they convey the same model structure 
information. Finally, the initial values for the most important country-specific stocks and 
converters are situated in Table 4.1. Many of these figures are the same as those that are 
used for the baseline statistical model, but there are some that are new to the systems 
model. 
Previous-Data Model Test--Before explicating the projection results of the systems 
model, it would be reasonable to discuss an examination of the model’s predictive 
accuracy using data from 199660 to 2003. Just as with the similar work involving the 
baseline statistical61 model, the question here is how much one can trust the forecasting 
capacity of the systems model given its ability to “predict” known data points. In 
conducting this investigation, 1996 data62 from the statistical modeling material and from 
the sources described previously in this chapter are utilized, with a few exceptions. The 
exclusions from that blanket statement primarily revolve around how sender-country 
GDP change, population change, and young worker proportion (level and change) are 
programmed. In both baseline forecasting models, donor-country GDP change is 
estimated so as to create a two-percent convergence between it and the receiver-country’s 
GDP. However, in this examination of the baseline system model’s predictive capability,  
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Table 4.1: Starting Values for Selected Baseline Systems Model Stocks and Converters 
 
Country Population Pct Population 
Change 
Migrant 
Stock 
GDP Ratio GDP Change 
Bulgaria 7,824,000 -0.00850 44300 3.0494 1.033539 
Czech Republic 10,202,000 -0.00133 30186 1.9328 1.034598 
Estonia 1,354,000 -0.00283 4220 1.3350 1.034350 
Hungary 10,130,000 -0.00333 54714 2.4090 1.033736 
Latvia 2,325,000 -0.00517 9341 1.9691 1.034899 
Lithuania 3,454,000 -0.00500 13985 2.3972 1.035017 
Poland 38,195,000 -0.00400 326882 2.4947 1.034163 
Romania 21,734,000 -0.00617 89104 5.4541 1.032656 
Slovakia 5,379,000 -0.00200 19567 2.0383 1.034430 
Slovenia 1,997,000 -0.00250 21795 1.3679 1.034308 
 
 
Country Average 
Education Level 
Pct College 
Migrants 
Pct 
20-34 
Decrease 
20-34 
Employment 
Bulgaria 11.157 0.313 0.2178 -0.002800 84.9375 
Czech Republic 12.216 0.356 0.2363 -0.003252 93.0125 
Estonia 11.968 0.169 0.2155 -0.002056 89 
Hungary 11.354 0.266 0.2285 -0.002568 92.875 
Latvia 12.517 0.113 0.2155 -0.002820 85.625 
Lithuania 12.635 0.159 0.2111 -0.002336 85.2125 
Poland 11.781 0.217 0.2389 -0.003460 84.7875 
Romania 10.205 0.141 0.2371 -0.003116 93.1375 
Slovakia 12.048 0.158 0.2493 -0.003612 84.3125 
Slovenia 11.926 0.092 0.2194 -0.002672 93.1125 
 
Change German GDP: 1.0141 
German Employment: 91.2125 
 
Note: the numbers for “Pct Population Change”, “Pct College Migrants” and “Pct 20-34” 
are actually proportions or rates rather than percentages; these labels are used here 
because that is how they are marked in the stock and flow diagrams. 
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the average rate of the new member-state annual GDP changes between 1996 and 2003 is 
utilized instead. This calculation is the same as the one that grants the 1.41 percent 
average yearly GDP change employed for German GDP in the forecast models. 
Population changes are calculated in a similar fashion in that the average rate of annual 
population change between 1996 and 2003 is used here to estimate sender-country 
population levels and shifts. Matters are somewhat more complex in calculating the 
young worker proportion variables because United Nations Demographic Yearbook data 
must be employed rather than World Bank data and there are years missing in the time 
series for all of the donor countries. This latter observation implies that one cannot use 
the average rate of annual change in the sender-countries’ twenty to thirty-four year old 
population to program the young worker proportion change converter; rather, the overall 
average annual change from 1996 to 200363 must be employed instead. Although that 
makes this change variable different from the others utilized in this test model, it is 
impossible to avoid that divergence in methods given the circumstances.  
 The results of the present investigation into the adequacy of the systems model 
are actually fairly encouraging. Just like with the statistical model, the projected totals for 
worker migration in 2003 are compared with the actual CEEC10 population movements 
to Germany in that year. In this instance, the difference between the actual (33,085) and 
projected (32,765) worker migration is less than one (-0.977) percent. As is true for the 
statistical model, the estimates for individual countries64 in 2003 might be off the mark, 
but the differences between the overall totals are quite small. The systems model permits 
this research to make an additional check on the accuracy of this forecast; namely, it can 
compare the projection results based on the 1996 data with the actual CEEC10 worker 
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movements for the entire 1997 to 2003 period. The outcomes of this test are also quite 
good (a predicted total of 231,584 worker migrants compared to the actual total of 
226,950, for a difference of almost exactly two percent), even though again the 
differences for individual countries can be fairly large. Overall, given the assumptions of 
this model, the data problems described earlier, and the economic upheaval that occurred 
in the CEEC10 during these years, both of these tests should grant one a sense that this 
model can be an accurate predictor of CEEC10 worker migration in the future. 
Model Results and Testing: 
In general, the results of the systems modeling projections using the baseline model and 
its alternative specifications forecast a modest future movement of workers from the 
CEEC10 to the EU15 member states. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 provide the final values for 
many of the variables65 in the baseline model and the worker migrant totals for all ten 
newly-accessioned states, respectively. As one can determine from the latter table, the 
baseline systems model forecasts that a slightly smaller percentage of CEEC10 migrants 
will have moved to the EU15 countries by 2030 than the population-adjusted statistical 
model does (1.310 percent versus 1.331 percent). Although much more information is 
presented in the discussion section of this chapter explicating the magnitude of the 
systems model worker migrant totals, it is noteworthy here that the varying influences on 
the migration rate interact to produce a reduction in the number of workers shifting from 
one economy to another rather than an enhancement. Additionally, the dynamic pattern of 
the systems model flows is slightly different from that of the statistical model; for 
instance, the migration rate decreases constantly over time for all ten systems model 
countries (except for the jump when the free migration policy is introduced in 2011), but  
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Table 4.2: Final (2030) Values for Selected Baseline Systems Model Variables  
 
Country Population Migrant Stock GDP Ratio GDP Change 
Bulgaria 6,213,442 117082 1.8061 1.033630 
Czech Republic 9,841,911 89418 1.1122 1.034692 
Estonia 1,254,259 12171 0.7735 1.034443 
Hungary 9,257,567 123255 1.4192 1.033827 
Latvia 2,021,355 27775 1.1239 1.034993 
Lithuania 3,016,793 43757 1.3639 1.035112 
Poland 34,277,462 700118 1.4527 1.034255 
Romania 18,389,352 274046 3.3151 1.032675 
Slovakia 5,095,962 66570 1.1784 1.034523 
Slovenia 1,866,494 33878 0.7934 1.034401 
 
 
Country Average 
Education Level 
Pct College 
Migrants 
Pct 
20-34 
Employment 
Bulgaria 11.248 0.287 0.1422 86.1602 
Czech Republic 12.310 0.328 0.1485 94.1081 
Estonia 12.061 0.142 0.1600 90.0981 
Hungary 11.445 0.239 0.1592 94.0345 
Latvia 12.611 0.085 0.1394 86.8003 
Lithuania 12.730 0.131 0.1480 86.4009 
Poland 11.873 0.190 0.1455 86.0928 
Romania 10.293 0.116 0.1530 94.2647 
Slovakia 12.141 0.130 0.1518 85.4631 
Slovenia 12.019 0.065 0.1473 94.4284 
 
German Employment: 91.5932 
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Table 4.3: Baseline Forecast of Migration to Germany by CEE Country 
 
Country Baseline Systems Model 
2004-2030 Migrants 
Population-Adjusted Statistical 
Model 2004-2030 Migrants 
Bulgaria 72,782 73,810 
Czech Republic 59,232 60,785 
Estonia 7,951 8,060 
Hungary 68,541 69,128 
Latvia 18,434 18,688 
Lithuania 29,772 30,048 
Poland 373,236 381,231 
Romania 184,942 186,173 
Slovakia 47,003 48,026 
Slovenia 12,083 12,436 
Total 873,975 888,384 
 
Systems Model: 
Total CEEC10 Migrants to All EU15 Member States: 1,343,750 
Percentage of CEEC10 Population Migration to EU15 Countries: 1.310% 
 
Statistical Model: 
Total CEEC10 Migrants to All EU15 Member States: 1,365,904 
Percentage of CEEC10 Population Migration to EU15 Countries: 1.331% 
 
Table 4.4: Baseline Forecast of Migration to Germany by CEE Country and Selected 
Year 
 
Country 2004 2010 2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 Total 
Bulgaria 2911 2768 2843 2754 2651 2554 2465 72,782 
Czech Republic 2300 2205 2322 2260 2182 2103 2022 59,232 
Estonia 311 297 312 303 292 281 271 7,951 
Hungary 2652 2552 2666 2602 2523 2446 2370 68,541 
Latvia 725 694 718 699 675 653 631 18,434 
Lithuania 1161 1117 1154 1126 1093 1061 1030 29,772 
Poland 14269 13878 14304 14057 13759 13471 13193 373,236 
Romania 7240 6949 7177 6995 6778 6573 6379 184,942 
Slovakia 1779 1737 1800 1772 1738 1704 1670 47,003 
Slovenia 469 450 473 460 445 429 414 12,083 
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it increases slightly over the run in a few of the statistical model cases (compare Table 
4.4 to Table 3.11). Potential reasons for this observation are explored in the discussion 
section of this chapter as well. In order to ensure that no one variable in the systems 
model has too great of an impact on the baseline model and to investigate how the 
implementation of an important policy might affect the overall migration figures, several 
alternative migration scenarios are presented in Table 4.5. The conditions for each of 
these experiments are defined in the same way as in the alternative statistical models 
presented in Chapter Three (Table 3.12). These models behave similarly to the original 
formulation of the systems model and grant results that resemble those observed from the 
alternative statistical models as compared to their baseline operationalization. For 
instance, the continual presence or absence of the free migration variable has relatively 
limited bearing on the overall migration numbers, and the high and low migration-
incentive conditions induce quite a few more or fewer workers to leave their home 
economies, respectively. Additionally, changing the assumptions in the economic 
conditions based alternatives affects some countries much more than others (e.g., 
compare how Bulgarian and Slovene workers react to these modified assumptions in both 
the systems and statistical models compared to their baseline forecasts). In short, the 
consistency of these alternatives’ results with those observed from the statistical model’s 
various operationalizations makes one more confident about the quality of the systems 
model’s outcomes. 
 However, there remains one difference between the statistical and systems models 
that has not yet been explored thoroughly: population changes. Given the minor 
alterations described previously in how population changes are calculated and  
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Table 4.5: Alternative Systems Model Projections of 2004-2030 CEEC10 Migration 
 
Country Low-Incentive High-Incentive Free 
Movement 2004 
No Free 
Movement 
Bulgaria 49,344 79,435 73,587 70,879 
Czech Republic 51,190 94,375 60,305 56,445 
Estonia 5,293 10,910 8,092 7,590 
Hungary 60,394 102,123 69,600 65,863 
Latvia 11,654 21,001 18,676 17,837 
Lithuania 19,238 33,156 30,131 28,883 
Poland 250,212 406,108 377,221 363,247 
Romania 169,781 255,981 187,195 179,454 
Slovakia 28,384 50,947 47,568 45,550 
Slovenia 10,595 18,911 12,293 11,548 
Total (Germany) 656,086 1,072,948 884,667 847,297 
Total (EU15) 1,008,742 1,649,674 1,360,190 1,302,732 
%CEEC10 Migration 0.983 1.608 1.326 1.270 
 201
programmed between the systems and statistical models, it is imperative to ensure that 
any observed results disparities between them are not an artifact of this methodological 
shift. An examination of Table 4.6 in comparison to Table 4.3 (or Table 4.7 with Table 
4.4) would confirm that although the divergent definitions of population change may 
have some effect on the final results, most of the observed decrease in migration between 
the systems and statistical models are a result of the former’s new variables and 
relationships, not its calculation of population changes. A greater substantiation of this 
claim can be obtained by perusing the outcomes of the no population growth systems 
models displayed in Table 4.8 and comparing them to the corresponding statistical model 
runs in Table 3.12. The fact that these various no population growth models behave 
exactly as one might expect them to given the results of the previous modeling 
experiments also bolsters the case that these systems models’ operationalizations are 
acceptable. In short, one should be able to conclude here that the observed systems model 
migrant population decrease is a real effect and not a data anomaly. 
Stress and Surprise Behavior Testing--In order to assess the validity of a systems model’s 
results, many extreme value (stress) and surprise behavior tests should be performed on it 
(Sterman 2000, 882-883). These diagnostics are important because they can reveal flaws 
in the model and illustrate some limitations that exist on its applicability. Some basic 
results from these tests can be spotted66 in Table 4.9, along with an explanation of what 
some of the experiments do when it is not obvious from the description in the table. For 
the most part, this systems model survives the stress and surprise behavior testing quite 
well and the model behaves as initially expected; the exceptions to these statements are 
discussed in this section along with any interesting results that appear during these  
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Table 4.6: No Population Growth Systems Model Migration Projection 
 
Country No Population Growth Systems 
Model 2004-2030 Migrants 
Baseline Statistical Model 
2004-2030 Migrants 
Bulgaria 79,823 80,755 
Czech Republic 60,097 60,770 
Estonia 8,200 8,317 
Hungary 70,955 71,598 
Latvia 19,516 19,826 
Lithuania 31,478 31,933 
Poland 388,995 392,887 
Romania 198,109 199,000 
Slovakia 48,077 48,399 
Slovenia 12,332 12,573 
Total 917,582 926,059 
 
Systems Model: 
Total CEEC10 Migrants to All EU15 Member States: 1,410,796 
Percentage of CEEC10 Population Migration to EU15 Countries: 1.375% 
 
Statistical Model: 
Total CEEC10 Migrants to All EU15 Member States: 1,423,831 
Percentage of CEEC10 Population Migration to EU15 Countries: 1.388% 
 
 
Table 4.7: No Population Growth Systems Model Migration Projection by CEE Country 
and Year 
 
Country 2004 2010 2011 2015 2020 2025 2030 Total 
Bulgaria 2911 2896 2997 2989 2977 2964 2950 79,823 
Czech Republic 2300 2221 2342 2290 2222 2152 2080 60,097 
Estonia 311 302 318 312 304 296 287 8,200 
Hungary 2652 2596 2720 2683 2636 2586 2534 70,955 
Latvia 725 714 742 735 725 715 705 19,516 
Lithuania 1161 1147 1191 1183 1172 1160 1148 31,478 
Poland 14269 14160 14645 14578 14488 14392 14288 388,995 
Romania 7240 7186 7463 7431 7388 7341 7291 198,109 
Slovakia 1779 1756 1823 1808 1788 1767 1745 48,077 
Slovenia 469 455 479 469 457 444 430 12,332 
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Table 4.8: No Population Growth Alternative Systems Model Projections of  
2004-2030 CEEC10 Migration  
 
Country Low-Incentive High-Incentive Free 
Movement 2004 
No Free 
Movement 
Bulgaria 53,643 87,351 80,649 77,640 
Czech Republic 51,892 95,862 61,174 57,249 
Estonia 5,438 11,274 8,343 7,822 
Hungary 62,392 106,038 72,025 68,128 
Latvia 12,259 22,278 19,761 18,867 
Lithuania 20,231 35,116 31,843 30,514 
Poland 259,343 423,865 393,027 378,335 
Romania 181,464 275,101 200,403 192,042 
Slovakia 28,962 52,142 48,645 46,576 
Slovenia 10,787 19,387 12,543 11,775 
Total (Germany) 686,411 1,128,414 928,413 888,947 
Total (EU15) 1,055,368 1,734,954 1427,449 1,366,769 
%CEEC10 Migration 1.029 1.691 1.391 1.332 
 204
Table 4.9: Selected Results from Stress and Surprise Behavior Tests 
 
Test Total CEEC10 
Migrants (Germany) 
Total CEEC10 
Migrants (EU15) 
% CEEC10  
Migration (EU15) 
50 year run 1,531,895 2,355,312 2.296 
100 year run 2,739,501 4,212,025 4.106 
-5% convergence 1,144,018 1,758,946 1.714 
15% convergence 323,437 497,290 0.485 
college education 867,929 1,334,455 1.301 
primary education 879,913 1,352,880 1.319 
no education 886,273 1,362,658 1.328 
GDP Ratio = 10 1,237,872 1,903,248 1.855 
GDP Ratio = 20 1,434,987 2,206,315 2.151 
GDP Ratio = 0.5 385,955 593,412 0.578 
donor employment = 50 2,416,722 3,715,748 3.622 
German employment = 50 0 0 0 
1/10 population 181,236 278,653 2.716 
10x population 7,801,536 11,994,982 1.169 
2x 20-34 population 940,296 1,445,720 1.409 
0.5x 20-34 population 840,815 1,292,766 1.260 
war! = 10 869,782 1,337,303 1.303 
war! = 50 851,448 1,309,114 1.276 
disaster! = 10 858,345 13,197,181 1.286 
disaster! = 100 702,041 1,079,399 1.052 
depression! = 0.1 889,789 1,368,064 1.333 
 
 
Note: the titles for each test refer to the values that these variables have for all ten 
countries, where appropriate. For instance, “college education” means that all ten CEE 
states have an initial average education level equal to seventeen, and “10x population” 
implies that each CEE country starts the run with a population ten times what is actually 
observed in 2003. The “disaster!”, “depression!”, and “war!” entries refer to new surprise 
behavior variables that are utilized solely for these tests. “Disaster!” creates a one-year 
(2015) ten or hundred-fold increase in the population change variables to simulate a 
major natural calamity; “depression!” produces a ten percent (0.1) decrease in the sender 
countries’ GDP level for one year (2015); and “war!” generates a ten or fifty-fold boost 
to the young worker population decrease converter for one year (2015). Each of these 
surprise behavior variables are programmed into the systems modeling software using 
Boolean algebra in a fashion similar to that of the free migration variable. In every case, 
no values other than the ones listed in the label are changed; in all cases but the first two, 
each experiment runs from 2004 to 2030. It should also be noted here that the CEEC10 
population values are multiplied by the appropriate factors to calculate the percentage of 
CEEC10 migration in the one-tenth and tenfold population experiments. 
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experiments. The first exemption from the assertion that the model performs as expected 
can be found in the long-term (fifty and one hundred-year) diagnostic tests. While the 
model seems to be perfectly fine in the test that lasts until 2053, two of the reservoirs 
(young workers and college migrants) for each sender country empty completely67 or 
come very close to voiding by 2103. Although the model is only designed to illustrate the 
moderately long-term possibilities for CEEC10-EU15 migration, the presence of these 
vacant reservoirs is an indication of a missing balancing loop or other structural element 
in the model that would need to be added if it were to be used for long-term forecasts. 
This point is explored in more detail in the discussion portion of this chapter along with 
some of the other noteworthy results of these model-testing experiments.  
 The GDP convergence tests evince some interesting findings, starting with the 
fact that the negative five-percent convergence (five-percent divergence) experiment 
grants several outcomes that are reversed from what the baseline model displays. For 
instance, this stress test model has decreasing employment and education level figures 
along with increasing percentages of worker migrants possessing a college education. 
These products are a mirror image of what the baseline model has and are what would be 
predicted given the relationships constructed in the initial systems model. In addition, a 
considerably larger number of worker migrants arrive in the EU15 countries under the 
conditions of this test, a consequence of this alteration to the model’s conditions that 
would have been expected. The extreme convergence model also behaves as one would 
have presumed, with a great reduction in the total number of worker migrants who would 
take jobs in the EU15 countries. In fact, after a time the yearly flows of workers 
(although not the migrant stocks) turn negative, implying that eventually more workers 
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would be induced to return to their home countries than would leave from there to 
Germany. This observation68 demonstrates that the model’s net flows can be negative as 
well as positive, a fact that would not necessarily be obvious from its previous runs.  
 While the GDP ratio stock experiments behave exactly as one would expect and 
without any serious issues, the investigations involving education are remarkable because 
none of them produce much change in the final number of migrants who move to the 
EU15 economies. That result occurs because there are counterbalancing effects of 
improved education levels on the migration rate. A higher level of education within a 
country’s population leads directly to higher migration totals in this model because 
workers have more and better skills to exploit in their receiver-country economies. 
However, increases in education also generate enhancements in sender-country GDP 
changes, which raises the convergence rate between the host and donor economies and 
thus accelerates the rate at which the GDP ratio shrinks. An attenuated ratio between the 
receiver and sender countries’ per capita gross domestic products then reduces the 
migration rate between them and lowers the overall number of workers who switch 
economies. In each of these three education-related experiments, the indirect GDP ratio 
impact is stronger than the direct effect, but these offsetting influences prevent any huge 
shifts in the final worker migrant figures. Another fascinating set of stress tests is 
comprised of the employment figures for Germany and the various CEE donor countries. 
Dropping the starting sender-country employment total to fifty percent creates an 
enormous increase in the number of CEEC10 migrants, as one might anticipate, but 
otherwise the model behaves well. However, reducing the host-country employment level 
to fifty percent induces no net CEEC10 workers to shift economies over the quarter-
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century of this experiment. In fact, in all but two cases, the migrant stocks of the CEEC10 
are exhausted by the end of that period, leaving no “donor-country” workers in Germany 
at all. A brief consideration of the intuition behind this result would reveal why it makes 
sense; at some level, it would be amazing that there would be any workers of any type69 
left in a country with roughly fifty percent unemployment. In short, the systems model 
behaves here exactly as one would presume it would under these conditions. 
 The two groups of extreme value trials involving various aspects of the population 
figures in the model also display some interesting outcomes, although they are not quite 
as remarkable as the ones from the tests that utilize education stock. For instance, the 
one-tenth and tenfold sender-country population experiments do not simply decrease the 
number of migrants by around ninety percent or increase it by ten times, respectively. 
That straightforward expectation is not fulfilled because of the impact this change has on 
the per capita migrant stock denominator and the further moderating impact that migrant 
stock has on the migration rate calculation. Even though these models behave as one 
might predict otherwise, this wrinkle in the results is worthy of note because it 
demonstrates how the complexities of systems models can frustrate anticipated outcomes. 
Alterations to the young worker population proportion70 also produce some interesting 
outcomes in that even large-scale alterations to these figures do not affect the migration 
rate very much. They do generate changes in the expected directions (i.e., a doubling of 
the young worker population proportion increases the number of migrating workers), but 
these shifts are not very large.  
 The observation that the young worker population proportion stock does not 
impact the overall migration rate very much is continued in the discussion of the surprise 
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behavior converter that utilizes this variable, “war!”. The purpose of a surprise behavior 
test is to shock the system with a huge increase or decrease in a particular variable and 
see how well the system responds to that sudden spike in value. In this case, because war-
fighting predominantly involves the part of the population71 represented by the young 
worker variable, an intense elevation of the rate of decrease of this part of the population 
is introduced as if a conflict would occur in 2015. This year is chosen not because it is 
anticipated that a war will commence then; it is designated as the period of this conflict 
because that year should give the system sufficient time to recover from any disequilibria 
that this abrupt increase might cause. There is also enough time before 2015 here that the 
model’s pre-shock trends should be easily detectable by its observers. In fact, the 
system’s dynamics behave normally both before and after this blow to the system, even 
though there is a slight decline in the overall forecasted number of migrants who arrive in 
the EU15 countries according to this projection. That contention holds true even when 
there is a fifty-fold enhancement to the decrease in the young worker population 
proportion for one year.  
 Although the systems model behaves as one would anticipate under the influence 
of the sudden economic crisis variable “depression!”, the same cannot be asserted as 
whole-heartedly for the natural calamity variable “disaster!”. Since a catastrophe like a 
plague, hurricane, or earthquake generally affects all age groups72 in a society’s 
population equally, “disaster!” is the label for the surprise behavior test variable for 
population change (decrease). The fascinating part of these experiments is that even 
though the final percentage of the population that migrates is lower in both the tenfold 
and hundredfold increase cases because there are fewer people left to migrate after the 
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disaster, that reduction is considerably smaller than one might initially expect. This 
outcome is due to the impact that the sudden decrease in the population has on the per 
capita migrant stock variable. A large reduction in the denominator of per capita migrant 
stock produces a corresponding increase in its overall value, which then generates an 
increase in the migration rate that partially offsets the decrease in migrants created by the 
rapid population loss. The latter effect certainly overwhelms the former in the end, and 
the model returns to equilibrium quickly after the “disaster”, but this surprising result is 
precisely why one utilizes systems modeling in the first place.  
Assumption Testing: The final phase of the model testing process involves examining 
many of the assumptions about the magnitudes of most of the new relationships that are 
posited in this analysis. These assumptions are located in the graphical functions73 that 
program most of these relationships in the systems modeling software. The overriding 
purposes of these experiments are to determine whether the final results of the baseline 
model are overly dependent on any particular assumption and to ascertain if any of the 
relationships or variables in the model are problematic. All of these runs are 
operationalized by multiplying the appropriate relationship factor by ten; for instance, a 
one-percent increase in sender or recipient-country GDP now generates, ceteris paribus, 
a 0.1 percent enhancement to donor or host-country employment. The first association 
that is examined in this fashion is the one between GDP change and education level 
change (ROR <donor country> GDP ch <donor country> ed level ch). A preliminary 
inspection of this relationship might lead one to presume that a tenfold increase in the 
effect of GDP changes on the sender-countries’ average education levels would induce a 
considerable boost to migration flows because improved education levels produce higher 
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migration rates here. However, that tenfold enhancement in the impact of GDP changes 
also heightens the effect of the other new relationship in which average education level is 
involved, the one between that stock and donor-country GDP changes. This connection 
creates a negative impact on the overall migration rate because increases in education 
level lead to improvements in GDP, which then raises the convergence rate and 
accelerates the speed with which the GDP ratio between the sender and receiver country 
shrinks. This more rapidly dwindling ratio induces fewer donor-country migrants to leave 
home because the economic advantages to moving are not as great as they might 
otherwise have been. That argument implies that it would be difficult to know a priori 
which one of these influences would be dominant in this scenario. In fact, the former 
influence is minutely more powerful than the latter one as less than 0.001 percent more 
migrants arrive in this experiment (Table 4.10) compared to the baseline model. In short, 
the magnitude of this new relationship does not have an oversized impact on the final 
results of the systems model, and it otherwise behaves as expected.  
 The next two connections that are explored here are the others that are associated 
with the average sender-country education level stock. As is true for the previous 
relationship, the effect of enhancing the magnitude of the graphical function for the link 
between education level and GDP change is difficult to predict ahead of time, but for a 
different reason than before. In this case, the overall impact of this experiment depends 
on the average sender-country education levels themselves because they generate below-
zero figures for fewer than twelve years of education and above-zero figures when the 
average education level is greater than twelve years. In other words, countries that have 
an average education level of less than secondary school completion experience negative  
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Table 4.10: Selected Results from Assumptions Tests 
 
Test Total CEEC10 
Migrants (Germany) 
Total CEEC10 
Migrants (EU15) 
% CEEC10  
Migration (EU15) 
GDP change- 
education level change 874,075 1,343,904 1.310 
education level- 
GDP change 891,277 1,370,352 1.336 
education level- 
migration rate 861,695 1,324,869 1.291 
young worker proportion- 
migration rate 861,350 1,324,339 1.291 
migrant stock- 
donor employ change 843,363 1,296,683 1.264 
donor GDP change- 
donor employ change 761,085 1,170,180 1.141 
German GDP change- 
German employ change 922,101 1,417,745 1.382 
 
 
Baseline Systems Model Percentage CEEC10 Migration (EU15): 1.310%
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effects in their GDP changes and the converse is true for states whose citizens have an 
average level of education of above high-school completion. These GDP modifications 
then produce the alterations in GDP convergence, GDP ratio level, and migration rate 
described previously. In the end, a slight increase in CEEC10 migrants to the EU15 
countries is detected (1.336 percent of the CEEC10 population compared to 1.310 percent 
in the baseline case) due to the negative effects on GDP changes outweighing the positive 
ones. One could therefore argue that this assumption has only a very limited effect on the 
results of this systems model. The donor-country education level-migration rate 
relationship has the same prediction problem as the education level-GDP change one in 
that it is not obvious from the start whether the influences of the below-secondary school 
education average states can outweigh those from countries with an above-secondary 
school average or not. If the education level-GDP change results are an accurate guide to 
what should happen here, one would predict that an overall reduction in CEEC10 
migrants should be detected in this test. That outcome should occur because the education 
level-migration rate graphical function has a direct effect on the migration rate, and if the 
negative average level of education effects overwhelm the positive ones in the previous 
test they should in this trial as well. In fact, a tiny decrease in the total percentage of 
CEEC10 net migrants compared to the baseline model (1.291 versus 1.310 percent) is 
found in this experiment. This small net migration decline, just like the slight changes 
produced in the previous education-related assumption tests, leads one to conclude that 
this assumption also does not have an outsized impact on the overall results of the 
systems model. 
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 The other graphical function involving migration rate directly is the one 
connecting this quantity and donor-country young worker population proportion. Just like 
with the first function directly tied to migration rate, it is not obvious what the initial 
expectations of the effect of this assumption test on that rate should be. That assertion can 
be leveled because although each sender-country’s young worker proportion starts at 
above twenty percent (thus creating a positive effect on the migration rate), the 
decreasing young worker proportion converter drags all of these economies’ proportions 
below twenty percent (thereby producing a negative effect on migration rate) by 2030. 
However, at this juncture one might be able to forecast that the combination of these 
impacts should balance each other out, leading to a mild overall effect on the final results 
for this assumption. That initial belief is justified, as the observed migration decrease in 
this experiment is only fractionally smaller than the one observed for the education level-
migration rate test. Due to its operationalization, the trial results for the one graphical 
function that utilizes per capita migrant stock rather than migration rate as a variable 
should be relatively easy to forecast. Since the relationship between migrant stock and 
sender-country employment always produces a result greater than zero, boosting this 
effect tenfold should always increase donor-country employment and thus decrease that 
economy’s migration rate. That prediction is an accurate one, as there is a small decrease 
in CEEC10 migration observed in this experiment compared to the baseline model (1.264 
versus 1.310 percent), and the model components behave reasonably well otherwise. In 
short, neither of the assumptions described in this paragraph have an undue impact on the 
final results of the systems model.  
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 However, matters are somewhat different when one turns to the final two 
assumptions74 explicated in this section. These graphical functions describe the 
connection between sender-country per capita GDP change and employment change and 
receiver-country per capita GDP change and employment change, respectively. At the 
outset of these experiments, one would presume that a tenfold jump in the effect of 
sender-country GDP change on its employment level would lead to an increase in donor-
country employment and thus a reduction in its migration rate due to the associations 
between these variables and the graphical function’s operationalization. The converse 
position could be staked out concerning the impact that a tenfold boost in the effect that 
receiver-country GDP change would have on its employment level and migration rate. In 
fact, the directions of these predicted changes are observed exactly as the previous 
sentences indicate they would be; however, the magnitude of these shifts and the 
behavior of some of the other variables in the systems model under these conditions are 
problematic. First, the size of these two changes is considerably larger than those 
produced by the previous five assumption tests, even if in the broader picture these 
alterations are still moderate in scope. This observation indicates that this model is more 
sensitive to the size of the GDP change-employment change assumptions than the others 
in the model and that one should be mildly cautious in interpreting the results of the 
systems model due to the relative importance of this assumption. However, the larger 
issue is that in the donor GDP change-donor employment change trial, the tenfold 
enhancement of the effect of the former variable on the latter leads to at least four 
countries exceeding one-hundred percent employment by the end of the run. That 
outcome is logically impossible, and exposes both a limitation of this model and a 
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potentially problematic dependence of the results upon this assumption. While it is true 
that this issue is suggested by the results of some of the stress tests and other assumption 
experiments, the donor GDP change-donor employment change experiment is the only 
place where it appears in full force. This problem could theoretically be shared by some 
of the other stocks in this model as well, a difficulty that is also hinted at in some of the 
other systems-model testing. Although the appropriate part of the final section of this 
chapter explicates the implications of this issue in some detail, it should be kept in mind 
here that the discovery of this problem does not void the results of this model. The 
successful older data tests described previously are, in fact, a better measure of the 
accuracy and validity of the systems model. However, this assumption experiment does 
pinpoint a limitation of this model that should be addressed in a future iteration of this 
analysis, a matter that is returned to later. 
Discussion and Conclusion: 
At this stage of the chapter, it is appropriate to review what the outcomes of this research 
determine and weigh its utility in an appropriate fashion. Overall, the baseline systems 
model and its alternative specifications forecast that a slightly smaller percentage of 
CEEC10 worker migrants could be expected to arrive in the EU15 economies by 2030 
than the statistical model predicts. Since the latter method envisages a smaller percentage 
of these workers leaving the CEEC10 economies than most of the literature on this 
question predicts, the systems model’s results provide perhaps an improved background 
for the policy discussion that takes place in the concluding chapter of this effort. In the 
meantime, the critical question of why the systems model generates lower CEEC10 
migrant figures than the statistical model does, even taking into account the 
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methodological differences described in two75 earlier endnotes, remains. The key to 
addressing this question lies in both the conservative nature of the assumptions that are 
made in this analysis and the new relationships that are posited in this model. It is the 
second of these assertions that is the focus of the majority of the discussion that follows 
on this question. 
 The two new variables that are included in the systems model, young worker 
proportion and average sender-country education level, have direct impacts on the 
migration rate value, so it is with those entities that this discussion begins. As indicated 
elsewhere, the young worker cohort stock should have a positive relationship with the 
migration rate converter, but the magnitude and sign of the effect of the former on the 
latter depends on the stock’s value. It is therefore difficult to know ahead of time whether 
the young worker proportion variable would have an overall positive or negative impact 
on the migration rate. However, it is known from the assumption testing experiments that 
this variable reduces the migration rate over the course of the period in question and thus 
the number of CEEC10 migrants who shift economies. A similar argument could be 
composed concerning the other new variable that directly impacts migration rate, average 
education level. Again, this concept should have a positive relationship with the 
migration rate, but the overall sign and magnitude of education level’s effect on this 
converter is difficult to determine a priori. The assumption experimentation does provide 
a post-hoc answer to that question, however, as a similarly negative effect on migration 
rate as the young worker stock creates is observed here. It should also be noted in this 
explication that the GDP change-educational level change graphical function also impacts 
migration rate indirectly through the latter. Although it is known from the assumptions 
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testing that this result should be positive, it is so small that it is apparently overwhelmed 
by the much larger direct negative effect of the education level stock on migration rate. 
These two education level related functions also stimulate the migration rate figure 
indirectly through their impacts on donor-country GDP change and thus donor-country 
GDP ratio as well. Since the education levels for the CEEC10 are generally below 
secondary school final career achievement and stay that way for the most part throughout 
the baseline experiment, one can safely conclude that the education level function 
induces an overall negative effect on sender-country GDP change. That reduction occurs 
despite the positive impact that donor-country GDP change76 has on education level 
change. This negative effect on GDP change decelerates the convergence of the sender-
country economies with that of the receiver country and thus increases the migration rate 
over that calculated by the statistical model. In short, these new variables create two 
overall negative and one overall positive influence on the donor-countries’ migration rate 
values. 
 The receiver and sender-country GDP change variables also have important 
impacts on the migration rate in the directions visualized by the causal loop diagram77 
polarities. The baseline model assumes that average annual per capita GDP growth in 
Germany is about 1.4 percent over the course of the experiment and that same figure in 
the donor countries is around 3.4 percent. One should also expect that German GDP 
growth has an overall positive effect on migration rate and that sender-country GDP 
growth has a negative impact on that figure via the host and donor-country employment 
variables respectively. That latter negative effect is reduced somewhat by the negative 
influence that the average education level has on sender-country GDP change cited 
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above, but the overall influence of sender-country GDP on the migration rate remains 
negative as can be seen in Table 4.10. Given the projected GDP growth rates adopted by 
the baseline model and the coefficients of the employment variables in the migration rate 
calculation, one might also expect that changes to the sender-country employment values 
would create more dramatic alterations of the migration rate than those to receiver-
country employment. This notion is also confirmed by the assumption experiments table. 
Elucidating the effect that per capita migrant stock has on the migration rate is a bit more 
complicated than for some of the other variables, however. An investigation of the annual 
migrant flow data for the baseline systems model and the comparable statistical model 
indicates that fewer workers move from the CEEC10 economies to Germany each year 
even from the start of the process. That fact implies that the per capita migrant stock 
increases more slowly in the systems model projection compared to the statistical model 
forecast. According to network theory (and visualized as reinforcing loop R1), this 
observation implies that the migration rate is also relatively depressed by this reduced 
number of worker migrants as in a vicious cycle. However, the reduction produced by 
this reinforcing loop is offset by the increase in migration rate created by the balancing 
loop (B1) formed by per capita migrant stock, donor-country employment, and number of 
net worker migrants; this contention is also confirmed by the relevant result in the 
assumption78 testing table. In summary, it is the overall balance between these various 
new positive and negative influences on the migration rate’s magnitude that generates the 
small net negative change in total migrants observed in the baseline systems model as 
compared to the population-adjusted statistical model. 
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Model Limitations--As indicated previously, the rigorous and thorough testing that the 
baseline systems model is subjected to in this analysis reveals no major flaws in it but 
does expose a few areas of concern that should be addressed in this section of the 
research. In particular, the young worker proportion and percent college migrants 
variables fall to zero in some of the stress and assumptions trials, while the sender-
country employment variable79 tops one-hundred percent in the donor GDP change-donor 
employment change assumption test and approaches that limit in several others. It should 
be kept in mind here that the basic purpose of these extreme conditions and assumptions 
tests is to push the systems model as far as it can go without breaking it. Once one does 
break it, one should step back and see just how much pressure the model is able to 
withstand before falling apart. On those scores, the systems model performs well; 
especially for a relatively simple model, it is flexible and stable under a variety of 
stressful conditions. More to the point, under reasonable assumptions and conditions, the 
results of the systems model are quite realistic. The outcomes of the one-year (2003) and 
seven-year (1997-2003) “forecast” tests described earlier should bolster the legitimacy of 
that claim. 
 Although parsimony can be a goal of model-building, it should not be an excuse 
for refusing to complicate a model when necessary (King et. al., 20) or for not improving 
a model when given the chance to do so. With that notion in mind, there are at least three 
different strategies that could be adopted to ameliorate the issues exposed by the model 
testing. The first possibility would be to alter the graphical functions that involve the 
college migrant and employment variables80 so that higher levels of GDP growth and 
migrant stock presence would have progressively smaller impacts on employment and 
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college migrant percentage change. This action would essentially create limit function-
like structures in the relevant graphical functions rather than the linear relationships that 
are utilized elsewhere in this analysis. The problem with this strategy is that there is not 
much evidence for this alternative underlying structure, whereas linear relationships are 
the most common and logical presumptions to make when trying to determine how two 
variables relate to one another. A second option might be to include new relationships in 
the current model in order to address these stock problems. In general, that would mean 
revisiting some of the rejected relationships, especially the ones involving sender and 
receiver-country employment, described earlier in this chapter. For instance, adding a 
negative relationship between net worker migrants and host country employment would 
create a balancing loop that should make it more difficult for host-country employment to 
exceed the one-hundred percent logical limit. However, there were very good 
justifications for eliminating those relationships from the systems model in the first place, 
and one should be loathe to reject these reasons without very good cause. Finally, one 
could insert new variables into the model to endogenize certain features of it that are now 
treated as exogenous or to construct balancing loops that could control the growth of 
particular variables. For example, the addition of a donor-country labor costs variable 
would produce a balancing loop with donor-country employment. That loop would be 
established because as employment increases, labor costs would also increase, which 
would in turn decrease employment as it becomes more expensive for companies to hire 
new workers. Although this loop could limit the growth of sender-country employment, 
one must be cautious about incorporating new variables into a systems model in an ad 
hoc fashion simply to correct its perceived weaknesses. Again, the unadulterated baseline 
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model performs fairly well under typical circumstances, and it would be questionable 
whether adding this loop to correct this extreme value-induced condition would be worth 
making the model more complicated. In short, future iterations of this systems model 
could address this model’s limitations, but they should not do so in a theoretically 
haphazard fashion. 
Conclusion--Although in the last few decades systems modeling has not been employed 
very often in political science, it has proven to be a useful tool in studying the CEEC10-
EU15 migration system because it permits an expanded list of influences on migration to 
be included in the analysis. In this way, systems modeling acts as a complement to the 
statistical modeling presented in the previous chapter. Both models forecast that only a 
limited number of CEEC10 worker migrants are likely to transit to the EU15 countries 
over the next few decades. That statement holds true under many different alternative 
specifications, even those intended to maximize the number of workers who would 
realistically shift economies. Additionally, it can be legitimately argued that this figure 
should be less than what the most-concerned observers of European politics initially 
projected around the turn of the century. Any forecast of future human behavior has its 
methodological difficulties, of course, but this analysis addresses those issues directly 
and in a fashion that should give one as much confidence as possible in the soundness of 
its results. Therefore, the concluding chapter of this dissertation is spent discussing its 
policy implications and the future directions that this research could take.  
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Appendix: Baseline Systems Model Equations 
 
Note: for the sake of clarity, this information has been divided into stock and flow, 
converter and graphical function sections (in that order).  
 
Part 1: Stocks and Flows 
 
Average_Bulgaria_Education_Level(t) = Average_Bulgaria_Education_Level(t - dt) + 
(ch_av_Bulg_ed_level) * dt 
INIT Average_Bulgaria_Education_Level = 11.157 
INFLOWS: ch_av_Bulg_ed_level = ROR_Bulg_GDP_ch_Bulg_ed_level_ch 
 
Average_Czech_Education_Level(t) = Average_Czech_Education_Level(t - dt) + 
(ch_av_Czech_ed_level) * dt 
INIT Average_Czech_Education_Level = 12.216 
INFLOWS: ch_av_Czech_ed_level = ROR_Czech_GDP_ch_Czech_ed_level_ch 
 
Average_Estonia_Education_Level(t) = Average_Estonia_Education_Level(t - dt) + 
(ch_av_Est_ed_level) * dt 
INIT Average_Estonia_Education_Level = 11.968 
INFLOWS: ch_av_Est_ed_level = ROR_Est_GDP_ch_Est_ed_level_ch 
 
Average_Hungary_Education_Level(t) = Average_Hungary_Education_Level(t - dt) + 
(ch_av_Hung_ed_level) * dt 
INIT Average_Hungary_Education_Level = 11.354 
INFLOWS: ch_av_Hung_ed_level = ROR_Hung_GDP_ch_Hung_ed_level_ch 
 
Average_Latvia_Education_Level(t) = Average_Latvia_Education_Level(t - dt) + 
(ch_av_Lat_ed_level) * dt 
INIT Average_Latvia_Education_Level = 12.517 
INFLOWS: ch_av_Lat_ed_level = ROR_Lat_GDP_ch_Lat_ed_level_ch 
 
Average_Lithuania_Education_Level(t) = Average_Lithuania_Education_Level(t - dt) + 
(ch_av_Lith_ed_level) * dt 
INIT Average_Lithuania_Education_Level = 12.635 
INFLOWS: ch_av_Lith_ed_level = ROR_Lith_GDP_ch_Lith_ed_level_ch 
 
Average_Poland_Education_Level(t) = Average_Poland_Education_Level(t - dt) + 
(ch_av_Pol_ed_level) * dt 
INIT Average_Poland_Education_Level = 11.781 
INFLOWS: ch_av_Pol_ed_level = ROR_Pol_GDP_ch_Pol_ed_level_ch 
 
Average_Romania_Education_Level(t) = Average_Romania_Education_Level(t - dt) + 
(ch_av_Rom_ed_level) * dt 
INIT Average_Romania_Education_Level = 10.205 
INFLOWS: ch_av_Rom_ed_level = ROR_Rom_GDP_ch_Rom_ed_level_ch 
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Average_Slovakia_Education_Level(t) = Average_Slovakia_Education_Level(t - dt) + 
(ch_av_Svk_ed_level) * dt 
INIT Average_Slovakia_Education_Level = 12.048 
INFLOWS: ch_av_Svk_ed_level = ROR_Svk_GDP_ch_Svk_ed_level_ch 
 
Average_Slovenia_Education_Level(t) = Average_Slovenia_Education_Level(t - dt) + 
(ch_av_Slv_ed_level) * dt 
INIT Average_Slovenia_Education_Level = 11.926 
INFLOWS: ch_av_Slv_ed_level = ROR_Slv_GDP_ch_Slv_ed_level_ch 
 
Bulgaria_Employment(t) = Bulgaria_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_Bulg_employ) * dt 
INIT Bulgaria_Employment = 84.9375 
INFLOWS: ch_Bulg_employ = ROR_Bulg_mig_stk_Bulg_employ_ch+ 
ROR_Bulg_GDP_ch_Bulg_employ_ch 
 
Bulgaria_GDP_Ratio(t) = Bulgaria_GDP_Ratio(t - dt) + (ch_Bulg_GDP_ratio) * dt 
INIT Bulgaria_GDP_Ratio = 3.04937878305192 
INFLOWS: ch_Bulg_GDP_ratio = (-(GDP_Bulg_convergence_rate-1))* 
Bulgaria_GDP_Ratio 
 
Bulgaria_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t) = Bulgaria_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t - dt) + 
(yearly_net_Bulg_migrants) * dt 
INIT Bulgaria_Migrant_Stock_Germany = 44300 
INFLOWS: yearly_net_Bulg_migrants = net_migration_rate_Bulg*Bulgaria_Population 
 
Bulgaria_Population(t) = Bulgaria_Population(t - dt) + (pop_change_Bulg) * dt 
INIT Bulgaria_Population = 7824000 
INFLOWS: pop_change_Bulg = pct_pop_ch_Bulg*Bulgaria_Population 
 
Czech_Employment(t) = Czech_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_Czech_employ) * dt 
INIT Czech_Employment = 93.0125 
INFLOWS: ch_Czech_employ = ROR_Czech_migstk_Czech_employ_ch+ 
ROR_Czech_GDP_ch_Czech_employ_ch 
 
Czech_GDP_Ratio(t) = Czech_GDP_Ratio(t - dt) + (ch_Czech_GDP_ratio) * dt 
INIT Czech_GDP_Ratio = 1.93276123170116 
INFLOWS: ch_Czech_GDP_ratio = (-(GDP_Czech_convergence_rate-1))* 
Czech_GDP_Ratio 
 
Czech_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t) = Czech_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t - dt) + 
(yearly_net_Czech_migrants) * dt 
INIT Czech_Migrant_Stock_Germany = 30186 
INFLOWS: yearly_net_Czech_migrants = net_migration_rate_Czech*Czech_Population 
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Czech_Population(t) = Czech_Population(t - dt) + (pop_ch_Czech) * dt 
INIT Czech_Population = 10202000 
INFLOWS: pop_ch_Czech = pct_pop_ch_Czech*Czech_Population 
 
Estonia_Employment(t) = Estonia_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_Est_employ) * dt 
INIT Estonia_Employment = 89 
INFLOWS: ch_Est_employ = ROR_Est_migstk_Est_employ_ch+ 
ROR_Est_GDP_ch_Est_employ_ch 
 
Estonia_GDP_Ratio(t) = Estonia_GDP_Ratio(t - dt) + (ch_Est_GDP_ratio) * dt 
INIT Estonia_GDP_Ratio = 1.33500697350069 
INFLOWS: ch_Est_GDP_ratio = (-(GDP_Est_convergence_rate-1))* 
Estonia_GDP_Ratio 
 
Estonia_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t) = Estonia_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t - dt) + 
(yearly_net_Est_migrants) * dt 
INIT Estonia_Migrant_Stock_Germany = 4220 
INFLOWS: yearly_net_Est_migrants = net_migration_rate_Est*Estonia_Population 
 
Estonia_Population(t) = Estonia_Population(t - dt) + (pop_ch_Est) * dt 
INIT Estonia_Population = 1354000 
INFLOWS: pop_ch_Est = pct_pop_ch_Est*Estonia_Population 
 
Germany_Employment(t) = Germany_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_German_employ) * dt 
INIT Germany_Employment = 91.2125 
INFLOWS: ch_German_employ = ROR_German_GDP_ch_German_employ_ch 
 
Hungary_Employment(t) = Hungary_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_Hung_employ) * dt 
INIT Hungary_Employment = 92.875 
INFLOWS: ch_Hung_employ = ROR_Hung_migstk_Hung_employ_ch+ 
ROR_Hung_GDP_ch_Hung_employ_ch 
 
Hungary_GDP_Ratio(t) = Hungary_GDP_Ratio(t - dt) + (ch_Hung_GDP_ratio) * dt 
INIT Hungary_GDP_Ratio = 2.40895935573172 
INFLOWS: ch_Hung_GDP_ratio = (-(GDP_Hung_convergence_rate-1))* 
Hungary_GDP_Ratio 
 
Hungary_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t) = Hungary_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t - dt) + 
(yearly_net_Hung_migrants) * dt 
INIT Hungary_Migrant_Stock_Germany = 54714 
INFLOWS: yearly_net_Hung_migrants = net_migration_rate_Hung* 
Hungary_Population 
 
Hungary_Population(t) = Hungary_Population(t - dt) + (pop_ch_Hung) * dt 
INIT Hungary_Population = 10130000 
INFLOWS: pop_ch_Hung = pct_pop_ch_Hung*Hungary_Population 
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Latvia_Employment(t) = Latvia_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_Lat_employ) * dt 
INIT Latvia_Employment = 85.625 
INFLOWS: ch_Lat_employ = ROR_Lat_migstk_Lat_employ_ch+ 
ROR_Lat_GDP_ch_Lat_employ_ch 
 
Latvia_GDP_Ratio(t) = Latvia_GDP_Ratio(t - dt) + (ch_Lat_GDP_ratio) * dt 
INIT Latvia_GDP_Ratio = 1.96914215182061 
INFLOWS: ch_Lat_GDP_ratio = (-(GDP_Lat_convergence_rate-1))*Latvia_GDP_Ratio 
 
Latvia_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t) = Latvia_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t - dt) + 
(yearly_net_Lat_migrants) * dt 
INIT Latvia_Migrant_Stock_Germany = 9341 
INFLOWS: yearly_net_Lat_migrants = net_migration_rate_Lat*Latvia_Population 
 
Latvia_Population(t) = Latvia_Population(t - dt) + (pop_ch_Lat) * dt 
INIT Latvia_Population = 2325000 
INFLOWS: pop_ch_Lat = pct_pop_ch_Lat*Latvia_Population 
 
Lithuania_Employment(t) = Lithuania_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_Lith_employ) * dt 
INIT Lithuania_Employment = 85.2125 
INFLOWS: ch_Lith_employ = ROR_Lith_migstk_Lith_employ_ch+ 
ROR_Lith_GDP_ch_Lith_employ_ch 
 
Lithuania_GDP_Ratio(t) = Lithuania_GDP_Ratio(t - dt) + (ch_Lith_GDP_ratio) * dt 
INIT Lithuania_GDP_Ratio = 2.39719509140996 
INFLOWS: ch_Lith_GDP_ratio = (-(GDP_Lith_convergence_rate-1))* 
Lithuania_GDP_Ratio 
 
Lithuania_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t) = Lithuania_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t - dt) + 
(yearly_net_Lith_migrants) * dt 
INIT Lithuania_Migrant_Stock_Germany = 13985 
INFLOWS: yearly_net_Lith_migrants = net_migration_rate_Lith*Lithuania_Population 
 
Lithuania_Population(t) = Lithuania_Population(t - dt) + (pop_ch_Lith) * dt 
INIT Lithuania_Population = 3454000 
INFLOWS: pop_ch_Lith = pct_pop_ch_Lith*Lithuania_Population 
 
Percent_Bulgaria_20_to_34_Population(t) = Percent_Bulgaria_20_to_34_Population(t - 
dt) + (ch_Bulg_20_to_34_pct) * dt 
INIT Percent_Bulgaria_20_to_34_Population = .2178 
INFLOWS: ch_Bulg_20_to_34_pct = dec_Bulg_pct_20_to_34_pop 
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Percent_Bulgaria_College_Migrants(t) = Percent_Bulgaria_College_Migrants(t - dt) + 
(ch_Bulg_pct_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Percent_Bulgaria_College_Migrants = .313 
INFLOWS: ch_Bulg_pct_coll_migrants = 
(ROR_Bulg_GDP_ch_pct_Bulg_coll_migrants_ch/10)+ 
(ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch/10) 
 
Percent_Czech_20_to_34_Population(t) = Percent_Czech_20_to_34_Population(t - dt) + 
(ch_Czech_20_to_34_pct) * dt 
INIT Percent_Czech_20_to_34_Population = .2363 
INFLOWS: ch_Czech_20_to_34_pct = dec_Czech_pct_20_to_34_pop 
 
Percent_Czech_College_Migrants(t) = Percent_Czech_College_Migrants(t - dt) + 
(ch_Czech_pct_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Percent_Czech_College_Migrants = .356 
INFLOWS: ch_Czech_pct_coll_migrants = 
(ROR_Czech_GDP_ch_pct_Czech_coll_migrants_ch/10)+ 
(ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch/10) 
 
Percent_Estonia_20_to_34_Population(t) = Percent_Estonia_20_to_34_Population(t - dt) 
+ (ch_Est_20_to_34_pct) * dt 
INIT Percent_Estonia_20_to_34_Population = .2155 
INFLOWS: ch_Est_20_to_34_pct = dec_Est_pct_20_to_34_pop 
 
Percent_Estonia_College_Migrants(t) = Percent_Estonia_College_Migrants(t - dt) + 
(ch_Est_pct_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Percent_Estonia_College_Migrants = .169 
INFLOWS: ch_Est_pct_coll_migrants = 
(ROR_Est_GDP_ch_pct_Est_coll_migrants_ch/10)+ 
(ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch/10) 
 
Percent_Hungary_20_to_34_Population(t) = Percent_Hungary_20_to_34_Population(t - 
dt) + (ch_Hung_20_to_34_pct) * dt 
INIT Percent_Hungary_20_to_34_Population = .2285 
INFLOWS: ch_Hung_20_to_34_pct = dec_Hung_pct_20_to_34_pop 
 
Percent_Hungary_College_Migrants(t) = Percent_Hungary_College_Migrants(t - dt) + 
(ch_Hung_pct_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Percent_Hungary_College_Migrants = .266 
INFLOWS: ch_Hung_pct_coll_migrants = 
(ROR_Hung_GDP_ch_pct_Hung_coll_migrants_ch/10)+ 
(ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch/10) 
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Percent_Latvia_20_to_34_Population(t) = Percent_Latvia_20_to_34_Population(t - dt) + 
(ch_Lat_20_to_34_pct) * dt 
INIT Percent_Latvia_20_to_34_Population = .2155 
INFLOWS: ch_Lat_20_to_34_pct = dec_Lat_pct_20_to_34_pop 
 
Percent_Latvia_College_Migrants(t) = Percent_Latvia_College_Migrants(t - dt) + 
(ch_Lat_pct_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Percent_Latvia_College_Migrants = .113 
INFLOWS: ch_Lat_pct_coll_migrants = 
(ROR_Lat_GDP_ch_pct_Lat_coll_migrants_ch/10)+ 
(ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch/10) 
 
Percent_Lithuania_20_to_34_Population(t) = Percent_Lithuania_20_to_34_Population(t 
- dt) + (ch_Lith_20_to_34_pct) * dt 
INIT Percent_Lithuania_20_to_34_Population = .2111 
INFLOWS: ch_Lith_20_to_34_pct = dec_Lith_pct_20_to_34_pop 
 
Percent_Lithuania_College_Migrants(t) = Percent_Lithuania_College_Migrants(t - dt) + 
(ch_Lith_pct_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Percent_Lithuania_College_Migrants = .159 
INFLOWS: ch_Lith_pct_coll_migrants = 
(ROR_Lith_GDP_ch_pct_Lith_coll_migrants_ch/10)+ 
(ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch/10) 
 
Percent_Poland_20_to_34_Population(t) = Percent_Poland_20_to_34_Population(t - dt) 
+ (ch_Pol_20_to_34_pct) * dt 
INIT Percent_Poland_20_to_34_Population = .2389 
INFLOWS: ch_Pol_20_to_34_pct = dec_Pol_pct_20_to_34_pop 
 
Percent_Poland_College_Migrants(t) = Percent_Poland_College_Migrants(t - dt) + 
(ch_Pol_pct_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Percent_Poland_College_Migrants = .217 
INFLOWS: ch_Pol_pct_coll_migrants = 
(ROR_Pol_GDP_ch_pct_Pol_coll_migrants_ch/10)+ 
(ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch/10) 
 
Percent_Romania_20_to_34_Population(t) = Percent_Romania_20_to_34_Population(t - 
dt) + (ch_Rom_20_to_34_pct) * dt 
INIT Percent_Romania_20_to_34_Population = .2371 
INFLOWS: ch_Rom_20_to_34_pct = dec_Rom_pct_20_to_34_pop 
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Percent_Romania_College_Migrants(t) = Percent_Romania_College_Migrants(t - dt) + 
(ch_Rom_pct_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Percent_Romania_College_Migrants = .141 
INFLOWS: ch_Rom_pct_coll_migrants = 
(ROR_Rom_GDP_ch_pct_Rom_coll_migrants_ch/10)+ 
(ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch/10) 
 
Percent_Slovakia_20_to_34_Population(t) = Percent_Slovakia_20_to_34_Population(t - 
dt) + (ch_Svk_20_to_34_pct) * dt 
INIT Percent_Slovakia_20_to_34_Population = .2493 
INFLOWS: ch_Svk_20_to_34_pct = dec_Svk_pct_20_to_34_pop 
 
Percent_Slovakia_College_Migrants(t) = Percent_Slovakia_College_Migrants(t - dt) + 
(ch_Svk_pct_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Percent_Slovakia_College_Migrants = .158 
INFLOWS: ch_Svk_pct_coll_migrants = 
(ROR_Svk_GDP_ch_pct_Svk_coll_migrants_ch/10)+ 
(ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch/10) 
 
Percent_Slovenia_20_to_34_Population(t) = Percent_Slovenia_20_to_34_Population(t - 
dt) + (ch_Slv_20_to_34_pct) * dt 
INIT Percent_Slovenia_20_to_34_Population = .2194 
INFLOWS: ch_Slv_20_to_34_pct = dec_Slv_pct_20_to_34_pop 
 
Percent_Slovenia_College_Migrants(t) = Percent_Slovenia_College_Migrants(t - dt) + 
(ch_Slv_pct_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Percent_Slovenia_College_Migrants = .092 
INFLOWS: ch_Slv_pct_coll_migrants = 
(ROR_Slv_GDP_ch_pct_Slv_coll_migrants_ch/10)+ 
(ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch/10) 
 
Poland_Employment(t) = Poland_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_Pol_employ) * dt 
INIT Poland_Employment = 84.7875 
INFLOWS: ch_Pol_employ = ROR_Pol_migstk_Pol_employ_ch+ 
ROR_Pol_GDP_ch_Pol_employ_ch 
 
Poland_GDP_Ratio(t) = Poland_GDP_Ratio(t - dt) + (ch_Pol_GDP_ratio) * dt 
INIT Poland_GDP_Ratio = 2.49465728433672 
INFLOWS: ch_Pol_GDP_ratio = (-(GDP_Pol_convergence_rate-1))*Poland_GDP_Ratio 
 
Poland_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t) = Poland_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t - dt) + 
(yearly_net_Pol_migrants) * dt 
INIT Poland_Migrant_Stock_Germany = 326882 
INFLOWS: yearly_net_Pol_migrants = net_migration_rate_Pol*Poland_Population 
 
 
 229
Poland_Population(t) = Poland_Population(t - dt) + (pop_ch_Pol) * dt 
INIT Poland_Population = 38195000 
INFLOWS: pop_ch_Pol = pct_pop_ch_Pol*Poland_Population 
 
Romania_Employment(t) = Romania_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_Rom_employ) * dt 
INIT Romania_Employment = 93.1375 
INFLOWS: ch_Rom_employ = ROR_Rom_migstk_Rom_employ_ch+ 
ROR_Rom_GDP_ch_Rom_employ_ch 
 
Romania_GDP_Ratio(t) = Romania_GDP_Ratio(t - dt) + (ch_Rom_GDP_ratio) * dt 
INIT Romania_GDP_Ratio = 5.45413105413105 
INFLOWS: ch_Rom_GDP_ratio = (-(GDP_Rom_convergence_rate-1))* 
Romania_GDP_Ratio 
 
Romania_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t) = Romania_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t - dt) + 
(yearly_net_Rom_migrants) * dt 
INIT Romania_Migrant_Stock_Germany = 89104 
INFLOWS: yearly_net_Rom_migrants = net_migration_rate_Rom*Romania_Population 
 
Romania_Population(t) = Romania_Population(t - dt) + (pop_ch_Rom) * dt 
INIT Romania_Population = 21734000 
INFLOWS: pop_ch_Rom = pct_pop_ch_Rom*Romania_Population 
 
Slovakia_Employment(t) = Slovakia_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_Svk_employ) * dt 
INIT Slovakia_Employment = 84.3125 
INFLOWS: ch_Svk_employ = ROR_Svk_migstk_Svk_employ_ch+ 
ROR_Svk_GDP_ch_Svk_employ_ch 
 
Slovakia_GDP_Ratio(t) = Slovakia_GDP_Ratio(t - dt) + (ch_Svk_GDP_ratio) * dt 
INIT Slovakia_GDP_Ratio = 2.03833049403747 
INFLOWS: ch_Svk_GDP_ratio = (-(GDP_Svk_convergence_rate-1))* 
Slovakia_GDP_Ratio 
 
Slovakia_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t) = Slovakia_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t - dt) + 
(yearly_net_Svk_migrants) * dt 
INIT Slovakia_Migrant_Stock_Germany = 19567 
INFLOWS: yearly_net_Svk_migrants = net_migration_rate_Svk*Slovakia_Population 
 
Slovakia_Population(t) = Slovakia_Population(t - dt) + (pop_ch_Svk) * dt 
INIT Slovakia_Population = 5379000 
INFLOWS: pop_ch_Svk = pct_pop_ch_Svk*Slovakia_Population 
 
Slovenia_Employment(t) = Slovenia_Employment(t - dt) + (ch_Slv_employ) * dt 
INIT Slovenia_Employment = 93.1125 
INFLOWS: ch_Slv_employ = ROR_Slv_migstk_Slv_employ_ch+ 
ROR_Slv_GDP_ch_Slv_employ_ch 
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Slovenia_GDP_Ratio(t) = Slovenia_GDP_Ratio(t - dt) + (ch_Slv_GDP_ratio) * dt 
INIT Slovenia_GDP_Ratio = 1.36791711325473 
INFLOWS: ch_Slv_GDP_ratio = (-(GDP_Slv_convergence_rate-1))* 
Slovenia_GDP_Ratio 
 
Slovenia_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t) = Slovenia_Migrant_Stock_Germany(t - dt) + 
(yearly_net_Slv_migrants) * dt 
INIT Slovenia_Migrant_Stock_Germany = 21795 
INFLOWS: yearly_net_Slv_migrants = net_migration_rate_Slv*Slovenia_Population 
 
Slovenia_Population(t) = Slovenia_Population(t - dt) + (pop_ch_Slv) * dt 
INIT Slovenia_Population = 1997000 
INFLOWS: pop_ch_Slv = pct_pop_ch_Slv*Slovenia_Population 
 
Total_Bulgarian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Bulgarian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Bulg_net_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Bulgarian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Bulg_net_coll_migrants = yearly_net_Bulg_coll_migrants 
 
Total_Bulgarian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Bulgarian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Bulg_net_migrants_age_20_to_34) * dt 
INIT Total_Bulgarian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Bulg_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
yearly_Bulg_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 
 
Total_Bulgarian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t) = Total_Bulgarian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t - 
dt) + (ch_tot_Bulg_net_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Bulgarian_Net_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Bulg_net_migrants = yearly_net_Bulg_migrants 
 
Total_Czech_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Czech_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Czech_net_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Czech_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Czech_net_coll_migrants = yearly_net_Czech_coll_migrants 
 
Total_Czech_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Czech_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Czech_net_migrants_age_20_to_34) * dt 
INIT Total_Czech_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Czech_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
yearly_Czech_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 
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Total_Czech_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t) = Total_Czech_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Czech_net_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Czech_Net_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Czech_net_migrants = yearly_net_Czech_migrants 
 
Total_Estonian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Estonian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Est_net_coll_migrants)* dt 
INIT Total_Estonian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Est_net_coll_migrants = yearly_net_Est_coll_migrants 
 
Total_Estonian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Estonian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Est_net_migrants_age_20_to_34) * dt 
INIT Total_Estonian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Est_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
yearly_Est_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 
 
Total_Estonian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t) = Total_Estonian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t - 
dt) + (ch_tot_Est_net_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Estonian_Net_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Est_net_migrants = yearly_net_Est_migrants 
 
Total_Hungarian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Hungarian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Hung_net_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Hungarian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Hung_net_coll_migrants = yearly_net_Hung_coll_migrants 
 
Total_Hungarian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Hungarian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Hung_net_migrants_age_20_to_34) * dt 
INIT Total_Hungarian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Hung_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
yearly_Hung_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 
 
Total_Hungarian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t) = Total_Hungarian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t 
- dt) + (ch_tot_Hung_net_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Hungarian_Net_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Hung_net_migrants = yearly_net_Hung_migrants 
 
Total_Latvian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Latvian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + (ch_tot_Lat_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Latvian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Lat_coll_migrants = yearly_net_Lat_coll_migrants 
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Total_Latvian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Latvian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Lat_net_migrants_age_20_to_34) * dt 
INIT Total_Latvian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Lat_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
yearly_Lat_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 
 
Total_Latvian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t) = Total_Latvian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) 
+ (ch_tot_Lat_net_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Latvian_Net_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Lat_net_migrants = yearly_net_Lat_migrants 
 
Total_Lithuanian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Lithuanian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Lith_net_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Lithuanian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Lith_net_coll_migrants = yearly_net_Lith_coll_migrants 
 
Total_Lithuanian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Lithuanian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Lith_net_migrants_age_20_to_34) * dt 
INIT Total_Lithuanian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Lith_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
yearly_Lith_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 
 
Total_Lithuanian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Lithuanian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + (ch_tot_Lith_net_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Lithuanian_Net_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Lith_net_migrants = yearly_net_Lith_migrants 
 
Total_Polish_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Polish_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Pol_net_coll_migrants)*dt 
INIT Total_Polish_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Pol_net_coll_migrants = yearly_net_Pol_coll_migrants 
 
Total_Polish_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Polish_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Pol_net_migrants_age_20_to_34) * dt 
INIT Total_Polish_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Pol_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
yearly_Pol_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 
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Total_Polish_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t) = Total_Polish_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Pol_net_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Polish_Net_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Pol_net_migrants = yearly_net_Pol_migrants 
 
Total_Romanian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Romanian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Rom_net_coll_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Romanian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Rom_net_coll_migrants = yearly_net_Rom_coll_migrants 
 
Total_Romanian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Romanian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Rom_net_migrants_age_20_to_34) * dt 
INIT Total_Romanian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Rom_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
yearly_Rom_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 
 
Total_Romanian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t) = Total_Romanian_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t 
- dt) + (ch_tot_Rom_net_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Romanian_Net_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Rom_net_migrants = yearly_net_Rom_migrants 
 
Total_Slovak_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Slovak_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Svk_net_coll_migrants)*dt 
INIT Total_Slovak_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Svk_net_coll_migrants = yearly_net_Svk_coll_migrants 
 
Total_Slovak_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Slovak_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Svk_net_migrants_age_20_to_34) * dt 
INIT Total_Slovak_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Svk_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
yearly_Svk_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 
 
Total_Slovak_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t) = Total_Slovak_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Svk_net_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Slovak_Net_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Svk_net_migrants = yearly_net_Svk_migrants 
 
Total_Slovene_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Slovene_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Slv_net_college_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Slovene_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Slv_net_college_migrants = yearly_net_Slv_coll_migrants 
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Total_Slovene_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t) = 
Total_Slovene_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030(t - dt) + 
(ch_tot_Slv_net_migrants_age_20_to_34) * dt 
INIT Total_Slovene_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Slv_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
yearly_Slv_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 
 
Total_Slovene_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t) = Total_Slovene_Net_Migrants_to_2030(t - dt) 
+ (ch_tot_Slv_net_migrants) * dt 
INIT Total_Slovene_Net_Migrants_to_2030 = 0 
INFLOWS: ch_tot_Slv_net_migrants = yearly_net_Slv_migrants 
 
Part 2: Converters 
 
age_disproportionate_factor = 3 
 
CEEC10_total_net_college_migrants_to_Germany = 
Total_Bulgarian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Czech_Net_College_Migrants_
to_2030+Total_Estonian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Hungarian_Net_Colleg
e_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Latvian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Lithuanian
_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Polish_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030+Total_
Romanian_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Slovak_Net_College_Migrants_to_20
30+Total_Slovene_Net_College_Migrants_to_2030 
 
CEEC10_total_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = 
Total_Bulgarian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030+Total_Czech_Net_Migrants_A
ge_20_to_34_to_2030+Total_Estonian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030+Total_H
ungarian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030+Total_Latvian_Net_Migrants_Age_20
_to_34_to_2030+Total_Lithuanian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030+Total_Polis
h_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030+Total_Romanian_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_
34_to_2030+Total_Slovak_Net_Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030+Total_Slovene_Net_
Migrants_Age_20_to_34_to_2030 
 
CEEC10_total_net_migrants_to_Germany = 
Total_Bulgarian_Net_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Czech_Net_Migrants_to_2030+Total_E
stonian_Net_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Hungarian_Net_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Latvia
n_Net_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Lithuanian_Net_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Polish_Net_
Migrants_to_2030+Total_Romanian_Net_Migrants_to_2030+Total_Slovak_Net_Migran
ts_to_2030+Total_Slovene_Net_Migrants_to_2030 
 
ch_Bulg_GDP = 1.034382+ROR_av_Bulg_ed_level_Bulg_GDP_ch 
 
ch_Czech_GDP = 1.034382+ROR_av_Czech_ed_level_Czech_GDP_ch 
 
ch_Est_GDP = 1.034382+ROR_av_Est_ed_level_Est_GDP_ch 
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ch_German_GDP = 1.0141 
 
ch_Hung_GDP = 1.034382+ROR_av_Hung_ed_level_Hung_GDP_ch 
 
ch_Lat_GDP = 1.034382+ROR_av_Lat_ed_level_Lat_GDP_ch 
 
ch_Lith_GDP = 1.034382+ROR_av_Lith_ed_level_Lith_GDP_ch 
 
ch_Pol_GDP = 1.034382+ROR_av_Pol_ed_level_Pol_GDP_ch 
 
ch_Rom_GDP = 1.034382+ROR_av_Rom_ed_level_Rom_GDP_ch 
 
ch_Slv_GDP = 1.034382+ROR_av_Slv_ed_level_Slv_GDP_ch 
 
ch_Svk_GDP = 1.034382+ROR_av_Svk_ed_level_Svk_GDP_ch 
 
dec_Bulg_pct_20_to_34_pop = -.002800 
 
dec_Czech_pct_20_to_34_pop = -.003252 
 
dec_Est_pct_20_to_34_pop = -.002056 
 
dec_Hung_pct_20_to_34_pop = -.002568 
 
dec_Lat_pct_20_to_34_pop = -.002820 
 
dec_Lith_pct_20_to_34_pop = -.002336 
 
dec_Pol_pct_20_to_34_pop = -.003460 
 
dec_Rom_pct_20_to_34_pop = -.003116 
 
dec_Slv_pct_20_to_34_pop = -.002672 
 
dec_Svk_pct_20_to_34_pop = -.003612 
 
free_migration_policy? = IF(TIME<2011) THEN 0 ELSE 1 
 
GDP_Bulg_convergence_rate = ch_Bulg_GDP/ch_German_GDP 
 
GDP_Czech_convergence_rate = ch_Czech_GDP/ch_German_GDP 
 
GDP_Est_convergence_rate = ch_Est_GDP/ch_German_GDP 
 
GDP_Hung_convergence_rate = ch_Hung_GDP/ch_German_GDP 
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GDP_Lat_convergence_rate = ch_Lat_GDP/ch_German_GDP 
 
GDP_Lith_convergence_rate = ch_Lith_GDP/ch_German_GDP 
 
GDP_Pol_convergence_rate = ch_Pol_GDP/ch_German_GDP 
 
GDP_Rom_convergence_rate = ch_Rom_GDP/ch_German_GDP 
 
GDP_Slv_convergence_rate = ch_Slv_GDP/ch_German_GDP 
 
GDP_Svk_convergence_rate = ch_Svk_GDP/ch_German_GDP 
 
net_migration_rate_Bulg = (0.00595407870156363*per_capita_Bulg_mig_stk) + 
(0.000100377268106815*LOGN(Bulgaria_GDP_Ratio))+ 
(0.00100030142107599*LOGN(Germany_Employment))+ 
(-0.000965588821154321*LOGN(Bulgaria_Employment))+ 
(0.0000131907879702328*free_migration_policy?)+ 
(ROR_av_Bulg_ed_level_Bulg_mig_rate/10000)+ 
(ROR_Bulg_20_to_34_pop_Bulg_mig_rate/10000) 
 
net_migration_rate_Czech = (0.00595407870156363*per_capita_Czech_mig_stk)+ 
(0.000100377268106815*LOGN(Czech_GDP_Ratio))+ 
(0.00100030142107599*LOGN(Germany_Employment))+ 
(-0.000965588821154321*LOGN(Czech_Employment))+ 
(0.0000131907879702328*free_migration_policy?)+ 
(ROR_av_Czech_ed_level_Czech_mig_rate/10000)+ 
(ROR_Czech_20_to_34_pop_Czech_mig_rate/10000) 
 
net_migration_rate_Est = (0.00595407870156363*per_capita_Est_mig_stk)+ 
(0.000100377268106815*LOGN(Estonia_GDP_Ratio))+ 
(0.00100030142107599*LOGN(Germany_Employment))+ 
(-0.000965588821154321*LOGN(Estonia_Employment))+ 
(0.0000131907879702328*free_migration_policy?)+ 
(ROR_av_Est_ed_level__Est_mig_rate/10000)+ 
(ROR_Est_20_to_34_pop_Est_mig_rate/10000) 
 
net_migration_rate_Hung = (0.00595407870156363*per_capita_Hung_mig_stk)+ 
(0.000100377268106815*LOGN(Hungary_GDP_Ratio))+ 
(0.00100030142107599*LOGN(Germany_Employment))+ 
(-0.000965588821154321*LOGN(Hungary_Employment))+ 
(0.0000131907879702328*free_migration_policy?)+ 
(ROR_av_Hung_ed_level_Hung_mig_rate/10000)+ 
(ROR_Hung_20_to_34_pop_Hung_mig_rate/10000) 
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net_migration_rate_Lat = (0.00595407870156363*per_capita_Lat_mig_stk)+ 
(0.000100377268106815*LOGN(Latvia_GDP_Ratio))+ 
(0.00100030142107599*LOGN(Germany_Employment))+ 
(-0.000965588821154321*LOGN(Latvia_Employment))+ 
(0.0000131907879702328*free_migration_policy?)+ 
(ROR_av_Lat_ed_level__Lat_mig_rate/10000)+ 
(ROR_Lat_20_to_34_pop_Lat_mig_rate/10000) 
 
net_migration_rate_Lith = (0.00595407870156363*per_capita_Lith_mig_stk)+ 
(0.000100377268106815*LOGN(Lithuania_GDP_Ratio))+ 
(0.00100030142107599*LOGN(Germany_Employment))+  
(-0.000965588821154321*LOGN(Lithuania_Employment))+ 
(0.0000131907879702328*free_migration_policy?)+ 
(ROR_av_Lith_ed_level_Lith_mig_rate/10000)+ 
(ROR_Lith_20_to_34_pop_Lith_mig_rate/10000) 
 
net_migration_rate_Pol = (0.00595407870156363*per_capita_Pol_mig_stk)+ 
(0.000100377268106815*LOGN(Poland_GDP_Ratio))+ 
(0.00100030142107599*LOGN(Germany_Employment))+ 
(-0.000965588821154321*LOGN(Poland_Employment))+ 
(0.0000131907879702328*free_migration_policy?)+ 
(ROR_av_Pol_ed_level__Pol_mig_rate/10000)+ 
(ROR_Pol_20_to_34_pop_Pol_mig_rate/10000) 
 
net_migration_rate_Rom = (0.00595407870156363*per_capita_Rom_mig_stk)+ 
(0.000100377268106815*LOGN(Romania_GDP_Ratio))+ 
(0.00100030142107599*LOGN(Germany_Employment))+ 
(-0.000965588821154321*LOGN(Romania_Employment))+ 
(0.0000131907879702328*free_migration_policy?)+ 
(ROR_av_Rom_ed_level__Rom_mig_rate/10000)+ 
(ROR_Rom_20_to_34_pop_Rom_mig_rate/10000) 
 
net_migration_rate_Slv = (0.00595407870156363*per_capita_Slv_mig_stk)+ 
(0.000100377268106815*LOGN(Slovenia_GDP_Ratio))+ 
(0.00100030142107599*LOGN(Germany_Employment))+ 
(-0.000965588821154321*LOGN(Slovenia_Employment))+ 
(0.0000131907879702328*free_migration_policy?)+ 
(ROR_av_Slv_ed_level__Slv_mig_rate/10000)+ 
(ROR_Slv_20_to_34_pop_Slv_mig_rate/10000) 
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net_migration_rate_Svk = (0.00595407870156363*per_capita_Svk_mig_stk)+ 
(0.000100377268106815*LOGN(Slovakia_GDP_Ratio))+ 
(0.00100030142107599*LOGN(Germany_Employment))+ 
(-0.000965588821154321*LOGN(Slovakia_Employment))+ 
(0.0000131907879702328*free_migration_policy?)+ 
(ROR_av_Svk_ed_level__Svk_mig_rate/10000)+ 
(ROR_Svk_20_to_34_pop_Svk_mig_rate/10000) 
 
pct_pop_ch_Bulg = -.00850 
 
pct_pop_ch_Czech = -.00133 
 
pct_pop_ch_Est = -.00283 
 
pct_pop_ch_Hung = -.00333 
 
pct_pop_ch_Lat = -.00517 
 
pct_pop_ch_Lith = -.00500 
 
pct_pop_ch_Pol = -.00400 
 
pct_pop_ch_Rom = -.00617 
 
pct_pop_ch_Slv = -.00250 
 
pct_pop_ch_Svk = -.00200 
 
per_capita_Bulg_mig_stk = Bulgaria_Migrant_Stock_Germany/Bulgaria_Population 
 
per_capita_Czech_mig_stk = Czech_Migrant_Stock_Germany/Czech_Population 
 
per_capita_Est_mig_stk = Estonia_Migrant_Stock_Germany/Estonia_Population 
 
per_capita_Hung_mig_stk = Hungary_Migrant_Stock_Germany/Hungary_Population 
 
per_capita_Lat_mig_stk = Latvia_Migrant_Stock_Germany/Latvia_Population 
 
per_capita_Lith_mig_stk = Lithuania_Migrant_Stock_Germany/Lithuania_Population 
 
per_capita_Pol_mig_stk = Poland_Migrant_Stock_Germany/Poland_Population 
 
per_capita_Rom_mig_stk = Romania_Migrant_Stock_Germany/Romania_Population 
 
per_capita_Slv_mig_stk = Slovenia_Migrant_Stock_Germany/Slovenia_Population 
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per_capita_Svk_mig_stk = Slovakia_Migrant_Stock_Germany/Slovakia_Population 
 
yearly_Bulg_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = (age_disproportionate_factor* 
Percent_Bulgaria_20_to_34_Population)*yearly_net_Bulg_migrants 
 
yearly_Czech_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = (age_disproportionate_factor* 
Percent_Czech_20_to_34_Population)*yearly_net_Czech_migrants 
 
yearly_Est_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = (age_disproportionate_factor* 
Percent_Estonia_20_to_34_Population)*yearly_net_Est_migrants 
 
yearly_Hung_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = (age_disproportionate_factor* 
Percent_Hungary_20_to_34_Population)*yearly_net_Hung_migrants 
 
yearly_Lat_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = (age_disproportionate_factor* 
Percent_Latvia_20_to_34_Population)*yearly_net_Lat_migrants 
 
yearly_Lith_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = (age_disproportionate_factor* 
Percent_Lithuania_20_to_34_Population)*yearly_net_Lith_migrants 
 
yearly_net_Bulg_coll_migrants = 
Percent_Bulgaria_College_Migrants*yearly_net_Bulg_migrants 
 
yearly_net_Czech_coll_migrants = 
Percent_Czech_College_Migrants*yearly_net_Czech_migrants 
 
yearly_net_Est_coll_migrants = 
Percent_Estonia_College_Migrants*yearly_net_Est_migrants 
 
yearly_net_Hung_coll_migrants = 
Percent_Hungary_College_Migrants*yearly_net_Hung_migrants 
 
yearly_net_Lat_coll_migrants = 
Percent_Latvia_College_Migrants*yearly_net_Lat_migrants 
 
yearly_net_Lith_coll_migrants = 
Percent_Lithuania_College_Migrants*yearly_net_Lith_migrants 
 
yearly_net_Pol_coll_migrants = 
Percent_Poland_College_Migrants*yearly_net_Pol_migrants 
 
yearly_net_Rom_coll_migrants = 
Percent_Romania_College_Migrants*yearly_net_Rom_migrants 
 
yearly_net_Slv_coll_migrants = 
Percent_Slovenia_College_Migrants*yearly_net_Slv_migrants 
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yearly_net_Svk_coll_migrants = 
Percent_Slovakia_College_Migrants*yearly_net_Svk_migrants 
 
yearly_Pol_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = (age_disproportionate_factor* 
Percent_Poland_20_to_34_Population)*yearly_net_Pol_migrants 
 
yearly_Rom_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = (age_disproportionate_factor* 
Percent_Romania_20_to_34_Population)*yearly_net_Rom_migrants 
 
yearly_Slv_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = (age_disproportionate_factor* 
Percent_Slovenia_20_to_34_Population)*yearly_net_Slv_migrants 
 
yearly_Svk_net_migrants_age_20_to_34 = (age_disproportionate_factor* 
Percent_Slovakia_20_to_34_Population)*yearly_net_Svk_migrants 
 
Part 3: Graphical Functions 
 
ROR_av_Bulg_ed_level_Bulg_GDP_ch = 
GRAPH(Average_Bulgaria_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.012), (1.00, -0.011), (2.00, -0.01), (3.00, -0.009), (4.00, -0.008), (5.00, -0.007), 
(6.00, -0.006), (7.00, -0.005), (8.00, -0.004), (9.00, -0.003), (10.0, -0.002), (11.0, -0.001), 
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.001), (14.0, 0.002), (15.0, 0.003), (16.0, 0.004), (17.0, 0.005),  
(18.0, 0.006), (19.0, 0.007), (20.0, 0.008), (21.0, 0.009), (22.0, 0.01), (23.0, 0.011),  
(24.0, 0.012), (25.0, 0.013), (26.0, 0.014), (27.0, 0.015), (28.0, 0.016), (29.0, 0.017), 
(30.0, 0.018) 
 
ROR_av_Bulg_ed_level_Bulg_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Average_Bulgaria_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.12), (1.00, -0.11), (2.00, -0.1), (3.00, -0.09), (4.00, -0.08), (5.00, -0.07),  
(6.00, -0.06), (7.00, -0.05), (8.00, -0.04), (9.00, -0.03), (10.0, -0.02), (11.0, -0.01),  
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.01), (14.0, 0.02), (15.0, 0.03), (16.0, 0.04), (17.0, 0.05), (18.0, 0.06), 
(19.0, 0.07), (20.0, 0.08), (21.0, 0.09), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.11), (24.0, 0.12), (25.0, 0.13), 
(26.0, 0.14), (27.0, 0.15), (28.0, 0.16), (29.0, 0.17), (30.0, 0.18) 
 
ROR_av_Czech_ed_level_Czech_GDP_ch = 
GRAPH(Average_Czech_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.012), (1.00, -0.011), (2.00, -0.01), (3.00, -0.009), (4.00, -0.008), (5.00, -0.007), 
(6.00, -0.006), (7.00, -0.005), (8.00, -0.004), (9.00, -0.003), (10.0, -0.002), (11.0, -0.001), 
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.001), (14.0, 0.002), (15.0, 0.003), (16.0, 0.004), (17.0, 0.005),  
(18.0, 0.006), (19.0, 0.007), (20.0, 0.008), (21.0, 0.009), (22.0, 0.01), (23.0, 0.011),  
(24.0, 0.012), (25.0, 0.013), (26.0, 0.014), (27.0, 0.015), (28.0, 0.016), (29.0, 0.017), 
(30.0, 0.018) 
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ROR_av_Czech_ed_level_Czech_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Average_Czech_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.12), (1.00, -0.11), (2.00, -0.1), (3.00, -0.09), (4.00, -0.08), (5.00, -0.07),  
(6.00, -0.06), (7.00, -0.05), (8.00, -0.04), (9.00, -0.03), (10.0, -0.02), (11.0, -0.01),  
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.01), (14.0, 0.02), (15.0, 0.03), (16.0, 0.04), (17.0, 0.05), (18.0, 0.06), 
(19.0, 0.07), (20.0, 0.08), (21.0, 0.09), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.11), (24.0, 0.12), (25.0, 0.13), 
(26.0, 0.14), (27.0, 0.15), (28.0, 0.16), (29.0, 0.17), (30.0, 0.18) 
 
ROR_av_Est_ed_level_Est_GDP_ch = GRAPH(Average_Estonia_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.012), (1.00, -0.011), (2.00, -0.01), (3.00, -0.009), (4.00, -0.008), (5.00, -0.007), 
(6.00, -0.006), (7.00, -0.005), (8.00, -0.004), (9.00, -0.003), (10.0, -0.002), (11.0, -0.001), 
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.001), (14.0, 0.002), (15.0, 0.003), (16.0, 0.004), (17.0, 0.005),  
(18.0, 0.006), (19.0, 0.007), (20.0, 0.008), (21.0, 0.009), (22.0, 0.01), (23.0, 0.011),  
(24.0, 0.012), (25.0, 0.013), (26.0, 0.014), (27.0, 0.015), (28.0, 0.016), (29.0, 0.017), 
(30.0, 0.018) 
 
ROR_av_Est_ed_level__Est_mig_rate = GRAPH(Average_Estonia_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.12), (1.00, -0.11), (2.00, -0.1), (3.00, -0.09), (4.00, -0.08), (5.00, -0.07),  
(6.00, -0.06), (7.00, -0.05), (8.00, -0.04), (9.00, -0.03), (10.0, -0.02), (11.0, -0.01),  
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.01), (14.0, 0.02), (15.0, 0.03), (16.0, 0.04), (17.0, 0.05), (18.0, 0.06), 
(19.0, 0.07), (20.0, 0.08), (21.0, 0.09), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.11), (24.0, 0.12), (25.0, 0.13), 
(26.0, 0.14), (27.0, 0.15), (28.0, 0.16), (29.0, 0.17), (30.0, 0.18) 
 
ROR_av_Hung_ed_level_Hung_GDP_ch = 
GRAPH(Average_Hungary_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.012), (1.00, -0.011), (2.00, -0.01), (3.00, -0.009), (4.00, -0.008), (5.00, -0.007), 
(6.00, -0.006), (7.00, -0.005), (8.00, -0.004), (9.00, -0.003), (10.0, -0.002), (11.0, -0.001), 
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.001), (14.0, 0.002), (15.0, 0.003), (16.0, 0.004), (17.0, 0.005),  
(18.0, 0.006), (19.0, 0.007), (20.0, 0.008), (21.0, 0.009), (22.0, 0.01), (23.0, 0.011),  
(24.0, 0.012), (25.0, 0.013), (26.0, 0.014), (27.0, 0.015), (28.0, 0.016), (29.0, 0.017), 
(30.0, 0.018) 
 
ROR_av_Hung_ed_level_Hung_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Average_Hungary_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.12), (1.00, -0.11), (2.00, -0.1), (3.00, -0.09), (4.00, -0.08), (5.00, -0.07),  
(6.00, -0.06), (7.00, -0.05), (8.00, -0.04), (9.00, -0.03), (10.0, -0.02), (11.0, -0.01),  
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.01), (14.0, 0.02), (15.0, 0.03), (16.0, 0.04), (17.0, 0.05), (18.0, 0.06), 
(19.0, 0.07), (20.0, 0.08), (21.0, 0.09), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.11), (24.0, 0.12), (25.0, 0.13), 
(26.0, 0.14), (27.0, 0.15), (28.0, 0.16), (29.0, 0.17), (30.0, 0.18) 
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ROR_av_Lat_ed_level_Lat_GDP_ch = GRAPH(Average_Latvia_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.012), (1.00, -0.011), (2.00, -0.01), (3.00, -0.009), (4.00, -0.008), (5.00, -0.007), 
(6.00, -0.006), (7.00, -0.005), (8.00, -0.004), (9.00, -0.003), (10.0, -0.002), (11.0, -0.001), 
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.001), (14.0, 0.002), (15.0, 0.003), (16.0, 0.004), (17.0, 0.005),  
(18.0, 0.006), (19.0, 0.007), (20.0, 0.008), (21.0, 0.009), (22.0, 0.01), (23.0, 0.011),  
(24.0, 0.012), (25.0, 0.013), (26.0, 0.014), (27.0, 0.015), (28.0, 0.016), (29.0, 0.017), 
(30.0, 0.018) 
 
ROR_av_Lat_ed_level__Lat_mig_rate = GRAPH(Average_Latvia_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.12), (1.00, -0.11), (2.00, -0.1), (3.00, -0.09), (4.00, -0.08), (5.00, -0.07),  
(6.00, -0.06), (7.00, -0.05), (8.00, -0.04), (9.00, -0.03), (10.0, -0.02), (11.0, -0.01),  
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.01), (14.0, 0.02), (15.0, 0.03), (16.0, 0.04), (17.0, 0.05), (18.0, 0.06), 
(19.0, 0.07), (20.0, 0.08), (21.0, 0.09), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.11), (24.0, 0.12), (25.0, 0.13), 
(26.0, 0.14), (27.0, 0.15), (28.0, 0.16), (29.0, 0.17), (30.0, 0.18) 
 
ROR_av_Lith_ed_level_Lith_GDP_ch = GRAPH(Average_Lithuania_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.012), (1.00, -0.011), (2.00, -0.01), (3.00, -0.009), (4.00, -0.008), (5.00, -0.007), 
(6.00, -0.006), (7.00, -0.005), (8.00, -0.004), (9.00, -0.003), (10.0, -0.002), (11.0, -0.001), 
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.001), (14.0, 0.002), (15.0, 0.003), (16.0, 0.004), (17.0, 0.005),  
(18.0, 0.006), (19.0, 0.007), (20.0, 0.008), (21.0, 0.009), (22.0, 0.01), (23.0, 0.011),  
(24.0, 0.012), (25.0, 0.013), (26.0, 0.014), (27.0, 0.015), (28.0, 0.016), (29.0, 0.017), 
(30.0, 0.018) 
 
ROR_av_Lith_ed_level_Lith_mig_rate = GRAPH(Average_Lithuania_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.12), (1.00, -0.11), (2.00, -0.1), (3.00, -0.09), (4.00, -0.08), (5.00, -0.07),  
(6.00, -0.06), (7.00, -0.05), (8.00, -0.04), (9.00, -0.03), (10.0, -0.02), (11.0, -0.01),  
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.01), (14.0, 0.02), (15.0, 0.03), (16.0, 0.04), (17.0, 0.05), (18.0, 0.06), 
(19.0, 0.07), (20.0, 0.08), (21.0, 0.09), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.11), (24.0, 0.12), (25.0, 0.13), 
(26.0, 0.14), (27.0, 0.15), (28.0, 0.16), (29.0, 0.17), (30.0, 0.18) 
 
ROR_av_Pol_ed_level_Pol_GDP_ch = GRAPH(Average_Poland_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.012), (1.00, -0.011), (2.00, -0.01), (3.00, -0.009), (4.00, -0.008), (5.00, -0.007), 
(6.00, -0.006), (7.00, -0.005), (8.00, -0.004), (9.00, -0.003), (10.0, -0.002), (11.0, -0.001), 
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.001), (14.0, 0.002), (15.0, 0.003), (16.0, 0.004), (17.0, 0.005),  
(18.0, 0.006), (19.0, 0.007), (20.0, 0.008), (21.0, 0.009), (22.0, 0.01), (23.0, 0.011),  
(24.0, 0.012), (25.0, 0.013), (26.0, 0.014), (27.0, 0.015), (28.0, 0.016), (29.0, 0.017), 
(30.0, 0.018) 
 
ROR_av_Pol_ed_level__Pol_mig_rate = GRAPH(Average_Poland_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.12), (1.00, -0.11), (2.00, -0.1), (3.00, -0.09), (4.00, -0.08), (5.00, -0.07),  
(6.00, -0.06), (7.00, -0.05), (8.00, -0.04), (9.00, -0.03), (10.0, -0.02), (11.0, -0.01),  
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.01), (14.0, 0.02), (15.0, 0.03), (16.0, 0.04), (17.0, 0.05), (18.0, 0.06), 
(19.0, 0.07), (20.0, 0.08), (21.0, 0.09), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.11), (24.0, 0.12), (25.0, 0.13), 
(26.0, 0.14), (27.0, 0.15), (28.0, 0.16), (29.0, 0.17), (30.0, 0.18) 
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ROR_av_Rom_ed_level_Rom_GDP_ch = 
GRAPH(Average_Romania_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.012), (1.00, -0.011), (2.00, -0.01), (3.00, -0.009), (4.00, -0.008), (5.00, -0.007), 
(6.00, -0.006), (7.00, -0.005), (8.00, -0.004), (9.00, -0.003), (10.0, -0.002), (11.0, -0.001), 
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.001), (14.0, 0.002), (15.0, 0.003), (16.0, 0.004), (17.0, 0.005),  
(18.0, 0.006), (19.0, 0.007), (20.0, 0.008), (21.0, 0.009), (22.0, 0.01), (23.0, 0.011),  
(24.0, 0.012), (25.0, 0.013), (26.0, 0.014), (27.0, 0.015), (28.0, 0.016), (29.0, 0.017), 
(30.0, 0.018) 
 
ROR_av_Rom_ed_level__Rom_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Average_Romania_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.12), (1.00, -0.11), (2.00, -0.1), (3.00, -0.09), (4.00, -0.08), (5.00, -0.07),  
(6.00, -0.06), (7.00, -0.05), (8.00, -0.04), (9.00, -0.03), (10.0, -0.02), (11.0, -0.01),  
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.01), (14.0, 0.02), (15.0, 0.03), (16.0, 0.04), (17.0, 0.05), (18.0, 0.06), 
(19.0, 0.07), (20.0, 0.08), (21.0, 0.09), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.11), (24.0, 0.12), (25.0, 0.13), 
(26.0, 0.14), (27.0, 0.15), (28.0, 0.16), (29.0, 0.17), (30.0, 0.18) 
 
ROR_av_Slv_ed_level_Slv_GDP_ch = GRAPH(Average_Slovenia_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.012), (1.00, -0.011), (2.00, -0.01), (3.00, -0.009), (4.00, -0.008), (5.00, -0.007), 
(6.00, -0.006), (7.00, -0.005), (8.00, -0.004), (9.00, -0.003), (10.0, -0.002), (11.0, -0.001), 
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.001), (14.0, 0.002), (15.0, 0.003), (16.0, 0.004), (17.0, 0.005),  
(18.0, 0.006), (19.0, 0.007), (20.0, 0.008), (21.0, 0.009), (22.0, 0.01), (23.0, 0.011),  
(24.0, 0.012), (25.0, 0.013), (26.0, 0.014), (27.0, 0.015), (28.0, 0.016), (29.0, 0.017), 
(30.0, 0.018) 
 
ROR_av_Slv_ed_level__Slv_mig_rate = GRAPH(Average_Slovenia_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.12), (1.00, -0.11), (2.00, -0.1), (3.00, -0.09), (4.00, -0.08), (5.00, -0.07),  
(6.00, -0.06), (7.00, -0.05), (8.00, -0.04), (9.00, -0.03), (10.0, -0.02), (11.0, -0.01),  
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.01), (14.0, 0.02), (15.0, 0.03), (16.0, 0.04), (17.0, 0.05), (18.0, 0.06), 
(19.0, 0.07), (20.0, 0.08), (21.0, 0.09), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.11), (24.0, 0.12), (25.0, 0.13), 
(26.0, 0.14), (27.0, 0.15), (28.0, 0.16), (29.0, 0.17), (30.0, 0.18) 
 
ROR_av_Svk_ed_level_Svk_GDP_ch = GRAPH(Average_Slovakia_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.012), (1.00, -0.011), (2.00, -0.01), (3.00, -0.009), (4.00, -0.008), (5.00, -0.007), 
(6.00, -0.006), (7.00, -0.005), (8.00, -0.004), (9.00, -0.003), (10.0, -0.002), (11.0, -0.001), 
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.001), (14.0, 0.002), (15.0, 0.003), (16.0, 0.004), (17.0, 0.005),  
(18.0, 0.006), (19.0, 0.007), (20.0, 0.008), (21.0, 0.009), (22.0, 0.01), (23.0, 0.011),  
(24.0, 0.012), (25.0, 0.013), (26.0, 0.014), (27.0, 0.015), (28.0, 0.016), (29.0, 0.017), 
(30.0, 0.018) 
 
ROR_av_Svk_ed_level__Svk_mig_rate = GRAPH(Average_Slovakia_Education_Level) 
(0.00, -0.12), (1.00, -0.11), (2.00, -0.1), (3.00, -0.09), (4.00, -0.08), (5.00, -0.07),  
(6.00, -0.06), (7.00, -0.05), (8.00, -0.04), (9.00, -0.03), (10.0, -0.02), (11.0, -0.01),  
(12.0, 0.00), (13.0, 0.01), (14.0, 0.02), (15.0, 0.03), (16.0, 0.04), (17.0, 0.05), (18.0, 0.06), 
(19.0, 0.07), (20.0, 0.08), (21.0, 0.09), (22.0, 0.1), (23.0, 0.11), (24.0, 0.12), (25.0, 0.13), 
(26.0, 0.14), (27.0, 0.15), (28.0, 0.16), (29.0, 0.17), (30.0, 0.18) 
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ROR_Bulg_20_to_34_pop_Bulg_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Percent_Bulgaria_20_to_34_Population) 
(0.00, -0.2), (0.1, -0.1), (0.2, 0.00), (0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.2), (0.5, 0.3), (0.6, 0.4), (0.7, 0.5), 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.9, 0.7), (1, 0.8) 
 
ROR_Bulg_GDP_ch_Bulg_ed_level_ch = GRAPH(ch_Bulg_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.03), (0.71, -0.029), (0.72, -0.028), (0.73, -0.027), (0.74, -0.026), (0.75, -0.025), 
(0.76, -0.024), (0.77, -0.023), (0.78, -0.022), (0.79, -0.021), (0.8, -0.02), (0.81, -0.019), 
(0.82, -0.018), (0.83, -0.017), (0.84, -0.016), (0.85, -0.015), (0.86, -0.014), (0.87, -0.013), 
(0.88, -0.012), (0.89, -0.011), (0.9, -0.01), (0.91, -0.009), (0.92, -0.008), (0.93, -0.007), 
(0.94, -0.006), (0.95, -0.005), (0.96, -0.004), (0.97, -0.003), (0.98, -0.002), (0.99, -0.001), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.001), (1.02, 0.002), (1.03, 0.003), (1.04, 0.004), (1.05, 0.005),  
(1.06, 0.006), (1.07, 0.007), (1.08, 0.008), (1.09, 0.009), (1.10, 0.01), (1.11, 0.011),  
(1.12, 0.012), (1.13, 0.013), (1.14, 0.014), (1.15, 0.015), (1.16, 0.016), (1.17, 0.017), 
(1.18, 0.018), (1.19, 0.019), (1.20, 0.02), (1.21, 0.021), (1.22, 0.022), (1.23, 0.023),  
(1.24, 0.024), (1.25, 0.025), (1.26, 0.026), (1.27, 0.027), (1.28, 0.028), (1.29, 0.029), 
(1.30, 0.03) 
 
ROR_Bulg_GDP_ch_Bulg_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_Bulg_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
 
ROR_Bulg_GDP_ch_pct_Bulg_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_Bulg_GDP) 
(0.7, 0.15), (0.71, 0.145), (0.72, 0.14), (0.73, 0.135), (0.74, 0.13), (0.75, 0.125),  
(0.76, 0.12), (0.77, 0.115), (0.78, 0.11), (0.79, 0.105), (0.8, 0.1), (0.81, 0.095),  
(0.82, 0.09), (0.83, 0.085), (0.84, 0.08), (0.85, 0.075), (0.86, 0.07), (0.87, 0.065),  
(0.88, 0.06), (0.89, 0.055), (0.9, 0.05), (0.91, 0.045), (0.92, 0.04), (0.93, 0.035),  
(0.94, 0.03), (0.95, 0.025), (0.96, 0.02), (0.97, 0.015), (0.98, 0.01), (0.99, 0.005),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, -0.005), (1.02, -0.01), (1.03, -0.015), (1.04, -0.02), (1.05, -0.025), 
(1.06, -0.03), (1.07, -0.035), (1.08, -0.04), (1.09, -0.045), (1.10, -0.05), (1.11, -0.055), 
(1.12, -0.06), (1.13, -0.065), (1.14, -0.07), (1.15, -0.075), (1.16, -0.08), (1.17, -0.085), 
(1.18, -0.09), (1.19, -0.095), (1.20, -0.1), (1.21, -0.105), (1.22, -0.11), (1.23, -0.115), 
(1.24, -0.12), (1.25, -0.125), (1.26, -0.13), (1.27, -0.135), (1.28, -0.14), (1.29, -0.145), 
(1.30, -0.15) 
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ROR_Bulg_mig_stk_Bulg_employ_ch = GRAPH(per_capita_Bulg_mig_stk) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3),  
(0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), (0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65),  
(0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), (0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 1.00) 
 
ROR_Czech_20_to_34_pop_Czech_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Percent_Czech_20_to_34_Population) 
(0.00, -0.2), (0.1, -0.1), (0.2, 0.00), (0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.2), (0.5, 0.3), (0.6, 0.4), (0.7, 0.5), 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.9, 0.7), (1, 0.8) 
 
ROR_Czech_GDP_ch_Czech_ed_level_ch = GRAPH(ch_Czech_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.03), (0.71, -0.029), (0.72, -0.028), (0.73, -0.027), (0.74, -0.026), (0.75, -0.025), 
(0.76, -0.024), (0.77, -0.023), (0.78, -0.022), (0.79, -0.021), (0.8, -0.02), (0.81, -0.019), 
(0.82, -0.018), (0.83, -0.017), (0.84, -0.016), (0.85, -0.015), (0.86, -0.014), (0.87, -0.013), 
(0.88, -0.012), (0.89, -0.011), (0.9, -0.01), (0.91, -0.009), (0.92, -0.008), (0.93, -0.007), 
(0.94, -0.006), (0.95, -0.005), (0.96, -0.004), (0.97, -0.003), (0.98, -0.002), (0.99, -0.001), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.001), (1.02, 0.002), (1.03, 0.003), (1.04, 0.004), (1.05, 0.005),  
(1.06, 0.006), (1.07, 0.007), (1.08, 0.008), (1.09, 0.009), (1.10, 0.01), (1.11, 0.011),  
(1.12, 0.012), (1.13, 0.013), (1.14, 0.014), (1.15, 0.015), (1.16, 0.016), (1.17, 0.017), 
(1.18, 0.018), (1.19, 0.019), (1.20, 0.02), (1.21, 0.021), (1.22, 0.022), (1.23, 0.023),  
(1.24, 0.024), (1.25, 0.025), (1.26, 0.026), (1.27, 0.027), (1.28, 0.028), (1.29, 0.029), 
(1.30, 0.03) 
 
ROR_Czech_GDP_ch_Czech_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_Czech_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
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ROR_Czech_GDP_ch_pct_Czech_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_Czech_GDP) 
(0.7, 0.15), (0.71, 0.145), (0.72, 0.14), (0.73, 0.135), (0.74, 0.13), (0.75, 0.125),  
(0.76, 0.12), (0.77, 0.115), (0.78, 0.11), (0.79, 0.105), (0.8, 0.1), (0.81, 0.095),  
(0.82, 0.09), (0.83, 0.085), (0.84, 0.08), (0.85, 0.075), (0.86, 0.07), (0.87, 0.065),  
(0.88, 0.06), (0.89, 0.055), (0.9, 0.05), (0.91, 0.045), (0.92, 0.04), (0.93, 0.035),  
(0.94, 0.03), (0.95, 0.025), (0.96, 0.02), (0.97, 0.015), (0.98, 0.01), (0.99, 0.005),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, -0.005), (1.02, -0.01), (1.03, -0.015), (1.04, -0.02), (1.05, -0.025), 
(1.06, -0.03), (1.07, -0.035), (1.08, -0.04), (1.09, -0.045), (1.10, -0.05), (1.11, -0.055), 
(1.12, -0.06), (1.13, -0.065), (1.14, -0.07), (1.15, -0.075), (1.16, -0.08), (1.17, -0.085), 
(1.18, -0.09), (1.19, -0.095), (1.20, -0.1), (1.21, -0.105), (1.22, -0.11), (1.23, -0.115), 
(1.24, -0.12), (1.25, -0.125), (1.26, -0.13), (1.27, -0.135), (1.28, -0.14), (1.29, -0.145), 
(1.30, -0.15) 
 
ROR_Czech_migstk_Czech_employ_ch = GRAPH(per_capita_Czech_mig_stk) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3),  
(0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), (0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65),  
(0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), (0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 1.00) 
 
ROR_Est_20_to_34_pop_Est_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Percent_Estonia_20_to_34_Population) 
(0.00, -0.2), (0.1, -0.1), (0.2, 0.00), (0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.2), (0.5, 0.3), (0.6, 0.4), (0.7, 0.5), 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.9, 0.7), (1, 0.8) 
 
ROR_Est_GDP_ch_Est_ed_level_ch = GRAPH(ch_Est_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.03), (0.71, -0.029), (0.72, -0.028), (0.73, -0.027), (0.74, -0.026), (0.75, -0.025), 
(0.76, -0.024), (0.77, -0.023), (0.78, -0.022), (0.79, -0.021), (0.8, -0.02), (0.81, -0.019), 
(0.82, -0.018), (0.83, -0.017), (0.84, -0.016), (0.85, -0.015), (0.86, -0.014), (0.87, -0.013), 
(0.88, -0.012), (0.89, -0.011), (0.9, -0.01), (0.91, -0.009), (0.92, -0.008), (0.93, -0.007), 
(0.94, -0.006), (0.95, -0.005), (0.96, -0.004), (0.97, -0.003), (0.98, -0.002), (0.99, -0.001), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.001), (1.02, 0.002), (1.03, 0.003), (1.04, 0.004), (1.05, 0.005),  
(1.06, 0.006), (1.07, 0.007), (1.08, 0.008), (1.09, 0.009), (1.10, 0.01), (1.11, 0.011),  
(1.12, 0.012), (1.13, 0.013), (1.14, 0.014), (1.15, 0.015), (1.16, 0.016), (1.17, 0.017), 
(1.18, 0.018), (1.19, 0.019), (1.20, 0.02), (1.21, 0.021), (1.22, 0.022), (1.23, 0.023),  
(1.24, 0.024), (1.25, 0.025), (1.26, 0.026), (1.27, 0.027), (1.28, 0.028), (1.29, 0.029), 
(1.30, 0.03) 
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ROR_Est_GDP_ch_Est_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_Est_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
 
ROR_Est_GDP_ch_pct_Est_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_Est_GDP) 
(0.7, 0.15), (0.71, 0.145), (0.72, 0.14), (0.73, 0.135), (0.74, 0.13), (0.75, 0.125),  
(0.76, 0.12), (0.77, 0.115), (0.78, 0.11), (0.79, 0.105), (0.8, 0.1), (0.81, 0.095),  
(0.82, 0.09), (0.83, 0.085), (0.84, 0.08), (0.85, 0.075), (0.86, 0.07), (0.87, 0.065),  
(0.88, 0.06), (0.89, 0.055), (0.9, 0.05), (0.91, 0.045), (0.92, 0.04), (0.93, 0.035),  
(0.94, 0.03), (0.95, 0.025), (0.96, 0.02), (0.97, 0.015), (0.98, 0.01), (0.99, 0.005),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, -0.005), (1.02, -0.01), (1.03, -0.015), (1.04, -0.02), (1.05, -0.025), 
(1.06, -0.03), (1.07, -0.035), (1.08, -0.04), (1.09, -0.045), (1.10, -0.05), (1.11, -0.055), 
(1.12, -0.06), (1.13, -0.065), (1.14, -0.07), (1.15, -0.075), (1.16, -0.08), (1.17, -0.085), 
(1.18, -0.09), (1.19, -0.095), (1.20, -0.1), (1.21, -0.105), (1.22, -0.11), (1.23, -0.115), 
(1.24, -0.12), (1.25, -0.125), (1.26, -0.13), (1.27, -0.135), (1.28, -0.14), (1.29, -0.145), 
(1.30, -0.15) 
 
ROR_Est_migstk_Est_employ_ch = GRAPH(per_capita_Est_mig_stk) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3),  
(0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), (0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65),  
(0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), (0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 1.00) 
 
ROR_German_GDP_ch_German_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_German_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
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ROR_German_GDP_ch_pct_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_German_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.15), (0.71, -0.145), (0.72, -0.14), (0.73, -0.135), (0.74, -0.13), (0.75, -0.125), 
(0.76, -0.12), (0.77, -0.115), (0.78, -0.11), (0.79, -0.105), (0.8, -0.1), (0.81, -0.095),  
(0.82, -0.09), (0.83, -0.085), (0.84, -0.08), (0.85, -0.075), (0.86, -0.07), (0.87, -0.065), 
(0.88, -0.06), (0.89, -0.055), (0.9, -0.05), (0.91, -0.045), (0.92, -0.04), (0.93, -0.035), 
(0.94, -0.03), (0.95, -0.025), (0.96, -0.02), (0.97, -0.015), (0.98, -0.01), (0.99, -0.005), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.005), (1.02, 0.01), (1.03, 0.015), (1.04, 0.02), (1.05, 0.025),  
(1.06, 0.03), (1.07, 0.035), (1.08, 0.04), (1.09, 0.045), (1.10, 0.05), (1.11, 0.055),  
(1.12, 0.06), (1.13, 0.065), (1.14, 0.07), (1.15, 0.075), (1.16, 0.08), (1.17, 0.085),  
(1.18, 0.09), (1.19, 0.095), (1.20, 0.1), (1.21, 0.105), (1.22, 0.11), (1.23, 0.115),  
(1.24, 0.12), (1.25, 0.125), (1.26, 0.13), (1.27, 0.135), (1.28, 0.14), (1.29, 0.145),  
(1.30, 0.15) 
 
ROR_Hung_20_to_34_pop_Hung_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Percent_Hungary_20_to_34_Population) 
(0.00, -0.2), (0.1, -0.1), (0.2, 0.00), (0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.2), (0.5, 0.3), (0.6, 0.4), (0.7, 0.5), 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.9, 0.7), (1, 0.8) 
 
ROR_Hung_GDP_ch_Hung_ed_level_ch = GRAPH(ch_Hung_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.03), (0.71, -0.029), (0.72, -0.028), (0.73, -0.027), (0.74, -0.026), (0.75, -0.025), 
(0.76, -0.024), (0.77, -0.023), (0.78, -0.022), (0.79, -0.021), (0.8, -0.02), (0.81, -0.019), 
(0.82, -0.018), (0.83, -0.017), (0.84, -0.016), (0.85, -0.015), (0.86, -0.014), (0.87, -0.013), 
(0.88, -0.012), (0.89, -0.011), (0.9, -0.01), (0.91, -0.009), (0.92, -0.008), (0.93, -0.007), 
(0.94, -0.006), (0.95, -0.005), (0.96, -0.004), (0.97, -0.003), (0.98, -0.002), (0.99, -0.001), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.001), (1.02, 0.002), (1.03, 0.003), (1.04, 0.004), (1.05, 0.005),  
(1.06, 0.006), (1.07, 0.007), (1.08, 0.008), (1.09, 0.009), (1.10, 0.01), (1.11, 0.011),  
(1.12, 0.012), (1.13, 0.013), (1.14, 0.014), (1.15, 0.015), (1.16, 0.016), (1.17, 0.017), 
(1.18, 0.018), (1.19, 0.019), (1.20, 0.02), (1.21, 0.021), (1.22, 0.022), (1.23, 0.023),  
(1.24, 0.024), (1.25, 0.025), (1.26, 0.026), (1.27, 0.027), (1.28, 0.028), (1.29, 0.029), 
(1.30, 0.03) 
 
ROR_Hung_GDP_ch_Hung_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_Hung_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
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ROR_Hung_GDP_ch_pct_Hung_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_Hung_GDP) 
(0.7, 0.15), (0.71, 0.145), (0.72, 0.14), (0.73, 0.135), (0.74, 0.13), (0.75, 0.125),  
(0.76, 0.12), (0.77, 0.115), (0.78, 0.11), (0.79, 0.105), (0.8, 0.1), (0.81, 0.095),  
(0.82, 0.09), (0.83, 0.085), (0.84, 0.08), (0.85, 0.075), (0.86, 0.07), (0.87, 0.065),  
(0.88, 0.06), (0.89, 0.055), (0.9, 0.05), (0.91, 0.045), (0.92, 0.04), (0.93, 0.035),  
(0.94, 0.03), (0.95, 0.025), (0.96, 0.02), (0.97, 0.015), (0.98, 0.01), (0.99, 0.005),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, -0.005), (1.02, -0.01), (1.03, -0.015), (1.04, -0.02), (1.05, -0.025), 
(1.06, -0.03), (1.07, -0.035), (1.08, -0.04), (1.09, -0.045), (1.10, -0.05), (1.11, -0.055), 
(1.12, -0.06), (1.13, -0.065), (1.14, -0.07), (1.15, -0.075), (1.16, -0.08), (1.17, -0.085), 
(1.18, -0.09), (1.19, -0.095), (1.20, -0.1), (1.21, -0.105), (1.22, -0.11), (1.23, -0.115), 
(1.24, -0.12), (1.25, -0.125), (1.26, -0.13), (1.27, -0.135), (1.28, -0.14), (1.29, -0.145), 
(1.30, -0.15) 
 
ROR_Hung_migstk_Hung_employ_ch = GRAPH(per_capita_Hung_mig_stk) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3),  
(0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), (0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65),  
(0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), (0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 1.00) 
 
ROR_Lat_20_to_34_pop_Lat_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Percent_Latvia_20_to_34_Population) 
(0.00, -0.2), (0.1, -0.1), (0.2, 0.00), (0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.2), (0.5, 0.3), (0.6, 0.4), (0.7, 0.5), 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.9, 0.7), (1, 0.8) 
 
ROR_Lat_GDP_ch_Lat_ed_level_ch = GRAPH(ch_Lat_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.03), (0.71, -0.029), (0.72, -0.028), (0.73, -0.027), (0.74, -0.026), (0.75, -0.025), 
(0.76, -0.024), (0.77, -0.023), (0.78, -0.022), (0.79, -0.021), (0.8, -0.02), (0.81, -0.019), 
(0.82, -0.018), (0.83, -0.017), (0.84, -0.016), (0.85, -0.015), (0.86, -0.014), (0.87, -0.013), 
(0.88, -0.012), (0.89, -0.011), (0.9, -0.01), (0.91, -0.009), (0.92, -0.008), (0.93, -0.007), 
(0.94, -0.006), (0.95, -0.005), (0.96, -0.004), (0.97, -0.003), (0.98, -0.002), (0.99, -0.001), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.001), (1.02, 0.002), (1.03, 0.003), (1.04, 0.004), (1.05, 0.005),  
(1.06, 0.006), (1.07, 0.007), (1.08, 0.008), (1.09, 0.009), (1.10, 0.01), (1.11, 0.011),  
(1.12, 0.012), (1.13, 0.013), (1.14, 0.014), (1.15, 0.015), (1.16, 0.016), (1.17, 0.017), 
(1.18, 0.018), (1.19, 0.019), (1.20, 0.02), (1.21, 0.021), (1.22, 0.022), (1.23, 0.023),  
(1.24, 0.024), (1.25, 0.025), (1.26, 0.026), (1.27, 0.027), (1.28, 0.028), (1.29, 0.029), 
(1.30, 0.03) 
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ROR_Lat_GDP_ch_Lat_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_Lat_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
 
ROR_Lat_GDP_ch_pct_Lat_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_Lat_GDP) 
(0.7, 0.15), (0.71, 0.145), (0.72, 0.14), (0.73, 0.135), (0.74, 0.13), (0.75, 0.125),  
(0.76, 0.12), (0.77, 0.115), (0.78, 0.11), (0.79, 0.105), (0.8, 0.1), (0.81, 0.095),  
(0.82, 0.09), (0.83, 0.085), (0.84, 0.08), (0.85, 0.075), (0.86, 0.07), (0.87, 0.065),  
(0.88, 0.06), (0.89, 0.055), (0.9, 0.05), (0.91, 0.045), (0.92, 0.04), (0.93, 0.035),  
(0.94, 0.03), (0.95, 0.025), (0.96, 0.02), (0.97, 0.015), (0.98, 0.01), (0.99, 0.005),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, -0.005), (1.02, -0.01), (1.03, -0.015), (1.04, -0.02), (1.05, -0.025), 
(1.06, -0.03), (1.07, -0.035), (1.08, -0.04), (1.09, -0.045), (1.10, -0.05), (1.11, -0.055), 
(1.12, -0.06), (1.13, -0.065), (1.14, -0.07), (1.15, -0.075), (1.16, -0.08), (1.17, -0.085), 
(1.18, -0.09), (1.19, -0.095), (1.20, -0.1), (1.21, -0.105), (1.22, -0.11), (1.23, -0.115), 
(1.24, -0.12), (1.25, -0.125), (1.26, -0.13), (1.27, -0.135), (1.28, -0.14), (1.29, -0.145), 
(1.30, -0.15) 
 
ROR_Lat_migstk_Lat_employ_ch = GRAPH(per_capita_Lat_mig_stk) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3),  
(0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), (0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65),  
(0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), (0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 1.00) 
 
ROR_Lith_20_to_34_pop_Lith_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Percent_Lithuania_20_to_34_Population) 
(0.00, -0.2), (0.1, -0.1), (0.2, 0.00), (0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.2), (0.5, 0.3), (0.6, 0.4), (0.7, 0.5), 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.9, 0.7), (1, 0.8) 
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ROR_Lith_GDP_ch_Lith_ed_level_ch = GRAPH(ch_Lith_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.03), (0.71, -0.029), (0.72, -0.028), (0.73, -0.027), (0.74, -0.026), (0.75, -0.025), 
(0.76, -0.024), (0.77, -0.023), (0.78, -0.022), (0.79, -0.021), (0.8, -0.02), (0.81, -0.019), 
(0.82, -0.018), (0.83, -0.017), (0.84, -0.016), (0.85, -0.015), (0.86, -0.014), (0.87, -0.013), 
(0.88, -0.012), (0.89, -0.011), (0.9, -0.01), (0.91, -0.009), (0.92, -0.008), (0.93, -0.007), 
(0.94, -0.006), (0.95, -0.005), (0.96, -0.004), (0.97, -0.003), (0.98, -0.002), (0.99, -0.001), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.001), (1.02, 0.002), (1.03, 0.003), (1.04, 0.004), (1.05, 0.005),  
(1.06, 0.006), (1.07, 0.007), (1.08, 0.008), (1.09, 0.009), (1.10, 0.01), (1.11, 0.011),  
(1.12, 0.012), (1.13, 0.013), (1.14, 0.014), (1.15, 0.015), (1.16, 0.016), (1.17, 0.017), 
(1.18, 0.018), (1.19, 0.019), (1.20, 0.02), (1.21, 0.021), (1.22, 0.022), (1.23, 0.023),  
(1.24, 0.024), (1.25, 0.025), (1.26, 0.026), (1.27, 0.027), (1.28, 0.028), (1.29, 0.029), 
(1.30, 0.03) 
 
ROR_Lith_GDP_ch_Lith_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_Lith_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
 
ROR_Lith_GDP_ch_pct_Lith_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_Lith_GDP) 
(0.7, 0.15), (0.71, 0.145), (0.72, 0.14), (0.73, 0.135), (0.74, 0.13), (0.75, 0.125),  
(0.76, 0.12), (0.77, 0.115), (0.78, 0.11), (0.79, 0.105), (0.8, 0.1), (0.81, 0.095),  
(0.82, 0.09), (0.83, 0.085), (0.84, 0.08), (0.85, 0.075), (0.86, 0.07), (0.87, 0.065),  
(0.88, 0.06), (0.89, 0.055), (0.9, 0.05), (0.91, 0.045), (0.92, 0.04), (0.93, 0.035),  
(0.94, 0.03), (0.95, 0.025), (0.96, 0.02), (0.97, 0.015), (0.98, 0.01), (0.99, 0.005),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, -0.005), (1.02, -0.01), (1.03, -0.015), (1.04, -0.02), (1.05, -0.025), 
(1.06, -0.03), (1.07, -0.035), (1.08, -0.04), (1.09, -0.045), (1.10, -0.05), (1.11, -0.055), 
(1.12, -0.06), (1.13, -0.065), (1.14, -0.07), (1.15, -0.075), (1.16, -0.08), (1.17, -0.085), 
(1.18, -0.09), (1.19, -0.095), (1.20, -0.1), (1.21, -0.105), (1.22, -0.11), (1.23, -0.115), 
(1.24, -0.12), (1.25, -0.125), (1.26, -0.13), (1.27, -0.135), (1.28, -0.14), (1.29, -0.145), 
(1.30, -0.15) 
 
ROR_Lith_migstk_Lith_employ_ch = GRAPH(per_capita_Lith_mig_stk) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3),  
(0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), (0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65),  
(0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), (0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 1.00) 
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ROR_Pol_20_to_34_pop_Pol_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Percent_Poland_20_to_34_Population) 
(0.00, -0.2), (0.1, -0.1), (0.2, 0.00), (0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.2), (0.5, 0.3), (0.6, 0.4), (0.7, 0.5), 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.9, 0.7), (1, 0.8) 
 
ROR_Pol_GDP_ch_pct_Pol_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_Pol_GDP) 
(0.7, 0.15), (0.71, 0.145), (0.72, 0.14), (0.73, 0.135), (0.74, 0.13), (0.75, 0.125),  
(0.76, 0.12), (0.77, 0.115), (0.78, 0.11), (0.79, 0.105), (0.8, 0.1), (0.81, 0.095),  
(0.82, 0.09), (0.83, 0.085), (0.84, 0.08), (0.85, 0.075), (0.86, 0.07), (0.87, 0.065),  
(0.88, 0.06), (0.89, 0.055), (0.9, 0.05), (0.91, 0.045), (0.92, 0.04), (0.93, 0.035),  
(0.94, 0.03), (0.95, 0.025), (0.96, 0.02), (0.97, 0.015), (0.98, 0.01), (0.99, 0.005),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, -0.005), (1.02, -0.01), (1.03, -0.015), (1.04, -0.02), (1.05, -0.025), 
(1.06, -0.03), (1.07, -0.035), (1.08, -0.04), (1.09, -0.045), (1.10, -0.05), (1.11, -0.055), 
(1.12, -0.06), (1.13, -0.065), (1.14, -0.07), (1.15, -0.075), (1.16, -0.08), (1.17, -0.085), 
(1.18, -0.09), (1.19, -0.095), (1.20, -0.1), (1.21, -0.105), (1.22, -0.11), (1.23, -0.115), 
(1.24, -0.12), (1.25, -0.125), (1.26, -0.13), (1.27, -0.135), (1.28, -0.14), (1.29, -0.145), 
(1.30, -0.15) 
 
ROR_Pol_GDP_ch_Pol_ed_level_ch = GRAPH(ch_Pol_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.03), (0.71, -0.029), (0.72, -0.028), (0.73, -0.027), (0.74, -0.026), (0.75, -0.025), 
(0.76, -0.024), (0.77, -0.023), (0.78, -0.022), (0.79, -0.021), (0.8, -0.02), (0.81, -0.019), 
(0.82, -0.018), (0.83, -0.017), (0.84, -0.016), (0.85, -0.015), (0.86, -0.014), (0.87, -0.013), 
(0.88, -0.012), (0.89, -0.011), (0.9, -0.01), (0.91, -0.009), (0.92, -0.008), (0.93, -0.007), 
(0.94, -0.006), (0.95, -0.005), (0.96, -0.004), (0.97, -0.003), (0.98, -0.002), (0.99, -0.001), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.001), (1.02, 0.002), (1.03, 0.003), (1.04, 0.004), (1.05, 0.005),  
(1.06, 0.006), (1.07, 0.007), (1.08, 0.008), (1.09, 0.009), (1.10, 0.01), (1.11, 0.011),  
(1.12, 0.012), (1.13, 0.013), (1.14, 0.014), (1.15, 0.015), (1.16, 0.016), (1.17, 0.017), 
(1.18, 0.018), (1.19, 0.019), (1.20, 0.02), (1.21, 0.021), (1.22, 0.022), (1.23, 0.023),  
(1.24, 0.024), (1.25, 0.025), (1.26, 0.026), (1.27, 0.027), (1.28, 0.028), (1.29, 0.029), 
(1.30, 0.03) 
 
ROR_Pol_GDP_ch_Pol_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_Pol_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
 
 
 
 
 253
ROR_Pol_migstk_Pol_employ_ch = GRAPH(per_capita_Pol_mig_stk) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3),  
(0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), (0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65),  
(0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), (0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 1.00) 
 
ROR_Rom_20_to_34_pop_Rom_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Percent_Romania_20_to_34_Population) 
(0.00, -0.2), (0.1, -0.1), (0.2, 0.00), (0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.2), (0.5, 0.3), (0.6, 0.4), (0.7, 0.5), 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.9, 0.7), (1, 0.8) 
 
ROR_Rom_GDP_ch_pct_Rom_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_Rom_GDP) 
(0.7, 0.15), (0.71, 0.145), (0.72, 0.14), (0.73, 0.135), (0.74, 0.13), (0.75, 0.125),  
(0.76, 0.12), (0.77, 0.115), (0.78, 0.11), (0.79, 0.105), (0.8, 0.1), (0.81, 0.095),  
(0.82, 0.09), (0.83, 0.085), (0.84, 0.08), (0.85, 0.075), (0.86, 0.07), (0.87, 0.065),  
(0.88, 0.06), (0.89, 0.055), (0.9, 0.05), (0.91, 0.045), (0.92, 0.04), (0.93, 0.035),  
(0.94, 0.03), (0.95, 0.025), (0.96, 0.02), (0.97, 0.015), (0.98, 0.01), (0.99, 0.005),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, -0.005), (1.02, -0.01), (1.03, -0.015), (1.04, -0.02), (1.05, -0.025), 
(1.06, -0.03), (1.07, -0.035), (1.08, -0.04), (1.09, -0.045), (1.10, -0.05), (1.11, -0.055), 
(1.12, -0.06), (1.13, -0.065), (1.14, -0.07), (1.15, -0.075), (1.16, -0.08), (1.17, -0.085), 
(1.18, -0.09), (1.19, -0.095), (1.20, -0.1), (1.21, -0.105), (1.22, -0.11), (1.23, -0.115), 
(1.24, -0.12), (1.25, -0.125), (1.26, -0.13), (1.27, -0.135), (1.28, -0.14), (1.29, -0.145), 
(1.30, -0.15) 
 
ROR_Rom_GDP_ch_Rom_ed_level_ch = GRAPH(ch_Rom_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.03), (0.71, -0.029), (0.72, -0.028), (0.73, -0.027), (0.74, -0.026), (0.75, -0.025), 
(0.76, -0.024), (0.77, -0.023), (0.78, -0.022), (0.79, -0.021), (0.8, -0.02), (0.81, -0.019), 
(0.82, -0.018), (0.83, -0.017), (0.84, -0.016), (0.85, -0.015), (0.86, -0.014), (0.87, -0.013), 
(0.88, -0.012), (0.89, -0.011), (0.9, -0.01), (0.91, -0.009), (0.92, -0.008), (0.93, -0.007), 
(0.94, -0.006), (0.95, -0.005), (0.96, -0.004), (0.97, -0.003), (0.98, -0.002), (0.99, -0.001), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.001), (1.02, 0.002), (1.03, 0.003), (1.04, 0.004), (1.05, 0.005),  
(1.06, 0.006), (1.07, 0.007), (1.08, 0.008), (1.09, 0.009), (1.10, 0.01), (1.11, 0.011),  
(1.12, 0.012), (1.13, 0.013), (1.14, 0.014), (1.15, 0.015), (1.16, 0.016), (1.17, 0.017), 
(1.18, 0.018), (1.19, 0.019), (1.20, 0.02), (1.21, 0.021), (1.22, 0.022), (1.23, 0.023),  
(1.24, 0.024), (1.25, 0.025), (1.26, 0.026), (1.27, 0.027), (1.28, 0.028), (1.29, 0.029), 
(1.30, 0.03) 
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ROR_Rom_GDP_ch_Rom_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_Rom_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
 
ROR_Rom_migstk_Rom_employ_ch = GRAPH(per_capita_Rom_mig_stk) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3),  
(0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), (0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65),  
(0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), (0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 1.00) 
 
ROR_Slv_20_to_34_pop_Slv_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Percent_Slovenia_20_to_34_Population) 
(0.00, -0.2), (0.1, -0.1), (0.2, 0.00), (0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.2), (0.5, 0.3), (0.6, 0.4), (0.7, 0.5), 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.9, 0.7), (1, 0.8) 
 
ROR_Slv_GDP_ch_pct_Slv_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_Slv_GDP) 
(0.7, 0.15), (0.71, 0.145), (0.72, 0.14), (0.73, 0.135), (0.74, 0.13), (0.75, 0.125),  
(0.76, 0.12), (0.77, 0.115), (0.78, 0.11), (0.79, 0.105), (0.8, 0.1), (0.81, 0.095),  
(0.82, 0.09), (0.83, 0.085), (0.84, 0.08), (0.85, 0.075), (0.86, 0.07), (0.87, 0.065),  
(0.88, 0.06), (0.89, 0.055), (0.9, 0.05), (0.91, 0.045), (0.92, 0.04), (0.93, 0.035),  
(0.94, 0.03), (0.95, 0.025), (0.96, 0.02), (0.97, 0.015), (0.98, 0.01), (0.99, 0.005),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, -0.005), (1.02, -0.01), (1.03, -0.015), (1.04, -0.02), (1.05, -0.025), 
(1.06, -0.03), (1.07, -0.035), (1.08, -0.04), (1.09, -0.045), (1.10, -0.05), (1.11, -0.055), 
(1.12, -0.06), (1.13, -0.065), (1.14, -0.07), (1.15, -0.075), (1.16, -0.08), (1.17, -0.085), 
(1.18, -0.09), (1.19, -0.095), (1.20, -0.1), (1.21, -0.105), (1.22, -0.11), (1.23, -0.115), 
(1.24, -0.12), (1.25, -0.125), (1.26, -0.13), (1.27, -0.135), (1.28, -0.14), (1.29, -0.145), 
(1.30, -0.15) 
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ROR_Slv_GDP_ch_Slv_ed_level_ch = GRAPH(ch_Slv_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.03), (0.71, -0.029), (0.72, -0.028), (0.73, -0.027), (0.74, -0.026), (0.75, -0.025), 
(0.76, -0.024), (0.77, -0.023), (0.78, -0.022), (0.79, -0.021), (0.8, -0.02), (0.81, -0.019), 
(0.82, -0.018), (0.83, -0.017), (0.84, -0.016), (0.85, -0.015), (0.86, -0.014), (0.87, -0.013), 
(0.88, -0.012), (0.89, -0.011), (0.9, -0.01), (0.91, -0.009), (0.92, -0.008), (0.93, -0.007), 
(0.94, -0.006), (0.95, -0.005), (0.96, -0.004), (0.97, -0.003), (0.98, -0.002), (0.99, -0.001), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.001), (1.02, 0.002), (1.03, 0.003), (1.04, 0.004), (1.05, 0.005),  
(1.06, 0.006), (1.07, 0.007), (1.08, 0.008), (1.09, 0.009), (1.10, 0.01), (1.11, 0.011),  
(1.12, 0.012), (1.13, 0.013), (1.14, 0.014), (1.15, 0.015), (1.16, 0.016), (1.17, 0.017), 
(1.18, 0.018), (1.19, 0.019), (1.20, 0.02), (1.21, 0.021), (1.22, 0.022), (1.23, 0.023),  
(1.24, 0.024), (1.25, 0.025), (1.26, 0.026), (1.27, 0.027), (1.28, 0.028), (1.29, 0.029), 
(1.30, 0.03) 
 
ROR_Slv_GDP_ch_Slv_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_Slv_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
 
ROR_Slv_migstk_Slv_employ_ch = GRAPH(per_capita_Slv_mig_stk) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3),  
(0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), (0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65),  
(0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), (0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 1.00) 
 
ROR_Svk_20_to_34_pop_Svk_mig_rate = 
GRAPH(Percent_Slovakia_20_to_34_Population) 
(0.00, -0.2), (0.1, -0.1), (0.2, 0.00), (0.3, 0.1), (0.4, 0.2), (0.5, 0.3), (0.6, 0.4), (0.7, 0.5), 
(0.8, 0.6), (0.9, 0.7), (1, 0.8) 
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ROR_Svk_GDP_ch_pct_Svk_coll_migrants_ch = GRAPH(ch_Svk_GDP) 
(0.7, 0.15), (0.71, 0.145), (0.72, 0.14), (0.73, 0.135), (0.74, 0.13), (0.75, 0.125),  
(0.76, 0.12), (0.77, 0.115), (0.78, 0.11), (0.79, 0.105), (0.8, 0.1), (0.81, 0.095),  
(0.82, 0.09), (0.83, 0.085), (0.84, 0.08), (0.85, 0.075), (0.86, 0.07), (0.87, 0.065),  
(0.88, 0.06), (0.89, 0.055), (0.9, 0.05), (0.91, 0.045), (0.92, 0.04), (0.93, 0.035),  
(0.94, 0.03), (0.95, 0.025), (0.96, 0.02), (0.97, 0.015), (0.98, 0.01), (0.99, 0.005),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, -0.005), (1.02, -0.01), (1.03, -0.015), (1.04, -0.02), (1.05, -0.025), 
(1.06, -0.03), (1.07, -0.035), (1.08, -0.04), (1.09, -0.045), (1.10, -0.05), (1.11, -0.055), 
(1.12, -0.06), (1.13, -0.065), (1.14, -0.07), (1.15, -0.075), (1.16, -0.08), (1.17, -0.085), 
(1.18, -0.09), (1.19, -0.095), (1.20, -0.1), (1.21, -0.105), (1.22, -0.11), (1.23, -0.115), 
(1.24, -0.12), (1.25, -0.125), (1.26, -0.13), (1.27, -0.135), (1.28, -0.14), (1.29, -0.145), 
(1.30, -0.15) 
 
ROR_Svk_GDP_ch_Svk_ed_level_ch = GRAPH(ch_Svk_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.03), (0.71, -0.029), (0.72, -0.028), (0.73, -0.027), (0.74, -0.026), (0.75, -0.025), 
(0.76, -0.024), (0.77, -0.023), (0.78, -0.022), (0.79, -0.021), (0.8, -0.02), (0.81, -0.019), 
(0.82, -0.018), (0.83, -0.017), (0.84, -0.016), (0.85, -0.015), (0.86, -0.014), (0.87, -0.013), 
(0.88, -0.012), (0.89, -0.011), (0.9, -0.01), (0.91, -0.009), (0.92, -0.008), (0.93, -0.007), 
(0.94, -0.006), (0.95, -0.005), (0.96, -0.004), (0.97, -0.003), (0.98, -0.002), (0.99, -0.001), 
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.001), (1.02, 0.002), (1.03, 0.003), (1.04, 0.004), (1.05, 0.005),  
(1.06, 0.006), (1.07, 0.007), (1.08, 0.008), (1.09, 0.009), (1.10, 0.01), (1.11, 0.011),  
(1.12, 0.012), (1.13, 0.013), (1.14, 0.014), (1.15, 0.015), (1.16, 0.016), (1.17, 0.017), 
(1.18, 0.018), (1.19, 0.019), (1.20, 0.02), (1.21, 0.021), (1.22, 0.022), (1.23, 0.023),  
(1.24, 0.024), (1.25, 0.025), (1.26, 0.026), (1.27, 0.027), (1.28, 0.028), (1.29, 0.029), 
(1.30, 0.03) 
 
ROR_Svk_GDP_ch_Svk_employ_ch = GRAPH(ch_Svk_GDP) 
(0.7, -0.3), (0.71, -0.29), (0.72, -0.28), (0.73, -0.27), (0.74, -0.26), (0.75, -0.25),  
(0.76, -0.24), (0.77, -0.23), (0.78, -0.22), (0.79, -0.21), (0.8, -0.2), (0.81, -0.19),  
(0.82, -0.18), (0.83, -0.17), (0.84, -0.16), (0.85, -0.15), (0.86, -0.14), (0.87, -0.13),  
(0.88, -0.12), (0.89, -0.11), (0.9, -0.1), (0.91, -0.09), (0.92, -0.08), (0.93, -0.07),  
(0.94, -0.06), (0.95, -0.05), (0.96, -0.04), (0.97, -0.03), (0.98, -0.02), (0.99, -0.01),  
(1.00, 0.00), (1.01, 0.01), (1.02, 0.02), (1.03, 0.03), (1.04, 0.04), (1.05, 0.05), (1.06, 0.06), 
(1.07, 0.07), (1.08, 0.08), (1.09, 0.09), (1.10, 0.1), (1.11, 0.11), (1.12, 0.12), (1.13, 0.13), 
(1.14, 0.14), (1.15, 0.15), (1.16, 0.16), (1.17, 0.17), (1.18, 0.18), (1.19, 0.19), (1.20, 0.2), 
(1.21, 0.21), (1.22, 0.22), (1.23, 0.23), (1.24, 0.24), (1.25, 0.25), (1.26, 0.26), (1.27, 0.27), 
(1.28, 0.28), (1.29, 0.29), (1.30, 0.3) 
 
ROR_Svk_migstk_Svk_employ_ch = GRAPH(per_capita_Svk_mig_stk) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.05, 0.05), (0.1, 0.1), (0.15, 0.15), (0.2, 0.2), (0.25, 0.25), (0.3, 0.3),  
(0.35, 0.35), (0.4, 0.4), (0.45, 0.45), (0.5, 0.5), (0.55, 0.55), (0.6, 0.6), (0.65, 0.65),  
(0.7, 0.7), (0.75, 0.75), (0.8, 0.8), (0.85, 0.85), (0.9, 0.9), (0.95, 0.95), (1.00, 1.00) 
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1
 One related notion that is not part of the discussion here is Easton’s (1965) form of systems analysis 
(Penn). It seems as though his ideas stem from the same intellectual ferment that created the systems 
modeling under examination here, but Easton adopts a structural-functional construction that what this 
research is interested in employing does not. 
 
2
 In his article celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of system dynamics’ genesis, Sterman (2007, 89) implies 
that this literature did not really flourish until Jay Forrester’s writings of the late 1950s. On the other hand, 
Sterman also admits that any dating of the birth of a new academic field is always imprecise and subject to 
error. 
 
3
 Since the terminology employed in systems modeling often becomes quite confusing and imprecise 
(Hoos, 124), it is critical to expend a moment explicitly defining some important terms used in this area. A 
model is an “idealized representation of reality describing some phenomenon whose behavior is to be 
highlighted” (Clark and Cole, 33). A system, however, is a “set of at least two interconnected elements 
such that each element is related to all other elements, either directly or indirectly” (Clark and Cole, 31). 
Please keep in mind that the generality of this definition implies that setting appropriate boundaries of the 
system of interest is an extremely important first step to any study that utilizes systems modeling (Sterman 
2000, 97-99). General systems theory is an “attempt to formulate and develop principles which hold for 
systems in general” (Clark and Cole, 32), while system dynamics is the field of study concerned with 
understanding how complex systems operate (Sterman 2000, 4-5). Systems analysis is also a commonly 
used term in this field, but because it can be confused with Easton’s work (see earlier endnote), this 
research avoids using this expression whenever possible. The definitions of systems thinking, systems 
theory and systems modeling that are given in the main body of the text are also operative throughout this 
research. 
 
4
 Another notion (Klir, 99) that appeared during the search for a general systems theory is fuzzy systems 
(Klir et. al.), the idea that systems can take values from sets that are not precisely specified. This concept is 
most closely associated with the work of Lotfi Zadeh (for citations, see Klir, 99).  
 
5
 For a view of how political science and general systems theory interact within the literature, please see 
Harrison and Singer (2006), which describes Singer’s (1971) concerted attempt to create a taxonomy of 
general systems theory for the discipline.  
 
6
 Although the commentary for this work (Meadows et. al. 1972, 185) insists that it is not a piece of 
futurology, that is how it was taken by a large portion of the book’s contemporary audience. Over the next 
few decades, as some of the forecasts of its models turned out to be inaccurate, critics of the study’s 
conclusions seized upon those “failures” to try to discredit the entire work and its methodology. 
Interestingly enough, the origins of some of the current partisan struggles over the regulation of greenhouse 
gas emissions (Meadows et. al. 1972, 71-73) could arguably be located in the fight over the conclusions of 
this book. For a more in-depth examination of the roles that systems modeling could play in the debates 
over global climate change, please see Sterman (2000, 241-249). 
 
7
 This statement is not meant to imply that systems modeling cannot be used in other contexts that might be 
applicable to the study of labor migration. For instance, Gonçalves et. al. (2005) utilize this tool to examine 
business supply-chain endogeneity in push-pull systems.  
 
8
 A possible example of this problem is Meadows et. al. (1982), which uses colored paper and non-
traditional poetry to capture the reader’s attention. Even one of Kenneth Boulding’s (1978) famous books 
has a rather non-social scientific ambiance to it. 
 
9
 Perhaps demonstrating that system dynamics scholars have a sense of humor about themselves, Meadows 
et. al. (1982, 31, 95) reprints two New Yorker cartoons concerning the controversy surrounding the Club of 
Rome models. 
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10
 One difficulty with citing Hoos’ book as a criticism of systems modeling per se is that she also attacks 
methods (like cost-benefit analysis and technology assessments) that lie outside of the subject under 
discussion here (Hoos, 136-146, 294-300). 
 
11
 A similar explication of systems thinking concepts can be located in Richmond (2004, 10-26).  
 
12
 Similarly, a person’s consciousness can only be perceived if the brain is working properly and is 
supported by the respiratory, circulatory, nervous, and other bodily systems; one cannot dissect even a 
living brain to find where consciousness resides. 
 
13
 As demonstrated by Kelley and Schmidt (1995, 546-547), “stock and flow” terminology is not utilized by 
systems modeling exclusively. However, these concepts are quite basic to how systems modelers think 
about the natural, social and economic worlds that they explore. 
 
14
 Sterman (2000, 202-205) explicates converters in his discussion of intermediate or auxiliary variables, 
which include not only constants or exogenous inputs to flow rates but also functions of stocks based on 
feedback loops or state-determined variables. For example, an increase in per capita food availability leads 
to short-term increases in a region’s net birth rate (flow) and population (stock). However, that increase in 
population (everything else equal) eventually reduces the available amount of food per capita, the net birth 
rate, and (in drastic, long-run cases) the population of that region. 
 
15
 Since stock levels may only change through their flow rates, converters may never directly influence 
stocks (Sterman 2000, 204-205). To return to the grammar analogy once more, converters are adverbs, not 
adjectives! 
 
16
 Similar descriptions of the model construction and testing process can be found in Richmond (2004, 109-
120) and Clark and Cole (1975, 56-69). 
 
17
 STELLA is proprietary software of Isee Systems Incorporated (www.iseesystems.com); version 9.1.2 is 
used for this analysis under perpetual license to the author. 
 
18
 For example, a naive observer of sports might assume that an all-star team would naturally be the best 
possible combination of players for that sport. However, the emergent properties of team dynamics and 
inter-player cooperation usually make that all-star squad a less effective collection of players than a less-
talented team that has been playing together for an entire season. 
 
19
 Of course, one could discover how a system reacts in the future by waiting until these events transpire, 
but that would obviate the need for creating projection models and take a long time to boot. 
 
20
 In fact, Richmond (2004, 109) begins his description of systems model writing with almost an entire 
page of quotes that express this sentiment.  
 
21
 Both sensitivity analysis and behavioral reproduction tests can have statistical footings (Sterman 2000, 
874-876, 884-887), but there is no equivalent to an F-test for entire systems models or a t-test for individual 
relationships within models. That kind of testing information would need to be derived from explicitly 
statistical models in the literature on the subject in question or from separate research conducted by the 
investigator. 
 
22
 For example, a systems model of production facilities at the DuPont Corporation convinced management 
personnel there that the financial benefits of short-term reductions in maintenance and repair costs had been 
creating vicious long-term cycles in which far more money was being lost to downtime than was being 
saved by the initial work reductions. The insights generated by the DuPont model have been successfully 
applied at other plants that were facing the same negative reinforcing cycle of low maintenance and high 
repair costs (Sterman 2000, 66-73). 
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23
 One exception to this statement is the incomplete model of the governance structure of the Oneida Nation 
described by Gharajedaghi (1999, 155-162). 
 
24
 As noted earlier, the political effects of temporary and permanent migration may be quite different. 
Politicians in receiver countries may be pressured to react to small levels of permanent migration that 
would be ignored if the worker migration were merely temporary because of the demographic changes that 
the former type of movement implies. Network theory also contends that having some volume of long-term 
migration from one country to another eases the way for later workers to make the same trip. That effect 
would obviously not exist, or at least be much weaker, if the migration were only short-term. However, 
large-scale deluges of even temporary migrants would still likely force receiving countries to limit their 
acceptance of future economic migrants in order to prevent serious disequilibria in their labor markets. This 
process appears to be behind the differing policy responses of the UK government to the 2004 and 2007 EU 
accession rounds (Drew and Sriskandarajah), especially since those reactions seem to have been based on 
the gross CEEC8 worker migration to the UK. 
 
25
 Although the political effect would be the same in both economies (i.e., tighter restrictions on worker 
mobility), the reasons for those limits might be quite different. In the receiver country, local workers would 
probably be alarmed about increased competition for their jobs and demand that their government protect 
them. In the sender country, fears of a “brain drain” (Frey; Straubhaar and Wolburg; Favell et. al., 11-13; 
Brücker and Damelang, 29-31) could lead the sender government to implement policies that would 
encourage their most skilled and educated workers to stay in the national economy. In addition, the sender 
government would likely place a higher premium on economic development measures that would hopefully 
slow the flow of their workers to other countries.  
 
26
 Those negative economic effects did not occur in the newly expanded EU, not even the UK or Poland, in 
the few years just after the 2004 accession round (European Commission 2006, 10), but they might happen 
in other cases. 
 
27
 The main problem with separately tracking gross worker inflows and outflows between the CEEC10 and 
Germany is that the GDP effect on migration assumption would be different here from that which has been 
presumed up to this point in the analysis. In the net migration statistical model, the guiding supposition is 
that the change in the GDP ratio between the two involved countries creates the push-pull effects necessary 
for net migration to occur. In a study of gross migration, the individual changes to national GDP in the CEE 
countries and Germany generate separate pressures for migrants to leave home and take up employment in 
the receiver country, respectively. That difference is a subtle but important theoretical distinction that 
would make comparing the statistical models’ outcomes and those of the gross systems models’ net 
migration results inappropriate. While it might be reasonable to compare two different systems models’ net 
migration figures (one with gross migration and another with net migration as its structural basis), when the 
goal is to contrast results derived from a statistical study of net migration with those taken from a systems 
model investigation of worker movement, the underlying assumptions must be as similar as possible. 
Another issue related to the decision to construct solely a net migration-based systems model in this 
analysis involves how the software for this technique is designed. In general, when one assumes that the 
causal mechanisms that create flows in and out of a stock are the same, which is the case here, one should 
represent those movements as biflows (two-directional flows that appear as double-headed flows in 
pictorial representations of systems models). If one contends that the inflow and outflow determinants are 
different, which would be true in a gross migration-based model, then they should be represented as 
separate one-directional uniflows (Richmond, 40). Although it is certainly possible to build models with 
separate uniflows in and out of the relevant stocks, these models tend to be more visually and 
mathematically complex and thus more difficult to understand and explain. For the sake of simplicity on 
more than one level, the adoptions of biflows and the assumption of identical causal flow mechanisms are 
made here.  
 
28
 The directions of these relationships are represented in the causal loop diagram by the positive and 
negative signs located at the relevant arrowheads, respectively. 
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29
 The one balancing (B1) and two reinforcing (R1 and R2) loops are the result of the inclusion of these new 
variables and feedback structures. Further loops involving these variables are possible if certain other 
relationships are postulated here, but there are very good reasons for omitting those interactions, as a later 
section demonstrates. As an aside, one simple way to tell the difference between a reinforcing and a 
balancing loop is to count the number of negative links in the loop (Sterman 2000, 144). An odd number of 
negative relationships indicates the presence of a balancing loop, while an even number of negative links 
(including zero) demonstrates that a reinforcing loop is under examination.  
 
30
 At this juncture, it should be observed that this portion of the discussion is constructed somewhat 
differently from the corresponding part of the statistical modeling chapter. In particular, there are no 
explicit hypothesis statements in this material. That omission is due to the fact that, as stated previously, 
systems modeling rarely allows standard hypothesis testing to be performed. These relationships are really 
more like geometric postulates than hypotheses in the social scientific sense of that term. When systems 
modelers speak of “dynamic hypotheses”, they are really referring more to how they initially expect an 
entire model to behave due to its endogenous features than how individual building blocks within that 
model will act (Sterman 2000, 86-87, 94-102). Using this definition as a reference point, one could state 
that the dynamic hypothesis of the systems model explicated here is that its endogenous and exogenous 
variables should impel relatively few future CEEC10 workers to take jobs in the EU15 countries. 
 
31
 In fact, similar statements could be made concerning most of the new relationships explicated below. 
 
32
 For all five of the relationships that employ change in GDP as their base, a zero-percent increase in GDP 
generates no change in the second variable. In other words, a positive change in GDP engenders a positive 
change in the companion variable, and a negative GDP change produces a negative shift in the second 
variable.  
 
33
 Most of these new relationships are programmed into STELLA using graphical functions, which are tools 
that can be utilized to visually or tabularly articulate the relationships between input and output variables 
(Richmond, 81-83, 90-94). Graphical functions operate on an explicit ceteris paribus principle where one 
must estimate them assuming that all other factors that may influence the relationship being programmed 
are held constant. They can be identified in stock and flow diagrams as converters with a small tilde near 
the bottom of the circle. In this analysis, they can also be recognized by the prefix “ROR” in their names 
(for instance, the two functions under discussion here are entitled “ROR <donor country> GDP ch <donor 
country> employ ch” and “ROR German GDP ch German employ ch”, respectively). The prefix stands for 
“rate of return”; while these functions are not literally rates of return in the economic sense, they could 
remind one of this idea enough that the prefix could become a handy tool for quickly comprehending the 
purpose of these converters. 
 
34
 It should be noted here that STELLA’s architecture necessitates a modification in how changes in the 
GDP ratio stocks are calculated in the systems models compared to how those operations are carried out in 
the statistical models. During the statistical models’ projection calculations, each year’s national GDP ratio 
variables are determined by dividing the previous year’s ratios by 1.02 (or whatever the convergence factor 
is in that run). However, it is impossible to compute these stocks’ values by this method in STELLA; 
instead, the following formula is used:  
GDP Ratiot = GDP Ratiot-1 - [(GDP convergence factor - 1) * GDP Ratiot-1].  
The results of these calculations grant figures that are very close, but not identical, to what one would 
acquire through the method that is utilized in the statistical models. Therefore, it is necessary to reperform 
the forecast for one country’s worker migration (Bulgaria) using the baseline assumptions described in the 
previous chapter to determine if this change has any noticeable effect on the final results of these 
operations. In the end, it so happens that this methodological shift has only a negligible impact on the 
relevant outcome (i.e., a reduction of about eight migrants out of the roughly 81,000 who are predicted to 
leave Bulgaria for Germany between 2004 and 2030; the exact numbers are available upon request).  
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35
 This contention assumes that the sender-country’s population does not increase faster than its migrant 
stock does. Given the population projections for the CEEC10 over the time period of these forecasts, this 
presumption seems quite reasonable. 
 
36
 The graphical function for this relationship covers all logical possibilities for the value of per capita 
migrant stock (zero to one; i.e., zero to one-hundred percent). Should this model ever generate numbers 
beyond these limits, one would immediately know that something had gone quite awry with it. A similar 
statement could be made for the other graphical functions, even the ones for which there is no natural limit 
on the span of values that their base variables could take. In particular, the graphical functions involving 
GDP are tabulated for figures ranging from a thirty percent annual decrease in GDP to a thirty percent 
annual increase in that statistic; the education-related graphical functions utilize numbers that span from 
zero to thirty average years of schooling; and the one graphical function related to sender-country young 
adult population covers the entire logical extent of that value (zero to one-hundred percent). For the first 
two of these graphical functions, even though theoretically there could be values that could appear outside 
those ranges, such values have never been detected in the real world (Richmond, 92). In fact, the limits set 
by these functions encompass even the extremes that have been recorded for annual GDP change and 
average education well.  
 
37
 The average number of years of education for workers in each sender country is calculated by 
multiplying the percentages from the appropriate table by the estimated average number of years that it 
takes to complete that level of education. “No schooling” is thus defined as zero years, “incomplete 
primary education” as four years, “primary” education as six years, “lower secondary” education as nine 
years, “upper secondary” education as twelve years, “post-secondary non-tertiary” education as fourteen 
years, and “tertiary” education as seventeen years of education. These average number of years values are 
based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED97) definitions listed in an appendix 
in UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2008, 292-293). In cases where national statistical agencies do not 
separate their categories in the way the ISCED97 classifications do, the relevant numbers are combined 
with the closest available category. (For instance, several countries do not provide percentages for “no 
schooling” and “incomplete primary” education, so those figures are reported as part of the “primary” 
education category as well.) These data are only available from the national education agencies on a 
sporadic basis; some of the CEE countries’ data are thus from before 2004 and some are from after that 
year. Further complicating matters, UNESCO apparently only started collecting and reporting these latest-
available data with the 2008 edition of this volume (perusals of earlier volumes for these data turn up 
nothing). Although it may seem that the use of this data source violates the principle that this analysis 
would only use information that EU15 decision-makers would have had on hand in 2004, average 
education levels change only very slowly (and likely would have been available to these decision-makers 
from other sources), and these are the best-available data with which to program the model. Finally, the 
Polish government report no relevant education data to UNESCO in any year, so the average value for the 
other nine CEE member states (11.781 years of education) is used to program this country’s stock initially.  
 
38
 This issue has even affected American politics over the past few decades, as Midwestern state politicians 
have tried using a variety of methods to convince young graduates of its universities to stay in their states 
rather than depart for other areas of the country for work (Mattoon, 2-3; Paulson).  
 
39
 A linear relationship between these two variables above and below twelve years of education is still 
assumed here, but the education variable has a positive impact on the migration rate above twelve years of 
education and a negative effect below that value. At exactly twelve years of education, this variable has no 
independent effect on the sender-country’s migration rate. 
 
40
 Due to technical constraints of the STELLA software program, this relationship is actually programmed 
in a graphical function in the model as a 0.01 increase per year of education. It is then divided by 10,000 
(1x104) in the migration rate equation itself to arrive at the 1x10-6 effect. 
 
41
 It should be kept in mind here that the addition of this variable to the model implies that the convergence 
factor is no longer exactly two percent per projection year (or whatever it is supposed to be for the model 
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run under examination). The convergence factor value is affected by this function so that it is now two 
percent per year plus or minus the education level-GDP function result. This modification is justifiable in 
that more-educated countries tend to grow faster than ones with reduced levels of education, and this 
alteration permits countries to vary on this measure in a uniformly determined fashion. However, when 
comparing the results of the systems models to those of the statistical models described earlier, one must be 
aware of the changes in how the convergence factor is calculated. 
 
42
 At least one study of post-accession CEE worker migration attempts to take age into account in its 
projection of future worker movements. Fertig and Schmidt (2000, 21-25, 35-37) find that the migration 
rate among younger CEEC4 (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia) workers is higher than that of the 
population as a whole and that overall forecast worker movement is likely to be reduced by the fact that 
CEE societies are aging just like their Western European counterparts are. However, this study is not 
entirely applicable to this investigation due to their definition of “younger workers” (people aged zero to 
thirty-nine) and their focus on fewer countries than the present analysis contains.  
 
43
 It should be noted here that the age structures of the CEEC10 are treated by this model as exogenous, and 
that a future revision of this systems model should attempt to endogenize this factor, if possible.  
 
44
 Due to a limitation in the graphical function code in STELLA, this relationship is actually entered as a 
0.01 increase in migration rate per one-percent enlargement in young worker proportion and is then divided 
by 10,000 in the migration rate equation itself. 
 
45
 Technically, utilizing the 2005 rather than the 2003 data is a violation of the working presumption that 
this analysis only employs information that would have been available to decision-makers in 2004. 
However, similar figures would have been obtainable by them from the then most-recent UN Demographic 
Yearbook, and these values do not change very rapidly over only a few years. More importantly, this data 
source is the same one that is used for some of the population change projections referenced in the 
statistical model section of this study, and it is reasonable to bend the data availability rule a little to ensure 
that the same data sources are used wherever practicable. The World Development Indicators source is also 
utilized to provide projections of how the CEEC10 young worker proportion is forecast to change over the 
next several decades, as is seen momentarily. 
 
46
 This calculation is made by determining the projected 2030 young worker population proportion, 
subtracting the 2005 proportion from it, and then dividing by twenty-five. Although it would be better if the 
2003 numbers could be utilized here, data availability and other considerations described in a previous 
endnote make that goal difficult to accomplish. Since the World Bank forecasts overall declines in this age 
group’s population proportion for all ten CEE countries, these figures are referred to in the model as 
decreases of the sender countries’ twenty to thirty-four year old population rather than changes in that 
percentage.  
 
47
 Again, the use of these data could be perceived as a violation of the principle that this study only utilizes 
information available at the time of CEEC8 accession. However, since the purpose of this exercise is purely 
descriptive (i.e., these figures are not employed to determine migration rates), this objection does not raise 
any fatal issues for this part of the analysis. In addition, estimates of the age structure of CEE worker flow 
could easily have been created using the migration theory and data available in 2004. However, one must 
be cautious about exploiting the Brücker and Damelang (2009, 32) figures because they are for the 
working-age population only rather than the population as a whole.  
 
48
 One intriguing feature of the combination of projected declining young-person population share and a 
forecast of the percentage of the migrant population that will fall into that group is that such forecasts 
follow the predictions of cumulative causation migration theory (Massey et. al., 45-50) almost 
inadvertently. This theory argues that migrant populations start to resemble the home population’s 
demographic profile (age, skill and education) more closely as time passes. Since an outsized part of the 
migrant population is composed of young people and that fraction decreases over time, according to these 
projections, these forecasts appear to follow this theory. 
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49
 An interesting side note can be derived from a quick visual inspection of these data. It is apparent from 
such an assessment that the countries that have the worst-performing economies in 2006 also seem to be the 
ones that have the greatest percentage of college-educated migrants move to the EU15 countries during that 
year. There are a few exceptions to that rule (the Czech Republic’s percentage is higher than one might 
expect, while Romania’s is lower), but the underlying pattern is fairly clear. 
 
50
 These 2006 data are also disputable because they could not have been known by EU15 policymakers at 
the time of CEEC8 accession in 2004, even if alternative data sources might have given them some 
estimates of that figure based on previous flows from non-CEE countries. Additionally, these data are for 
the CEEC10 citizens in the EU15 member states as a whole rather than just Germany. However, since these 
figures are being used for purely descriptive purposes, these data difficulties should not affect this study’s 
overall conclusions about the magnitude of future CEEC10 migration to Western Europe and what the 
general policy responses should be to this event. Even if they are only able to grant an approximate sense of 
how many college migrants there might be in this worker migration flow, it would be better than nothing 
(as long as the above caveats are kept in mind, of course). It might also be noted here that the authors 
(Brücker and Damelang, 25) equate high skill level with having a tertiary degree. Their classifications of 
“high skill level” are based on the same ISCED97 categories utilized in the operationalization of the 
education level variable in this study. 
 
51
 The model is currently constructed in STELLA so that one might be able to make that calculation 
legitimately should a future version of this model locate appropriate data to fill that stock. However, the 
numbers of sender-country college-educated worker migrants derived from these experiments are not 
reported here for obvious reasons.  
 
52
 Due to a limitation in the construction of the graphical function interface in STELLA, this relationship is 
actually programmed into the model as a 0.005 college-educated migrant increase per 0.01 increase in 
German GDP. The resulting number from the graphical function is then divided by ten in the change in 
college-educated migrant equations. A nearly identical statement can be made about the relationship 
between increases in sender-country GDP and the change in the college-educated migrant percentages.  
 
53
 An astute observer might be tempted at this point to inquire as to how any causal loop relationships can 
be modeled if that is the case. The rule of thumb in these instances is that the presence of a stock must 
intervene in the loop in order for it to be functional. Stocks are accumulations and thus have persistence 
(Richmond, 41-42); flows and converters are instantaneous and perishable indications of the value of 
certain phenomena. The presence of a stock in a balancing or reinforcing loop obviates the issue of having 
two or more flows or converters (two converters in the present case) simultaneously and instantaneously 
determining the value of each other. One way to keep the different implications of a stock and flow or 
converter in mind is to imagine that the system of interest seized up and everything in it stopped moving; 
the values of the flows (and many of the converters as well) would immediately fall to zero, while the 
stocks’ values would remain in place.  
 
54
 A further potential interaction involving net worker migrants that is excluded from this systems model is 
the one from this variable to sender-country employment. This relationship is not included here because 
sender-country employment is already indirectly influenced by net migrants through per capita migrant 
stock. 
 
55
 It should be noted here that the way in which these World Bank population projection data are utilized in 
the two “baseline” models is somewhat different. In the statistical model, each five-year (e.g., 2015-2020) 
average annual rate change in the sender-country’s population is utilized for that time period (with the 
2005-2010 shift employed for 2004 as well). However, due to programming restrictions in the systems 
modeling software that make it difficult for user-determined converter values to be adjusted during a run, 
the average value for all of those five-year average annual changes is employed instead. Because the 
projected population rate changes in the CEEC10 tend to become more negative over time and their 
populations are larger in the earlier years of the projections, taking the average value of these changes 
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results in lower overall population estimates (roughly one percent less in the systems model compared to 
the statistical model in 2030 when checked using data from Bulgaria; complete figures are available upon 
request). Although this difference is a small one, it must be kept in mind when comparing the results of the 
two population change forecasts. This methodological distinction also makes it necessary to run “no 
population change” models during the alternative modeling phase of the project to determine exactly how 
influential this difference is. Finally, this analysis remains aware of the other caveats of utilizing these 
World Bank population projection data described earlier.  
 
56
 The migration rate calculation equation (using the one for Bulgaria as an example) is as follows: 
(0.00595407870156363 * per_capita_Bulg_mig_stk) + (0.000100377268106815 * 
LOGN(Bulgaria_GDP_Ratio)) + (-0.000965588821154321 * LOGN(Bulgaria_Employment)) + 
(0.00100030142107599 * LOGN(Germany_Employment)) + (0.0000131907879702328 * 
free_migration_policy?) + (ROR_av_Bulg_ed_level_Bulg_mig_rate/10000) + 
(ROR_Bulg_20_to_34_pop_Bulg_mig_rate/10000). 
The coefficients for the first several equation elements are the long-term coefficients taken from the GLS 
statistical model that excludes the country-specific variables. Please see several previous endnotes and the 
text for descriptions of the other parts to this equation.  
 
57
 An interesting comment can be made after closely examining the first part of Figure 4.2 (the section 
labeled “Bulgarian Basics”). It might seem at first that there should be a thick flow arrow between the 
population and migrant stock reservoirs rather than a thin connector arrow between the population stock 
and yearly net migrants flow because Bulgarian citizens are moving out of the country to take up positions 
as worker migrants in Germany. However, that action would effectively remove these migrants from the 
population stock. Both the statistical (where appropriate) and systems models assume that the only way that 
a CEE country’s citizens can leave the population is through the population change variable (i.e., death or 
some other permanent removal from these figures). While it is true that some EU worker migrants 
eventually become citizens of the country where they take up jobs, relatively few of them take that action 
and only after a considerable delay after moving away from home. Having yearly flows of workers and 
assuming that they all become citizens of Germany upon moving, which is what having a flow arrow 
between the two reservoirs would imply, is therefore inappropriate. The few people who do change their 
citizenship can be accounted for in the systems model by using the population change converter (which 
takes projected future permanent emigration into account) that adds or subtracts individuals from the 
sender-country’s population. Effectively, this strategy avoids double-counting the citizens who 
permanently leave and prevents an overestimation of how many new citizens the host country could expect 
to receive from Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
58
 The user interface is also left out of the present figure. That action is taken because it consists only of 
tables and numeric displays designed to maximize available information to the author and could thus be 
considered rather user-unfriendly. If this model is ever to be utilized by the public in some future iteration, 
a new interface containing more user-friendly tools like knobs, sliders and graphs must be created 
(Richmond, 116-120; Sterman 2000, 898).  
 
59
 Please note that the data sources and variable specifications for the various parts of the baseline systems 
model are available in the relevant parts of Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
60
 This date is chosen as the initial year for this investigation because, as is discussed in the statistical 
modeling chapter, it is the first year that reliable unemployment data are available for all of the CEEC10 
new member states. 
 
61
 A potential version of this systems model may someday employ data from all twenty-two countries 
utilized in the statistical model as a check on this systems model for post-CEEC8 accession migration from 
these twenty-two sender countries, but that test remains to be performed. In other words, the question here 
would be how well the model continues to track migration in its post-2003 “future”. 
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62
 One unavoidable exception to this timing rule concerns the education level data. As indicated earlier, 
these data are only available sporadically from the various national statistical offices and have only been 
collected by UNESCO in recent years. These facts imply that the circa-2003 education level data must be 
employed in this systems model test despite the issues that this act introduces. Even though national 
average education levels change quite slowly, it would have been better to employ data closer to 1996, but 
that option is foreclosed here. On the other hand, because the proportion of college migrants from each 
sender country does not affect the migration rate calculations, any problems with having these data 
programmed into the model are completely avoided. 
 
63
 Again, every sender country is missing at least one entry in the twenty to thirty-four year old population 
time series between 1996 and 2003. Some countries are missing more points than others, but every new 
CEE member state has at least one gap. However, every country has an entry for 1996 (except Slovakia, 
where the 1999 entry must be used instead) and 2003 (except Slovakia and Latvia, where their 2002 data 
must be adopted), which allows this research to utilize the overall average change rather than the average of 
the annual changes for this converter.  
 
64
 It should be kept in mind here that the purpose of all of the models in this analysis is to predict worker 
migration from a group of countries to Germany (and eventually to the EU15), so the presence of 
discrepancies in individual country estimates does not pose an issue for these models. The statistical 
models use data from twenty-two countries to create estimators for migration predictions from ten countries 
(not just one), after all, and considerable portions of the systems models rely upon these statistical model 
results. 
 
65
 The percentage of (working-age) college migrants in the migration flow is reported rather than the 
number of college migrants due to the reasons described in a previous endnote. The percentage of younger 
workers in that flow is presented in the relevant table because of uncertainties surrounding the 
operationalization of the age disproportionate factor converter. (Additionally, an initial division by zero 
problem in the systems model requires one to calculate the overall percentages of young worker migrants 
separately.) Again, while it is helpful to be able to assert something in this analysis about the composition 
of the projected CEEC10-EU15 worker movement, one cannot overstate the case here by reporting exact 
numbers of these workers in the relevant migration stream.  
 
66
 More information and figures from these tests, along with the experiments concerning this model’s 
assumptions, are available upon request.  
 
67
 The systems modeling software can be programmed to forbid negative values in stocks and thus prevent 
ridiculous outcomes like a negative young worker population. However, it cannot be instructed to place a 
maximum limit on some stock, an observation that is important later in this discussion. It is also interesting 
that these problems arise in the two “descriptive” reservoirs rather than any of the substantive stocks, which 
is a theme that is evident in later discussion as well.  
 
68
 It should also be noted that the percent college migrants reservoirs become completely or almost 
completely depleted by the end of this experiment, but that consequence is not overly important given that 
this variable plays no role in calculating the migration rate for each sender country. 
 
69
 One might even be tempted to interpret that observation as an indication of just how difficult it is to 
impel many workers to leave home for job opportunities elsewhere.  
 
70
 Please keep in mind that the age disproportionate factor is not tested in this section because it does not 
have any impact on the migration rate calculations. (This assertion is also the reason why the percent 
college migrants stock is not discussed very much in this section of the chapter either.) However, if one 
were examining the actual numbers of young worker migrants here, the disproportion factor would need to 
be adjusted so as to not create figures that exceed the total number of migrants in the relevant flow. 
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71
 This statement can be made because most soldiers belong to this age group. In fact, the infamous 
demographic situation facing France after World War I (Zolberg 1983, 242) is the inspiration for this label. 
 
72
 Although the elderly and children are sometimes more susceptible to the effects of natural disasters, that 
difference is not great enough to treat those groups disparately in this variable test.  
 
73
 Please see an earlier endnote for details about what graphical functions are and how they operate. 
 
74
 It should be observed here that neither of the assumptions that deal with college migrants proportion 
change are discussed in this section because the college migrants stock does not affect the calculation of 
any sender-country’s migration rate. However, an interesting point regarding the sender-country GDP 
change-college migrants change assumption experiment is that the boost to this rate of change depletes 
every country’s college migrant population by the end of the test run. Obviously, this outcome is 
unrealistic; if this variable had an effect on the migration rate, one would even assert that this result might 
expose an unhealthy dependence on this assumption. However, it only reveals a limitation in this model 
that is taken up in somewhat more detail in the discussion portion of this chapter. Additionally, the age 
disproportionate converter test is not explored here because the underlying assumption in that relationship 
also has no impact on the migration rate calculation. 
 
75
 Those two earlier endnotes describe how each forecast year’s GDP ratio is calculated and how population 
changes are handled differently in the systems and statistical models. One of the overarching reasons why 
the no population change models are so prominently featured in the text of this chapter is to demonstrate 
that the observed migrant numbers decline is not only attributable to the alteration in the operationalization 
of population change, in fact. An interesting observation about the migration rates in the statistical and 
systems models is that six out of the ten CEEC10 migration rates in the former are increasing by the end of 
the run while that is true for only two (Bulgaria and Romania) of the ten countries in the latter.  
 
76
 The reinforcing loop R2 in the causal loop diagram graphically illustrates the implications of what is 
described in these past few sentences. 
 
77
 This paragraph treats “net migration rate” (Figure 4.2) and “number net CEEC worker migrants” (Figure 
4.1) as equivalent for the purposes of this exposition. Although this decision represents a bit of an elision 
and these are two distinct ideas that should normally be kept separate, it is convenient for the moment to 
treat them as interchangeable ideas here. 
 
78
 One might object here that the per capita migrant stock-donor employment change assumption test shows 
that a tenfold increase in the effect of the migrant stock variable on employment change generates a 
negative influence on the migration rate. However, this argument begins from the imposition of a negative 
alteration on per capita migrant stock, which should eventually create a positive change in migration rate. 
In other words, these two observations are consistent with one another, although one would need to spell 
them out explicitly to see why. On another note, more information on the annual migrant flow data of the 
baseline systems and population-adjusted statistical models is available upon request. 
 
79
 Theoretically, any of the stocks could decay to zero if the experimental conditions were set harshly 
enough, but none of the other stocks seem to suffer from this threat under reasonable testing conditions. 
Even the two that collapse to zero more than once only do so under fairly trying conditions. One could 
make a corresponding statement about the remainder of the stocks “exploding” to ridiculously high values, 
except for the German employment stock. That variable is a concern for the same reasons that drive the 
present discomfort about the sender-country employment stocks, even if during its own GDP change 
assumption test German employment does not approach the one-hundred percent limit particularly closely. 
 
80
 This technique would not be applicable to the young worker variable because it is only reduced by the 
projected average rate of this population segment’s decline (see Figure 4.2 for confirmation).  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
 At the end of any lengthy research project such as the present one, it is valuable to 
spend some time evaluating the contributions that it makes to the field and to reflect upon 
the future course that the analysis could take. Therefore, the goals of this chapter are to 
succinctly review the results of this work (including the policy implications of its 
outcomes), appreciate the places where the work could be strengthened, and forecast how 
it might develop in the future. This section of the project addresses these ambitions by 
first discussing the particular outcomes of the statistical and systems models in detail and 
linking them to the general migration literature. This discussion also endeavors to fit the 
results of the current study into the pattern created by previous examinations of CEEC10 
post-accession migration. A description of the policy repercussions that these results 
could have for the EU, especially for how the organization and its member states should 
deal with the issues generated by future accession rounds, follows this part of the 
discussion. Finally, a brief analysis of how the statistical and systems models’ outcomes 
may illuminate interesting political features of the EU, along with the future directions 
that this research might take in terms of subject matter, model construction, and 
methodology, are explicated in great detail. There remains much to be investigated about 
the politics of CEE migration within the EU, especially as the latter continues to accept 
new member states from this region.  
Results Overview:  
Since the results of the statistical model form much of the basis for the conclusions that 
this analysis can reach, it is appropriate to elucidate what is discovered using this model 
first. Perhaps the most critical observation one can make about these results is that a 
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variety of economic, demographic, political and policy influences all help to significantly 
determine the rate at which migrants arrive in Germany over the forty four-year period 
(1960-2003) of the statistical model’s analysis. As asserted by various versions of the 
neo-classical economic1 theory of migration, disparities in GDP between countries and 
the employment levels in both the host and receiver states have important effects on the 
net migration rate between them. Although the relationship between the lagged GDP ratio 
variable and migration rate is distorted by the presence of the country-specific dummies 
and several dichotomous policy variables in at least some versions of the statistical 
model, the model’s economic variables2 tend to be consistent and significant predictors of 
the migration rate over most of the statistical model’s variants. However, the same claim 
cannot be made for the migrant stock variable, which network theory3 states should be a 
significantly positive determinant of migration rate but Fertig (2001, 714) discovers is a 
significantly negative predictor of this quantity. The difficulty in the present analysis is 
that in many of the model’s variations per capita migrant stock also interacts with the 
country-specific variables. Initially, it appears as though Fertig’s assertion that the 
presence of same-country migrants in a receiver economy makes it more difficult4 for 
later such worker migrants to find jobs there. However, once the influence of the country-
specific dummies5 is removed, per capita migrant stock possesses network theory’s 
predicted positive relationship with migration rate (albeit insignificantly). In short, little 
can be conclusively stated about the influence of migrant stock on migration rate, even if 
the weight of the literature’s evidence behind network theory leads to the use of this 
positive coefficient in both sets of projections and the systems model’s construction.  
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 As stated earlier, certain political, policy and demographic variables also 
significantly determine migration rate magnitude. For instance, guest worker programs 
have a considerably positive impact on migration rates because the receiver governments 
are actively encouraging particular countries’ workers to labor in their economies. The 
reverse logic explains why migrant repatriation programs have a significantly negative 
effect on the dependent variable. The observed significance and direction of both of these 
relationships would have been expected according to neo-classical economic theories of 
migration that argue that the magnitude of certain obstacles to worker movement can be 
expressed in migration utility equations as part of a constant term. The relative level of 
national development, a measure of national economic, educational and medical care 
achievement (United Nations 2008, 355), also has a strongly negative impact on 
migration because the benefits to workers of moving in cases of similar development 
levels between economies are small. The existence of a language similarity between the 
sender and receiver country, another demographic characteristic, is a positive determinant 
of migration rate because that feature of the two relevant countries removes an important 
barrier to worker migrant employment. Civil wars also tend to drive migrants out of their 
home countries for receiver ones, even if the broader measure of political instability 
initially utilized in this study is not a good predictor of interstate migration. In fact, not 
every political and policy variable6 is a significant determinant of the dependent variable 
in the theoretically expected direction. The existence of an authoritarian government in a 
donor country, for instance, is not a statistically substantial reason for that state’s workers 
to move to a democratic one. The presence of a global city in a sender country, which 
according to world systems theory7 should attract internal migrants and thus depress 
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interstate migration, also has no significant impact on the migration rate (although that 
influence is in the theoretically expected direction). Most surprisingly for this analysis, 
however, is the observation that the free worker movement dummy is not a significant 
predictor of migration rate even though some major studies cited earlier (Boeri and 
Brücker 2000; Fertig) find that it is. Even though this variable is brought forward into the 
systems and statistical models’ projection phases for theoretical reasons, this lack of a 
significant relationship with the dependent variable has important implications for EU 
worker migration policymaking. 
 In order for this analysis to be able to proffer conclusions about this subject in 
regards to Central and Eastern Europe, it must also contain projections of the magnitude 
of this phenomenon over the course of the next several decades. It would prove to be very 
difficult to comment on or plan for this movement without some fairly reliable estimates 
of how many such workers (and their dependents) might be arriving in the EU15 member 
states during that time frame. In the end, the forecasts of CEEC10 worker migration 
based solely on the statistical model’s results estimate that a modest net percentage 
(1.388%) of those countries’ citizens will arrive in the EU15 economies by 2030. 
Although there is always considerable uncertainty involved in extrapolation or projection 
of any sort, one could take some comfort in the experiment that demonstrates that the 
statistical model’s estimators, when combined with the appropriate 2003 data, calculate a 
total migration result that is less than two percent higher than the actual number of 
CEEC10 net migrants who arrived in Germany that year. This model’s prediction of a 
moderate influx of CEEC10 workers is also robust under a number of different realistic 
alternative economic and policy scenarios. The projections from the systems models, 
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which are founded on the results of the statistical models, confirm that a modest number 
of post-accession CEEC10 workers should be expected to arrive in the EU15 member 
states given sensible expectations about the economic performance of both the host and 
donor countries. Even after the introduction of several new variables, relationships, and 
loops in the systems model compared to the statistical one, even fewer workers would be 
expected to arrive in the receiver economies. In fact, it seems as though the addition of 
these new entities may have improved the accuracy of the overall model; the 2003 point 
estimate is now under one percent away from the observed net CEEC10 migration total in 
Germany, and the seven-year (1997-2003) total is only two percent above what is 
recorded for that period. The calculation of the alternative assumptions projections for the 
systems model reinforces one’s beliefs about it, as the model grants reasonable 
projections under several realistic sets of economic and policy conditions. 
 The question then arises concerning what these projection results imply for the 
literature on post-accession CEE worker migration to the older EU states. A wide variety 
of projections of CEE worker movement appears in the policymaking and academic 
literature written in the decade or so before CEEC8 accession in 2004. These forecasts 
adopt numerous differing methodologies, evidence sources and time horizons, but a 
liberal synthesis of these studies could assert that the general consensus of this research is 
that in the long term around two to four percent of the CEEC10 population at the time of 
their accession would move to the older member states. Some investigations produce 
smaller percentages than this consensus and others (including many of those that received 
the most public attention) report larger percentages, of course, but the majority of the best 
projection estimates lie within the two to four percent range. The realization of such an 
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influx over that time span would present political and economic challenges for both the 
receiver and sender countries, but they would be manageable using normal state 
resources. The fact that the present research determines that a somewhat smaller number 
than this consensus figure of worker migrants could have been expected based on a 
different methodology and data set than the previous studies utilize suggests even more 
strongly than the consensus figure does that the higher numbers reported in this literature 
may be unrealistic and unlikely to be observed. It also implies that perhaps some of the 
higher consensus figures (Krieger, 16-18) could be improbable as well. Furthermore, the 
low figures generated by both the statistical and systems models in the present research 
intimate that CEEC10 net worker migration to the EU15 countries will not be as 
disruptive to either the sender or receiver economies as one might expect8 from the 
consensus figures. This observation provides at least some of the background for a few of 
the matters that are discussed in the next section. 
EU Policymaking Implications: 
One of the original loci of this research effort is to investigate and describe various public 
policies that the EU and its member states could adopt to affect the magnitude and 
characteristics of intra-EU worker migrants. Therefore, a detailed discussion of how the 
results of this study could inform the EU worker migration policymaking environment is 
appropriate for this concluding chapter. First, it is critical to note that the statistical model 
demonstrates that EU supranational and member-state politicians can devise policies9 that 
have the ability to affect the net migration flow for receiver countries despite intimations 
to the contrary (e.g., European Commission 2006, 14). Both guest-worker and migrant 
repatriation policies10 have significant effects on the net migration rate in the theoretically 
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expected directions in the modified basic model. However, neither of these policies is 
available to politicians when dealing with concerns surrounding intra-EU migration. 
Member-state government policies must treat all other EU countries’ citizens equally, and 
nothing can be done to hinder their acceptance of work in any other member state, so an 
intra-EU guest worker program or return migration project11 would fall afoul of these 
rules.  
 By contrast, the one policy option that is temporarily available to older member 
states that want to control worker migration from accession countries, delaying their 
application of the EU’s free migration policy to the new member-states’ workers, does 
not garner much support from the statistical model. Although the implementation of this 
policy does have a positive effect on the observed migration rate (and thus delaying that 
implementation would slow it down), this variable is not statistically significant in almost 
all versions of the model. Both the statistical and systems model-based forecasts also 
demonstrate that the timing of when (or whether) this policy is put into practice by the 
receiver country has a very limited impact on the overall number of projected worker 
migrants who change economies. Additionally, the strongly bounded post-accession 
evidence of greater economic growth by member states that allowed free migration from 
the first moments of CEEC8 accession would tend to mitigate against adopting a policy 
of free worker movement postponement. On the other hand, proponents of embracing that 
delay would point to the post-2004 “deflection effect” as evidence that older EU member 
states can control whether accession-country workers arrive in their economies and that 
perhaps they should take advantage of that derogation if their governments believe that 
their constituents’ jobs would be threatened by new member-state workers. However, 
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neither the EU nor its member states are likely to want to encourage the sort of “beggar-
thy-neighbor” attitude inherent in promoting such a policy option, especially when the 
organization was founded to promote comity between European nations. 
 The matter of what the EU and its member states might choose to do given the 
evidence in the present worker migration investigation as it continues to admit countries 
from poorer parts of Eastern Europe should now be addressed. Exploiting the policy 
learning process is a vital part of improving any institution’s efficacy, and the EU is no 
exception to that rule if it wants to accomplish its most important objectives. For many 
decades, one of those goals has been to foster a Europe-wide single market in labor as 
well as for the other factors of production, and many EU programs have been designed to 
develop and strengthen that market and the workers within it. However, the outcomes of 
this research seem to indicate that there will not be large post-accession movements of 
workers within the expanded EU even though there are (and will likely continue to be) 
considerable economic disparities between different EU regions. This observation implies 
that if the EU really wants to cultivate the intensification of a continent-wide labor 
market, it must continue to sponsor programs like EURES and LINGUA that assist in 
that growth. Even though they are designed for use in all EU countries, the expansion of 
programs like them in the new CEE member states would probably broaden and deepen 
the single labor market by improving the knowledge and skills of that region’s workers. 
Another step in that direction might be to eliminate or at least drastically curtail the 
application of the free movement derogation in future accession treaties. Virtually none 
of the statistical models developed in this study demonstrate that its presence is a 
significant predictor of migration rate, and the forecasts derived from the statistical and 
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systems models do not seem to indicate that the introduction and maintenance of this 
policy has much effect on the magnitude of projected CEE worker migration. Therefore, 
one could contend that the derogation should be eliminated given the hard feelings it 
engenders among the citizens and governments of new member states. As indicated 
earlier, the imposition of these limits on only the less-affluent candidate countries can 
make their workers feel like “second-class citizens” of the EU, an outcome that the EU as 
a whole should want to avoid. 
 However, these policy suggestions ignore some unyielding verities of EU state-
level politics of the past two decades. Despite the weight of the evidence presented in 
most of the forecasts (and now in a few years of experience) of CEE worker movement to 
the EU15 countries, their publics’ and thus politicians’ concerns about a flood of cheaper 
CEE labor arriving in those economies remains high. While federalists (Reid, 45-46) and 
other EU supporters may desire to create a continental free market for labor, it is far from 
clear that some member-state politicians and their publics share that objective. Concerns 
about native workers’ job and wage losses from the expansion of competition represented 
by CEE accession might trump that goal even if it were a common ambition of all 
members of these groups. Any sincere suggestion about making labor competition more 
intense or accelerating its onset would likely be met with serious political resistance from 
some quarters. The issue can then be raised about what the EU and its member-state 
politicians could do to achieve this goal even in the face of such opposition12.  
 One potential lower-resistance path to this objective might be to continue the 
policy of allowing countries to adopt the derogation on free worker mobility in future 
accession rounds despite the limited evidence in support of its efficacy. That step could 
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permit member-state politicians to assert to their voters that they have done something 
concrete to protect their country’s workers from “foreign” competition and give those 
workers a comforting sense that their jobs have been temporarily protected. While on the 
surface this strategy could seem like a good application of political psychology, on 
another level it seems disingenuous to sell a policy whose benefits are scanty at best to 
the public as a solid solution to the problem of increased post-enlargement labor 
competition. An improved solution to this conundrum might be for EU policymakers and 
member-state politicians to present an evidence-based case for the single labor market 
and plan to compensate and retrain older EU member-state workers who might be 
harmed by increased competition from accession-country workers. Even though most 
forecasts, including the present one, indicate that relatively few EU15 workers should 
worry about being harmed by EU expansion, some of them will be and there should be 
some policies in place to assist them. These programs to aid vulnerable EU15 workers 
would not even need to be anything new13 since the EU’s cohesion policy programs 
(Dinan 2005, 373-385) have been assisting workers in similar straits for many years. 
While this plan might be criticized using the argument that information access is not 
really the problem14 here, it has the advantage of proposing practical strategies to address 
very real issues involved with European economic integration.  
Broader EU Political Implications: 
One could certainly contend that the results of this analysis could be mined for inferences 
that go beyond the strictly policymaking realm15 of EU politics. Perhaps the most 
interesting such inference is what this research can illuminate about the dynamics of two-
level games (Putnam 1988, 433-435) within the various EU political arenas. This analogy 
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is designed to help political scientists examine the political opportunities and constraints 
that national politicians encounter when engaging in international relations. More 
specifically, state-level politicians in democratic societies must simultaneously satisfy 
both domestic interest groups and voting blocs that control their chances of political 
survival and the other heads of state and government with whom they are bargaining 
during interstate negotiations. At times, the former may make it impossible for state 
politicians to complete international deals that would be advantageous for them, and the 
reverse may also be true occasionally. Conversely, fortuitous arrangements of domestic 
forces (and international relationships) may allow agreements to be finalized that would 
have been impossible under other circumstances. Two-level games are apparently quite 
common in the EU (Moravcsik, 3-7, as cited in Cini, 109-112); in fact, a clear-cut case of 
one can be spotted in the behavior of German Chancellor Angela Merkel during the 
Greek bailout crisis of 2010 (Kulish). At the same time that Chancellor Merkel felt 
extreme pressure from her Eurozone partners to not allow the Greek government’s 
finances to wreck the common currency and thus to lead the charge for a bailout, she was 
tightly constrained by domestic electoral concerns and massive German popular 
disapproval for rescuing the “profligate” Greeks. These countervailing demands led, in 
the eyes of some observers, to dawdling on Merkel’s part and an escalation of the size of 
the Greek debt crisis. 
 It could be argued that another two-level game exists in the way that the EU15 
member-state politicians handled the free worker movement derogation for the CEEC10 
(and for earlier accession countries as well). At the European level, these heads of 
government were supposedly committed by the Treaty of Rome to the ideal of 
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demolishing any remaining barriers to the free movement of all factors of production 
between that document’s signatories. These politicians may even have been personally 
convinced of the rectitude of this policy by the economic or pacificatory justifications for 
it without the outside compulsion wrought by their treaty obligations. Additionally, 
bureaucrats within the European Commission, the body that negotiates accession treaties 
on behalf of the EU, were also strongly committed to this principle. However, virtually 
all of the domestic policymakers (especially the leaders of EU15 countries such as 
France, Germany and Austria) faced considerable to massive resistance to the notion of 
free labor mobility from the CEEC10 in the years immediately preceding their accession. 
It would have been politically difficult, or likely impossible, for these politicians to sell 
the CEEC10 accession treaties to their home legislatures and publics without the free 
labor derogation. These heads of government would have probably faced substantial 
retribution at the ballot box16 during their next elections without its inclusion. In fact, it 
likely would have done these decision-makers little good, in defense of their electoral 
chances, to cite the results of the Commission’s studies of CEEC10 migration potential 
(or that of the present research, if they had been available) that promised that a modest 
number of these countries’ workers would move to the EU15 economies. The constraints 
created by these domestic pressures therefore impelled the EU15 governments to insist 
upon the free worker movement delay, despite the costs associated with this policy.  
 The detection of this two-level game holds at least two possible implications for 
the future of the European Union and the research agenda present in this endeavor. First, 
this perspective helps one to resolve a central puzzle for this analysis, the apparent 
divergence between what EU15 politicians stated publicly about the importance of 
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opening markets to the CEEC10 and their actions when it came to labor mobility. One 
might be tempted to ascribe insincere motives to these politicians, but that is not really 
what engendered this behavior. Rather, the different audiences that these politicians were 
forced to address, along with the conflicting incentives that they provided to these 
decision-makers, shaped how these politicians behaved when the worker mobility 
derogation was being negotiated. In short, this situation is not one of contradiction 
between soaring rhetoric17 and grotty reality; in fact, it is actually one of healthy 
compromise and the “art of the possible” that is a normal part18 of democratic politics.  
 Second, the perception of this two-level game in the politics of intra-EU labor 
migration may have implications for the future of the European Union19. A federalist may 
take a pessimistic view of the presence of a two-level game in this policy area because it 
implies that state-level concerns may always outweigh supranational ones for EU 
member-state politicians. It also indicates that these constraints may halt pro-single 
market policies from being enacted or fully implemented, even when they would be to 
the advantage of both the member states and the EU. A person who had this perspective 
might continue by asserting that if the German role in the 2010 Greek bailout is the 
expected outcome of these two-level games, then the EU may face a bleak future indeed 
(and not just in the area of free labor migration).  However, a different observer of EU 
politics could examine this situation and conclude that the prospects of the organization 
are actually fairly good. If two-level games are as ubiquitous and inevitable as they seem 
to be and the EU has managed thus far to muddle through to its present status as a 
guarantor of peace and economic prosperity throughout Europe, then perhaps it will 
continue to resolve these matters in ways that will benefit its member-state citizens. 
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Future Research Directions and Conclusion: 
Despite the fact that many features of the politics and magnitudes of past, present and 
future CEEC10-EU15 migration are elucidated fairly thoroughly in this analysis, there 
remains much to be done in this area and with these models. For instance, even though its 
results are reasonably good when calculating 2003 migration, the baseline statistical 
model20 could probably be improved by expanding the number of countries in the data 
set. At least one country with a full collection of net migration data to Germany from 
1960 to 2003 is left out of the set because its migration numbers are so miniscule 
(Iceland), and several others are omitted because they have almost, but not quite full, 
time series available (e.g., South Korea, Mexico). An interesting experiment with this 
data set21 would be to see how, if at all significantly, the results of the statistical model 
would be altered by the inclusion of these initially excluded economies. Due to the 
balanced panel requirement of the statistical technique utilized in this analysis (Baltagi 
2009, 99, 187), the addition of the second type of country would need to be accompanied 
by an alteration of the time frame under investigation. Aside from changing the list of 
sender countries in the data series and exploring whether the present outcomes are overly 
dependent on the choice of donors, this alteration could be justified by investigating the 
interpolation assumption that is necessary to have migrant stock data available back to 
1961. In other words, eliminating the 1961 to 1966 migrant stock data interpolation might 
have an impact on the results, and it would be reasonable to investigate that possibility 
with and without an expansion of the available sender countries. Another potential way of 
modifying the time period of this research would be to drop the pretense adopted in this 
study of investigating the net worker migration magnitude that could have been expected 
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at the time of CEEC8 accession and examining what current politicians could expect 
from this part of the EU from now until 2030. That action22 would allow data from a few 
more years to be available to this investigation and perhaps make this study of more 
interest to a wider audience. It may also permit this project to take into account the post-
accession “deflection effects” that altered the CEEC10-EU15 migration patterns, 
especially since Eurostat has been collecting internal worker migrant distribution 
information for the past several years (Herm, Vasileva). 
 Adding data to the statistical model to update it to the present day would be a 
necessary step for the next (and possibly the most important) potential extension of this 
research. Now that CEEC10 enlargement is an accomplished reality, the EU and its 
member-state policymakers are interested in understanding the implications of the next 
round of CEE accessions that are tentatively scheduled to occur during the 2010s. The 
three official CEE candidate countries (Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey), as well as most 
of the potential member states23 that have filed accession applications but have not yet 
been accepted as official candidates, are considerably poorer than the member states that 
joined in 2004 and 2007. If EU15 public concerns about Poland and Romania joining the 
organization were elevated given these new member-states’ economic circumstances, 
those anxieties are almost certain to be even higher over the potential membership of the 
applicant countries, especially Turkey given its population size and relative 
impoverishment. Any systematic study that can provide an estimation of the worker 
migration magnitude that the EU15 countries might experience from expanded CEE 
membership would likely be appreciated in both the academic and policymaking 
communities. In fact, this extension could be taken even further by applying the 
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forecasting model to CEE countries that have not applied for EU membership yet but 
might do so in the future (e.g., Ukraine, Belarus). Even though their EU membership 
might be a distant prospect given their current economic and political troubles, EU 
policymakers and publics are probably concerned about the level of migration that they 
might expect from these countries and want to know more about this prospect.  
 Two comparatively minor potential future alterations to the statistical model 
remain to be elucidated in this section. The first change concerns the use of Germany as 
the host country for worker migrants and the base from which movement to the entire EU 
is calculated. As stated in the explication of the statistical model, Germany is utilized as 
the migration target country in almost all studies of post-accession migration potential 
because the country’s data are the most comprehensive. However, other member states 
and the EU itself have been improving their migration statistics in recent years, so it 
might be worthwhile in future iterations of this research agenda to revisit the question of 
whether German data24 must be used in constructing these models. That development 
might allow other member states or the EU as a whole to act as the base country, which 
may alter the worker migration magnitudes forecast by such models, especially when 
combined with updated information on migrant geographical distribution. Another 
possibly useful shift of the model’s methodology would be to permit the two-percent 
economic convergence assumption to vary by sender country. A step is this direction is 
taken by the systems model as it allows the education level graphical function to affect 
this value, of course, but one could argue that other factors should impact this figure as 
well. These additional variables (e.g., level of development, inertia) could be accounted 
for by using the average value of each donor-country’s convergence rate over a certain 
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number of years rather than assigning a blanket two-percent projected rate to each new 
member state. Although this act might make the model’s construction a bit more 
complex, it could be worthwhile in that it may provide a somewhat more realistic view of 
how economic convergence between the host and sender countries occurs. 
Systems Model Changes--Since systems models have a different construction from 
statistical models, there are certain features that can be added to or changed in the former 
that cannot be altered in the latter. As implied in the conclusion of the systems modeling 
chapter, the present baseline model is of relatively minimal complexity because this 
research is trying to maximize its leverage (King et. al., 29-31) over the CEEC10-EU15 
migration system. Parsimony is not an overarching goal here, but in general simpler 
models with fewer variables that explain more of the features of any particular system are 
better than complicated models with many variables that explain relatively little about the 
system in question. However, the goal of expanding leverage as far as possible cannot be 
allowed to block progress in understanding more features of the relevant migration 
system. Therefore, this discussion explicates the most to least-extensive modifications to 
the baseline systems model that are under consideration for future iterations of this 
research. The most considerable potential change is one that has already been discussed: 
creating a systems model that tracks gross rather than25 net migration. As indicated 
earlier, the dynamics, politics and policymaking of gross migration could be quite 
different from that of net migration because small-scale net migration could be the result 
of either large or small two-way gross migration. These two possibilities could have quite 
different effects on both the receiver and sender-country’s economic and political 
systems. Thus, the CEEC10-EU15 gross migration system should be examined carefully 
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in a future analysis to determine which reason is present for the relatively small net 
migration observed in this study. Gross migration data to and from Germany are available 
from the Statistisches Bundesamt, so all that would be required here is the time and 
thought necessary to construct new models from first principles. 
 The next hypothetical addition to the baseline systems model involves explicitly 
endogenizing two features that are currently treated as exogenous. In other words, the 
modified systems model would calculate certain values that are basically treated as 
givens in the original version of the systems model. Specifically, the sender-country age26 
and educational advancement structures would be included explicitly in the updated 
systems model as “aging chains” (Sterman 2000, 469-472). A purpose of these chains is 
to grant the modeler a better understanding of the dynamics of the system under study if 
considerable delays and leaks are expected within its growth structures. Their inclusion 
here should permit the calculation of the average values of these stocks within the model 
and allow for the investigation of how different policies might affect these worker 
migration determinants. For instance, chains for skills development, educational 
acquisition and aging are employed in the Indiana workforce analysis cited earlier 
(Bickers); that action allows users of this model an opportunity to create different public 
spending mixes that could maximize employment opportunities for Indiana workers or 
accomplish other important policy goals. They are not utilized in this version of the 
CEEC10-EU15 worker migration systems model because their implementation can be 
problematic due to their complexity, but a future iteration of this model may be able to 
take advantage of the opportunities these chains provide. Another possible expansion of 
this model would involve dividing the implicit receiver-country labor market into high 
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and low-skill sectors and then examining the kinds of workers who are attracted to that 
economy. In other words, one could investigate how high the skill and education levels of 
the CEEC10 workers who arrive in the host country are and whether that receiver country 
can enact policies that appeal to certain kinds of worker migrants over others. Once 
again, the inspiration for this change is the Indiana workforce model that is 
predominantly concerned with what businesses and politicians can do to attract and keep 
high-skilled workers and jobs in that state. This notion could have been added to the 
present version of the systems model, but is not included due to a decision to keep the 
model as simple as possible. However, a future rendering of this model could certainly 
include it if this research evolves sufficiently in that direction. 
 An elucidation of three less-complicated modifications to the systems model 
remains to be completed to finish this section of the conclusion. The first of these 
revisions would be to include gender in the model, either as a descriptive characteristic of 
the worker migrant population (like the college migrants percentage stock is) or as part of 
the migration rate calculation. It is widely acknowledged that economic migration, 
especially in the earlier periods of a migration system’s creation, tends to be a young 
male’s pursuit (Hatton and Williamson, 10-11; Massey et. al. 1998, 47-49), and there is at 
least some early evidence from the post-accession experiences of the UK as a host 
country that this statement is holding true in the CEEC10-EU15 migration system 
(Pollard et. al., 25). However, as the migration system and the networks that sustain it 
mature, the migration flow’s composition becomes more representative of the donor 
economy as a whole (Massey et. al. 1998, 50). More research is necessary to determine 
whether this variable should be included in the systems model and the way in which it 
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should be incorporated (if at all), but once this inquiry is completed gender may prove to 
be a useful addition to this investigation. One particular change in methodological 
assumption that could be made here would be to create a revised graphical function 
between migrant stock and the migration rate. Instead of having a perfectly linear positive 
relationship involving these two variables (i.e., as the migrant stock grows, so does the 
migration rate using the coefficient derived from the statistical model), one could assert 
that the networking effects of the migrant stock do not operate until after a certain 
percentage threshold is surpassed. In other words, the network must reach a “critical 
mass” before it can provide support services to later migrants in sufficient amounts to 
affect the migration rate; just having a few fellow citizens (likely with scanty resources of 
their own) in the host country would not be enough to generate those network effects. An 
alternative formulation of this same idea might assert that this influence would be smaller 
at lower migrant stock levels but would eventually reach its full force after some 
threshold is reached. Considerable examination of these formulations remains to be 
undertaken if either is to be incorporated into the model, but at first glance this idea 
appears to have at least some merit. The final model revision that should be mentioned in 
this section consists of the set of variable, relationship, and operationalization changes 
that may be necessary to prevent particular stocks in model (e.g., sender and receiver-
country employment) from taking on impossible values. Although many of the variants 
of these alterations are discussed in detail at the end of the systems modeling chapter, 
they deserve to be referenced here as well because they represent relatively 
uncomplicated potential future changes to the baseline systems model. 
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New Policy Studies and Overall Conclusion--Generating migration forecasts of CEEC10 
workers to the EU15 countries so the latter member-states’ decision-makers can create 
appropriate admissions policies is only the first potential application for this research’s 
outcomes. Perhaps the clearest potential use of it would be to expand its scope so that it 
can judiciously comment on the question of what governments can do to encourage the 
“right” migrants to move to their economies. In other words, the puzzle here is what 
policies politicians can put in place to attract the workers that their economies need to 
prosper in the future. For the most part, EU15 economies require highly skilled and 
educated worker migrants27 to fill jobs in advanced service-oriented positions that cannot 
be filled by domestic workers. This problem is likely to become more acute over time as 
the populations of the EU15 countries continue to age and shrink over the next several 
decades (Coleman 2002, 49-57) even though continued GDP growth is necessary to 
support that more-elderly population. The Indiana workforce development systems model 
described previously attempts to address that question through different mixtures of 
economic development, traditional education, and adult skills-acquisition funding. It 
might be possible to further develop the systems and statistical models explicated in this 
analysis to address this policy question, but quite a bit more work on them would be 
necessary so that these models could take on that task. This analysis demonstrates that 
politicians can, under certain circumstances, affect the magnitude of the worker migration 
that their countries experience; it would be interesting to resolve whether they can impact 
their flows’ skills composition as well. 
 Another readily apparent extension of the policy research in this analysis would 
be to expand the ambit of the brief welfare tourism case study explicated in the 
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discussion portion of the statistical modeling chapter. This investigation focuses on the 
UK-Poland worker migration relationship and makes a few comments about the absence 
of evidence for social tourism in the UK and elsewhere in the EU15 countries, but does 
not assert much more than that on this topic. Expanding the number of countries in the 
case study would be a relatively straightforward way to augment its coverage, as would a 
more in-depth qualitative examination of the CEEC10 worker migrants themselves and 
their reasons for moving to the EU15 economies. Given the concern that seems to exist in 
Europe about welfare tourism, there is certainly enough interest to warrant an article-
length treatment on it in the future. A final policymaking issue that could be addressed by 
a future version of this research refers back to an implication that is suggested in the 
introductory chapter of this work. Although it appears that most mainstream European 
politicians accept the reality of European free worker movement, a considerable portion 
of their constituents do not and are trying to take a political stand against this issue. The 
concern that follows this observation is what these mainstream politicians should do to 
persuade their reluctant voters to acknowledge this new state of affairs and perhaps 
accept it substantively and psychologically. One answer to this query might be that they 
should do nothing but accept the voters’ disquiet and repeal the laws and treaty 
provisions28 that guarantee free worker movement, but that option does not seem realistic 
and would probably do more long-term harm than good to their constituents. Although 
this conclusion may derive from the elite-mass opinion divide that separates these sides 
on issues of European integration and may be another manifestation of the democratic 
deficit issue, it does seem that European policymakers at the member-state and EU levels 
must do something to address this problem. Increased spending on cohesion and regional 
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policy, including programs that prepare all EU workers to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by the expanded single market, might help, as could amplified 
hortatory appeals on the part of EU politicians in favor of free worker migration. 
However, a detailed examination of how well these programs and appeals have worked in 
the past would be necessary before any such recommendation could be made, thus 
providing at least two more interesting courses into which this analysis could branch. 
 In conclusion, a considerable amount of work remains to be done on this research 
agenda and it could move in several exciting directions depending upon the outcomes of 
forthcoming investigations in this area. This analysis makes substantial strides in the 
correct direction, but once again there is much more to accomplish on this subject. 
However, one issue described in the introductory chapter remains to be elucidated here: 
the question of whether this research does anything to make the politics of worker 
migration a more conventional topic in the discipline. The answer to this question should 
likely be a qualified yes; while this analysis determines that certain public policies can 
impact the magnitude of intra-EU worker migration, it does not contain many suggestions 
for what future EU or member-state policymakers could do to affect the size or 
compositions of these flows. Again, some of the most effective policy tools for 
accomplishing this goal will not be available to EU decision-makers in the future, and it 
is unclear what should replace them. Future research may be able to shed some light on 
this question, and hopefully many more investigators will soon be interested in 
addressing this matter. 
 290
Table 5.1: Comparative Information on Various CEEC10 Migration Forecasts 
Author(s) Target Area Estimated Migration Flow 
Ortsey (statistical model) EU15 1.4 percent in 2004-2030 
Ortsey (systems model) EU15 1.3 percent in 2004-2030 
Alvarez-Plata et. al. (2003) EU15 3.6 percent in 2004-2030 
Boeri and Brücker (2000) EU15 4 percent in 2002-2030 
Brücker (2001) Germany 2-3 percent in 2002-2030 
Fertig (2001) Germany ≈1 percent over 20 years 
Hille and Straubhaar (2001) EU15 0.2-0.4 percent per year 
Orłowski et. al. (2001) Austria  187 to 302 thousand over 10-12 years 
Zaiceva (2006) EU15 3-5 percent over 10 years 
 
Note: unlike Table 2.1, this graphic only includes studies where the CEEC10 comprise 
the sender countries and (with the exception of the Zaiceva piece) the research in 
question uses a strictly econometric approach. This tactic is utilized in order to make the 
results of these investigations as comparable as possible; additionally, the baseline 
model’s results for each author’s forecasts is listed here rather than any of their 
alternative projections for the same reason. Please see Table 2.1 for a more complete list 
of past studies of CEEC10 labor migration. 
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1
 Since macro-level neo-classical economic models of migration often contemplate labor shortages in 
receiver countries as pull factors for worker movement, one might hope to test the relevant hypothesis 
related to this concept and theory using the main statistical model described in Chapter 3. However, as can 
be seen there, the absorption capacity variables are so collinear with the employment variables that they 
camouflage the expected effects between the latter variables and change in net migration. Perhaps a revised 
version of this research might be able to construct a better operationalization for absorption capacity (labor 
shortages) that can avoid this difficulty. 
 
2
 Unfortunately, no variables associated with the new economics of migration theory could be incorporated 
into the statistical or systems models as that action would likely require their complete restructuring to 
accommodate the assumptions of this theory. However, a future iteration of the systems model using the 
family unit as its base might be assembled to explore the utility of this theoretical framework. 
 
3
 Although the institutional and cumulative causation migration theories are briefly summarized by this 
analysis’ literature review, neither one of these notions provides the theoretical basis for any of the 
variables included in the models. Still, it should be noted that cumulative causation theory implicitly 
contains some positive feedback loops (e.g., the arrival of skilled migrants in a receiver area encourages 
later such migrants to settle in that same region) that could be investigated using systems modeling. 
 
4
 This reversal of network theory that one might be willing to term the “saturation hypothesis” is deserving 
of further study because it seems to refute the reasonable contention of network theory that social capital 
and intra-migrant group relationships should make it easier for same-group migrants to make the transition 
to the receiver economies. On the other hand, common sense would dictate that an influx of too many 
worker migrants to an area with too few jobs would make it more difficult for later arrivals to find work. 
Hopefully, a modified rendering of the absorption capacity variable or something quite similar to it would 
allow a future analysis to clarify this matter more conclusively. 
 
5
 By contrast, the political and policy dichotomous variables do not seem to interact very much with the 
country-specific ones as the former tend to keep their significance and relationship direction with the 
dependent variable regardless of whether the latter are included in the model (numbers omitted, but 
available upon request).  
 
6
 In addition to these subsequent policy and political variables, the two gravity model-inspired regressors 
(distance and border) are also insignificant predictors of migration rate. It should also be noted that 
although this model does not test for the potential of democratic donor-country migrants moving to 
authoritarian receiver countries, one would expect that relationship to be negative or non-existent.  
 
7
 Another theory described in the literature review that does not receive any attention from the current 
research’s models is dual labor market theory. Since dual labor market theory is concerned with the types 
of jobs that migrants take in their receiver economies, one implication of any discussion of splitting the 
relevant portions of a revised systems model to explicitly deal with the skills and education required for 
certain positions is that dual labor market theory might be incorporated into that analysis. This argument 
should be kept in mind while perusing the systems model future improvements section of this chapter. 
 
8
 At the end of this chapter, Table 5.1 lists several important previous forecasts of CEEC10 net migration 
from the literature review along with the outcomes derived from this analysis in order to locate the latter in 
the pattern created by previous investigations of this question. 
 
9
 One topic that sometimes arises when discussing policymaking, especially in a situation such as the one 
surrounding CEEC10 migration potential forecasts where it appears that politicians systematically 
discounted the guidance that their advisors provided them, involves the use of expert analysis by 
politicians. This issue is especially contentious when these instances involve the utilization of natural 
science research, such as in the disagreements surrounding climate change policy, the epidemiological links 
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between environmental chemical exposure and cancer, the dangers of secondhand smoke, and the safety of 
dietary supplements. Unfortunately, there is at least some evidence (Mooney and Kirshenbaum, 57-60) that 
suggests that policymakers are liable in these situations to “cherry-pick” the information that supports their 
predetermined conclusions rather than weigh all of the best-available data and make decisions based on the 
relevant facts. If this contention is correct when it comes to evidence derived from the natural sciences, it is 
unlikely to be any different when it comes to social scientific evidence. However, both social and natural 
scientists have the same professional and ethical responsibility to pursue factual knowledge using the best 
methodologies and practices that they know regardless of how (if at all) it might be used by politicians and 
other policymakers. As this author was told in his first semester of studying public policy, all you can do as 
an analyst is the best job possible; what happens to your report, along with its data and conclusions, after it 
is released to the client is out of your hands. 
 
10
 It should probably be mentioned at this point that, according to the statistical model, the existence of an 
intrastate war can also significantly impel more migrants from one place to another. However, it is 
extremely unlikely that a country would start an armed conflict to drive out migrants or attract them to the 
relevant host country. 
 
11
 This argument is almost certainly true of the program that was recently under consideration by the 
Spanish government to encourage Romanian worker migrants to return home. This program would have 
been modeled after the one they utilized to persuade Latin American immigrants to leave Spain during the 
recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s (Lungescu 2009; Donadio and Schwartz). As part of the 
literature review indicates, there is also some preliminary evidence that the overall migration of CEEC10 
workers to the EU15 countries decelerated considerably due to these global economic troubles (BBC News 
2009a; Donadio and Schwartz).  
 
12
 A Eurosceptic might assert that the EU should abandon its plans to bring more countries into the 
organization and create a single market for labor if such heavy resistance to these ideas exists. The 
intention of the EU’s leaders to continue these projects would likely be taken by that Eurosceptic as 
evidence of the elitist nature of the European project and a manifestation of the democratic deficit problem 
(McCormick, 141-149) described earlier. However, most mainstream European politicians seem committed 
to one degree or another to these causes, so workable solutions to these problems must be explored. 
 
13
 This idea is also inspired at least partly by the American government’s post-NAFTA trade adjustment 
assistance programs that are designed to help workers who can demonstrate that they have been displaced 
from their jobs due to increased free trade with Canada and Mexico (Baicker and Rehavi, 241-243).  
 
14
 Some individuals might contend that the evidence concerning the economic advantages of the single 
market have been public and well-known for a long time but that average Europeans simply do not learn 
much about what the European Union is or does. This knowledge deficit (McCormick, 136) issue has been 
a challenge for federalists and other pro-Europeanists for some time now, and is unlikely to be solved 
completely in the near future. 
 
15
 Please note that this endeavor’s contributions to the literature on worker migration more generally and 
the specific question of CEEC10 post-accession migration potential are discussed in the first main section 
of this chapter.  
 
16
 Although there is some doubt (McCormick, 145-146) that European voters pay much attention to what 
the EU does when they decide for whom to vote, the May 2010 election in the German state of North-
Rhine Westphalia provides evidence that they do care about that under certain circumstances (Kulish).  
 
17
 Another source of the apparent inconsistency between rhetoric and reality in this situation is related to 
the time horizons often placed on the policy of free worker migration. Generally, the idea of an open 
market for all of the means of production has been rhetorically placed in some far-distant perfect future 
when the benefits of that development can be enjoyed by all EU member-state citizens. As a politician, it is 
rather easy to be in favor of such a utopian notion. However, it is quite another matter for the individuals 
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who must pay the (hopefully short-term) costs of creating that market and facing their wrath at subsequent 
elections. Again, the divergence here does not indicate any sort of hypocrisy on the part of EU15 
politicians, but it does demonstrate the difference between the generally enjoyed benefits that support the 
single market scheme and the specific, directed and immediate costs of implementing it.  
 
18
 One might also be persuaded to understand this clash between reality and rhetoric as evidence of 
domestic-level interest group or ideological competition between the industries, organizations and political 
parties that would have benefited from an expanded single market and those that would have been harmed 
by it. A productive line of future research might include a comparative case study (possibly using polling 
data) between countries that activated and rejected the free labor mobility derogation in 2004 and 2007 to 
observe what sorts of differences might have led to the decisions that these countries made. 
 
19
 The two-level game idea may also allow one to hypothesize about the reasons for why the staff and 
leadership of the European Commission seem to be so rhetorically devoted to the free migration of workers 
but still develop programs to keep many of the workers who might benefit the most from that policy at 
home (e.g., special job training programs for particularly depressed regions; agricultural subsidies for small 
farmers). These programs may be a response to demands by member-state politicians who must assist their 
economically disadvantaged citizens in exchange for their votes and to demonstrate the utility of the EU to 
those voters (who will hopefully support their countries’ membership in that organization). Once again, a 
combination of specific incentives and the two-level game perspective could allow one to clarify an 
apparent contradiction between the behavior and statements of European policymakers. In fact, case study 
research should be undertaken in the future to determine whether this hypothesis is reasonable.  
 
20
 Many of the future research suggestions described in this section could apply equally well to the baseline 
systems model, but these proposed improvements are separated out here for expository purposes. 
 
21
 Given Iceland’s recent application for EU membership (BBC News 2010), there may be an even better 
reason to include this country in the statistical model’s data set (i.e., this action would avoid the double 
extrapolation problem inherent in the CEEC10 projections if one desired to forecast Iceland’s post-
accession worker movement). However, it should be omitted if one wanted to be totally consistent here 
with the practices adopted for predicting accession-state worker migration.  
 
22
 A follow-up study that would be interesting but problematic to complete would be to check the accuracy 
of the statistical model’s forecasts against the number of CEEC10 workers who have actually arrived in 
Germany (and the rest of the EU15 countries) since CEEC8 accession. While the migration data for 
Germany are available from the Statistisches Bundesamt (and for the EU15 countries from Eurostat), the 
problem is that the model is geared towards creating medium to long-term predictions. It has only been a 
few years since 2004, and it would be inappropriate to try to draw solid conclusions about its performance 
using the first few years of post-accession worker migration data regardless of what those results turned out 
to be.  
 
23
 Since Iceland is already part of the Schengen area (McCormick, 160; Poole, 163; Hailbronner, 73-74) 
and its economy is considerably more prosperous than those of the other current applicants, the 
implications of the next several sentences do not apply to that potential member state.  
 
24
 Another potential extension and improvement to this investigation would be to deal with the post-CEEC8 
deflection effect that altered the distribution of these countries’ worker migrants in the EU15 economies. 
Part of the literature review chapter of this study indicates that this phenomenon has been observed and 
some updated distribution numbers are available (Ruhs, 11; Boeri and Brücker 2005, 11, 14-16), but these 
figures are not reported for one particular base year currently. In order for this research augmentation to be 
accomplished, one would need to drop the assumption of a pre-accession knowledge base and gather 
consistent distribution data from post-2004 labor force survey and national census reports. This step would 
certainly be necessary if this study were to expand its concerns to individual member-state level worker 
migrant distributions, but it might also improve the overall EU15-level projections depending on how 
greatly the deflection effect attenuated the predominance of Germany as a migrant-destination country. 
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Obviously, the accuracy of that contention would not be known until after the forecasting period had 
expired, but it might be worthwhile to perform these alternative projections anyway as a comparison to the 
ones that are reported in this investigation.  
 
25
 Any model that tracks gross migration to and from receiver countries can be modified to follow both 
simultaneously. However, this alternative model would be constructed around the notion of gross rather 
than net migration, which is the reason for the language choice in this sentence. It should also be noted here 
that statistical models that use gross in and outmigration rates to and from the receiver countries as their 
dependent variables would be necessary to operationalize this systems model. In fact, some statistical 
modeling may be necessary to operationalize any of the new relationships described in this section of the 
conclusion. 
 
26
 One could also utilize age as an explanatory variable in the systems model to investigate the effects that 
aging societies have on economic growth, employment, and migration rates. The initial expectations of 
such a model would be that aging societies would have slower economic growth and a need to attract 
migrants to replace retiring native workers, but any comprehensive exploration of these ideas must await a 
future version of this research.  
 
27
 This argument ties into the “brain drain versus brain gain” or “brain circulation” debate (Straubhaar and 
Wolburg; Favell et. al., 11-13) referenced in the previous chapter’s baseline systems model new 
relationships discussion. These concepts should not be confused with “brain waste” (Brücker and 
Damelang, 30-31), which is when high-skill migrants take low-skill jobs in the receiver economy. 
Additionally, some low-skill migrants may be necessary to fill jobs that native workers will not accept for 
whatever reason (Massey et. al. 1998, 28-34). However, this extension of the present research is less 
interested in these workers than the highly-skilled ones and are left aside for the moment. 
 
28
 Even though this outlook is a highly Eurosceptical one and is not held by most members of the European 
public, the Eurosceptic position does manage to attract some electoral support, especially during votes for 
the European Parliament (Dinan 2005, 5, 271-272).   
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